Madhya Pradesh High Court
Raghvendra Rishiswar vs State Of M.P. on 4 December, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31519
1 WP-2777-2012
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
ON THE 4 th OF DECEMBER, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 2777 of 2012
RAGHVENDRA RISHISWAR
Versus
STATE OF M.P. AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Alok Katare - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri B.M. Patel - Government Advocate for the respondents/State.
ORDER
This petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been preferred seeking the following relief(s):
"(i) That, the present petition filed by the petitioner may kindly be allowed;
(ii) That, the order dated 26.11.2007 Annexure P/1 and the order dated 24.05.2008 Annexure P/2 passed by the respondents may kindly be directed to be quashed.
(iii) That, any other just, suitable and proper relief, which this Hon'ble Court deems fit, may also kindly be granted to the petitioner. Costs be also awarded in favour of the petitioner."
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that initially the petitioner was appointed on the post of Sub Inspector on 18.09.1992 and at the relevant point of time petitioner was posted as a Station House Officer, Police Station Piprai, District Ashoknagar, where a FIR was lodged by one Shivraj Singh that his minor daughter aged 14 years has been kidnapped by Chandrabhan. The petitioner being Station House Officer had arrested the Signature Not Verified Signed by: MONIKA SHARMA Signing time: 12/6/2025 11:16:53 AM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31519 2 WP-2777-2012 culprit and the case was registered under Section 363, 366, and 376 of IPC. The accused has committed suicide by hanging himself from the ventilator by tying his neck by the red shirt. Due to the aforesaid suicide, Merg No.4/2007 under Section 174 of CrPC was registered and due to the custodial death, enquiry was conducted by SDM, Mungaoli and in the inquiry, SDM found that there were no lapses on the part of the petitioner. Despite the aforesaid enquiry report, DIG, Gwalior Range, Gwalior issued a charge-sheet dated 09.04.2007. As per Police Regulation 228, Superintendent of Police alone is competent to issue the charge-sheet up to the rank of Inspector and the petitioner was Sub-Inspector, DIG is not empowered to issue the charge-sheet. The similar controversy involved in the present case has already been decided in the case of Arun Prakash Yadav Vs. State of M.P. and others reported in 2013(3) MPLJ 508 . On the basis of the aforesaid charge-sheet, The Enquiry Officer was appointed and no Presenting Officer was appointed and submitted that the Enquiry Officer himself acted as a Presenting Officer which is not permissible.
3 . Per contra, counsel appearing for the respondents has vehemently opposed the contentions and supported the impugned order stating that the petitioner who has participated in the departmental enquiry has never raised such objection before the authorities. It is only after conclusion of the departmental enquiry and passing of the punishment order, such objection was taken for the first time in this writ petition. It is argued that the interference with respect to departmental enquiry is limited to the extent that there cannot be any reappreciation of evidence at this stage. In this regard, Signature Not Verified Signed by: MONIKA SHARMA Signing time: 12/6/2025 11:16:53 AM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31519 3 WP-2777-2012 certain parameters have been provided in the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with respect to interference in the cases of departmental enquiry. Placing reliance upon the judgment passed in the case of Union of India and others vs. P. Gunasekaran reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 , he has prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
4. Heard. Having considered the rival submissions and on perusal of the record, it is found that the Inquiry Officer had admittedly cross examined the petitioner. The Supreme Court, in the case of Union of India and others vs. Ram Lakhan Sharma (2018) 7 SCC 670 has held as under:-
"31. A Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court speaking through Justice R.V. Raveendran, CJ (as he then was) had occasion to consider the question of vitiation of the inquiry when the Inquiry Officer starts himself acting as prosecutor in Union of India and ors. vs. Mohd. Naseem Siddiqui, ILR (2004) MP 821. In the above case the Court considered Rule 9(9) (c) of the Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968. The Division Bench while elaborating fundamental principles of natural justice enumerated the seven well recognised facets in paragraph 7 of the judgment which is to the following effect: "7. One of the fundamental principles of natural justice is that no man shall be a judge in his own cause. This principle consists of seven well recognised facets:
(i) The adjudicator shall be impartial and free from bias,
(ii) The adjudicator shall not be the prosecutor,
(iii) The complainant shall not be an adjudicator,
(iv) A witness cannot be the Adjudicator,
(v) The Adjudicator must not import his personal knowledge of the facts of the case while inquiring into charges,
(vi) The Adjudicator shall not decide on the dictates of his Superiors or others,
(vii) The Adjudicator shall decide the issue with reference to material on record and not reference to extraneous material or on extraneous considerations. If any one of these fundamental rules is breached, the inquiry will be vitiated."
32. The Division Bench further held that where the Inquiry Officer acts as Presenting Officer, bias can be presumed. In paragraph 9 is as follows:
"9. A domestic inquiry must be held by an unbiased person who is unconnected with the incident so that he can be impartial and objective in deciding the subject matters of inquiry. He should Signature Not Verified Signed by: MONIKA SHARMA Signing time: 12/6/2025 11:16:53 AM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31519 4 WP-2777-2012 have an open mind till the inquiry is completed and should neither act with bias nor give an impression of bias. Where the Inquiry Officer acts as the Presenting Officer, bias can be presumed. At all events, it clearly gives an impression of bias. An Inquiry Officer is in position of a Judge or Adjudicator. The Presenting Officer is in the position of a Prosecutor. If the Inquiry Officer acts as a Presenting Officer, then it would amount to Judge acting as the prosecutor. When the Inquiry Officer conducts the examination- in- chief of the prosecution witnesses and leads them through the facts so as to present the case of the disciplinary authority against the employee or cross- examines the delinquent employee or his witnesses to establish the case of the employer/disciplinary authority evidently, the Inquiry Officer cannot be said to have an open mind. The very fact that he presents the case of the employer and supports the case of the employer is sufficient to hold that the Inquiry Officer does not have an open mind."
33. The Division Bench after elaborately considering the issue summarised the principles in paragraph 16 which is to the following effect:
"16. We may summarise the principles thus:
(i) The Inquiry Officer, who is in the position of a Judge shall not act as a Presenting Officer, who is in the position of a prosecutor.
(ii) It is not necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to appoint a Presenting Officer in each and every inquiry. Non- appointment of a Presenting Officer, by itself will not vitiate the inquiry.
(iii) The Inquiry Officer, with a view to arrive at the truth or to obtain clarifications, can put questions to the prosecution witnesses as also the defence witnesses. In the absence of a Presenting Officer, if the Inquiry Officer puts any questions to the prosecution witnesses to elicit the facts, he should thereafter permit the delinquent employee to crossexamine such witnesses on those clarifications.
(iv) If the Inquiry Officer conducts a regular examination-in-chief by leading the prosecution witnesses through the prosecution case, or puts leading questions to the departmental witnesses pregnant with answers, or cross-examines the defence witnesses or puts suggestive questions to establish the prosecution case employee, the Inquiry Officer acts as prosecutor thereby vitiating the inquiry.
(v) As absence of a Presenting Officer by itself will not vitiate the inquiry and it is recognised that the Inquiry Officer can put questions to any or all witnesses to elicit the truth, the question whether an Inquiry Officer acted as a Presenting Officer, will have to be decided with reference to the manner in which the evidence is let in and recorded in the inquiry.
Whether an Inquiry Officer has merely acted only as an Inquiry Officer or has also acted as a Presenting Officer depends on the facts of each case. To avoid any allegations of bias and running the risk of inquiry being declared as illegal and vitiated, the present trend appears to be to invariably appoint Presenting Officers, except in simple cases. Be that as it may."
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34. We fully endorse the principles as enumerated above, however, the principles have to be carefully applied in facts situation of a particular case................................" xxxxx
36. Thus, the question as to whether Inquiry Officer who is supposed to act independently in an inquiry has acted as prosecutor or not is a question of fact which has to be decided on the facts and proceedings of particular case. In the present case we have noticed that the High Court had summoned the entire inquiry proceedings and after perusing the proceedings the High Court came to the conclusion that Inquiry Officer himself led the examination in chief of the prosecution witness by putting questions. The High Court further held that the Inquiry Officer acted himself as prosecutor and Judge in the said disciplinary enquiry. The above conclusion of the High Court has already been noticed from paragraphs 9 and 10 of the judgment of the High court giving rise to Civil Appeal No.2608 of 2012.
37. The High Court having come to the conclusion that Inquiry Officer has acted as prosecutor also, the capacity of independent adjudicator was lost which adversely affecting his independent role of adjudicator. In the circumstances, the principle of bias shall come into play and the High Court was right in setting aside the dismissal orders by giving liberty to the appellants to proceed with inquiry afresh. We make it clear that our observations as made above are in the facts of the present cases."
5. On perusal of the aforesaid decision, it would clearly reveal that an Inquiry Officer cannot play the role of a prosecutor and cross examine the delinquent employee, whereas, in the present case, as already observed, the petitioner has been elaborately cross-examined by the Inquiry officer, and in such circumstances, the petition deserves to be allowed on this ground only.
6. From the perusal of the aforesaid, it is apparently clear that the enquiry officer himself has acted as a prosecutor in the case and has cross- examined the witnesses which is not permissible in law. The aforesaid aspect was considered in the case of Ram Prakash Singh vs. State of M.P. and others, W.P.No.414 of 2002 decided on 16.11.2009 wherein the case of Union of India vs K.D. Pandey reported in (2002) 10 SCC 471 was taken Signature Not Verified Signed by: MONIKA SHARMA Signing time: 12/6/2025 11:16:53 AM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31519 6 WP-2777-2012 note of and it has been held as under :
"In the present case, no Presenting Officer was appointed by the disciplinary authority and the subsequent enquiry officer himself has acted as Presenting Officer, meaning thereby, as a prosecutor. The enquiry officer has handed over the written questionnaire to the witnesses and on the basis of written questionnaire, the enquiry has been concluded in the matter. ....
8. The Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs K.D. Pandey and another (2002) 10 SCC 471 in paragraph 5 has held as under -
5. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that in this case the Board had examined the material on record and come to the conclusion that four of the six charges could be proved on the available material, which had not been properly examined in the earlier inquiry. In fact from the order made by the Railway Board as well as from that part of the file where the inquiry report made earlier is discussed, it is clear that specific findings have been given in respect of each of the charges after discussing the matter and, if that is so, we fail to understand as to how there could have been a remit to the inquiry authority for further inquiry. Indeed this resulted in second inquiry and not in a further inquiry on the same set of charges and the material on record. If this process is allowed the inquiries can go on perpetually until the view of the inquiry authority is in accord with that of the disciplinary authority and it would be abuse of the process of law. In that view of the matter we think that the order made by the High Court affirming the order of the Tribunal is just and proper and, therefore, we decline to interfere with the same. The appeal is dismissed accordingly.
11. Keeping in view the aforesaid judgments, as it is evident in the present case that the enquiry officer has acted as a prosecutor in the subsequent enquiry conducted in the matter and therefore, the same deserves to be and is hereby quashed. Resultantly, the writ petition is allowed with the following directions :
(a) The impugned order of compulsory retirement dated 03.11.2001 and the order passed by the appellate authority dated 28.02.2002 are hereby quashed.
(b) The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner back in service forthwith. The respondents are directed to grant the consequential benefits to the petitioner i.e. annual increments, 50% back wages and subsequent promotions, in case any junior has been considered and promoted to the next higher post.
(c) The aforesaid exercise of granting back wages, notional fixation of salary, increments, consequential promotion, if any, shall be concluded within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order."
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7. The case of the petitioner herein is that the Presenting Officer was not appointed and Enquiry Officer has acted as Presenting Officer as he conducted cross-examination of petitioner as well as witnesses which is in violation of provisions of clause (c) of sub-rule (5) of Rule 14 of the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. The said issue has already been decided in the case of Ram Prakash Gaya Prashad v. State of M.P., 2008 (4) MPLJ 35, K.C. Bhargava v. State of M.P., 2012 (4) MPLJ 244 and judgment dated 19.6.2007 passed by this Court in W.P. No.5449/2006 (Abde Kasim Sheikh v. State of M.P.).
8. The similar is the situation in the present case. Therefore, the impugned order is unsustainable as the enquiry officer has acted as a prosecutor and cross-examined the prosecution witnesses.
9. The case of the petitioner is squarely covered by the judgment passed in the aforesaid cases. The counsel appearing for the respondents/State could not dispute the aforesaid fact and fairly submits that the enquiry officer himself has acted as a prosecutor in the matter and conducted the cross-examination of the witness which is not permissible.
10. It is settled position that as per Police Regulation 228, Superintendent of Police alone is competent to issue charge-sheet. This position has already been held in the judgments i.e. Arun Prakash Yadav (supra), R.K. Richhariya Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others (W.P.No.1509/2012 decided on 19.04.2023 at Principal Seat) and The State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Mahesh Kumar Bhargave (W.A.No.704/2014 decided on 14.09.2016 at Indore Bench).
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11. The Division Bench of this Court at Indore in the case of Mahesh Kumar Bhargave (supra) has held as under:
"6. That, the appeal has been filed on the ground that under Regulation 228 of the 'Regulation' in all cases of removal, compulsory retirement, reduction in rank and withdrawal of increment, the Inspector General of Police also competent to issue the charges.
Regulation 228 and 229 of the said Rules are reproduced as under:
228. D.E. - When and how held.- In every case of removal, compulsory retirement from service, reduction in rank, grade or pay or withholding of increment for a period in excess of one year a formal proceedings must be recorded by the Superintendent in the prescribed form, - setting forth].
(a) the charge;
(b) the evidence on which the charge is based'
(c) the defence of the accused;
(d) the statements of his witnesses (if any);
(e) the finding of the Superintendent, with the reasons on which it is based;
(f) the Superintendent's final order or recommendation, as the case may be;
Provided that it shall not be necessary to record a formal proceeding, if due to exigencies of serviced and not by reason of any misconduct or fault on his part, a police officer is transferred from a post carrying a specialist pay in the special Armed Force, Motor Transport or Radio Telegraphy sections to a post not carrying such pay and reduction in his pay is caused by reason of such transfer.
Note (1) If a written defence is tendered, it should be accepted and attached to the record.
Note (2) Reasonable time should, however, be given to the accused person to submit his written defence after the charge sheet is handed over to him.
Note (3) The traveling allowance of the defence witnesses shall be borne by the department. In order to facilitate the production of defence witnesses, the Inquiry Officer on the application of the accused should issue a notice to the defense witnesses to present themselves on the date so fixed. If the witnesses do not turn up after such notice, it shall be the responsibility of the accused to produce his own witnesses.
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229. D.E. - Final orders in. - If the Superintendent is empowered to pass the final order in the case, the papers will be filed in his office, a copy of the order being sent to be Deputy Inspector General with the monthly punishment return. In other cases they will be forwarded as follows:-
(a) Reduction in rank of an Assistant Sub-Inspector to the Deputy Inspectors General through the District Magistrate.
(b) All proposals for the dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement of an officer of and above the rank of Assistant Sub-Inspector should be forwarded to the proper authority though the District Magistrate except in cases where an officer is not serving in a district.
(c) In the case of transfer of an officer of or above the rank of Inspector, the Superintendent of Police should forward the District Magistrate's suggestion to the Deputy Inspector General of Police.
7. It is further submitted that is Inspector General of Police is the appointing authority of Inspector as per the Madhya Pradesh Police Recruitment Rules, 1997, therefore, he is competent to issue the charge-sheet.
8. Shri Mangal, learned Government Advocate for the appellant submits that the judgment passed in case of Arun Prakash Yadav (Supra) requires reconsideration as the scope of Regulation 229 has not been considered by the Division Bench where the Superintendent is empowered to pass the final order in certain cases and in other cases file would be sent to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, therefore, the Regulation 228 and 229 has to be read together and according to which, the Superintendent of Police alone is not competent to issue the charge-sheet, but Deputy Inspector General of Police can also issue a charge-sheet to the Inspector. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance over the judgment of this Court in case of State of M.P. Vs. Virendra Singh Gurjar, reported in 2015, SCC Online MP 5850 , in case of Shyambaboo Vs. State of M.P. , reported in 1987(2) MPWN 43 and in case of State of M.P. Vs. Shivaji Rao, reported in 1990(2), MPWN 172.
9. Per contra, Shri S.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent submits that however, the State Government is challenging the order passed in Arun Prakash Yadav (Supra) by way of SLP 820- 821/15 but vide order dated 01.12.2015 the SLP was dismissed and thereafter the review petition has also been dismissed, Signature Not Verified Signed by: MONIKA SHARMA Signing time: 12/6/2025 11:16:53 AM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31519 10 WP-2777-2012 therefore, the order passed in case of Arun Prakash Yadav (Supra) has attained finality and is not require to be reconsidered. He has further submitted that after passing the order in the case of Arun Prakash Yadav (Supra) , various writ appeals were filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh has been dismissed. One of the copy of order was passed in W.A.No.553/2013 dated 30.11.2015 is produced at the time of argument, therefore, no case is made out to interfere with the order of Single Judge in the present writ appeal.
10. In rejoinder, Shri Mangal submits that the SLP was dismissed in default because of non-compliance of the Court order and not on merits, therefore, it does not construe a binding precedent. In support of his plea, he has placed reliance over the judgment passed in case of Bhakra Beas Management Board Vs. Krishan Kumar Vij and Anr., reported in (2010) 8 SCC 701, therefore, this Court can reconsider the issue decided in the case of Arun Prakash Yadav (Supra).
11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
12. Though the writ Court has allowed the writ petition placing reliance over the judgment passed in Naresh Kumar Suryavanshi (Supra) and set-aside the chargesheet, but in case of Arun Prakash Yadav (Supra), the Division Bench on a reference has specifically held that the Superintendent of Police alone has been mentioned as authority to frame and issue the charge-sheet in respect of penalty or penalties. Para 19, 20, 21, 34 and 36 of the judgment passed in the case of Arun Prakash Yadav (Supra) is reproduced as below:
19. It would be appropriate at this stage to decipher the real intent and purport of the Regulation 228 for finding out as to whether any other authority superior or inferior in rank to SP can also exercise the power of issuance of charge-sheet against an Officer subordinate in rank to SP. For convenience, the relevant extract of the Regulation 228 is reproduced below:
228. D.E. - When and how held.- In every case of removal, compulsory retirement from service, reduction in rank, grade or pay or withholding of increment for a period in excess of one year a formal proceedings must be recorded by the Superintendent in the prescribed form, - setting forth].
(a) the charge;
(b) the evidence on which the charge is based'
(c) the defence of the accused;
(d) the statements of his witnesses (if any);
(e) the finding of the Superintendent, with the reasons on which it is based;
(f) the Superintendent's final order or recommendation, Signature Not Verified Signed by: MONIKA SHARMA Signing time: 12/6/2025 11:16:53 AM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31519 11 WP-2777-2012 as the case may be;
20. A bare reading of Regulation 228 indicates that Superintendent alone has been mentioned as the authority to frame and issue a charge-sheet in respect of major penalty or penalties which have the effect of major penalties. The term Superintendent means the Superintendent of Police, which is evident from Regulation 32 which describes the SP as the head of Police Force of his District. The Police Regulations do not prescribe the competence of any authority to issue a charge-sheet in any other provisions except Regulation 228, which solely empowers the SP. This power of issuance of charge-sheet is bestowed upon the SP in regard to all persons holding the ranks subordinate to that of the SP. By necessary implication, the provisions of Regulation 228 exclude all authorities, superior or inferior to the SP to issue a chargesheet to any Police personnel holding the rank subordinate to that of SP. It can, thus, be safely held that for an Inspector of Police, which in rank is subordinate to SP, the sole competent authority to issue charge-sheet is the SP under the Police Regulations, which exclusively govern the field as held supra.
21. From the above discussion, it is crystal clear that no other authority except SP is empowered under the Police Regulation to institute disciplinary proceedings/issue chargesheet to an Inspector of Police.
34. From the above conspectus of facts and law, it is evident that neither in the case of N.K. Pandey (supra) nor in the case of Dalchand Ahirwar (supra) the question of applicability or non-applicability of the Rules of 1966 was raised or considered by this Court for deciding the question of competence of the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against an Inspector of Police. Moreso, this Court in both these contrary decisions was not posed with, and, therefore, did not consider, the question as to whether mere declaration of the post of Inspector as Gazetted can induct by implication the post of Inspector into the Gazetted service constituted under the Gazetted Rules, without the said Rules being amended.
36. This bench, thus, answers the reframed question in the following manner:-
(i) An Inspector of Police while assailing the competence of authority to issue major penalty/charge-
sheet against him cannot avail induction into the Signature Not Verified Signed by: MONIKA SHARMA Signing time: 12/6/2025 11:16:53 AM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31519 12 WP-2777-2012 gazetted cadre constituted under the Gazetted Rules of 2000 merely because of being declared as Gazetted and being upgraded in the scale of pay of Rs.6500-10,500/-, unless the Gazetted Rules of 2000 are amended suitably.
(ii) For the purpose of deciding the competence of an authority to institute disciplinary proceedings/issuance of chargesheet against an Inspector of Police, the M.P. Police Regulations alone would apply to the exclusion of M.P. Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966.
(iii) As per Regulation 228 of Police Regulations, the Superintendent of Police alone is the competent authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings/issue charge-sheet for major penalties, against an Inspector of Police; and
(iv) Neither the decision rendered in the case of N.K.Pandey Vs. State of M.P., ILR (2011) MP 2168 nor the decision in the case of Dalchand Ahirwar Vs. State of M.P., ILR (2012) M.P. 902 lay down the correct law for deciding the question of competency of authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings/issue charge-sheet to an Inspector of Police.
13. In the present case, the impugned charge-sheet was issued by the DIG and the petitioner was holding the post of Inspector, therefore, the ratio laid down by the Division Bench in case of Arun Prakash Yadav (Supra) is fully applicable in the present case.
14. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is concerned about the applicability of Regulation 229, the Regulation 229 deals with the final orders after completion of the departmental enquiry. Under Regulation 229 if the Superintendent of Police is empowered to pass the final order in case of paper will be filed in his office, a copy of the order be sent to the DIG with the montly punishment return, therefore, the power to exercise the authority at the time of final order may be exercised by DIG but that stage would come at the time of passing of final order. But in the present case, the petitioner has challenged the charge-sheet on an issue under Regulation 228 by Superintendent of Police. Stage of issuance of charge-sheet is provided under Regulation 228 of the 'Rules of 1964' , where the Superintendent alone has been granted authority to issue the charge-sheet and conduct the departmental enquiry. Thereafter, under Sub-Regulation (f) of Regulation 228 , he is also competent to pass the final order or give a recommendation, as the case may be, therefore, in view of the above, since, the present case is at the Signature Not Verified Signed by: MONIKA SHARMA Signing time: 12/6/2025 11:16:53 AM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31519 13 WP-2777-2012 stage of issuance of charge-sheet, therefore, provision of Regulation 228 will alone apply.
15. In view of the law laid down in the case of Arun Prakash Yadav (Supra), the present case is examined independently within the scope of Regulation 228. The writ Court has not committed any error while quashing the charge-sheet, therefore, we do not find any ground to interfere with the order of learned Single Judge and do not find any ground to reconsider the judgment passed in case of Arun Prakash Yadav (Supra).
16. The present appeal is dismissed, however, the liberty granted by the writ Court to the competent authority to issue charge-sheet is maintained."
12. Considering the above, the impugned orders dated 26.11.2007 (Annexure P/1), 11.05.2008 (Annexure P/2) and charge-sheet dated 09.04.2007 (Annexure P/9) are hereby quashed. The petitioner is held to be entitled to get all consequential benefits. Petitioner is retired. Respondents are directed to revise the PPO and GPO and pay the arrears of pension, in accordance with law within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.
13. With the aforesaid, present petition stands disposed of.
14. All interlocutory applications, if any, are also disposed of.
(ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT) JUDGE Monika Signature Not Verified Signed by: MONIKA SHARMA Signing time: 12/6/2025 11:16:53 AM