Chattisgarh High Court
Rajkumar Dewangan vs State Of Chhattisgarh And Ors on 30 January, 2020
1
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
WP No.2135 of 2003
• Rajkumar Dewangan S/o K. B. L. Dewangan, aged about 34 years,
presently posted as Superintendent of Police at Korea (Chhattisgarh)
---- Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Chhattisgarh through the Principal Secretary, Department of
Home, D.K.S. Bhawan, Raipur (Chhattisgarh)
2. Director General of Police, Government of Chhattisgarh, Raipur (C.G.)
---- Respondents
For petitioner : Shri Prafull Bharat, Advocate For Respondent/State: Smt. Fouzia Mirza, Additional Advocate General S.B.: Hon'ble Shri Justice Manindra Mohan Shrivastava CAV Order 30/01/2020
1. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for expunging adverse remarks and strictures made against him by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sakti in its judgment dated 12-05-2003 passed in Sessions Trial No.166/1999.
2. On 02-02-1999, crime in Crime No.21/1999 was registered in Police Station, Baradwar on the allegation of commission of offence of dacoity, punishable under Section 395, 397 of IPC that cash of Rs.13,56,493/-, which was being carried from bank to destination towards distribution of salary to Teachers, was looted. The driver of the vehicle was injured by gun shot injury. Lakhan Lal, Chitrangan, Tosh Kumar and Mohit Ram were accused of commission of offence. Mohit Ram was involved on the allegation that he received the looted cash knowing fully well that it was looted. In the aforesaid trial, accused Lakhan Maina was convicted for commission of offence under 2 Section 394 and 397 of IPC and sentenced 10 years R.I. for each of the offences. Other accused Chitranjan, Tosh Kumar and Mohit Ram were acquitted from all the charges by giving them benefit of doubt. While disposing off the aforesaid criminal case, the learned Additional Sessions Judge made various observations commenting upon the conduct of the petitioner, who at the relevant time, was posted and working as Superintendent of Police, Janjgir-Champa. The learned trial Court, taking into consideration the statement of the prosecution witnesses that false evidence was created in respect of seizure of alleged looted cash, which was already recovered from the possession of other persons and further statement of the prosecution witnesses that instead of allowing appropriate seizure proceedings to be drawn from those persons from whom the cash amount was actually recovered, it was directed by the petitioner that the looted and recovered cash be kept in the malkhana and further proceedings to be drawn after return of Investigating Officer, Narendra Mishra from Bihar and thus, investigation was tainted due to such illegal acts. Various observations were recorded regarding conduct and forwarded a copy of the judgment to the Director General of Police and Secretary (Home) of the State for drawing appropriate proceedings for creating false evidence.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the observations, which have been made by the learned trial Court, while disposing off the criminal case, amount to passing serious strictures against the petitioner, who at that relevant time, was posted as Superintendent of Police, Janjgir-Champa, without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that while passing strictures against the petitioner, upon scrutiny of the evidence on record, the learned trial Court ignored that the petitioner was not a party in the said proceedings nor he appeared as a prosecution witness nor any notice was given to him to explain his conduct before passing strictures against him. Next submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the 3 learned trial Court relied upon the evidence of some of the prosecution witnesses, whose evidences were not reliable as such and also suffered from material discrepancies, in so far as they stated regarding the role played by the petitioner in the matter of drawing appropriate proceedings towards seizure of allegedly looted cash. He would argue that the petitioner was not the Investigating Officer and the investigation was being carried out by the Sub Inspector-Narendra Mishra. The petitioner did not in any manner interfere with the investigation and he did not even direct any police officer, much less, Investigating Officer or any other witnesses as to how looted and recovered cash is to be dealt with. He would argue that only on the basis of unreliable and shaky statement of the seizure witnesses, without any other documentary evidence of involvement of the petitioner in the investigation, the learned trial Court passed serious strictures that the petitioner was involved in creating false evidence of seizure of looted cash from persons other than those from whose possession, cash was actually recovered. It is further contended that irrespective of merits of the criminal case as to whether the evidence of recovery of cash is reliable or not, he would highlight that the role of the petitioner was not the subject matter of decision of the criminal case, because according to the prosecution, the accused persons had looted cash from Lorry, which was carrying cash from the bank. There is neither any allegation that the petitioner was involved in loot nor the petitioner was involved in the case as Investigating Officer nor there is any material to show that the petitioner was directly monitoring or supervising the investigation or that he himself kept cash, which was brought to the police station and thereafter, before him or on his instructions, proceedings were drawn in respect of looted cash. Therefore, the learned trial Court had no occasion to discuss the conduct of the petitioner as it was not at all necessary nor integrally connected with the case. Therefore, it is argued, the stricture passed against the petitioner is illegal and unsustainable in 4 law. In support of his argument, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decisions in the case of State of U.P. vs. Mohammad Naim, AIR 1964 SC 703, Manish Dixit and others vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2001 SC 93, Prakash Singh Teji vs. Northern India Goods Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Another, (2009) 12 SCC 577 and Om Prakash Chautala vs. Kanwar Bhan and others, (2014)5 SCC 417.
4. Per contra, learned State counsel submitted that in the present case, the learned trial Court, while scrutinizing the evidence led by the prosecution, particularly the evidence with regard to seizure of looted cash, considered the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and in view of what was stated by the prosecution witnesses, the learned trial Court recorded a finding with regard to the guilt of the accused in trial. Except, Lakhan Maina, all other accused were acquitted by giving them benefit of doubt. The learned trial Court reached to the conclusion that the Investigating Officer-Narendra Mishra prepared false seizure documents showing seizure of Rs.1,95,000/- from accused Lakhan Maina, whereas witnesses have stated that this cash amount was already recovered from the mother of the accused-Lakhan on 03-02-1999 and thereafter, it was kept with Narendra Mishra and later on, false seizure from accused-Lakhan Maina was prepared on 07-02-1999. The learned trial Court also reached to the conclusion that the memorandum of seizure of cash of Rs.5,60,000/- was also falsely prepared, which was already recovered on the memorandum of wife of Mohit Ram, from the house of Manharan Chandra. Similarly, other cash amount, which was found in possession of different persons, were not seized by drawing appropriate proceedings from those persons, but were falsely stated to be recovered from Lakhan on subsequent dates. Learned State counsel further highlighted that the prosecution witnesses stated during trial that the cash amount, which were collected from different places, were kept without drawing seizure proceedings i.e. preparation of seizure memo and the petitioner directed 5 entire cash amount to be kept with Sub Inspector-Narendra Mishra. Even though, it was brought to the notice of the petitioner, the petitioner did not allow proceedings to be drawn during investigation and directed entire cash to be handed over to Narendra Mishra. Therefore, observations made by the learned trial Court with regard to conduct of the petitioner, a senior Police Officer and role played by him in creating false evidence is not only integral part of the case, but without such finding, the criminal case could not be decided. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses fully justifies recording of such observations. It is lastly submitted that the learned trial Court itself has clearly stated in its order that it is not recording any specific finding on the role of the petitioner as he not been put to the notice, all the observations made in the order, are only for the purposes of prima facie consideration as to why cases is being referred for proper enquiry on the conduct of the petitioner by higher Police Officer. In view of the such observations made in para 81 of the judgment, remarks cannot be assailed on the ground that the principles of natural justice have been violated. In support of this argument, learned State counsel placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of W.B. vs. Mir Mohammad Omar and others, (2000) 8 SCC 382.
5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, record of the case has been perused. Along with the petition, judgment of the trial Court as also the statement of the witnesses have also been placed for perusal of the Court.
6. A perusal of the judgment dated 12-05-2003 passed by the learned trial Court in Sessions Trial No.166/1999 reveals that the accused persons in that case were tried for commission of offence under Section 395 & 397 of IPC and other offences on the allegation that huge amount of cash, which was being transported from bank to other destination for distribution of salary to the teachers, was looted during transit by the accused and there was also an allegation that the driver was injured by gun shot injury. As in cases of loot and 6 dacoity, the evidence of identification and recovery of looted article are most important amongst other incriminating evidence, the learned trial Court scrutinized the evidence of prosecution witnesses with regard to alleged recovery of looted cash. In paras 27 to 38, the learned trial Court has recorded a finding based on the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, Shiv Shankar Baghel, PW-33, who prepared memorandum documents, in which, he has admitted that Narendra Mishra prepared seizure memo on 07-02-1999 showing recovery of Rs.1,95,000/- from the accused Lakhan Maina, whereas according to this witness, this cash amount was already recovered by Narendra Mishra in presence of other witness, on 03-02-1999, from the mother of the accused- Lakhan Maina and kept in the police station. It was further recorded that the aforesaid statement of Shiv Shankar Baghel was corroborated from the statement of another prosecution witnesses Swaynwar Singh, PW-7, who also stated regarding recovery of part of looted cash from the possession of mother of Lakhan Maina on 03-02-1999. The learned trial Court further took into consideration evidence of another prosecution witness A. Sai Manohar, PW-65, who has admitted that though, cash was seized by Narendra Mishra, he had not prepared any memorandum statement and seizure of cash was later on shown to be seized on 07-02-1999, whereas, Rs.1,95,000/- was already recovered from the possession of mother of Laxman Maina. Further, this witness also stated that on 07-02-1999, Rs.20,000/- was seized from the possession of Badha Ram Maina and all the documents of memorandum and seizure were prepared subsequently. This witness also stated that even before 07-02-1999, Rs.5,60,000/- were recovered from one of the accused Manharan Chandra on the disclosure made by wife of one of the accused Mohit Ram, but again false memorandum was prepared, which did not disclose the aforesaid true facts. The learned trial Court on the basis of evidence of false seizure held prosecution story with regard to recovery of Rs5,60,000/- from the possession of Mohit Ram, 7 seizure of Rs.30,000/- from Tiharin Bai and seizure of Rs.20,000/- from Badha Ram highly doubtful. The evidence of Swyanwar Singh, PW-7, Nand Kumar Chandra, PW-26, Sadhna Singh, PW-15 were also scrutinized and observed that the version of the prosecution that recovery of cash was made on 07-02-1999 was doubtful because when the cash amount, which was recovered from the different persons, was brought before the Superintendent of Police, even before preparation of memorandum statement, the Superintendent of Police did not direct appropriate seizure proceedings to be drawn showing recovery of cash from the persons, from whose possession, cash amount was found. He directed that no proceedings of seizure be drawn and the cash amount be handed over to the Investigating officer, Narendra Mishra, upon his return. On such findings, the learned trial Court entertained doubt with regard to recording of memorandum statement and recovery of cash of Rs.5,60,000/- from one of the accused-Mohit Ram. Thus, Mohit Ram was given benefit of doubt because of discrepancies, therefore, the learned trial Court had to acquit Mohit Ram and Badha Ram.
7. The conduct of the petitioner was a matter of discussion by the learned trial Court in the course of scrutiny of evidence of witnesses of memorandum and seizure. In fact, criminal case was registered against the Investigating Officer, Narendra Mishra, which is clear from the judgment of the learned trial Court itself.
8. In view of the aforesaid evidence, which had come on record, the learned trial Court had to make certain observations with regard to the conduct of the petitioner. In para 81 of the judgment, the learned trial Court recorded that as the petitioner, the then Superintendent of Police, has not been afforded any opportunity of hearing, therefore, it would not be proper to pass any stricture against him, but at the same time, looking to his overall conduct and the manner, in which, he himself directed investigation and did not allow seizure 8 proceedings to be drawn from those persons, from whom, cash was actually seized and thereby, creation of false evidence by directing cash amount to be handed over to Mr. Narendra Mishra, an enquiry was necessary. Further, in para 83, the learned trial Court further observed that without making any unnecessary comment, it considers it proper to direct the Home Secretary to cause enquiry held against the petitioner by a Gazetted Officer. In para 84 & 85 of the judgment, the learned trial Court directed copy of the order be forwarded to the Home Secretary and Director General of Police, Government of Chhattisgarh to hold enquiry and if upon such enquiry, the petitioner is found guilty in any criminal act, take necessary action in the matter in accordance with the rules.
9. Though, the learned trial Court has recorded in para 81 & 83 of the judgment that it is not going to record any specific stricture against the officer, because he has not been given any opportunity of hearing and it would be proper that the enquiry is to be made by the government, this Court finds that various observations made in the judgment including those, which have been made in paras 80 to 82, constitute stricture against the petitioner. This is clear from following observations made in various paras of the judgment dated 12-05-2003:-
-++ 26- Þbl izdj.k esa vUos".k dks rRdkyhu iqfyl v/kh{kd jktdqekj nsokaxu vkSj rRdkyhu Fkkuk izHkkjh ujsUnz feJk }kjk xEHkhj :i ls fod`r dj fn;k x;k gS vkSj fod`r vkSj fu/kkZfjr izfd;kvksa dk ikyu ugh djrs gq;s euekus <ax ls vUos".k fd;k x;k gS vkSj ;g rF; vfHk;kstu lkf{k;ksas ds dFku ls izdV gqvk gS k & & xx & & 65- ÞvUos".kvf/kdkjh ujsUnz feJk vkSj rRdkyhu iqfyl v/kh{kd jktdqekj nsokaxu us eseksjs.Me vkSj tIrh dks iw.kZ :i ls fod`r ] vfo'oluh; vkSj feF;k lk{; x<rs gq;s eseksjs.Me vkSj tIrh cukus dk iz;kl fd;k gS kÞ & & xx & & 80 Þbl izdj.k esa rRdkyhu iqfyl v/kh{kd jktdqekj nsokaxu ds }kjk vkSj ujsUnz feJk rRdkyhu Fkkuk izHkkjh }kjk foospuk essa lk{; dks fod`r fd;s tkus] jkf'k dh tIrh gksus ds ckn Hkh mldk iapukek ugh cuk;k tkuk] 9 jkstukepk dh izfr QkM+ fn;s tkus vkSj feF;k :i ls eseksjs.Me c;ku rS;kj dj lk{; dks feF;k :i ls x<rs gq;s tIrh iapukek cuk;s tkus ds xEHkhj fdLe dh lk{; dks fod`r djus dk iz;kl] bl izdj.k essa lk{; dks foyksfir djus ,oa lk{; dks fod`r djus dh dksf'k'k dh xbZ ftlls izdj.k xEHkhj :i ls izHkkfor gqvk gS kÞ The opening remarks made in para 81 of the judgment were as below:-
-++ 81- Þbl izdj.k esa D;ksafd jktdqekj nsokaxu rRdkyhu iqfyl v/kh{kd dks U;k;ky; esas lquokbZ dk volj ugh fn;k x;k gS] blfy;s muds d`R; ds ckjsa esa] fdlh izdkj dh fuankRed fVIi.kh fd;k tkuk mfpr ugh gS Þ & & xx & & But, thereafter, following remarks were specifically recorded by the learned trial Court:-
-++ 81- & & xx & & Þiqfyl v/kh{kd jktdqekj nsokaxu us gh tc Loa;oj flag vkSj lk/kuk flag us y[ku eSuk dh eka ls 1]95]000 :i;s eksfgr jke ds ?kj ls 5]60]000 :i;s rFkk ujs'k mQZ uudk"}kjk frgkfju ckbZ ds crk;s vuqlkj 50]000 :i;s fn;s tk pqds Fks] ml jkf'k dks Hkh lk/kuk flag }kjk ykdj fn;s tkus ds ckotwn Hkh ftu O;fDr;kssa ds ikl ls jkf'k ykbZ xbZ Fkh] mlls tIrh u cuk;k tkuk vkSj ykbZ xbZ jkf'k dks iqu% iqfyl ds eky[kkus es ys tkdj j[k nsuk vkSj vfHk;qDrksa ls feF;k :i ls lk{; x<rs gq;s tIrh;ka cukbZ tkuk ,d xEHkhj fdLe dh vijkf/kd izo`fRr dks nZf'kr djrh gS k blls foospuk izHkkfor gqbZ] ftldk ykHk vfHk;qDr eksfgr jke dks izkIr gqvk SÞ In para 82 also, following serious comments/observations were made:-
-++ 82- ÞrRdkyhu iqfyl v/kh{kd jktdqekj nsokaxu dk vkpj.k bl izdj.k esa vR;Ur gh lansgkLin gS vkSj lk{; dks u"V] fod`r ,oa foyksfir djus tSlk d`R; gS k mudh mifLFkrh esa jkf'k;ka cjken dj ykbZ xbZ Fkh] blds ckotwn Hkh lEiw.kZ dk;Zokgh dh tkudkjh iqfyl dks gksus ds ckn Hkh tIrh ugh cukbZ xbZ vkSj feF;k :i ls lk{; dks x<us tSlk d`R; fd;k x;k gSkS Þ Again, in para 83, it was written, as below:-
-++ 83- bu lkjh ifjfLFkfr;ksa ds dkj.k] U;k;ky; fcuk fdlh vuko';d fVIi.kh ds bl izdj.k ds lac/k esa rRdkyhu iqfyl v/kh{kd jktdqekj nsokaxu ds ckjs esa x`g lfpo dks fdlh l{ke drZO;fu"V jktif++=r vf/kdkjh ls i`Fkd ls tkap djkdj dk;Zokgh djus dk funsZ'k nsuk mfpr le>rh gSkS Þ 10
10. From cumulative reading of the relevant excerpts contained in different paras of the judgment of the learned trial Court, it is clear that the learned trial Court, though made observation that it is not passing any stricture or recording any adverse remarks, the observations, as have actually been made, referred to hereinabove, did constitute serious strictures against the petitioner. In para 81 of the judgment, it has also been observed that the conduct of the petitioner reflects criminal mentality. Therefore, it cannot be said that the learned trial Court only made passing observations and did not record any strictures and adverse remarks against the petitioner.
11. At this juncture, it is relevant to examine the legal position with regard to authority of the Court to pass strictures and also the permissible grounds, on which, strictures could be challenged and the considerations, which should weigh with the Court to decide whether strictures should be expunged or allowed to remain.
12 In one of its earliest judgment, the Supreme Court in the case of Mohammad Naim (supra), examined legal position and held that though, the jurisdiction of the Court to expunge remarks is of exceptional nature and it is to be exercised in most exceptional case only, it is open for the High Court to expunge remarks from the judgment in order to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of the process of the court. In the aforesaid judgment, the Supreme Court held thus:-
9. ----- xxx ----
"The position as to case-law now seems to be that except for a somewhat restricted view taken by the Bombay High Court, the other High Courts have taken the view that though the jurisdiction is of an exceptional nature and is to be exercised in most exceptional cases only, it is undoubtedly open to the High Court to expunge remarks from a judgment in order to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of the process of the court [see Emperor v. Ch. Mohd. Hassan AIR 1943 Lah 298 ; State v. Chhotay Lal, 1955 ALL LJ 240; Lalit Kumar v. S. S. Bose AIR 1957 ALL 398; S.Lal Singh v. State AIR 1959 Punj 211; Ram Sagar Singh v. Chandrika Singh (AIR 1961 Pat 364); and In re Ramaswami AIR 1958 Mad
305). The view taken in the Bombay High Court is that the High Court has no jurisdiction to expunge passages from the judgment of an inferior court which has not been brought before it in regular appeal or revision; but an 11 application under s. 561-A CrP C is maintainable and in a proper case the High Court has inherent jurisdiction, even though no appeal or revision is preferred to it, to correct judicially the observations made by pointing out that they were not justified, or were without foundation, or were wholly wrong or improper I see HYPERLINK "https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1067971/"State v. Nilkanth Shripad Bhave ILR (1954) Bom 148; AIR 1954 Bom 65)."
----- xxx -----
13. In later part of the said judgment, the Supreme Court, while emphasizing upon cardinal principle of independence of Judges and Magistrates in administration of justice also laid down relevant considerations while dealing with such case of strictures/adverse remarks made by the Judges and Magistrates in judicial disposition. It was authoritatively pronounced thus:-
10. ---- xxx ----
"If there is one principle of cardinal importance in the administration of justice, it is this : the proper freedom and independence of judges and Magistrates must be maintained and they must be allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly and without undue interference by any body, even by this court. At the same time it is equally necessary that in expressing their opinions judges and Magistrates must be guided by considerations of justice, fairplay and restraint. It is not infrequent that sweeping generalisations defeat the very purpose for which they are made. It has been judicially recognised that in the matter of making disparaging remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is relevant to consider (a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself ;
(b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks ; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also been recognised that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature, and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve."
14. On facts, in the aforesaid case, it was found that general observations against the entire police force of the State were made which were considered to be unwarranted, lacking in material and not necessary for decision of the case.
15. Three relevant considerations, while dealing with the case of strictures/adverse remarks made by the Judges, Magistrates in judicial disposition against the subordinates or any other persons laid down in the case of Mohammad Naim (supra) has held the field and made basis to determine 12 the issue as to whether adverse remarks/strictures are required to be expunged, in Jage Ram vs. Hans Raj Midha, (1972)1 SCC 181, R. K. Lakshmanan vs. A. K. Srinivasan, (1975) 2 SCC 466, Niranjan Patnaik vs. Sashibhusan Kar, (1986) 2 SCC 569, Dilip Kumar Deka vs. State of Assam, 1996 (6) SCC 234, State of W.B. vs. Mir Mohammad Omar and others, AIR 2000 SC 2988, Manish Dixit and others vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2001 SC 1993, In the matter of: 'K' A Judicial Officer, 2001 (3) SCC 54, State of W.B. vs. Babu Chakraborthy, (2004) 12 SCC 201, Prakash Singh Teji vs. Northern India Goods Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Another, (2009) 12 SCC 577 and Om Prakash Chautala vs. Kanwar Bhan and others, 2014(5)SCC 417. In all these decisions, three tests laid down in the case of Mohd. Naim (supra) were applied.
16. I have taken into consideration, hereinabove, the material evidence led by the prosecution and the statement of prosecution witnesses regarding conduct of the present petitioner. Therefore, it is amply clear from the nature of accusation in the criminal case and the evidence led by the prosecution to prove guilt of the accused that the learned trial Court, while scrutinizing the evidence with regard to proof of seizure of looted cash, was necessarily required to assess evidence as to whether the prosecution had succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt that looted cash was recovered on the basis of disclosure statement given by the accused. Statement of the witnesses that the part of looted cash was already recovered from different persons even prior to recording disclosure statements of some of the accused and that when such recovered cash was taken before the petitioner, the petitioner asked the cash to be handed over to Narendra Mishra, without allowing due proceedings to be recorded that it was actually recovered from the persons other than the accused, can also not be said to be uncalled for. It was indeed necessary for the decision of the case as integral part thereof to animadvert on that conduct. 13
17. But, despite the strictures made by the learned trial Court passing the two tests, out of three tests laid down in plethora of decisions as noted above, it has failed to satisfy requirement of affording of opportunity of hearing to the petitioner-a police officer, before making such serious observations/strictures against him. I have highlighted hereinabove, with specific reference to the paras of the judgment of the learned trial Court that even though, the learned trial Court began with caveat that it is not passing any strictures as Officer has not been afforded opportunity of hearing, before and after that, in the judgment, there are actually serious strictures against the petitioner. Invariably, in those cases, where it has been found that the Judicial Officer or Police Officer or Investigating Authority or any other authority or any other person was not afforded opportunity of hearing before passing strictures, such strictures have been held to be unsustainable in law only on that count, irrespective of whether the strictures passes other two tests.
18. In the case of Dilip Kumar Deka (supra), after referring to authorities in the case of State of U.P. vs. Mohd. Naim (supra), Jage Ram (supra), R. K. Lakshmanan (supra), Niranjan Patnaik (supra), the Supreme Court reiterated that affording of opportunity of hearing was necessary in following words:-
7. "We are surprised to find that in spite of the above catena of decisions of this Court, the learned Judge did not, before making the remarks, give any opportunity to the appellants, who were admittedly not parties to the revision petition, to defend themselves. It cannot be gainsaid that the nature of remarks the learned Judge has made, has cast a serious aspersion on the appellants affecting their character and reputation and may, ultimately affect their career also. Condemnation of the appellants without giving them an opportunity of being heard was a complete negation of the fundamental principle of natural justice."
19. In a subsequent decision in the case of Manish Dixit (supra) also, non affording opportunity of hearing before passing stricture was held to render the stricture unsustainable in law and it was observed thus:-
43. "Even those apart, this Court has repeatedly cautioned that before any castigating remarks are made by the court against any person, particularly when such remarks could ensue serious consequences on the future career 14 of the person concerned he should have been given an opportunity of being heard in the matter in respect of the proposed remarks or strictures. Such an opportunity is the basic requirement, for, otherwise the offending remarks would be in violation of the principles of natural justice. In this case such an opportunity was not given to PW-30 (Devendra Kumar Sharma). [(State of U.P. vs. Mohd. Naim {1964 (2) SCR 363} (AIR 1964 SC 703: 1964 (1) Cr.L.J.549), Ch. Jage Ram vs. Hans Raj Midha {1972 (1) SCC 181}, AIR 1972 SC 1140: 1972 CriL.J. 768), R.K. Lakshmanan vs. A.K. Srinivasan {1975(2) SCC 466}, AIR 1975 SC 1741: 1975 Cri.L.J.1545), Niranjan Patnaik vs. Sashibhusan Kar {1986 (2) SCC 569}, AIR 1986 SC 819, 1986 Cri.L.J. 911): State of Karnataka vs. Registrar General {2000 (5) Scale 504} ( 2000 AIR SCW 2794 : AIR 2000 SC 2626)."
20. Studied scrutiny of the material on record and application of principles of law propounded in the decisions referred to hereinabove, leads to inevitable conclusion that the observations made by the learned trial Court in respect of the petitioner, constitute serious remarks on his conduct and such strictures could not be made without affording him any opportunity of hearing, even if I have to accept that there is evidence on record to justify such conclusion bearing on that conduct and that it was necessary for the decision of the case as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct.
21. All the adverse structures and remarks made against the petitioner are therefore, expunged. I have make it clear that direction of the learned trial Court to the competent authorities to enquire into the matter is not being interfered with, because such direction is within the authority of the Court.
22. In the result, the petition is allowed.
SD/-
(Manindra Mohan Shrivastava) JUDGE Tumane