Allahabad High Court
Banshi Deceased Now Kallu And 3 Others vs State Of U.P. on 20 July, 2022
Author: Alok Mathur
Bench: Alok Mathur
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH Reserved on 1.6.2022 Delivered on 20.07.2022 Case :- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 70 of 2001 Appellant :- Banshi Deceased Now Kallu, Ram Autar, Ram Prasad and Smt. Pyara Devi Respondent :- State of U.P. Counsel for Appellant :- M.P.Yadav,M.K.Misra,Prem Shankar Pandey,R.K.Shukla,Ranjan Shukla,Salil Kumar Srivastava Counsel for Respondent :- Govt.Advocate,Prem Shanker Pandey Hon'ble Alok Mathur, J.
1. This criminal appeal is directed against the judgment of the trial court dated 30.1.2001 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Sitapur thereby convicting the appellants under Sections 498A, 304 B of IPC and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and sentencing them seven years' rigorous imprisonment for the offences punishable under Section 304 B I.P.C.
2. During pendency of this appeal, as per the report of the Chief Judicial Magistrate concerned dated 9.8.2017 and 9.9.2021 appellant No. 1 Banshi and appellant No.5 Smt. Pyara Devi respectively have died. The appeal in respect of them, therefore, abates. The appeal now proceeds in respect of three appellants only i.e. Kallu, Ram Autar and Ram Prasad all sons of Banshi.
3. Kallu (accused) was married to the deceased (Phoolmati) about one year before the incident. The deceased has informed her mother about the demand of dowry by her in-laws and that in case dowry was not given she would be killed. On the date of the incident the deceased was found burning inside her house and when the fire was doused by the villagers, she was found to have suffered serious burn injuries. The F.I.R. was lodged three days subsequently.
4. Sri Ranjan Shukla, learned Counsel for the appellants has submitted that there was delay in lodging the first information report which has not been explained and also that initially a written complaint was handed over by the father of the deceased to the police on the date of the incident, where there was no mention with regard to demand of dowry, and it was only an afterthought, and this fact was incorporated in the First information report which was lodged 3 days after the incident, and hence the version of the prosecution cannot be relied upon. It has further been submitted that even according to the testimony of the Tulsi (PW1), there was no allegation with regards to demand of dowry, as he had himself offered to give certain items in the marriage, and further that his wife (PW2) had never informed him (PW1) about the fact that his daughter had told her mother that she was being harassed and tortured by her in laws. In light of the above facts, it has been submitted that ingredients of section 304 B IPC are not made out, and the solitary testimony of the mother of the deceased, without any corroboration, cannot be relied upon to bring home the charge of demand of dowry and harassment.
5. The second point urged by the learned counsel for the appellants is that as per the post mortem report the doctor has opined that there was smell of kerosene coming out of the hair of the deceased , but the Doctor who conducted the post mortem was not examined hence, the post mortem report having not been proved could not be relied upon.
6. Lastly, it was submitted that there is no evidence suggesting that there was either demand of dowry immediately preceding the incident, nor is there any evidence of cruelty having been meted out to the deceased by the accused. The appellants have relied upon the evidence of DW 1, to canvass their submission that the death of the deceased was due to accident, and no contrary evidence having been led by the prosecution, and rejecting the testimony of DW 1, by the trial Court, without giving any reason, the order of conviction is illegal, arbitrary, perverse and deserves to be set aside.
7. According to the prosecution, the complainant Tulsi Pasi (PW1) had married his daughter Phoolmati (deceased) with the accused Kalloo (accused) of Village Lauli, police Station Sandhna, District Sitapur about one year before her death. He had promised to give a watch and a cycle in the marriage but due to poverty, he could not give these articles. The deceased told her father (PW1) that her father-in-law Bansi (Accused no.1), mother-in-law-Smt. Pyara Devi (Accused no.5) and husband Kallu (Accused NO.2) reminded/castigated her for not bringing the watch and the cycle. Accused no. 4. Ram Prasad alias Sipahi, who was the younger brother-in-law and accused Ram Autar (Accused no.3) who was the elder brother of her husband were also castigating her on the same account. The complainant pacified the accused persons and promised to give the watch and cycle.
8. In the morning of 11.4.1994, the complainant was informed in his village by a Home-guard that his daughter had died of burn injuries. On this information, the complainant along with his son, wife and other villagers came to village Lauli where he saw that the dead body had been sealed by the police. He, thereafter, took the dead body of his daughter from post mortem house at Sitapur and took it to his house.
9. According to the complainant his daughter was set on fire by the accused in the evening of 10.4.1994 on account of non fulfillment of their demand for dowry.
10. The complainant got the report of the incident written from Murlidhar Shukla of Sandhna and gave it at the police station where on the basis of this written report, the F.I.R. was lodged on 13.4.1994 at 3.30 p.m.
11. About the death of Smt. Phoolmati, accused Bansi Pasi gave an information in writing at police station Sandhna in the morning of 11.4.1994 which was entered at G. D. no.5 at 4.30 a.m.
12. The accused were charged under Section 304-B of the I.P.C. on 24.4.1996 and an additional charge under Section 498A of the I.P.C. and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act was framed against them.
13. During the trial the prosecution had produced 3 witnesses namely Tulsi (PW1)- the father of the deceased, Sumitra (PW2) - mother of the deceased, Ved Prakash Singh (PW3) - the Investigating officer while the defense had produced a solitary witness Rajoo(DW1).
14. The trial court while convicting the accused has returned a finding that the death of the deceased was not due to any accident but kerosene oil was poured upon her body and then the fire was lit. The deceased had died within 7 years of her marriage, under circumstances which were other than normal, and she was subjected to cruelty by the accused which was in connection with the demand of dowry. Relying upon the post mortem report, it was said that smell of kerosene oil was present in the hair, and hence all the ingredients of section 304-B of the IPC stood fulfilled, leading to the conviction of all the accused.
15. I have heard the learned Counsels for the parties and perused the record. The appellants who is the husband of the deceased has been tried under sections 304 B and 498A of I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition act.
16. For examining the case of the prosecution and the evidence adduced by the accused, we may extract below the relevant provision of Section 304B IPC that relates to "dowry death": -
"304B Dowry Death - (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation.--For the purpose of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life."
15. As can be seen from the aforesaid provision, for convicting the accused for an offence punishable under Section 304 B IPC, the following pre-requisites must be met:-
"(i) that the death of a woman must have been caused by burns or bodily injury or occured otherwise than under normal circumstance;
(ii) that such a death must have occurred within a period of seven years of her marriage;
(iii) that the woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment at the hands of her husband, soon before her death; and
(iv) that such a cruelty or harassment must have been for or related to any demand for dowry."
16. Coming next to Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the same refers to a presumption relating to a dowry death and is phrased as below:-
"113B. Presumption as to dowry death -
When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death."
17. The import of the aforesaid provisions has been explained in several decisions of this Court. In Bansi Lal vs. State of Haryana (2011) 11 SCC 359, it has been held that:
"17. While considering the case under Section 498-A ( Section 304-B), cruelty has to be proved during the close proximity of time of death and it should be continuous and such continuous harassment, physical or mental, by the accused should make life of the deceased miserable which may force her to commit suicide."
18. In Maya Devi and Anr. vs. State of Haryana (2015) 17 SCC 405, it was held that:-
"23. To attract the provisions of Section 304-B, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that "soon before her death" she was subjected to cruelty or harassment "for, or in connection with the demand for dowry". The expression "soon before her death" used in Section 304-IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. In fact, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that there is no proximity for the alleged demand of dowry and harassment. With regard to the said claim, we shall advert to while considering the evidence led in by the prosecution. Though the language used is "soon before her death", no definite period has been enacted and the expression "soon before her death" has not been defined in both the enactments. Accordingly, the determination of the period which can come within the term "soon before her death" is to be determined by the courts, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. However, the said expression would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question.
19. In other words, there must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the women concerned, it would be of no consequence."
20. In light of the aforesaid legal proposition now we proceed to examine the evidence which has come on record.
21. To Consider whether the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment, related to the demand of dowry prior to the death, the father of the deceased, Tulsi was examined as P.W.1. He in his examination in chief has stated that his daughter was married to accused Kalloo son of Bansi nearly one year prior to the incident. Tulsi had himself offered to give watch and cycle in the marriage but due to poverty he could not do so. He has further stated that, not being able to fulfill the commitments made during the marriage, the accused, mother - in- law, father-in-law and husband used to harass and taunt his daughter and used to tell her that her father had promised to give the said goods which have not been given. It has also been stated by him that the mother in law of the deceased as well as elder brother Ram Autar used to harass and taunt her for the same.
22. During cross-examination he stated that firstly he had himself volunteered to give watch and cycle as dowry, and that he used to go to the house of the accused to accompany his daughter whenever his daughter used to visit their house. He has further stated that the deceased never informed him about the cruelty or harassment meted out by her in-laws, but this was told to him by his wife. Sumitra (PW2), the mother of the deceased has clearly stated that there was a demand of dowry by the accused Kallu on the occasion of "Kalva" she also stated that whenever the deceased to visit her she told her in case dowry is not given, the accused would kill her.
23. Sumitra, PW2, is the only witness to whom the deceased is said to have communicated about the demand of dowry as well as about the threat to her life. It is surprising that such a serious issue was never discussed with her husband (PW1). PW2 has admitted that she never informed her husband about what was told to by her daughter, and this try to justify that she would have told them at the right time. It is also noticed that PW1, Tulsi, the father of deceased used to go to fetch the deceased from the house of her in laws, whenever she used to visit her parents, but she never informed her father about the aspect of demand of dowry, or the cruelty or harassment being meted out to her by the accused. It is the case of the prosecution that the deceased had informed the mother that in case dowry was not given she would be done to death. There is no allegation in the entire testimony of PW1 or PW2 that the deceased was ever physically assaulted or verbally harassed, or there was any other act or omission on the part of the accused from which it may be gathered that the deceased was subjected to cruelty. The prosecution had also examined Ved Prakash Singh, as PW3 was the investigating officer. He has stated that during his investigation examined various villagers namely Raghunandan, Banwari, Rajoo, Brijlal, Arun Kumar Singh etc., but none of the villagers had informed him about the demand of dowry by the accused. It was stated by the villagers that there was a usual disputes between the deceased and her mother-in-law.
24. In light of the aforesaid evidence which have come forth from the statements recorded during the trial, the only witness who has stated about the demand of dowry is Sumitra, PW2, the mother of the deceased. On the date of the incident when she visited the police station but she had not inform the police about the demand of dowry or about the harassment. She further had not informed her husband about the fact that the daughter when she visited them for the last time, had complained about the threat to life on account of the demand of dowry. It is difficult to believe that the wife would not inform her husband immediately where her daughter is being harassed by the in-laws to such an extent, that she states that there is a threat to her life. It is also not convincing to accept the version of the prosecution, considering that the deceased used to be accompanied by her father PW1, whenever she was used to visit her parental home, and she never discussed or disclosed this aspect to her father. The mother being the only witness, considering her relation to the deceased, her conduct in not informing her husband about such an important and serious aspect relating to the life of her daughter, does not inspire confidence, and cannot be believed. There is no mention of any specific incidence of torture or cruelty to which the deceased was subjected to by any of the accused, except bald allegations.
25. During his deposition Tulsi has stated that he had assured his daughter that he shall arrange for the said goods and give them as soon as possible. It is stated that in the morning of 11.4.1994 a Home-guard from the local police station informed him that his daughter has died due to burn injuries. The complainant along-with his wife and other villager went to the house of in-laws of his daughter where he found that the dead body had already been sealed which was further taken to Sitapur for post-mortem and subsequently cremated. He has further submitted that due to poverty he could not give dowry for which father-in-law Bansi, son-in-law Kallo, elder brother-in-law and Sister of the deceased Sipahi along with on 10.4.1994 have burnt his daughter Phoolmati and murdered her.
26. During his cross examination he stated that the deceased had never informed him about the fact that the accused were torturing her, but in fact she had informed these facts to his wife.
27. Sumrita, mother of the deceased was examined as PW 2. She stated that apart from the son in law none of the other accused had made any demands of dowry and when the son in law came on the occasion of "Kalva" then he had asked for a Cot and Chain. The deceased had lastly visited her one month before the said incident where she had stayed for 15 days. PW 2 further stated that she did not inform to anyone about the conversation between her and her daughter, including her husband.
28. The prosecution in discharge of their initial burden have stated that foundational ingredients for the offense under section 304 B IPC stood established as the deceased had died within 7 years of marriage and according to PW 2 there was demand of dowry, and when the deceased had visited the house of her parents nearly one month before this incident she had informed her mother about the demand of dowry and the cruelty meted to her by the in laws, which resulted in the said incident where she died due to burn injuries.
29. The accused in his defence had produced a solitary witness, Rajoo who resides in the neighbourhood of the in laws of the deceased, who in his testimony has stated that his house is situated very close to house of the accused. On the date of the incident, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, while standing on the door of his house, he saw smoke emanating from the house of the accused. Seeing the smoke he rushed towards the house of the accused and saw that the "Chappar" was on fire. He shouted for help, and shortly all the villagers gathered and doused the flames. Inside the house the deceased was also on fire and he had heard her screams, but when he along with other villagers entered the house she was not speaking. In his cross examination he stated that there was no one else in the house and that the accused Bansi and Pyara Devi were working in the field, and reached the site of incident only subsequently. According to his testimony none of the accused were present in the house at the time of the incident as the husband Kallu was working in Lucknow as rickshaw puller, while Banshi and Smt Pyara Devi, father-in-law and mother-in-law of the deceased were working in the fields while the deceased Phoolmati was alone in the house.
D.W.1)
31. In the present case, as discussed above, there is absence of credible and reliable evidence of demand of dowry immediately preceding the said incident nor cruelty meted out to the deceased by her in -laws could be established by the prosecution. It is only when these foundational facts and basic ingredients for offence under Section 304 B of IPC are made out then the burden shifts upon the accused to demonstrate his innocence. Section 304 B IPC reads as under:-
"Section 304B IPC read in conjunction with Section 113B of the Evidence Act leaves no manner of doubt that once the prosecution has been able to demonstrate that a woman has been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry, soon before her death, the Court shall proceed on a p0resumption that the persons who have subjected her to cruelty or harassment in connection with the demand for dowry, have caused a dowry death within the meaning of Section 304B IPC. The said presumption is, however, rebuttable and can be dispelled on the accused being able to demonstrate through cogent evidence that all the ingredients of Section 304B IPC have not been satisfied.
Explanation - For the purposes of this section, "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in Section 304 B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." The explanation appended to Section 304 B IPC states that the word "dowry" shall have the same meaning as provided in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 which reads as follows:
"2. Definition of ''dowry' - In this Act, "dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly -
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or
(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person;
at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal law (Shariat) applies."
(ii) "Presumption of Innocence" (hereinafter referred to as "the principle") is one of the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence which axiomatically enunciates that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. This fundamental principle is underpinned by the maxim ''semper necessitas probandi incumbit ei qui agit' : the necessity of proof lies with the person who levels the charges.
The Principle, by default, applies to general and special statutes unless a provision stating otherwise exists in the statute. For instance, exceptions to the principle are contemplated in general statutes like the Indian Penal Code, 1860 by virtue of Sections 111A, 113A & B, 114A etc. of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Similarly, certain provisions in special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act, Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act etc. require the Courts to presume the existence of certain circumstances which point towards the guilt of the accused, thereby carving out an exception to the principle.
For example, Section 35 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 (NDPS Act) deals with presumption of culpable mental state of an accused requiring the Court to presume the existence of such mental state for a prosecution under the Act. Furthermore, an explanation is provided in the provision which states-
"In this section "culpable mental state" includes intention motive, knowledge of a fact and belief in, or reason to believe, a fact."
This essentially means that a person charged with an offence under the NDPS Act would have to rebut the presumption against him and the burden of proof would lie on him to show that he has not committed the act constituting an offence.
(iii) In Naresh Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2017) 15 SCC 684, the Supreme Court set aside the conviction imposed by the High Court against the accused who was charged under Sections 20 and 61 of the NDPS Act wherein the allegation against the Appellant was that two kilograms of charas was recovered from a bag in his possession. The Apex Court observed-
"9. The presumption against the accused of culpability under Section 35 and under Section 54 of the Act to explain possession satisfactorily, are rebuttable. It does not dispense with the obligation of the prosecution to prove the charge beyond all reasonable doubt....
10. In the facts of the present case, and the nature of evidence as discussed, the prosecution had failed to establish the foundational facts beyond all reasonable doubt."
(iv) Furthermore, in M/s Seema Silk and Sarees v. Directorate of Enforcement 2008 (5) SCC 580 it was observed-
"Reverse burden as also statutory presumptions can be raised in several statutes as, for example, the Negotiable Instruments Act, Prevention of Corruption Act, TADA, etc. Presumption is raised only when certain foundational facts are established by the prosecution. The accused in such an event would be entitled to show that he has not violated the provisions of the Act."
(v) It would be apposite to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Noor Aga's case which has been referenced in the above-mentioned judgment of Naresh Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh along-with the ratio rendered in V.D.Jhingan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 1762 wherein the Supreme Court held-
"It is not necessary for the accused person to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt or in default to incur a verdict of guilty. The onus of proof lying upon the accused person is to prove his case by a preponderance of probability."
(vi) In Sachin Kakde v. State of Maharashtra, 2016 ALL MR (Cri) 4049 the Bombay High Court (Aurangabad Bench) set aside the conviction of the Accused charged under provisions of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act observing-
"18. ...when a person is prosecuted for commission of the offence specified in the said section, the Court is required to presume that the said person has committed the said offence unless the contrary is proved.
19. The presumption, however, cannot be said to be irrebuttable. Infact, no presumption is irrebuttable in law, as this cannot be equated with conclusive proof. The provisions of section 29 of the POCSO Act mandates the Court to draw the presumption unless contrary is proved.
20. One has to keep in mind, as expressed by an eminent jurist that presumptions are bats in law; they fly in a twilight but vanish in the light of facts.
21. Here, the prosecution case of stupefying the victim is belied by the very video clip. Further, the presumption also stands rebutted in view of the medical examination of the prosecutrix, as detailed supra."
The above-mentioned decisions are referenced for the sole purpose of manifesting the level of reverse burden of proof imposed on an accused to rebut the presumption.
CONCLUSION:-
(i) It is often a pre-ordained notion, albeit misconceived, that the aspect of presumption comes into picture merely upon a charge being levelled against a person under a Statute expressly providing for such a presumption. The cumulative effect of past precedents, however, require the prosecution to lay down the foundation and bring sufficient material on record to make out a case against the accused for the presumption to apply. Once the foundational facts are established, the burden of proof shifts on the accused to rebut the presumption. This presumption could be rebutted by various means.
(ii) Moreover, the severity of the burden of proof on the accused is not as high as compared to the prosecution. The accused may rebut the presumption by bringing on record sufficient material to establish his case based on preponderance of probabilities.
(iii) From the evidence of Rajoo (D.W.-1) it is noticed that the thatch was on fire and the deceased was also engulfed in the flames and she was crying for help. When Rajoo along with other villagers entered the place of incident they witnessed burns and the deceased was also lying motionless having received severe burn injuries on her body and clothes. The fact of the thatch catching fire has been stated by Rajoo and also finds mentioned in the panchayatnama to evidence that there was a fard recovery memo indicating that ashes were collected from the scene of occurrence. Despite the fact that the thatch had caught fire P.W.1 in his testimony has stated that when he visited the place of occurrence he did not notice any sign that the thatch had caught fire and even the investigating officer (P.W.3) has stated that during investigation he did not see any sign of fire in the house. It is noticed that Rajoo is an independent witness living in neighborhood and his name is also mentioned as one of the proposed witnesses for the prosecution, in the charge sheet and, hence, his testimony cannot be discarded as has been done by the trial court. He is the first person to have reached the scene of occurrence and had shouted for help from the other villagers. His testimony is also supported by the panchayatnama as well as recovery memo indicating that ashes were recovered from the scene of occurrence. The facts as stated by Rajoo clearly demonstrate that the deceased had received burn injuries on account of the thatch catching fire which could be due to either the stove where where she was cooking but no such evidence has been brought on record to demonstrate the cause of fire. In the aforesaid facts it cannot be ruled out that the deceased had received burn injuries on account of accident and the same cannot be attributed to any of the accused persons.
(iv) Another important aspect which requires consideration about the presence of the accused at the place of occurrence. The prosecution witnesses P.W.1 and 2 admittedly reached the place of occurrence only after they were informed about the death of their daughter. D.W.1 in his testimony has stated that he learnt from the villagers that Kallu- the husband of the deceased works in Lucknow as Rickshaw Puller while Bansi (father in law) and Smt. Pyara Devi (the mother in law of the deceased) were working in the fields which is some distance away from the house and only after being informed about the said incident came to their house. There is no mention in any of the statements recorded during trial about presence of the other two brothers in laws of the deceased namely Ram Avtar and Sipahi. There is no evidence on record to indicate that either they had demanded dowry from the deceased or from her parents or they were involved in torturing the deceased and, hence, there is no material available on record to implicate them in the present case.
(v) Lastly, it is only in the post mortem report that the doctor has opined that smell of kerosene was coming out from the hair of the deceased. The post mortem report was admitted into the evidence and the same was not disputed by the accused and, hence, the doctor who conducted the post mortem was not brought in the witness box to support the case of the prosecution though he has stated that smell was emanating from the hair of the deceased and once he was suspicious that the deceased has been burnt to death by pouring kerosene oil, he should have immediately taken the sample and sent it for chemical analysis which has not been done by him.
(vi) There is no dispute about the reasons ascribed for cause of death of the deceased as stated in the post mortem report but it is doubtful as to whether the doctor would be a specialist in stating that smell of kerosene was emanating from the hair of the deceased which fact could have been confirmed in case his testimony would have been recorded. The trial court has dramatized the scenario of pouring kerosene oil and burning the deceased to death but this fact has not been stated by any of the witnesses who have been examined during the trial and, hence, this Court is of the considered view that the trial court has only considered the evidence coming from the record rather than exaggerating the said incident which have the tendency to prejudice the outcome and analyses the facts emanating from the testimony of the witnesses who were examined during the trial.
(vii) Having considered the entire evidence, this Court is of the considered view that neither charge of demand of dowry nor cruelty to the deceased nor the presence of the accused at the place of occurrence could be established by the prosecution and, hence, it is held that the accused appellants are not guilty of the offences under Sections 304 B IPC and 498A IPC. As such, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the trial court dated 30.1.2001 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Sitapur is set aside. The appellants are set at liberty.
Dated:-20.07.2022 (Alok Mathur, J.)
RKM