Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Kolkata
I.S.Leather, Kolkata vs Acit, Cir.25, Kolkata, Kolkata on 19 July, 2019
IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL "C", BENCH KOLKATA BEFORE SHRI S.S.GODARA, JM &DR. A.L.SAINI, AM आयकरअपीलसं./ITA No.334/Kol/2017 ( नधारणवष / Assessment Year:2010-11) I.S. Leather Vs. ACIT, Circle-25, Kolkata 15A/10, Chowbaga Road, Kolkata-700039 थायीले खासं . /जीआइआरसं . /PAN/GIR No.: AABFI 1937 M (Assessee) .. (Revenue) Assessee by : Shri Vigyaneshwar Nath Dutta, Advocate Respondent by : Shri Robin Choudhury, Addl. CIT DR सुनवाईक तार ख/ Date of Hearing : 25/04/2019 घोषणाक तार ख/Date of Pronouncement : 19/07/2019 आदे श / O R D E R Per Dr. A. L. Saini:
The captioned appeal filed by the Assessee, pertaining to assessment year 2010-11, is directed against the order passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeal)-7, Kolkata, which in turn arises out of an assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer u/s 147 r.w.s143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short the 'Act') dated 29/02/2016.
2. Although, in this appeal, the assessee has raised multiple grounds of appeal, but at the time of hearing, the solitary grievance of the assessee has been confined to the technical issue of reopening of the assessment u/s 147/148 of the Act, that is the assessee has challenged the reopening of assessment.
I.S. Leather ITA No334/Kol/2017 Assessment Year:2010-11
3. Facts of the case which can be stated quite shortly are as follows:The assessee filed its return of income for the AY 2010-11, on 12.10.2010 declaring total income to the tune of Rs.7,09,710/-. The assessee was a manufacturer of Finished Leather during AY 2010-11. The case of the assessee was re-opened u/s 147 of the Income Tax Act, for escapement of income chargeable to tax. The statutory notice u/s 148 of the Act dated 02.02.2015 was issued and duly served upon the assessee requesting him to file a return of income for the said AY 2010-11. In response to the said notice, the assessee vide its letter dated 21.12.2015 intimated to the assessing officer to treat its original return of income filed under section 139(1) of the Act as return of income filed in response to notice issued u/s 148 of the Act. The Assessing officer neither provided the reasons for re-opening u/s 147 of the Act nor adjudicated the issue of validity of reopening. However, the ld. Assessing Officer made addition, based on the merits of the case, on account of non- deduction of TDS on freight charges to tune of Rs. 21,05,955/- and addition on bogus sundry creditors to the tune of Rs. 22,30,000/-.
4. Aggrieved by the order of the Assessing Officer, the assessee carried the matter in appeal before the ld. CIT(A). The ld CIT(A) noted that the Assessing officer has recorded proper reasons for reopening the case under section 147 of the Act. Moreover during the appellate proceedings also the assessee was given copy of reasons and no material objection was made by the assessee which would made the proceedings invalid. This way, ld CIT(A) has confirmed the addition made by assessing officer. Aggrieved by the order of the ld. CIT(A), the assessee is in appeal before us.
5. The ld. Counsel for the assessee reiterated the submission made before the authorities below whereas the ld. The ld. DR has primarily reiterated the stand taken by the Assessing Officer which we have already noted in our earlier para and the same is not being repeated for the sake of brevity.
6. We have heard both the parties and perused the material available on record. We note that the assessee has raised the issue regarding validity of reopening of assessment u/s 147/148 of the Act, before the ld. CIT(A). However, the ld. CIT(A) Pa g e | 2 I.S. Leather ITA No334/Kol/2017 Assessment Year:2010-11 rejected the contention of the assessee and held that reopening made by the Assessing Officer was valid and reasons for reopening were provided to the assessee during the appellate proceedings and the assessee did not substantiate the issue regarding reopening of the assessment. We note that the reopening u/s 147 of the Act was mainlydone by the Assessing Officer on account of non-examination of freight charges of Rs.23,30,856/- which was paid to M/s Metro Global Logistics without making / deducting any TDS u/s 194C of the Act. The ld. Assessing Officer was of the view that since the assessee is engaged in processing and manufacturing of leather goods and is not engaged in the business of plying, hiring or leasing of goods carriages therefore such expenses of Rs. 23,30,856/- paid to M/s Metro Global Logistics as freight charges should have been disallowed u/s 40a(ia) of the Act. Therefore, the Assessing Officer was of the opinion that the income has escaped assessment to that extent. Further the Assessing Officer was of the view that there was no liability at the end of the year on 31.03.2010 whereas from the audited accounts furnished by the assessee it was noted by the Assessing Officer that there was a liability of Rs. 22,30,000/- towards purchase of leather at the end of the year. The main grievance of the Assessing Officer was that payment made to creditors aggregating to Rs. 22,30,000/- which were found to be made in cash on various dates as seen from the ledger account were actually not entered in the final books of accounts of the assessee therefore, as per AO, this payment to creditors were made out of unaccounted cash by the assessee and hence the Assessing Officer was of the opinion that income has escaped assessment to that extent. The next reason of reopening was that partners' remuneration of Rs. 12,89,569/- which was paid by the assessee and claimed in the profit and loss account which was fully claimed by the assessee u/s 40(b) of the Act in the computation of total income,however, no disallowance out of this claim was made in the assessment order. The Assessing Officer also noticed that partners` remuneration aggregating only Rs.1,50,000/- was allowable to the assessee firm, whereas partners remuneration of Rs. 12,89,569/- was claimed by the assessee and allowed in the assessment order, thus there was excess allowance of expenditure by Rs.11,39,569/-(Rs. 12,89,569-Rs.1,50,000).
Pa g e | 3 I.S. Leather ITA No334/Kol/2017 Assessment Year:2010-11
7. We note that the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer do not spell out the belief of the Assessing Officer, as we note that the details of these expenses which were noted by the Assessing Officer were already available during the normal assessment proceedings u/s 143(3) of the Act. During the normal assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer in spite of having details of these expenses has not verified therefore there is no new tangible material to reopen the assessment in the assessee's case under consideration was found by AO. Without any new tangible material the Assessing Officer cannot reopen the assessment which is already concluded u/s 143(3) of the Act and for that we rely on the judgment of Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in the case of Manmohan Kedia [2015] 370 ITR 649 (Cal) wherein it was held as follows:
"6. This notice under Section 148 is issued when the department contemplates action under Section 147 of the Act. It is issued in the case of an income which has, inter alia, "escaped assessment". The law is well-settled that in these proceedings, an assessment cannot be reopened beyond the ordinary period of limitation because a mistake therein is detected or realised or that something which ought to have come to the notice of the department went unnoticed. There is also no room for "change of opinion". (See CIT v. Kelvinator of India Ltd./Eicher Ltd. [2010] 320 ITR 561 (SC) where Mr. Justice S.H. Kapadia for the Supreme Court opined as follows:--
'On going through the changes, quoted above, made to section 147 of the Act, we find that, prior to the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, reopening could be done under the above two conditions and fulfilment of the said conditions alone conferred jurisdiction on the Assessing Officer to make a back assessment, but in section 147 of the Act (with effect from 1st April, 1989), they are given a go-by and only one condition has remained, viz., that where the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment, confers jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. Therefore, post-1st April, 1989, power to reopen is much wider. However, one needs to give a schematic interpretation to the words "reason to believe" failing which, we are afraid, section 147 would give arbitrary powers to the Assessing Officer to reopen assessments on the basis of "mere change of opinion", which cannot be per se reason to reopen'.
7. An assessment may be reopened when in spite of exercise of due diligence something escaped the attention of the assessing officer. The grounds on which an assessment can be reopened are very limited and strictly construed.
8. By his letter dated 10th April, 2013 the writ petitioner requested the assessing officer to treat the original return filed by him for the said assessment year as the return under Section 148. The writ petitioner also sought reasons. By a letter dated 16th May, 2013 issued by the department under Section 143 (2) of the Act, he was asked to appear before the assessing officer on 28th May, 2013. By another letter of the same date the reasons for issuance the notice under Section 148 were disclosed. It was stated that the writ petitioner received Rs. 9,54,326/-
from the government of West Bengal. This was reimbursement of value added tax and Central Sales Tax paid by the writ petitioner. The payment was made by the Pa g e | 4 I.S. Leather ITA No334/Kol/2017 Assessment Year:2010-11 government under the above scheme of 1994. According to the department the receipt did not fulfil the requirement of a capital receipt. It was being treated as a revenue receipt on the basis of the judgement of the Supreme Court in the Case of Sahney Steel & Press Works Ltd. v. CIT [1997] 228 ITR 253/94 Taxman 368.
9. In the letter dated 16th May, 2013 the writ petitioner was further informed that an amount of Rs. 14,17,382/- had escaped assessment. This amount was received as similar subsidy and shown in the assessment year 2010-2011.
17. Following Radhasoami Satsang v. CIT [1992] 193 ITR 321/60 Taxman 248 (SC) the Hon'ble Supreme Court in CIT v. Excel Industries Ltd./Mafatlal Industries (P.) Ltd. [2013] 358 ITR295/219 Taxman 379/38 taxmann.com 100 disallowed reconsideration of an issue in a subsequent year if the same "fundamental aspect" permeated different assessment years. The underlying principle is that at one point of time litigation must come to an end. It cannot be reopened. A point cannot be re-agitated again just because a person with "legal ingenuinity" thinks that the decision could have been different if certain law points not cited were placed or a certain weight were given to a particular piece of evidence. (See Hoystead v. Commissioner of Taxation [1926] AC 155 (PC). If one follows the ordinary rules of res-judicata reopening of an issue in a subsequent year or with regard to another assessee may not be barred. But atleast, in taxation cases the revenue is taken as one party for all assessment years and the assesses together taken as the other party. That which is decided between the revenue and one assessee in an assessment year, having permanent effects should not be decided otherwise or treated in any other way by the revenue with regard to any other assessee, so as to maintain consistency and fairness in government action.
18. In Amrit Feeds Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT [2012] 344 ITR 187/[2011] 196 Taxman 244/[2010] 8 taxmann.com 232 (Cal) I had remarked as follows:--
'The law regarding reopening of assessment is very strict. If an assessment could have been done but has not been done or erroneously done it cannot be done after expiry of the prescribed time limit. Exception can be made in very special circumstances. One of them, as I have stated earlier, being "escapement of income"/ Linked to this is the principle that a change of opinion would not constitute such escapement. In India Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Jt. CIT [2005] 275 ITR 155 (Cal) cited by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner, our court was concerned with deduction of expenditure for repairing ships.
Such deduction was sought to be reopened and disallowed in section 147 proceedings after having been allowed in the previous assessment years. The court allowed the writ application after discussing in detail several authorities on the subject. The court held that when all the necessary information was before the Assessing Officer in the earlier assessments, reopening under section 147 amounted to change of opinion.
In my opinion, the facts on this case are quite similar to the one decided by our court in India Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Jt. CIT [2005] 275 ITR 155 (Cal). If the Assessing Officers had not questioned the entitlement of the assessee to deduction under section 80-IB in the assessment years in question, it was their mistake. All information regarding the alleged manufacturing process of the assessee was before them. After the time limit for making assessment or reassessment had long Pa g e | 5 I.S. Leather ITA No334/Kol/2017 Assessment Year:2010-11 expired, the Revenue cannot turn round, take recourse to an extraordinary provision which is section 147 and attempt to reopen concluded assessments. If such exercise is permitted that would be quite contrary to the intention of the Act. In that case, there would be no finality to any assessment. Then, at any point of time after expiry of time the Assessing Officer can reopen assessments. That would plainly be against the statutory policy.'
19. That this subsidy was treated as a capital receipt in Section 263 proceedings for the assessment year 2003-2004 was within the knowledge of the department. Therefore, there was no ground for the Income Tax department to contend that income had escaped assessment and proceed to invoke the extraordinary provisions of Section 147 and 148 of the Act.
20. Considering all the decisions there is considerable merit in the submissions of Mr. Sen that the initiation and prosecution of the sections 147/148 proceedings were without jurisdiction. At any rate, they were in abuse of powers conferred on the Income Tax Authorities.
21. For those reasons this writ application has to succeed order in terms of prayer (a) of the writ petition by quashing the Sections 147/148 proceedings and the order dated 10th June, 2013.
No order as to costs.
8. On similar facts, the Hon'ble Calcutta High court in the case of Debasish Moulik [2015] 370 ITR 660(Cal) wherein it was held as follows:
"8. The Department's case is that by their letter dated November 19, 2013, the above reasons were attempted to be served upon the petitioner. It was refused by them. This in turn is disputed by the petitioner. Now, Mr. Dutta, learned advocate for the petitioner, argues that on the basis of the reasons disclosed by the Department in their affidavit-in-opposition, no case for reopening of the assessment under section 147 is made out.
9. Therefore, two alternative cases are run by the petitioner. First, the proceedings were invalid on the ground that no reasons were supplied. Secondly, even it was assumed that the reasons were advanced by the Department there was no cause of reopening the assessment under section 147/148.
10. To deal with the submission of Mr. Dutta, learned advocate for the petitioner, the facts in the background need to be noticed. For the assessment year 2009-10, the petitioner filed his return of income on September 29, 2009, under section 139 of the said Act showing a total income of Rs.2,71,01,034. On February 19,2011,the Department issued a letter to the petitioner stating that the return had been selected for scrutiny. On June 7, 2011, the Department issued a notice under section 142(1) of the Act to the petitioner calling for certain information in a prescribed format. Such information was furnished by the petitioner on June 17, 2011. On August 24, 2011, further queries were raised by the Department. Finally, on December 28, 2011, the Department completed the assessment under section 143(3) of the Act and determined the total income of the petitioner at Rs. 3,14,06,070 and computed the tax liability at Rs. 16,58,280. Mr. Dutta relied on ITO v. Nawab Mir Barkat Ali Khan Pa g e | 6 I.S. Leather ITA No334/Kol/2017 Assessment Year:2010-11 Bahadur [1974] 97 ITR 239 (SC). It was a decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court of India pronounced by Mr. Justice A. C. Gupta. In that case, the status of four mohammedan ladies and their children were involved. Under three deeds of trust of 1950, the relationship of the ladies and their children with the assessee were disclosed. There were further two trusts of 1957 which were not disclosed before the Department. However, the deeds of 1950 conformed in all material particulars to those of 1957. His Lordship observed as follows (page 244) :
"Clause (a) of section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, under which the assessments were sought to be reopened, so far as it is relevant for the present purpose, provides that if the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that, by reason of the omission or failure on the part of an assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for any year, income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that year, he may assess or reassess such income for the assessment year concerned. The High Court held that the reasons assigned for reopening the assessments did not fall within the scope of omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts, that all the material facts were before the Department when it made the assessments in question and the trusts created in 1957 did not 'throw a different light on the matters already disclosed'. . . The High Court was right in holding that the Income-tax Officer had no valid reason to believe that the respondent had omitted or failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts and consequently had no jurisdiction to reopen the assessments for the four years in question. Having second thoughts on the same material does not warrant the initiation of a proceeding under section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961."
11. Mr. Dutta contended and, in my opinion rightly, that during section 143(3) assessment, all information, documents and other records relating to the assessee for the relevant assessment year were before the Assessing Officer. The reasons which are advanced show discovery of new facts from the existing records. So the Assessing Officer wants to change his opinion regarding the assessment and to reopen it.
12. In my opinion "escapement of income" should be given a strict construction. Not only should it not be used to justify a change of view it should not be used to reopen an assessment on facts, information, documents which were before the Assessing Officer or could have been easily found by him while making the assessment. Otherwise, there would be no finality of assessment. It will go on and on and might become a tool in the hands of the Department to cause harassment to the assessee.
13. In this case, in the 143(3) proceedings all the data regarding the petitioner for the subject assessment year were before the Assessing Officer. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was "escapement of income" or that the reasons for believing that there was "escapement of income" were valid for the following reasons. In the case of Amrit Feeds Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT [2012] 344 ITR 187/[2011] 196 Taxman 244/[2010] 8 taxmann.com 232 (Cal.) a common question was involved in all the assessment years. In one of the years, there was scrutiny assessment under section 143(3). I had held that the issue regarding deduction under section 80-IB of the Act could not be said to have escaped assessment. The question in the case was whether the writ petitioner-assessee was engaged in the production of the cattle and poultry feed. According to the Revenue, the production of cattle and poultry could not be classified as manufacture to enable the writ petitioner to obtain the benefit of section 80-IB(5) of the Act. My ruling was that on the evidence before the Assessing Officer Pa g e | 7 I.S. Leather ITA No334/Kol/2017 Assessment Year:2010-11 he had held the business of the assessee to be manufacture cattle and poultry feed. During the subsequent year he could not reopen the assessment on the same evidence. I had followed a judgment of Mr. Justice Chattopadhyay in India Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Jt. CIT [2005] 275 ITR 155 (Cal).
14. Be that as it may according to the Department by their letter dated November 19, 2013, they proposed to serve the reasons upon the petitioner. It was allegedly sent by the Departmental process server on November 22, 2013. The Department's version is that the assessee refused to accept the letter. The reasons were also sent by speed post. The petitioner refused to accept the service and the envelope was returned to the Department on December 21, 2013. According to the petitioner, the reasons were not received by him and that the Department is wrongfully trying to assess his income under section 147.
15. Let us assume that the reasons were received by the assessee objected to by him and those objections rejected by the Department.
16. The Department, cannot reassesses the case of the writ petitioner as the initiation of section 147 proceedings was without jurisdiction, in view of the reasons given above.
17. This writ application is allowed by passing orders in terms of prayers (a) and (b) of the petition."
9. Our views are fortified by the judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench in the case of Debasish Dey 59 ITR 335 (Trib.), wherein the co-ordinate Bench, based on the identical facts and circumstances, has held as follows:
"7. I have considered the rival submissions and also perused the relevant material available on record. In order to appreciate the contention of the learned counsel for the assessee on the preliminary issue raised in this case challenging the validity of reopening of assessment, it is relevant to refer to the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer for reopening, which are extracted below :
"The assessee an individual, carried on the business of hiring trucks. He would maintain the accounts separately for his proprietary business named after M/s. Kiron Roadlines as well as that in his self name.
While the accounts of M/s. Kiron Roadlines were got audited under section 44AB of the Income-tax Act, the accounts pertaining to him was riot audited. In the unaudited profit and loss account (in self name), a loss of Rs. 2,46,687 was declared which was set off against the profit of other unit, M/s. Kiron Roadlines. The assessment under section 143(3) was completed on December 19,2006 accepting the said loss. It appears from the balance-sheet for his self business that the assessee owned 7 trucks. The profits earned from hiring these trucks were not offered on presumptive taxation basis as provided in section 44AE of the Income- tax Act. Sub-section (7) of section 44AE lays down that in case the assessee has preferred to claim lower profit that what he is entitled to claim on estimation as in sub-section (2) of section 44AE of the Act he is required to get his accounts audited under section 44AB of the Income-tax Act.
Pa g e | 8 I.S. Leather ITA No334/Kol/2017 Assessment Year:2010-11 Since the assessee has failed to get his accounts audited as such, the transparency of the financial result of his business (self) had not crystallised so as to accept the loss claimed by him. The fact of understatement of such income has got its support when the discrepancy between the debtor's (M/s. Kiron Roadlines) balance in its self-balance-sheet which is Rs. 9,97,533 and the corresponding creditors balance of Rs.7,21,996 in the separate balance-sheet of M/s. Kiron Roadlines is detected with due diligence.
The abovementioned reasons appear to be sufficient to form belief that the income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment under section 147 of the Income-tax Act.
The aforesaid reasons are hereby sent to the learned Commissioner of Income- tax-XXI, Kolkata for sanction of issue of notice under section 148 of the Income- tax Act as is provided under section 151(1) of the Income-tax Act."
8. A perusal of the aforesaid reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer makes it abundantly clear that the assessment originally completed by him under section 143(3) was reopened by the Assessing Officer on the basis of the same records as was available before him while completing the original assessment under section 143(3) and there was no new tangible material that had come to his possession on the basis of which the assessment was reopened by him. At the time of hearing before me, the learned Departmental representative has not disputed this position. The only contention raised by him is that the reopening of assessment by the Assessing Officer was based on altogether new issues, which had not been examined by the Assessing Officer during the course of the original proceedings under section 143(3). However, as submitted by the learned counsel for the assessee, the relevant records including the books of account of the assessee were duly examined by the Assessing Officer during the course of assessment proceedings and only after having satisfied with the same, the claim of the assessee was accepted by him in the assessment completed under section 143(3). The contention raised by the learned Departmental representative in this regard, even otherwise runs contrary to the decision of the hon'ble Calcutta High Court in the case of Debashis Moulik v. Asstt. CIT [2015] 62 taxmann.com 16/370 ITR 660 (Cal.), wherein the assessment originally completed under section 143(3) was sought to be reopened by the Assessing Officer on the basis of new facts discovered from the assessment records and it was held by the hon'ble Calcutta High Court that the assessment was reopened by the Assessing Officer merely on the basis of change of opinion, which was not permissible in law.
9. In the case of Kelvinator of India Ltd. (supra), cited by the learned counsel for the assessee it was held by the hon'ble Supreme Court that after the amendment made with effect from April 1, 1989, the Assessing Officer has to have reason to believe that income has escaped assessment but this does not imply that the Assessing Officer can reopen an assessment on a mere change of opinion. It was held that the concept of "change of opinion" must be treated as an in-built test to check the abuse of power and hence the Assessing Officer even after the amendments made in the relevant provisions from April 1, 1989 has the power to reopen an assessment provided there is tangible material to come to the conclusion that there was escapement of income from assessment. Applying the ratio laid down by the hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kelvinator of India Ltd. (supra) and by the hon'ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of Debashis Moulik (supra), I hold that the reopening of assessment made by the Assessing Officer in the present case was bad in law as the same was based merely on the change of opinion and the assessment completed by him under section 143(3) read with section 147 in pursuance thereof is invalid and the same is liable to Pa g e | 9 I.S. Leather ITA No334/Kol/2017 Assessment Year:2010-11 be cancelled. I order accordingly and allow the grounds of appeal raised by the assessee."
10. Therefore, we note that the Assessing Officer should have tangible material to reopen the concluded assessment. We note that the concept of "change of opinion"
must be treated as an in-built test to check the abuse of power by assessing officer and hence the Assessing Officer even after the amendments made in the relevant provisions from April 1, 1989 has the power to reopen an assessment provided there is tangible material to come to the conclusion that there was escapement of income from assessment.
We note that the ld. Assessing Officer made addition on account of non-deduction of TDS on freight charges to tune of Rs. 21,05,955/- and addition on bogus sundry creditors to the tune of Rs. 22,30,000/- in the reassessment proceedings. The information about freight charges and sundry creditors were available before the AO in the original assessment under section 143(3) of the Act. Therefore, it is not a new tangible material to reopen the assessment under section 147 of the Act, hence the reassessment proceedings, in the assessee`s case is bad in law, therefore, we quash the reassessment proceedings.
Since we allowed the appeal of the assessee on the technical ground, therefore we do not adjudicate the other grounds raised by the assessee on merits.
11. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed.
Order pronounced in the Court on 19.07.2019
Sd/- Sd/-
(S.S.GODARA) (A.L.SAINI)
या यकसद य / JUDICIAL MEMBER लेखासद य / ACCOUNTANT MEMBER
दनांक/ Date: 19/07/2019
(SB, Sr.PS)
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I.S. Leather
ITA No334/Kol/2017
Assessment Year:2010-11
Copy of the order forwarded to:
1. I.S. Leather
2. ACIT, Circle-25, Kolkata
3. C.I.T(A)- 4. C.I.T.- Kolkata.
5. CIT(DR), Kolkata Benches, Kolkata.
6. Guard File.
True copy
By Order
Assistant Registrar
ITAT, Kolkata Benches
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