State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
M/S Four Wings Travel & Tours,Through ... vs Shri Satyajit Sagoisem on 17 April, 2017
BEFORE THE MANIPUR STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL
COMMISSION
(STATE COMMISSION)
IMPHAL
MANIPUR
First Appeal No. A/22/2016
(Arisen out of Order Dated 28/09/2016 in Case No. CC/15/2015 of District Imphal)
M/s Four Wings Travel & Vs. Shri Satyajit Sagoisem
Tours,Through its Manager
BEFORE:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T.Nandakumar PRESIDENT
HON'BLE MR. M.Padmeshwor Singh JUDICIAL MEMBER
For the Mr. S. Premchand Singh, Advocate
Appellant:
For the
Mr.R.K. Goutsm Singh, Advocate
Respondent:
Dated : 17 Apr 2017
ORDER
The present appeal under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is directed against the judgment and order dated 28.09.2016 passed in Complainant Case No. 15 of 2015 wherein and where under the learned District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Imphal held that the Opposite Parties No. 1, 2 and 4 i.e. the present appellant, the respondent No. 2 and respondent No. 4 are jointly and severally liable to compensate the Complainant for the missing/loss of one packet/parcel out of the 2 (two) at an equal share/rate in term of money to the tune of Rs. 23,000/- (Rupees twenty-three thousand), (i) a sum of Rs. 15,000/- (Rupees fifteen thousand) for the value of the lost packet, (ii) Rs. 3,000/- (Rupees three thousand) for causing mental agony and (iii) Rs. 5000/- (Rupees five thousand) as costs of litigation to the complainant/Consignee/present respondent No. 1 within one month from the date of order and after one month @8% on the awarded amount shall be charged thereon.
2. Heard Mr. S. Premchand Singh, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Mr. Tapan Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 (Complainant), Mr. R.K. Gautam Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 2 and 4 and Mrs. Ch. Shaibalini Devi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3.
3. The main grounds for filing the present appeal against the impugned judgment and order dated 28.09.2016 passed in Complaint Case No. 15 of 2015 are :-
(i) the complainant/respondent No. 1 is not a consumer under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.-1-
(ii) the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Imphal has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint i.e. Compliant Case No. 15 of 2015 in as much as cause of action does not arise within its territorial jurisdiction i.e. District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Imphal.
(iii) there is no material evidence for coming to the finding that the value of the loss packet would be Rs. 15,000/-
For deciding these grounds it would be better to have a view of the fact of the case leading to filing of the Complaint Case No. 15 of 2015 and also the pleaded case of the respondents i.e. opposite parties in their respective written statements.
One Ms. Amita Mutum of New Delhi sent 2 (two) packets of electronic goods to the complainant through M/s Four Wings Travels & Tours, Connaught Circus, New Delhi, an authorized agent of Air India Ltd., New Delhi under consignment No. 098DEL14406055 on 02.09.2015. The said consignment was to be delivered to the complainant at his residence at Sega Road Thouda Bhabok Leikai, Imphal West District, Manipur. Ms. Amita Mutum, the consigner also paid the necessary charges for sending the said 2 (two) packets of electronic goods through the M/s Four Wings travels & Tours, New Delhi i.e. the present appellant under the said Consignment No. 098DEL14406055 but the complainant/respondent No. 1 had received only 1 (one) packet out of the 2 (two) packets. Accordingly, Ms. Amita Mutum made a complainant to the authorities concerned i.e. Air India Ltd., Respondent No. 2 and Officer-in-charge (Cargo) Air India Ltd., Imphal, Manipur, Respondent No. 4. The complainant also made another complaint on 06.10.2015 to the General Manager (OPS), Airport Authority of India, Ground Floor, C-Block, Coperate Head Quarters, New Delhi by enclosing all the relevant papers but no action was taken by the authority concerned for the loss of the said 1 (one) packet containing electronic goods. The complainant, after losing all hope of getting relief from the said authorities for the loss of the said 1 (one) packet of electronic goods which was sent under the said consignment No. 098DEL14406055 through the M/s Four Wings Travels & Tours, filed the Complaint Case No. 15 of 2015 before the learned District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Imphal at Sangaiprou for directions to the present appellant and the respondent No. 2, 3 and 4 :-
1. direct the opposite party to deliver the said consignment and handover/delivered the same to the complainant within a stipulated period.
2. direct the opposite parties to make payment of the cost of consignment.
3. direct the opposite party to pay compensation to the complainant to the tune of Rs. 30,000/-
besides directing to pay the cost of complaint to the tune of Rs. 5,000/-
4. pass and other appropriate order/direction that Hon'ble District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Imphal deems fit and just in the interest of justice.
4. The present appellant i.e. the opposite party No. 1 filed the written statement before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Imphal. The present appellant in his -2- written statement stated that the opposite party No.1/present appellant is the authorized agent of Air India Ltd. for Delhi only and 2 (two) packets/consignments were booked through the opposite party No. 1 i.e. the present appellant. The opposite party No.1/present Appellant handed over the said 2 (two) packets/consignment to the Officer-in-charge (Cargo) Air India Ltd., New Delhi for delivery to the consignee i.e. the complainant/respondent No. 1 at Imphal, Manipur. It is also the further case of the appellant/opposite party No. 1 that as the opposite party No. 1/present appellant had officially handed over the said 2 consignments to the Air India Ltd., the opposite party No. 1/present appellant has nothing to do with the consignment and responsibility of the opposite party No. 1/present appellant end there. The opposite party No. 1/present appellant had asserted in his written statement that the complainant i.e. respondent No. 1 is not a consumer in the light of Section 12 (1) (g) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 since the complainant is only a consignee. It is the further case of the opposite party No. 1/present appellant that the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Imphal has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint case for the reasons that the consignments were booked through the opposite party No. 1/present appellant at New Delhi. It is also the further case of the opposite party No. 1/present appellant that there was only a contract between Air India Ltd. and Ms. Amita Mutum, the consigner which clearly reflect that the consigner has an option of declaring the value of the content of the consignment failing which the Air India Ltd. is liable to pay an amount of Rs. 450/- per K.G.
5. The respondent No. 3, General Manager (OPS), Airport Authority of India filed his written statement stating that routines facilities to the travelers, the cargo booking, receiving of the fees charged the tickets rates and mode of collection and payment, along with the matters connected therewith and incidental thereto are the exclusive concern of the Airlines in question and Airport Authorities of India have little to do to the grievances of non-delivery of consignment booked in the Airlines. Airport Authority of India has never provided any service to the complainant and the complainant never avail or hire the service of the Airport Authority of India by a medium of contract or otherwise expressed or implied between them. Airport Authority of India is an authority having control, management and operation of the Airports in India where Airlines which are authorized, are permitted landing and take-off in the Airports. On conjoint reading of the separate written statements filed by the opposite parties it is clear that the opposite parties are not denying the fact that Ms. Amita Mutum of New Delhi sent 2 (two) packets of electronic goods through M/s Four Wings Travels & Tours, New Delhi under Consignment No. 098DEL14406055 on 02.09.2015 to the complainant/respondent No. 1 and the said 2 (two) packets of electronic goods were to be delivered to the Complainant at Imphal. The respondent No. 1, M/s Four Wings Travels & Tours (present appellant) admitted that one of the packets of electronic goods was not delivered to the complainant at his residence at Imphal and also that Ms. Amita Mutum of New Delhi, the consigner had already paid the necessary fees for sending the 2 (two) packets of electronic goods under the said consignment through the M/s Four Wings Travels & Tour. Now the question is if the complainant is the consumer as defined under Consumer Protection Act, 1986. For deciding this question it would be convenient to refer to Section 2(1) (d) (ii) which define the meaning of "consumer", Section 2(1) (g) which define the meaning of "deficiency" and Section 2 (1) (o) which define the meaning of "service". For easy reference the said provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 196 are quoted hereunder :-
"2(1) (d) "consumer" means any person who,- .............-3-
S.2(1) (d) (ii) hires or avails of any services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the person who hires or avails of the services for consideration paid or promised , or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such services are availed of with the approval of the first mentioned person but does not include a person who avails of such services for any commercial purpose;
S.2(1)(g) "deficiency" means any fault, imperfection or shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of performance which is required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in force or has been undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance of a contract or otherwise in relation to any service;
S.2(1)(o) "service" means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes, but not limited to, the provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both, housing construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service;"
On plaint reading of Section 2(1)(d)(ii), it is clear that the consumer means any person who hires or avails of any service for a consideration which has been paid and include any beneficiary of such services other than the person who hires the service for consideration.
6. In the instant case, the consigner, Ms. Amita Mutum of New Delhi hired the service of the respondents for sending and delivering the said 2 (two) electronic goods under the said consignment being No. 098DEL14406055 to the present complainant safely at Imphal. Therefore, the present complainant is none other than the beneficiary of the said service of the respondents who are supposed to send and deliver the said 2 (two) packets of electronic goods to the present complainant safely at Imphal. As such, the complainant is a consumer as defined under Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
7. Deficiency of service under Section 2 (1) (g) means any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of performance which is required to be maintained in pursuance of a contract or otherwise in relation to any service. It is admitted case of both the parties that there was a contract between the consigner, Ms. Amita Mutum of New Delhi and the Appellant, M/s Four Wings Travels & Tour for delivery of the said 2 (two) packets of electronic goods, which were under the consignment no. 098DEL14406055, to the complainant at Imphal and failure to deliver one of the 2 (two) packets of electronic goods is certainly deficiency of service as defined under Section 2 (1) (g) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
8. The Apex Court in Managing Director, Maharashtra State Financial Corporation & Ors Vs. Sanjay Shankarsa Mamarde reported in (2010) 7 SCC 489 had discussed the meaning of "deficiency in service" under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and held that there can be no single decisive test as to whether there is deficiency in service or not. And -4- the stand of deficiency is to be decided on the fact of the particular case having regard to the nature of service to be provided. Para 19 and 20 of the Supreme Court Cases in Managing Director, Maharashtra State Financial Corporation & Ors' case (supra) read as follows :
"19. "Deficiency" under clause (g) of Section 2(1) of the Act means :
"2. (1)(g) 'deficiency' means any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of performance which is required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in force or has been undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance of a contract or otherwise in relation to any service;"
20. It is manifest from the language employed in the clause that its scope is also very wide but no single test as decisive in the determination of the extent of fault, imperfection, nature and manner of performance, etc. required to be maintained can be laid down. It must depend on the facts of the particular case, having regard to the nature of the "service" to be provided. Therefore, insofar as the present case is concerned, in order to examine whether there was a deficiency in service by the Corporation, it has to be seen if there was any inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of performance which was required to be maintained by the Corporation in terms of their letter dated 2-7-1992, conveying the sanction of loan to the complainant."
9. In the process of statutory construction, the court must construe the Act before it bearing in mind the legal maxim ut res magis valeat quan pereat which means it is better for a thing to have effect than for it to be made void i.e. a statute must be construed in such a manner so as to make it workable. Viscount Simon, L.C. in Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. (1940 AC 1014 : (1940) 3 All ER 549 (HL) stated as follows :
"... if the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result."
Similarly in Whitney v. IRC (1926 AC 37 (HL) it was observed as under :
".... A statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable."
The doctrine of purposive construction may be taken recourse to for the purpose of giving full effect to statutory provisions, and the courts must state what meaning the statute should bear, rather than rendering the statute a nullity, as statutes are meant to be operative and not inept. The court must give effect to the purpose and object of the Act for the reasons that legislature is presumed to have enacted a reasonable statute. (Vide M. Pentiah v. Muddala Verramallappa (AIR 1961 SC 1107), S.P. Jain v. Krishna Mohan Gupta ((1987) 1 SCC 191 : AIR 1987 SC 222), RBI v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. ((1987) 1 SCC 424 : AIR 1987 SC 1023), Tinsukhai Electric Supply Co Ltd. V. State of -5- Assam ((1989) 3 SCC 709: AIR 1990 SC 123), SCC p. 754, para 118, UCO Bank v. Rajinder lal Capoor ((2008) 5 SCC 257 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 263) and Grid Corpn. Of Orissa Ltd. V. Eastern Metals and Ferro Alloys ((2011) 11 SCC 334 .
10. Section 11 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 clearly provides that the complaint shall be instituted in the District Forum within the local limit of whose jurisdiction the cause of action, wholly or partly arises . Section 11 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 reads as follows :-
"11. Jurisdiction of the District Forum.- (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the District Forum shall have jurisdiction to entertain complaints where the value of the goods or services and the compensation, if any, claimed does not exceed rupees twenty lakhs.
5. (2) A complaint shall be instituted in a District Forum within the local limits of whose jurisdiction,-
(a) the opposite party or each of the opposite parties, where there are more than one, at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or has a branch office or personally works for gain, or
(b) any of the opposite parties, where there are more than one, at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business or has a branch office, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the permission of the District Forum is given, or the opposite parties who does not reside, or carry on business or have a branch office, or personally work for gain, as the case may be, acquiesce in such institution; or
(c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. "
11. Keeping in view of the aim and object of Consumer Protection Act, 1986 we have to interpret the meaning of the words "cause of action" appearing in Section 11 (2) (c). Justice G.P. Singh had quoted the observation of Professor H.A. Smith in his work on statutory interpretation :-
" 'No word', says Professor H.A Smith 'has an absolute meaning, for no words can be defined in vacuo, or without reference to some context'. According to Sutherland there is a 'basic fallacy' in saying 'that words have meaning in and of themselves', and 'reference to the abstract meaning of words', states Craies, 'if there be any such thing, is of little value in interpreting statutes'. .... in determining the meaning of any word or phrase in a statute the first question to be asked is - "What is the natural or ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its context in the statute?"
It is only when that meaning leads to some result which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the intention of the legislature, that it is proper to look for some other possible meaning of the word or phrase.' The context, as already seen, in the construction of statutes, means the statute as a whole, the previous state of the law, other statute in pari material, the general scope of the statute and the mischief that it was intended to remedy."
-6-[ Ref.: V.N. Shrikande (Dr.) v. Anita Sena Fernandes (2011) 1 SCC 53] The meaning of the expression "cause of action" was discussed by the Apex Court in Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Association v. Union of India & Ors. (2001) 2 SCC 294 and held that the expression "cause of action" is well known. If the cause of action arises wholly or in part at places within territorial jurisdiction of the particular courts, those would have the exclusive jurisdiction. If the cause of action arises wholly or in part within the territorial jurisdiction of the different courts, it would be open to the litigant who is the dominus litis to have his forum conveniens. Further the expression "cause of action" with regard to a civil matter means that it should be left to the litigant to institute cases to the court according to the cause of action arising wholly or in part. Para 15 of SCC in Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Association case (Supra) read as follows :
"15. The expression similar to the one 'in respect of cases arising in the districts of' as used in para 2 of the Presidential Order came up for the consideration of a four Judge bench of this Court in Nasiruddin v. STAT (1975) 2 SCC 671: AIR 1976 SC 331. It was in the context of division of territorial jurisdiction between Allahabad and Lucknow benches in Uttar Pradesh. This Court held: (SCC pp. 683-84, paras 37-39) "[T]he expression 'cause of action' in an application under Article 226 would be as the expression is understood and if the clause of action arose because of the appellate order or the revisional order which came to be passed at Lucknow then Lucknow would have jurisdiction though the original order passed at a place outside the areas of Oudh . It may be that the original order was in favour of the person applying for a writ. In such case and adverse appellate order might be the cause of action. The expression ' cause of action ' is well known. If the cause of action arises wholly or in part at a place within the specified Oudh areas, the Lucknow Bench would have exclusive jurisdiction in such a matter. If the cause of action arises in part within the specified areas in Oudh it would be open to the litigant who is the dominus litis to have his forum conveniens. The litigant has the right to go to a court where part of his cause of action arises . In such case, it is incorrect to say that the litigant chooses any particular court. The choice is by reason of the jurisdiction of the court being attracted by part of cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the court. Similarly, if the cause of action can be said to have arisen partly within specified areas in Oudh and partly outside the specified Oudh areas, the litigant will have to choice to institute proceedings either in Allahabad or Lucknow. The Court will find out in each case whether the jurisdiction of the court is rightly attracted by the alleged cause of action .
[T]he expression ' cause of action ' with regard to a civil matter means that it should be left to the litigant to institute cases at Lucknow bench or Allahabad Bench according to the cause of action arising wholly or in part within either of the areas. If the cause of action arises wholly within Oudh areas then the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. Similarly, if the cause of action arises wholly outside the specified areas in Oudh then Allahabad will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action in part arises in the -7- specified areas and part of the cause of action arises outside the specified areas, it will be open to the litigant to frame the case appropriately to attract the jurisdiction either at Lucknow or at Allahabad.
Application under Article 226 will similarly lie either at Lucknow or at Allahabad as the applicant will allege that the whole of cause of action or part of the cause of action arose at Lucknow within the specified areas of Oudh or part of the cause of action arose at a place outside the specified Oudh areas."
12. The Apex Court in Gurdit Singh & Others v. Munsha Singh & Ors (1977) 1 SCC 791 had discussed the meaning of the expression "cause of action" and held that :
"41. The expression "cause of action" has sometimes been employed to convey the restricted idea of facts or circumstances which constitute either the infringement or the basis of a right and no more. In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has been used to denote the whole bundle of material facts which a plaintiff must prove in order to succeed. These are all those essential facts without the proof of which the plaintiff must fail in his suit. Now, whether we use the expression in the narrower or in the wider sense, in the case before us, the death of Kishan Singh was certainly an essential part of the cause of action......"
The Apex Court in Kandimalla Raghvaiah and Company v. National Insurance Company & Anr (2009) 7 SCC 768 held that "18. The term "cause of action" is neither defined in the Act nor in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 but is of wide import. It has different meanings in different contexts, that is when used in the context of territorial jurisdiction or limitation or the accrual of right to sue. Generally, it is described as "bundle of facts", which if proved or admitted entitle the plaintiff to the relief prayed for. Pithily stated, "cause of action" means the cause of action for which the suit is brought. "Cause of action" is cause of action which gives occasion for and forms the foundation of the suit. ( See Sidramappa v. Rajashetty (1970) 1 SCC 186 ). In the context of limitation with reference to a fire insurance policy, undoubtedly, the date of accrual of cause of action has to be the date on which the fire breaks out."
13. Keeping in mind the decisions of the Apex Court regarding the meaning of the expression "cause of action" in the cases discussed above, we have given our anxious consideration as to whether or not any part of the cause of action, in the given case, arose within the jurisdiction of the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Imphal on the failure of the appellant and opposite parties to deliver one of the 2 (two) packets of electronic goods which was sent under the said consignment being No. 098DEL14406055 to the complainant at Imphal. We are of the considered view that certainly cause of action arose at Imphal for filing the present complaint case and therefore, the learned District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Imphal had the jurisdiction to entertain the present complaint case.
14. Regarding the value of the said lost one packet of electronic goods which is weight about 24 k.g., we may look into the separate written statements of the respondents of the opposite parties including the present appellant wherein it is stated that there was a contract -8- between the Air India Ltd. and one Ms. Amita Mutum (Consigner) in the form of "AIRWAY BILL" in which it is clearly reflected that the consigner has a option of declaring the value of the content of the consignment failing which the opposite parties are liable to pay a amount of Rs. 450/- per k.g. Considering this admitted fact, the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Imphal vide impugned judgment and order dated 28.09.2016 had fixed the value of the lost one packet at Rs. 15,000/-. The Apex Court in State of Haryana & Anr. v. Jasbir Kaur & Ors. (2003) 7 SCC 484 held that measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations. Every method or mode adopted for assessing the compensation has to be considered in the background of "just" compensation which is the pivotal consideration. The expression "just" denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness and non-arbitrary. Para 7 of the State of Haryana & Anr. v. Jasbir Kaur's case (Supra) reads as follow :
"It has to be kept in view that the Tribunal constituted under the Act as provided in Section 168 is required to make an award determining the amount of compensation which is to be in the real sense "damages" which in turn appears to it to be "just and reasonable". It has to be borne in mind that compensation for loss of limbs or life can hardly be weighed in golden scales. But at the same time it has to be borne in mind that the compensation is not expected to be a windfall for the victim. Statutory provisions clearly indicate that the compensation must be "just" and it cannot be a bonanza; not a source of profit; but the same should not be a pittance. The courts and tribunals have a duty to weigh the various factors and quantify the amount of compensation, which should be just. What would be "just" compensation is a vexed question. There can be no golden rule applicable to all cases for measuring the value of human life or a limb. Measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations. It would depend upon the particular facts and circumstances, and attending peculiar or special features, if any. Every method or mode adopted for assessing compensation has to be considered in the background of "just" compensation which is the pivotal consideration. Though by use of the expression "which appears to it to be just" a wide discretion is vested in the Tribunal, the determination has to be rational, to be done by a judicious approach and not the outcome of whims, wild guess and arbitrariness. The expression "just" denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness, and non-arbitrary. If it is not so it cannot be just . (See Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC 1 (1999) 1 SCC 90 )."
In view of the decision of the Apex Court in State of Haryana & Anr. v. Jasbir Kaur's case (Supra), we are of the considered view that the value of the lost one packet of electronic goods fixed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Imphal at Rs. 15,000/- is just and reasonable.
15. Duties of the First Appellate Court is now well settled. When the appellate court agrees with the view of the trial court on evidence it need not restate the effect of evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial court. But the appellate court must indicate in a reasoned judgment that it has applied its mind to the material question of fact and law. The Apex Court in Alijan Nanhe Pehalwan Qureshi v. State of Maharashtra (1981) 1 SCC 415 held that -9- "1. ....... the High Court must indicate, in a reasoned judgment that it has applied its mind to the material questions of fact and law. A judgment may be brief but not a blank, especially in a situation such as this................"
The Apex Court in Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai & Ors. (2003) 12 SCC 395 held that
6. "17. It was submitted that when two views are possible and the High Court with well-chiselled conclusions has accepted a view, it would not be proper to exercise jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. Arguments are not substitutes for reasoning. More so when the appellate court upsets conclusions of the lower court. A party is not permitted to say that the arguments are what the court intended to accept or to convey. When the appellate court concurs with the views of the trial court the necessity for elaborately dealing with various aspects may not always be necessary. But when a view contrary to that of the lower court is expressed, it is imperative that reasons therefor should be clearly indicated. There is no scope for any departure from this basic requirement. Therefore, the plea of the accused-respondents that even though the judgment of the High Court is not very elaborately reasoned, yet it can be supplemented by arguments, is a fallacious one."
16. On the materials available on record, this Commission, an appellate authority having its defined limit, is of the considered view that the other amount of damages mentioned in the impugned judgment and order are not called for interference.
17. For the foregoing reasons, the present appeal is devoid of merit and accordingly dismissed.
18. Statutory deposit, if any, made by the appellant shall be refunded to the appellant or its authorized agent by the Registrar, on being identified by a Counsel known to the Commission.
19. Send down the records.
[HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T.Nandakumar] PRESIDENT [HON'BLE MR. M.Padmeshwor Singh] JUDICIAL MEMBER -10-