Madhya Pradesh High Court
Dilipsingh vs Malam Singh And Anr. on 20 November, 1985
Equivalent citations: AIR1986MP270, AIR 1986 MADHYA PRADESH 270, (1986) JAB LJ 497
ORDER T.N. Singh, J.
1. Heard counsel for both sides. This matter has to be disposed of at the threshold at the admission stage before the parties sink deep into the procedural quagmire and reach a point of no return. The point agitated is short and simple though it involves a tricky and ticklish question of law. By the Impugned order, the defendant-petitioner's application was dismissed summarily without holding an enquiry into his grievance. The application was filed under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act with the prayer that the Court may return the plaint to the plaintiff with the direction for filing the same in the proper Court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the dispute. The trial Court took the view that the application was misconceived because it was not open to the defendant to raise the objection without filing a written statement. Nothing more is said as to why the application was not entitled to consideration of the Court. In doing so, I have no doubt that the trial Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it, by refusing to look into the provisions of Order 8, Rule 1, as also Order 7, Rule 10 and Order 6, Rule 17, C.P.C.
2. Shri K.N. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the plaintiff had over-valued his suit designedly and deliberately, by which the defendant was sought to be deprived of recourse to one appellate forum. It is his contention that the suit ought to have been filed in the Court of Civil Judge, Class I, Basoda, while the plaintiff filed the instant suit in the Court of District Judge, Vidisha, which would have, in the normal course, heard appeal from the decision rendered by the Basoda Civil Judge's Court. It was suit for declaration of title and for permanent injunction in respect of a plot of agricultural land and Shri Gupta contends that the valuation of the suit should be made on the basis of twenty times the annual land revenue payable in respect of the suit land. This contention could have been decided without any evidence and it was not necessary for an issue to be framed on the point agitated and decision to be rendered on the basis of avidence adduced by the parties. Shri A.B. Khedkar, has drawn my attention to certain decisions of this Court, which, however, in my opinion, do not stand in my way in granting the limited relief in this case, requiring the trial Court to consider defendant-petitioner's application on merits.
3. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Jhamsingh, 1976 Jab LJ 693, the short question was whether the trial Court had acted in accordance with the provision of Order 14, Rule 2, C.P.C. by refusing to try additional issues as preliminary issues. It was held that despite the fact that factual investigation would be required in determining the concerned issues, they did not lose the character of preliminary issues and a decision thereon cannot, therefore, be postponed. The purport of the decision in Ramdayal Umraomal's case, 1976 Jab LJ 720 : (AIR 1979 Madh pra 153) (FB) came up for my consideration in Civil Revision No. 176 of 1985, decided on 5-11-1985 (Teekaram and Ors. v. Vasudeo Prasad and Anr.), wherein the view taken was that when an issue of law" has to be decided in terms of Order 14, Rule 2, C.P.C., decision thereon can be rendered only when no evidence was required to be adduced for determination of the issue. In Naresh Saxena (1984 MPWN 44), this Court took the view that the suit along with the application for temporary injunction could not have been dismissed on the ground of non-maintainability inasmuch as such an action could be taken only after written statement was filed and a decision on the preliminary issue of maintainability was rendered.
4. The legislative mandate of Rule 10(1) of Order 7, C.P.C. has a compelling relevance in the emerging procedural jurisprudence in the context, particularly, of dilatory civil actions. The provision has to be read in the context of Order 6, Rule 17 and Order 8, Rule 1, C.P.C. A party is required "to present a written statement of his defence" by Order 8, Rule 1 and the defendant is not precluded, therefore, to raise the question of jurisdiction of the court even without filing written statement at any earlier stage of the suit because of what is to be found in Rule 10(1) of Order 7, C.P.C. which, I propose to extract:
"10. Return of plaint.-- (1) Subject to the provision of Rule 10A, the plaint shall at any stage of the suit be returned to be presented to the Court in which the suit should have been instituted."
Whenever any question as to jurisdiction of the Court -- territorial or pecuniary -- is raised "at any stage of the suit", in my opinion, it is the bounden duty of the Court to decide the matter short-circuit litigation and protect parties from undue harassment of protracted and expensive litigation. In the course of hearing of the matter, it may be open to the offending party who has wrongly valued the suit, to amend his plaint "at any stage" as sanctioned by Order 6, Rule 17. But, simply on the ground that no written statement is filed, the Court cannot shirk the responsibility of rendering a decision on the question agitated. It is true that when the question of valuation has no bearing on the question of pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court, the situation may be otherwise. But, in the instant case, the position is entirely different as I have noticed above. As the point could be decided without evidence, it would be defeating the ends of justice by forcing the parties to wait till the evidence stage, which could have been merely an exercise in futility.
5. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, this petition has to be, and is, allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the trial Court is directed to rehear the petition on merit. However, there shall be no order as to costs.