Delhi District Court
Alavi Haji vs . Palapetty Muhd. & Anr 2007 6 Scc 555 Held ... on 7 June, 2022
IN THE COURT OF SH. P. BHARGAV RAO, M.M.01, N.I. ACT, WEST DISTRICT,
TIS HAZARI, DELHI
C.C. No.8208/17 DLWT020172952
M/s Naini Fincap Ltd
registered office at
A3/316, Paschim Vihar,
New Delhi110063
....Complainant
Versus
Mahabir Singh
S/o Sh. Kisna Ram
R/o WZ75, 80 Sq. Yards,
Tilak Nagar, New Delhi110018
.....Accused
Date of institution : 19.12.2017
Offence complained of: 138 NI Act
Date of final arguments: 25.05.2022
Date of Decision: 07.06.2022
Plea of guilt: Plead not guilty
Decision: Convicted
C.C. No. 8208/17 Dated 07.06.2022 Pages 1
JUDGMENT:
The present complaint has been filed by the complainant against the accused under section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred as the "Act").
Complainant's Version:
1. Complainant avers that complainant is a finance company. Complainant submitted that Sh. Rajpal Singh approached the complainant company to take a New Nissan Sunny Car on Hire Purchase basis. The accused Mahabir Singh stood guarantee for timely payment of all the installments, charges etc for the purpose of establishing their identity/credentials/credit worthiness, the borrower and guarantor furnished certain documents with the complainant company. Keeping in view the details and documents furnished by them, the complainant company believing the documents to be genuine, entered into an agreement no.H10696 dated 20.02.2015 in respect of said vehicle. As per the agreement, the Hirer and the accused both agreed that in the event of default, they shall be liable to pay the balance of installments together with other dues/ charges and shall also be liable to pay penal charges, overdue charge as well as interest, fees commitment charges on the outstanding amount till the date of receipt of payment to the company. As per the statement of account, an amount of Rs.
4,17,928 was outstanding as on 31.10.2017. The accused being a guarantor issued a cheque to the complainant company bearing no.239444 amounting to Rs. 4,15,000/ dated 06.11.2017 drawn on Bank of India, Keshopur Village Branch, WZ30, Village Keshopur, New Delhi 110018. Consequently, the complainant presented the impugned cheques with its Banker, Bank of India, Paschim Vihar, Delhi which got dishonoured vide return memo dated 07.11.2017 with remarks "funds insufficient".
2. Thereafter, the complainant sent a legal demand notice dated 09.11.2017 on address of the accused.
3. Upon failure of the accused to make payment of the cheque in question within the stipulated time of 15 days, the complainant has filed the present complaint u/s 138 of the Act.
C.C. No. 8208/17 Dated 07.06.2022 Pages 2
4. The complainant examined himself in presummoning evidence and after considering the complaint and entire documents on record, summon was issued by this Court against the accused on 05.01.2018.
Notice against the accused:
5. Notice was framed against the accused on 09.10.2019 and the accused pleaded not guilty and claim trial.
Plea of defence of the accused:
6. The accused had taken the following plea in his defence:
"I plead not guilty and claim trial.
I had given the cheque in question to the complainant as a guarantor of the loan taken by Sh. Rajpal Singh. I do not know the amount taken or returned by Sh. Rajpal Singh.
7. Thereafter, accused was permitted to crossexamine the complainant on 09.10.2019.
Complainant's evidence:
8. The complainant examined himself as CW1 reiterating the statements made in the complaint by way of affidavit which is CW1/A. He also relied upon the documents Ex. CW1/1 to CW1/10.
• Resolution passed by the board of Directors of the company is Ex.CW1/1 • Original proposal of the Hirer is Ex. CW1/2 • Hire purchase agreement dated 20.02.2015 is Ex.CW1/3 • Copies of reminders alongwith postal receipts is Ex.CW1/4(colly) • Statement of account of Sh. Rajpal is Ex. CW1/5 • Original cheque in question is Ex. CW1/6.
• Original return memo is Ex. CW1/7 • Copy of legal demand notice is Ex.CW1/8 • Original postal receipts is Ex. CW1/9 C.C. No. 8208/17 Dated 07.06.2022 Pages 3 • Tracking report is Ex.CW1/10
9. Thereafter, the complainant as CW1 was duly crossexamined by the Ld. Counsel of the accused. No other witness was examined by complainant. CE was closed by this Court vide order dated 18.03.2021.
Statement of the accused
10. Statement of the accused was recorded under section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred as "Cr.P.C") on 22.12.2021 wherein all the incriminating evidences were put up before the accused.
11. Accused stated that he had no liability to pay the loan amount given to the borrower. He was just guarantor. He further submitted that complainant presented the said cheque without his consent.
Defence Evidence:
12. The accused examined himself as DW1. DW1 was duly crossexamined by the Ld. Counsel for the complainant. No other witness was examined by the accused. DE was closed by this court on 27.04.2022.
Final arguments were heard on behalf of both the parties. I have heard the both the Ld Counsels and have given my thoughtful consideration to the material appearing on record.
The Law relating to Sec. 138 NI Act:
13. Before proceeding on the merits of the case, it is considered important to lay down the basic provisions of law with respect to section 138 of the Act which are as follows:
14. Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 makes dishonour of cheques an offence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde AIR 2008 SC 1325 held that the procedural requirements of section 138 are:
• There is a legally enforceable debt.
C.C. No. 8208/17 Dated 07.06.2022 Pages 4 • The drawer of the cheque issued the cheque to satisfy part or whole of the debt.
• The cheque so issued has been returned due to insufficiency of funds.
15. In order to establish an offence u/s 138 NI Act, following ingredients must be fulfilled by the complainant :
(i) The cheque was drawn by a person on account maintained by him for payment of money and the same is presented for payment within a period of 03 months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity;
(ii) The cheque was drawn by the drawer for discharge of any legally enforceable debt or other liability;
(iii) The cheque was returned unpaid by the bank due to either insufficiency of funds in the account to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account on an agreement made with that bank;
(iv) A demand of the said amount has been made by the payee or holder in due course of the cheque by a notice in writing given to the drawer within 30 days of the receipt of information of the dishonor of cheque from the bank;
(v) The drawer fails to make the payment of the said amount of money within fifteen days from the date of receipt of notice.
Points for Determination:
i. Whether the accused in the present case was in receipt of legal demand notice?
ii. Whether presumption under section 118(a) read with section 139 of the NI Act can be raised in favour of complainant in the present case?
iii. If the reply to the above question is in affirmative, whether the accused successfully rebutted the presumption u/s 118(a) r/w Section 139 of the NI Act through preponderance of probabilities?
iv. If the reply to the above question is in affirmative, whether the complainant could prove his case beyond reasonable doubt?
C.C. No. 8208/17 Dated 07.06.2022 Pages 5 I shall be deciding the abovementioned points of determination separately.
(I)Whether the accused in the present case was in receipt of legal demand notice?
16. The accused during framing of notice u/s 251 CrPC stated that he did not receive the legal demand notice however, the legal demand notice in question bears his correct office address.
17. Before examining the issue in hand, it would be prudent to discuss the legal position on the due service of notice sent by post. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of C.C Alavi Haji vs. Palapetty Muhd. & Anr 2007 6 SCC 555 held that section 27 of General Clauses Act gives rise to a presumption that service of notice has been effected when it is sent to the correct address by registered post. Unless and until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of business. Similar view has been taken the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Subodh S. Salaskar vs. Jay Prakash M. Shah & Anr (2008) 13 SCC 689 and M/s Madan & Company vs. Wazir Jaivir Chand 1989 1 SCC 264.
18. In the instant case, the accused has not challenged the correctness of his address during the framing of notice and statement u/s 313 Cr.Pc. It is pertinent to note that in reply to the question during framing of notice under section 251 Criminal Procedure Code (in short "CrPC"), the accused admits that the address in the legal demand notice is the correct address. A solitary, evasive and bald denial would be of no help to the accused in the absence of any other corroborative evidence on record.
19. The accused has failed to rebut the presumption regarding the successful delivery of legal demand notice. Therefore, this court is of the considered view that the legal demand notice in the present case has been successfully served to the accused on his address.
C.C. No. 8208/17 Dated 07.06.2022 Pages 6 (II) Whether presumption under section 118 read with section 139 NI Act can be raised in the favour of complainant in the present case?
20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kumar Exports vs. Sharma Carpets (2009) 2 SCC 513, while discussing the contours of section 118(a) r/w 139 of the N I Act, has held interalia the following:
"14. Section 139 of the Act provides that it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.
15. Applying the definition of the word "proved" in section 3 of the Evidence Act to the provisions of sections 118 and 139 of the Act, it becomes evident that in a trial under section 138 of the Act a presumption will have to be made that every negotiable intstrument was made or drawn for consideration and that it was executed for discharge of debt or liability once the execution of negotiable instrument is either proved or admitted. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument, say a note, was executed by the accused, the rules of presumptions under section 118 and 139 of the Act help him shift the burden on the accused. The presumption will live, exist and survive and shall end only when the contrary is proved by the accused, that is, the cheque was not issued for consideration and in discharge of any debt or liability. A presumption is not in itself evidence, but only makes a prima facie case for a party for whose benefit it exists."
21. In the instant case, the accused at the time of recording of statement u/s 313 CrPC did not deny the issuance of cheque in question and during framing of notice u/s 251 Cr.P.C has explicitly admitted the issuance of cheques to the complainant albeit the accused contends C.C. No. 8208/17 Dated 07.06.2022 Pages 7 that a blank signed cheque was issued by him as he was the guarantor of the loan taken by Sh. Rajpal Singh.
22. At this stage, reference may be sought from the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bir Singh vs. Mukesh Kumar (2019) 4 SCC 197 wherein the Apex Court while upholding the validity of blank signed cheque in a proceeding u/s 138 of the Act has interalia held the following:
37. "If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a payee towards some payment, the payee may fill up the amount and other particulars. This in itself would not invalidate the cheque. The onus would still be on the accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence."
23. Ergo, in light of the above discussion, this court is of the considered view that even in case of blank signed cheques, the statutory presumptions under section 118(a) and 139 would be raised in favour of the complainant. Therefore, in instant case, since, the accused has admitted the execution of impugned cheques, the aforementioned statutory presumptions would be raised in favour of the complainant regarding the fact that the impugned cheques have been drawn for consideration and issued by the accused in discharge of legally enforceable debt.
(III) Whether the accused has successfully rebutted the presumption u/s 118(a) r/w Section 139 of the Act through preponderance of probabilities?
24. In order to create doubt in the complainant's claims regarding existence of a legally enforceable debt, the accused has primarily adopted the following defence:
The cheque was given at the time of loan as a security cheque.
The accused was only a guarantor of the vehicle loan and the car was was registered in the name of the borrower Sh. Rajpal Singh.
C.C. No. 8208/17 Dated 07.06.2022 Pages 8
25. I shall be dealing with these defences separately. However, before delving into the facts of the case, it is pertinent to note that the standard of proof which is required from the accused to rebut the statutory presumption under section 118 read with section 139 of the Act is preponderance of probabilities. The accused is not required to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt. This onus on the accused can be discharged from the materials available on record and from the circumstantial evidences. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.S Narayan Menon @ Mani vs. State of Kerala, Appeal (Crl) 1012 of 1999 has interalia held the following:
"The standard of proof evidently is preponderance of probabilities. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials on record but also by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies"
26. Further, it should also be noted that the standard of proof in order to rebut the statutory presumption may be inferred from the materials on record and circumstantial evidences. It is not always mandatory for the accused to examine its own witnesses in order to rebut the said statutory presumption. At this point, reliance may be placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde AIR 2008 SC 1325, wherein the Hon'ble Court has categorically held the following:
"32. accused for discharging the burden of proof placed upon him under a statute need not examine himself. He may discharge his burden on the basis of the materials already brought on record. As accused has a constitutional right to remain silence. Standard of proof on the part of an accused and that of the prosecution in a criminal case is different.
34. Furthermore, whereas prosecution must prove the guilt of an accused beyond all reasonable doubt, the standard of proof so as to prove defence on the part of an accused is "preponderance of probabilities". Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies."
C.C. No. 8208/17 Dated 07.06.2022 Pages 9
27. This principle has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441 wherein while discussing the scope and ambit of statutory presumption under section 139 of the Act, the Hon'ble Court has held the following:
"27. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendantaccused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof.
28. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clause usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of "preponderance of probabilities". Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally recoverable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. As clarified in the citations, the accused can rely on the material submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her own."
28. Thus, section 139 of the Act puts the burden on the accused to prove his defence. However, the accused has to prove his defence on the balance of probabilities and not beyond reasonable doubt. Accused can prove his defence by drawing inferences from the materials already on record (including complainant's evidences), circumstances of the case and also leading his own evidences. Further, the presumption under section 139 of the and NI act cannot be debited upon a denial. The same can be rebutted by the accused only by leading cogent evidence. If the accused successfully creates doubts in the complainant's claim about the existence of legally enforceable debt then the burden of proof shifts back to the C.C. No. 8208/17 Dated 07.06.2022 Pages 10 complainant who is the required to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Reference can be taken from the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Company vs. Amin Chand Pyarelal 1999 (3) SCC 35, wherein it was held:
"Upon consideration of various judgments as noted hereinabove, the position of law which emerges is that once execution of the promissory note is admitted, the presumption under section 118(a) would arise that it is supported by a consideration. Such a presumption is rebuttable. The defendant can prove the nonexistence of a consideration by raising a probable defence. If the defendant is proved to have discharged the initial onus of proof showing that the existence of consideration was improbable or doubtful or the same was illegal, the onus would shift to the plaintiff who will be obliged to prove it as a matter of fact and upon its failure to prove would disentitle him to the grant of relief on the basis of the negotiable instrument. The burden upon the defendant of proving the non existence of the consideration can be either direct or by bringing on record preponderance of probabilities by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies. In such an event, the plaintiff is entitled under law to rely upon all the evidence led in the case including that of the plaintiff as well. In case, where the defendant fails to discharge the initial onus of proof by showing the non existence of the consideration, the plaintiff would invariably be held entitled to the benefit of presumption arising under section 118(a) in his favour. The court may not insist upon the defendant to disprove the existence of consideration by leading evidence as the existence of negative evidence is neither possible not contemplated and even if led, it is to be seen with a doubt..."
29. Keeping in mind, the pronouncements laid down by the Hon'ble SC in the aforementioned cases, let us now examine the defence of the accused one by one :
(a) Defence that the cheque was given as a guarantor at the time of loan as a security cheque.
30. With regard to the defence of security cheque, it should be noted that statutory presumptions under 118(a) r/w 139 of the Act also arises even if the cheque is issued by the accused as security for the repayment of a legally enforceable debt or other liability. It is for the accused to prove that the cheque in such cases was not issued in discharge of any legal C.C. No. 8208/17 Dated 07.06.2022 Pages 11 liability. Reference can be taken from the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/S Womb Laboratories Pvt Ltd vs Vijay Ahuja Criminal Appeals No. 13821383 of 2019 has categorically held that handing over of the cheques by way of security per se would not extricate the accused from the discharge of liability arising from such cheques. At this stage, I also find support from the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Suresh Chandra Goyal vs. Amit Singhal Crl. L.P 707/2014 wherein the Hon'ble Court has held the following:
"28. There is no magic in the word "security cheque", such that, the moment the accused claims that the dishonoured cheque (in respect whereof a complaint under section 138 of the Act is preferred) was given as a "security cheque", the Magistrate would acquit the accused. The expression "security cheque" is not a statutorily defined expression in the NI Act. The NI Act does not per se carve out an exception in respect of a 'security cheque' to say that a complaint in respect of such a cheque would not be maintainable."
31. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sampelly Satyanarayan Rao vs. Indian Renewable Energy (2016) 10 SCC 458 while discussing the ambit of section 138 of the Act visavis a cheque which has been stated to be given as security for repayment of loan, had interalia held the following:
"We are of the view that the question whether a postdated cheque is for "discharge of debt or liability" depends on the nature of the transaction. If on the date of the cheque liability or debt exists or the amount has become legally recoverable, the Section is attracted and not otherwise. Reference to the facts of the present case clearly shows that though the word "security" is used in clause 3.1(iii) of the agreement, the said expression refers to the cheques being towards repayment of installments. The repayment becomes due under the agreement, the moment the loan is advanced and the installment falls due. It is undisputed that the loan was duly disbursed on 28th February, 2002 which was prior to the date of the cheques. Once the loan was disbursed and installments have fallen due on the date of the cheque as per the agreement, dishonour of such cheques would fall under Section 138 of the Act. The cheques undoubtedly represent the outstanding liability."
C.C. No. 8208/17 Dated 07.06.2022 Pages 12
32. Further, it is a settled proposition of law that legal liability must exist on the date on which cheque was issued in order to attract section 138 of the Act. Reference can be taken from the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Indus Airways Private Limited vs. Magnum Aviation Private Limited (2014) 12 SCC 539 wherein the Apex Court has in teralia held the following:
"13. The explanation appended to Section 138 explains the meaning of the expression 'debt or other liability' for the purpose of Section 138. This expression means a legally enforceable debt or other liability. Section 138 treats dishonoured cheque as an offence, if the cheque has been issued in discharge of any debt or other liability. The explanation leaves no manner of doubt that to attract an offence under Section 138, there should be legally enforceable debt or other liability subsisting on the date of drawal of the cheque. In other words, drawal of the cheque in discharge of existing or past adjudicated liability is sine qua non for bringing an offence under Section 138. If a cheque is issued as an advance payment for purchase of the goods and for any reason purchase order is not carried to its logical conclusion either because of its cancellation or otherwise, and material or goods for which purchase order was placed is not supplied, in our considered view, the cheque cannot be held to have been drawn for an exiting debt or liability. The payment by cheque in the nature of advance payment indicates that at the time of drawal of cheque, there was no existing liability."
33. A combined reading of the aforementioned decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court suggests that a cheque which has allegedly been issued by the accused as a security to the loan would not per se be out of the ambit of section 138 of the Act. The important considera tion is the fact as to whether the said cheque has been issued in discharge of a debt or other liability or not i.e. whether any legally enforceable debt existed on the date when the cheque was issued. If the answer is in affirmative then section 138 of the Act would be attracted if the said cheque was dishonoured by the bank and there existed a legally enforceable debt on the date when the said cheque was issued. It is for the accused to prove that no legally en forceable debt existed on the date on which the cheque was issued.
C.C. No. 8208/17 Dated 07.06.2022 Pages 13
34. In the instant case, it is an undisputed fact that the impugned cheque was issued by the accused. It is the case of accused that the said cheque was handed over to the complainant at the time of loan taken by the principle borrower. Perusal of proposal of the hirer Ex. CW1/2 and hire purchase agreement Ex. CW1/3 shows that it was signed by the accused. The accused has admitted his signature on the said Exhibits in his cross examination dated 27.04.2022. However, he deposed that the same were blank at the time of his signature on the same. The onus of proof is on the accused to show that it was blank at the time of its exe cution. The accused has not brought any evidence on record to prove the said fact. In the nutshell, it can be said that the accused has not produced any credible evidence to prove that the impugned cheque was given as security to the complainant. It is trite in law to say that mere pleading not guilty and stating that the cheque was issued as security would not be suf ficient to rebut the statutory presumptions in a cheque bounce case. (V.S Yadav vs. Reena Crl. A. No. 1136 of 2010 decided by Hon'ble Delhi High Court).
35. As discussed earlier, purpose for which the cheque was issued by the accused would be immaterial if legally enforceable debt existed on the date on which it was issued. Making a bald and evasive statement in the plea of defence that the cheque was issued as security would not support the accused if legally enforceable debt existed on the date of issuance of cheque. In the instant case, the accused has not filed any evidence or highlighted any major contradiction in the complainant's claim to show that no legal debt existed on the date on which the impugned cheque was issued.
(b) Defence that the accused was only a guarantor of the vehicle loan and the car was registered in the name of the borrower Sh. Rajpal Singh.
36. With regard to the issue in hand, the same has been settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ICDS vs. Beena Shabeer AIR 2002 SC 3014 wherein the Hon'ble Court has dis cussed the contours of section 138 of the Act in order to include in its ambit "any cheque" is sued in discharge of debt or other liability. Relevant extract of the judgment is reproduced below:
C.C. No. 8208/17 Dated 07.06.2022 Pages 14 "The issue as regards the coextensive liability of the guarantor and the principal debtor, in our view, is totally out of the purview of Section 138 of the Act, neither the same calls for any discussion therein. The language of the Statute depicts the intent of the lawmak ers to the effect that wherever there is a default on the part of one in favour of another and in the event a cheque is issued in discharge of any debt or other liability there cannot be any restriction or embargo in the matter of application of the provisions of Section 138 of the Act:
'Any cheque' and 'other liability' are the two key expressions which stands as clarifying the legislative intent so as to bring the factual con text within the ambit of the provisions of the Statute. Any contra inter pretation would defeat the intent of the legislature. The High Court, it seems, got carried away by the issue of guarantee and guarantor's lia bility and thus has overlooked the true intent and purport of Section 138 of the Act."
37. Ergo, evaluation of the entire defence pleas shows that the accused has failed to rebut the presumption u/s 118 (a) read with Sec 139 of the NI Act by establishing a probable defence on a standard of preponderance of probabilities. Hence, the accused has failed to create any reasonable doubt in the complainant's claim and failed to prove that no liability existed towards the complainant.
Conclusion :
38. This court finds that a legally enforceable debt existed in favour of the complainant in the present case, impugned cheque was given by the accused in discharge of debt which got dishonoured. Execution of cheque is admitted by the accused. The accused failed to make payment to the complainant even after receiving the legal demand notice.
Decision:
39. In view of the above discussion, the accused is convicted for the offence under section 138 of the Act.
C.C. No. 8208/17 Dated 07.06.2022 Pages 15
40. Let the accused be heard on the quantum of sentence on 02.07.2022.
41. Copy of this judgment be given to the accused dasti.
Digitally
signed by P
P BHARGAV
RAO
BHARGAV Date:
RAO 2022.06.07
19:27:05
+0530
Announced in the open court on (P. BHARGAV RAO)
07.06.2022 MM01/NI Act/WEST/THC/DELHI
07.06.2022
It is certified that this judgment contains 16 pages and each page bears my signature.
Digitally signed P by P BHARGAV
BHARGAV RAO
Date: 2022.06.07
RAO 19:27:14 +0530
(P. BHARGAV RAO)
MM01/NI Act/WEST/THC/DELHI
07.06.2022
C.C. No. 8208/17 Dated 07.06.2022 Pages 16