Gujarat High Court
Jagmal Dayabhai Vala vs Junagadh Municipal Corporation ... on 25 February, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/6435/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6435 of 2020
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6436 of 2020
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6437 of 2020
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6438 of 2020
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK
==========================================
Approved for Reporting Yes No
- No
========================================== JAGMAL DAYABHAI VALA Versus JUNAGADH MUNICIPAL CORPORATION THROUGH COMMISSIONER ========================================== Appearance:
MR SAMIR B GOHIL(5718) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1 MR HS MUNSHAW(495) for the Respondent(s) No. 1 ========================================== CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK Date : 25/02/2026 COMMON JUDGMENT
1. Since common issue is involved in the captioned writ petitions, the same are heard analogously and are being decided by this common judgment.Page 1 of 19 Uploaded by V.R. PANCHAL(HC00171) on Mon Mar 02 2026 Downloaded on : Sat Mar 14 05:45:40 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/6435/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2026 undefined
2. Present petitions are filed by the petitioners - workmen under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India read with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter be referred to as "the Act") challenging the judgment and award passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Junagadh (hereinafter be referred to as "the Labour Court") in Reference (T) Nos. 196 of 2004, 194 of 2004, 201 of 2004 and 192 of 2004, respectively, whereby, the Labour Court has allowed the Reference filed by the respective petitioners and directed the respondent to reinstate the petitioners without back wages but, with continuity of service and also directed to pay sum of Rs.1,000/- as expenses to the workmen.
3. For the sake of convenience, the Special Civil Application No.6435 of 2020 is treated as a lead case. Brief facts of the case of the Special Civil Application No. 6435 of 2020 are as under:
3.1 That the petitioner joined service as daily Sweeper (Safai Kamdar) under the erstwhile Joshipura Nagarpalika in the year 1999 and thereafter Joshipura Nagarpalika merged with Junagadh Municipal Corporation w.e.f. 23.01.2004 and the petitioner - workman was also absorbed in Junagadh Municipal Corporation. The petitioner came to be terminated from the services w.e.f. 01.04.2004 without following due process of law and the order of termination came to be challenged before Labour Court by filing reference, which came to be allowed and directed the respondent to reinstate the petitioner in service with back wages.
3.2 The respondent - Corporation challenged the award by filing Special Civil Application No. 9799 of 2016 before this Court, which was allowed and remanded the matter back to the Labour Court on Page 2 of 19 Uploaded by V.R. PANCHAL(HC00171) on Mon Mar 02 2026 Downloaded on : Sat Mar 14 05:45:40 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/6435/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2026 undefined the ground that the terms of merger was not considered by the Labour Court. The Labour Court has, instead of adjudicating the issue of merger, reconsidered the entire case on merits and rejected the claim of reinstatement with back wages and continuity.
4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned award, the respective petitioners have preferred the above-mentioned writ petitions.
5. Heard Mr.Samir Gohil, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr.H. S. Munshaw, learned counsel for the respondent at length.
Perused the material placed on record.
6. Mr.Samir Gohil, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted the same facts which are narrated in the memo of petitions and has also submitted that the impugned award passed by the Labour Court is unjust and illegal. He has submitted that the Labour Court has failed to appreciate the fact that the respondent has not produced any documentary evidence to controvert the contentions raised by the petitioners before the Labour Court that the respondent has committed breach of Sections 2(oo) 25(B), 25(F), 25(G), 25(H) of the Act by producing the copy of the muster roll or the presence sheet etc. He has submitted that without relevant documentary evidence, the Labour Court has presumed that the petitioners failed to establish their case that they have worked for 240 days in each preceding year from the date of termination, which fact is completely contrary to law and erroneous finding recorded by the Labour Court. He has submitted that the impugned award passed by the Labour Court is against the settled principle of law and contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as this Court and hence, the Page 3 of 19 Uploaded by V.R. PANCHAL(HC00171) on Mon Mar 02 2026 Downloaded on : Sat Mar 14 05:45:40 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/6435/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2026 undefined present petition deserves to be allowed.
6.1 Mr.Gohil, learned counsel has submitted that the Labour Court had already adjudicated the issue regarding completion of 240 days and breach of Section 25F, 25G and 25H of the Act, while passing the award dated 16.01.2016. Over-and-above the contentions raised in the memo of petitions, Mr.Gohil, learned counsel has submitted that the petitions deserve to be allowed and the impugned awards deserve to be quashed and set aside.
7. On the other hand, Mr.Munshaw, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that w.e.f. 23.01.2004, the Corporation came into existence and, thereafter, the respondents had worked for a period of three months only and not worked thereafter and, therefore, it is pre-condition of Section 25(H) of the Act that prior to the date of termination, in the preceding year, the concerned workman has to complete 240 days. Mr.Munshaw, learned counsel has referred Section 2(oo), 25(B), 25(F), 25(G) and 25(H) of the Act, which reads as under:-
"2(oo) "retrenchment" means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include-- (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or (b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or 3 [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or] (c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health;] Page 4 of 19 Uploaded by V.R. PANCHAL(HC00171) on Mon Mar 02 2026 Downloaded on : Sat Mar 14 05:45:40 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/6435/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2026 undefined [25B. Definition of continuous service.--For the purposes of this Chapter,--
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
(b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) ninety-five days, in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case.
Explanation.--For the purposes of clause (2), the number of days on which a workman has actually worked under an employer shall include the days on which--
(i) he has been laid-off under an agreement or as permitted by standing orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946), or under this Act or under any other law applicable to the industrial establishment;
(ii) he has been on leave with full wages, earned in the Page 5 of 19 Uploaded by V.R. PANCHAL(HC00171) on Mon Mar 02 2026 Downloaded on : Sat Mar 14 05:45:40 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/6435/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2026 undefined previous years;
(iii) he has been absent due to temporary disablement caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment; and
(iv) in the case of a female, she has been on maternity leave; so, however, that the total period of such maternity leave does not exceed twelve weeks.] 25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.--
No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until--
(a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice;
* * * * *
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay [for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government [or such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
25G. Procedure for retrenchment.--Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman.
25H. Re-employment of retrenched workmen.--Where any workmen are retrenched, and the employer proposes to take into his employ any persons, he shall, in such manner as may be prescribed, give an opportunity [to the Page 6 of 19 Uploaded by V.R. PANCHAL(HC00171) on Mon Mar 02 2026 Downloaded on : Sat Mar 14 05:45:40 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/6435/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2026 undefined retrenched workmen who are citizens of India to offer themselves for reemployment and such retrenched workman] who offer themselves for re-employment shall have preference over other persons.
7.1 Mr.Munshaw, learned counsel has submitted that on reading of the aforesaid provision, it appears that the petitioners have failed to established the fact that they had worked 240 days in preceding year.
7.2 In support of his submissions, Mr.Munshaw, learned counsel has referred and relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Executive Engineer (Mechanical) Vs. Chetan P. Oza reported in 2005 (2) GLR 1778 : 2005 (2) GLH 742 and submitted that in the said decision, this Court has observed that Section 25(B) of Sub- Section (2) r/w. Section Section 25F of the Act retrenchment. That one year preceding the date of the order of termination, the workman has to complete 240 days in preceding year and if the concerned workman has not completed 240 days in preceding year i.e. in twelve calendar months, the workman would not be entitled to get any benefit under Section 25(B) and (F) of the Act.
7.3 Mr.Munshaw, learned counsel has also referred to and relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of General Manager, Indian Post & Telegraph Department and another Vs. Mohmad Sarfuddin N. Ansari reported in 2013 LawSuit (Guj) 1771 wherein this Court has held and observed in paras - 6 and 7 as under:-
"6. Apart from the above aspect, undisputedly, the respondent workman was daily rated workman and casual labourer. His case was that he worked with the petitioner's establishment for the years 19851989 and the alleged termination as stated above was alleged to be on 23.01.1995. There was no overt act on the part of the employer in terminating the services of the workman. The Page 7 of 19 Uploaded by V.R. PANCHAL(HC00171) on Mon Mar 02 2026 Downloaded on : Sat Mar 14 05:45:40 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/6435/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2026 undefined case of the employer was that the workman himself discontinued and never reported for duty from November, 1988.
6.1 In Om Prakash relied upon by the learned advocate for the petitioners, the Apex Court dealt with the case, where daily rated workman had ceased to report for duty and had remained absent for about three long years and the employer had done nothing whatsoever to put an end to his employment. It was held that the termination would not constitute retrenchment under section 2(oo) of the Act and hence, it would not attract the provisions of section 25F of the Act.
6.2 It was the contention of learned advocate for the respondent workman that section 25F was applicable and there was a breach thereof since, according to the learned advocate, the workman had completed 240 days of service in the years 1985-1989.
Even on demurer, it does not improve the case of the workman in any way. Section 25F deals with the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman and provides that no workman who has been in continue service for not less than 1 year under an employer shall be retrenched without complying with the conditions mentioned in the provision. Under the definition of "continuous service" under section 25B, it is provided that he shall be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year if the workman during the period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, he has actually worked for the number of days prescribed. In this case, the oral termination was on 25.01.1995 and there was no evidence produced by the workman to show that he was working with the petitioners any time after 1989. On the contrary, it was his case that he had made several requests to the petitioners to take him back in service which were not acceded to.
6.3 In Chetan P. Oza , the Division Bench of this Court held with reference to section 25B, 25F and continuous service that legal fiction is provided to treat a workman in continuous service for a period of one year in case he has rendered service for a period of 240 days during a period of 12 calendar months just preceding the relevant date, i.e. date of retrenchment. It was held that the workman could not contend that he had worked for 240 days in any Page 8 of 19 Uploaded by V.R. PANCHAL(HC00171) on Mon Mar 02 2026 Downloaded on : Sat Mar 14 05:45:40 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/6435/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2026 undefined calendar year and therefore, the contention of the respondent workman that he had put in requisite number of days of his continuous service during the year 1985- 1989, even if it is accepted to be true, was of no avail.
7. In the aforesaid position of law, the Industrial Tribunal wholly misdirected itself in granting reinstatement to the respondent workman.
The direction as regards the lump sum payment of compensation of Rs.25000/-, the Tribunal was in clear error in as much as there was no base to grant such compensation. When the order of reinstatement itself was bad in law, the award of compensation in lieu of back wages was not at all called for."
7.4 In view of the aforesaid fact, Mr.Munshaw, learned counsel has submitted that the petitions being meritless deserve to be dismissed.
8. I have perused the material placed on record and scrutinized the documentary evidence led by the parties. On perusal of the impugned award passed by the Labour Court, I find the following issues for determination.
(a) Whether the Labour Court was right and justified in dismissing the references filed by the petitioners or not?
(b) Whether the Labour Court has committed any illegality or irregularity in passing the impugned award and while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, whether this Court can interfere with the findings recorded by the Labour Court or not?
9. It emerges from the record that originally the petitioners were working with Joshipura Municipal Borough, Junagadh from 2001 to 23.01.2004 and when Junagadh Municipal Corporation came into force w.e.f. 23.01.2004, the petitioners have worked as a daily wager for a Page 9 of 19 Uploaded by V.R. PANCHAL(HC00171) on Mon Mar 02 2026 Downloaded on : Sat Mar 14 05:45:40 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/6435/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2026 undefined period of three months and the respondent - Corporation has terminated the services of the petitioners along with others with effect from 2004 and, therefore, they had preferred respective references before the Labour Court, which were partly allowed, against which the respondent - Corporation had preferred Special Civil Application No.9796 of 2016 and allied petitions before this Court, which came to be partly allowed vide order dated 25.07.2018. So far as the petitioners are concerned, the matter was remanded back to the Labour Court for re-determination of the issues, which read thus:-
"Undisputedly, the notification was not placed on record before learned Labour Court. The said notification and terms and conditions of merger of the municipality with corporation have not been taken into consideration by learned Labour Court while deciding the case of the claimants who were originally engaged by the Municipality.
Without addressing said issues, learned Labour Court could not have reached to the conclusion about breach of Section 25F and it could not have decided the issue about appropriate relief. For consideration of such issues, case of the claimants who were originally appointed by the Municipality and who rendered entire tenure of service - except last 2 to 3 months - with the Municipality, are required to be remanded to labour Court for fresh consideration.
Under the circumstances, awards impugned in Special Civil Application Nos.9796 of 2016, 9797 of 2016, 9798 of 2016, 9799 of 2016, 9800 of 2016, 9805 of 2016 and 10584 of 2016 are set aside for above mentioned reasons and the said cases are remanded to learned Labour Court for reconsideration and fresh decision after considering above discussed aspects."
9.1 After remanding the matter to the concerned Labour Court, the Labour Court has, after relying upon the documentary evidence at Page 10 of 19 Uploaded by V.R. PANCHAL(HC00171) on Mon Mar 02 2026 Downloaded on : Sat Mar 14 05:45:40 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/6435/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2026 undefined Exhibit 45 and list at Exhibit 50 produced by the parties, framed the following issues:-
(1) Whether the petitioners prove that act of termination of services of the petitioners from 01.04.2004 is illegal and against the provisions of law or not?
(2) Whether the petitioners are entitled to be reinstated to their original posts or not?
10. The Labour Court has, after considering the plethora of documentary evidence and the submissions of both the sides, answered the aforesaid issued in the negative. After detailed discussion of the facts, the Labour Court has observed that the petitioners have failed to prove their case that they have completed 240 days in each preceding year prior to the date of termination. As per the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court, it is upon the petitioners to prove their case that they have worked continuously for 240 days seeking the reliefs of violation of Section 25(F), 25(B)(2), 25(G) and 25(H). In the present case, on perusal of the record of the case, I am of the view that the petitioners have not established their case that they had completed 240 days in each preceding year from the date of termination and, therefore, the award passed by the Labour Court is in consonance with the settled principle of law and I do not find any illegality and infirmity in the impugned award. It is to be noted that almost 22 years have been passed and now, the concerned workmen might have been worked in some other establishment.
11. In the case of Mohd. Ali Vs. State Of Himachal Pradesh reported in (2018) 15 SCC 641 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras - 9, 10, 11 and 12 as under:-
Page 11 of 19 Uploaded by V.R. PANCHAL(HC00171) on Mon Mar 02 2026 Downloaded on : Sat Mar 14 05:45:40 IST 2026NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/6435/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2026 undefined "9. Now, Section 25-B was not always so worded. Prior to Act 36 of 1964, it read as follows:
"For the purposes of Sections 25-C and 25-F, a workman who, during a period of twelve calendar months, has actually worked in an industry for not less than two hundred and forty days shall be deemed to have completed one year of continuous service in the industry.
Explanation.-....
The difference between old Section 25-B and present Section 25-B is patent. The clause "where a workman is not in continuous service ... for a period of one year" with which present Section 25-B(2) so significantly begins, was equally significantly absent from old Section 25-B. Of the same degree of significance was the circumstance that prior to Act 36 of 1964 the expression "continuous service"
was separately defined by Section 2(eee) as follows:
"(eee) `continuous service' means uninterrupted service, and includes service which may be interrupted merely on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;"
Section 2(eee) was omitted by the same Act 36 of 1964 which recast Section 25-B. Section 25-B as it read prior to Act 36 of 1964, in the light of the then existing Section 2 (eee), certainly lent itself to the construction that a workman had to be in the service of the employer for a period of one year and should have worked for not less than 240 days before he could claim to have completed one year's completed service so as to attract the provisions of Section 25-F. That precisely was what was decided by this Court in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Ltd. v. Workmen. The court said:
"On the plain terms of the Section 25-F only a workman who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer is entitled to its benefit. `Continuous service' is defined in Section 2(eee) as meaning uninterrupted service, and includes service which may be interrupted merely on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due Page 12 of 19 Uploaded by V.R. PANCHAL(HC00171) on Mon Mar 02 2026 Downloaded on : Sat Mar 14 05:45:40 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/6435/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2026 undefined to any fault on the part of the workman. What is meant by `one year of continuous service' has been defined in Section 25-B. Under this section a workman who during a period of twelve calendar months has actually worked in an industry for not less than 240 days shall be deemed to have completed service in the industry. ... The position (therefore) is that during a period of employment for less than 11 calendar months these two persons worked for more than 240 days. In our opinion that would not satisfy the requirement of Section 25-B. Before a workman can be considered to have completed one year of continuous service in an industry it must be shown first that he was employed for a period of not less than 12 calendar months and, next that during those 12 calendar months had worked for not less than 240 days. Where, as in the present case, the workmen have not at all been employed for a period of 12 calendar months it becomes unnecessary to examine whether the actual days of work numbered 240 days or more."
Act 36 of 1964 has drastically changed the position. Section 2(eee) has been repealed and Section 25-B(2) now begins with the clause "where a workman is not in continuous service ... for a period of one year". These changes brought about by Act 36 of 1964 appear to be clearly designed to provide that a workman who has actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days during a period of twelve months shall be deemed to have been in continuous service for a period of one year whether or not he has in fact been in such continuous service for a period of one year. It is enough that he has worked for 240 days in a period of 12 months; it is not necessary that he should have been in the service of the employer for one whole year. So we hold that Usha Kumari and Madhu Bala are in the same position as the other appellants."
11. Further, this Court, in Mohan Lal v. Management of M/s Bharat Electronics Limited (1981) 3 SCC 225, in paragraphs 10 and 12 held as under:-
"10. It was, however, urged that Section 25-F is not attracted in this case for an entirely different reason. Mr Markendeya contended that before Section 25-F is invoked, the condition of eligibility for a workman to complain of invalid retrenchment must be satisfied. According to him unless the workman has put in continuous service for not Page 13 of 19 Uploaded by V.R. PANCHAL(HC00171) on Mon Mar 02 2026 Downloaded on : Sat Mar 14 05:45:40 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/6435/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2026 undefined less than one year his case would not be governed by Section 25-F......
12. Sub-section (2) incorporates another deeming fiction for an entirely different situation. It comprehends a situation where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of sub-section (1) for a period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer for a period of one year or six months, as the case may be, if the workman during the period of 12 calendar months just preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under that employer for not less than 240 days. Sub-section (2) specifically comprehends a situation where a workman is not in continuous service as per the deeming fiction indicated in sub-section (1) for a period of one year or six months. In such a case he is deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year if he satisfies the conditions in sub-clause (a) of clause (2). The conditions are that commencing (sic) the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, in case of retrenchment the date of retrenchment, if in a period of 12 calendar months just preceding such date the workman has rendered service for a period of 240 days, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purposes of Chapter V-A. It is not necessary for the purposes of clause (2)(a) that the workman should be in service for a period of one year. If he is in service for a period of one year and that if that service is continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) his case would be governed by clause (1) and his case need not be covered by clause (2). Clause (2) envisages a situation not governed by clause (1). And clause (2)(a) provides for a fiction to treat a workman in continuous service for a period of one year despite the fact that he has not rendered uninterrupted service for a period of one year but he has rendered service for a period of 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months counting backwards and just preceding the relevant date being the date of retrenchment. In other words, in order to invoke the fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it is necessary to determine first the relevant date i.e. the date of termination of service which is complained of as retrenchment. After that date is ascertained, move backward to a period of 12 months just preceding the date of retrenchment and then ascertain whether within the period of 12 months, the workman has rendered service for a period of 240 days. If these three Page 14 of 19 Uploaded by V.R. PANCHAL(HC00171) on Mon Mar 02 2026 Downloaded on : Sat Mar 14 05:45:40 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/6435/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2026 undefined facts are affirmatively answered in favour of the workman pursuant to the deeming fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it will have to be assumed that the workman is in continuous service for a period of one year and he will satisfy the eligibility qualification enacted in Section 25-F. On a pure grammatical construction the contention that even for invoking clause (2) of Section 25-B the workman must be shown to be in continuous service for a period of one year would render clause (2) otiose and socially beneficial legislation would receive a set back by this impermissible assumptions. The contention must first be negatived on a pure grammatical construction of clause (2). And in any event, even if there be any such thing in favour of the construction, it must be negatived on the ground that it would render clause (2) otiose. The language of clause (2) is so clear and unambiguous that no precedent is necessary to justify the interpretation we have placed on it......"
12. In the case of State Bank of India Vs. Jamnagar Jilla Mazdoor Sangh reported in 2022 (3) GLH 568 wherein this Court has held and observed in paras 12, 13 and 14 as under:-
"12. With regard to the findings of the Tribunal in relation to the violation of the provisions of section 25F of the I.D.Act, this Court does not approve the same. The award of the Tribunal is blissfully silent on the aspect of completion of 240 days in preceding 12 months before termination of the workmen. In the case of R.M.Yellatti vs The Asst. Executive Engineer, 2006 (1) S.C.C. 106, the Apex Court has observed thus:
"12 Analyzing the above decisions of this court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms do not apply to the proceedings u/s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general principles and on reading the aforestated judgments, we find that this court has repeatedly taken the view that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily waged earner, there will be no letter of Page 15 of 19 Uploaded by V.R. PANCHAL(HC00171) on Mon Mar 02 2026 Downloaded on : Sat Mar 14 05:45:40 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/6435/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2026 undefined appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce before the court the nominal muster roll of the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any, the wage register, the attendance register etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend thereafter on facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-serving statements made by the claimant/workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above judgments further lay down that mere non- production of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the labour court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon facts of each case."
13. In the case of Mohd. Ali vs. State of H.P., 2018 (15) S.C.C. 641, the Apex Court has reiterated the calculation of 240 days as follows:
"9. It is a well known fact that the Industrial Disputes Act is a welfare legislation. The intention behind the enactment of this Act was to protect the employees from arbitrary retrenchments. For this reason only, in a case of retrenchment of an employee who has worked for a year or more, Section 25F provides a safeguard in the form of giving one month's prior notice indicating the reasons for retrenchment to the employee and also provides for wages for the period of notice. Section 25B of the Act provides that when a person can be said to have worked for one year and the very reading of the said provisions makes it clear that if a person has worked for a period of 240 days in the last preceding year, he is deemed to have worked for a year. The theory of 240 days for continuous service is that a workman is deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year, if he, during the period of twelve calendar months preceding the date of retrenchment has actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days."Page 16 of 19 Uploaded by V.R. PANCHAL(HC00171) on Mon Mar 02 2026 Downloaded on : Sat Mar 14 05:45:40 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/6435/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2026 undefined
14. The aforenoted view of the Apex Court has been followed in various judgements and it is well settled proposition of law that the initial burden lies on the workmen to prove that he has completed 240 days in the last preceding year. It is held that the workman can only call upon the employer to produce before the court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any, the wage register, the attendance register etc, and the drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend thereafter on facts of each case. It is also asserted by the Apex Court that mere affidavits or self-serving statements made by the claimant / workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. In the instant case, the Tribunal had ordered production of the logbook of the car to ascertain the employment of the workmen. The Tribunal has also recorded that the petitioner-Bank had only produced the logbook prior to reference. After recording such findings, the Tribunal has not discussed evidence with regard to completion of 240 days by each of the workmen. It was the statutory duty and obligation of the Tribunal to give a specific finding with regard to completion of 240 days by each of the workmen, after examination of the logbook or any other documents, but such exercise has not been undertaken by the Tribunal. Thus, in absence of such exercise or findings, it was erroneous for the Tribunal to declare the termination illegal in violation of section 25F of the I.D.Act. Hence, the finding given by the Tribunal with regard to the termination of all the workmen being violative of the provisions of section 25F of the I.D.Act is perverse and does not reconcile with the law."
13. In the case of Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation Etc. Vs. Jadeja Govubha Chhanubha reported in 2015 AIR (SC) 609 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para - 8 as under:-
8. It is fairly well-settled that for an order of termination of the services of a workman to be held illegal on account of non-payment of retrenchment compensation, it is essential for the workman to establish that he was in Page 17 of 19 Uploaded by V.R. PANCHAL(HC00171) on Mon Mar 02 2026 Downloaded on : Sat Mar 14 05:45:40 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/6435/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2026 undefined continuous service of the employer within the meaning of Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. For the respondent to succeed in that attempt he was required to show that he was in service for 240 days in terms of Section 25B(2)(a)(ii). The burden to prove that he was in actual and continuous service of the employer for the said period lay squarely on the workman. The decisions of this Court in Range Forest Officer V/s. S.T. Hadimani (2002) 3 SCC 25, Municipal Corporation, Faridabad V/s. Siri Niwas (2004) 8 SCC 195, M.P. Electricity Board V/s. Hariram (2004) 8 SCC 246, Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd.
V/s. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (2004) 8 SCC 161, Surendra Nagar District Panchayat and Anr. V/s. Jethabhai Pitamberbhai (2005) 8 SCC 450, R.M. Yellatti V/s. Assistant Executive Engineer (2006) 1 SCC 106 unequivocally recognise the principle that the burden to prove that the workman had worked for 240 days is entirely upon him. So also the question whether an adverse inference could be drawn against the employer in case he did not produce the best evidence available with it, has been the subject- matter of pronouncements of this Court in Municipal Corporation, Faridabad V/s. Siri Niwas (supra) and M.P. Electricity Board V/s. Hariram (supra), reiterated in Manager, Reserve Bank of India, Bangalore V/s. S. Mani (2005) 5 SCC 100. This Court has held that only because some documents have not been produced by the management, an adverse inference cannot be drawn against it."
14. On perusal of the impugned award, it clearly transpires that the Labour Court has not committed any error of fact and law in appreciating the evidence on record and in passing the award. Even on re-appreciation of the evidence, it clearly transpires that the petitioners have miserably failed to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the impugned award of the Labour Court is sustainable in the eyes of law and the present petitions deserve to be dismissed.
15. In view of the above and considering aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and the aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble Page 18 of 19 Uploaded by V.R. PANCHAL(HC00171) on Mon Mar 02 2026 Downloaded on : Sat Mar 14 05:45:40 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/6435/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2026 undefined Supreme Court as well as this Court, the present petitions are devoid of merits and the same deserves to be dismissed. Resultantly, The petitions stand dismissed. Rule is discharged. Interim relief, if any, granted earlier shall stand vacated forthwith. There shall be on order as to costs.
(HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK,J) V.R. PANCHAL Page 19 of 19 Uploaded by V.R. PANCHAL(HC00171) on Mon Mar 02 2026 Downloaded on : Sat Mar 14 05:45:40 IST 2026