Madhya Pradesh High Court
Uttam Chand Sahu vs State Of M.P. on 13 March, 2025
Author: Sanjay Dwivedi
Bench: Sanjay Dwivedi
1
M.Cr.C.-29714.2020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJAY DWIVEDI
ON THE 13th OF MARCH, 2025
M.CR.C. No. 29714 of 2020
UTTAM CHAND SAHU
Versus
STATE OF M.P. AND ANOTHER
...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Appearance:
Shri Anil Khare- Senior Advocate with Shri Amit Singh Thakur -
Advocate for the petitioner.
Smt. Shradha Tiwari - Government Advocate for the respondent/State.
Shri Mayank Singh - Advocate for the complainant.
.........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Heard on : 19.02.2025
Pronounced on : 13.03.2025
ORDER
Petitioner by the instant petition is challenging the order 17.03.2020 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Rehli District Sagar in Criminal Case No.335/2019, whereby the trial Court has framed charges against him.
2. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has confined his argument only to the extent that the nature of alleged transaction does not fall within the ambit of charges as framed by the trial Court. It is contended that it was purely a civil transaction and as such, initiation of criminal prosecution was not proper on the part of the trial Court. He has further submitted that the trial Court without 2 M.Cr.C.-29714.2020 considering the material available before it in a proper manner and ignoring the legal aspect of the case, has framed the charges against the petitioner, which is improper.
3. Although, counsel for the respondent/State has opposed the submission made by counsel for the petitioner and submitted that so far as the contention as is being raised on behalf of the petitioner that the allegation made against him does not fall within the ambit of criminal prosecution is concerned, the said fact will be ascertained only after conducting the trial. She has further submitted that the Supreme Court in 0number of occasions has already held that the High Court, while entertaining a petition filed under Section 482 of the CrPC, cannot conduct a mini trial.
4. I have heard the rival submissions of the parties and perused the record.
5. The main contention of counsel for the petitioner is that as per facts involved in the case and material placed before the trial Court at the time of framing of charges, the Court could have exercised the power provided under Section 227 of CrPC and discharged the present petitioner with the alleged offence. As per counsel for the petitioner, from the nature of transaction alleged to have been committed by the present petitioner, the Court had to see that the dispute was purely of civil nature and as such, the offence under Sections 420 and 406 of IPC is not made out against him. Simultaneously, the Court had to see that the present petitioner on earlier two occasions had already challenged the registration of FIR against him and the charge-sheet was produced before the trial Court. Against registration of offence against the petitioner vide Crime No.270/2019, he filed a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC i.e. M.Cr.C. No.38361/2019 before this Court, in which, after discussing each and every aspect of the matter, the Court has observed as under:-
"The facts of the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v.Goloconda Linga Swamy and anr. (Supra), Jagdish Chanana and ors. v. State of 3 M.Cr.C.-29714.2020 Haryana and anr. (Supra) and Swaran Singh and ors. v. State Through Standing Counsel and anr. (Supra) on which learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance, in the aforesaid cases, facts are entirely different to the fact of the present matter. The basic principle which applies in this case has been dealt by the Apex Court in the case of Kamaladevi Agrawal v. State of W.B. and others (supra) and R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta and Ors (supra). Therefore, having considered the contentions of learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record, in view of this Court, FIR discloses all the necessary ingredients constituting the prime facie offence under section 406 and 420 of IPC. The grounds advanced in defence is required to be proved during trial. Whether FIR has been lodged with malafide intention will be tested only when the evidence is lead. Whether the complainant has made false allegation against the applicants is a matter of evidence. At this stage, the allegations levelled against the applicants by the complainant cannot be thrown away at the threshold. Hence, the FIR and further proceedings cannot be quashed on the grounds raised by the applicant.
Having considered the contentions of learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record, in view of this Court, FIR discloses all the necessary ingredients constituting the prime facie offence under section 406 and 420 of IPC. The grounds advanced in defence is required to be proved during trial. Whether FIR has been lodged with malafide intention will be tested only when the evidence is lead. Whether the complainant has made false allegation against the applicants is a matter of evidence. At this stage, the allegations levelled against the applicants by the complainant cannot be thrown away at the threshold. Hence, the FIR and further proceedings cannot be quashed on the grounds raised by the applicant.
The Apex Court in the case of J.P. Sharma Vs. Vinod Kumar Jain and others reported in (1986) 3 SCC 67 has held that if prima facie offences made out on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint without going into truth or otherwise of the allegations, High Court cannot exercise its power under Section 482.
Considering the aforesaid legal positions and the material available on record, this petition being devoid of merit stand dismissed.
A copy of this order be sent to the concerning court, P.S. Rehli, District Sagar (M.P.) for information and compliance."
6. Thereafter, another petition i.e. M.Cr.C. No.2814/2020 got filed wherein the challenge was made by the petitioner to the charge-sheet produced under Section 173 of CrPC. The said petition was withdrawn vide order dated 4 M.Cr.C.-29714.2020 25.02.2020 with liberty to raise the grounds/issues before the trial Court. The said order is available on record. Thereafter, the trial Court passed a detailed order on 17.03.2020 framing charges under Sections 420 and 406 of IPC.
7. It is not a case in which the High Court is scrutinizing the facts on first occasion to form an opinion, but it is a case in which on earlier occasion the Court had considered the facts in detail and formed its opinion on the basis of contents of FIR. Although, the trial Court has opined that facts available before it are not sufficient to hold that the material available is sufficient to reject the complaint at the threshold.
8. Shri Anil Khare, counsel for the petitioner although relied upon several decisions of Supreme Court i.e. Satish Mehra Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and another (2012) 13 SCC 614; Anil Mahajan Vs. Bhor Industries Ltd. And another (2005) 10 SCC 228; Satishchandra Ratanlal Shah Vs. State of Gujarat and another (2019) 9 SCC 148; Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma Vs. State of Bihar and another (2000) 4 SCC 168; Chandran Ratnawami Vs. K.C. Palanisamy and others (2013) 6 SCC 740 and Delhi Race (1940) Limited and others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another (2024) 10 SCC 690 but all the decisions are on the point that civil dispute cannot be given a colour of criminal offence. There is no dispute with regard to the said legal aspect but at the same time, the Court has to see that the Supreme Court has not outrightly restricted the prosecution to initiate criminal proceeding if a civil dispute exists. Both the proceedings can go on if from the facts and circumstances, it is found that offence has also been committed. This fact has been considered by the High Court in earlier round of litigation in M.Cr.C. No.38361/2019 because that was the stand before the Court while seeking quashing of FIR but that contention was rejected by the Court. Not only this, but the trial Court has also considered this aspect and relied upon various Supreme Court decisions which provide that civil proceeding 5 M.Cr.C.-29714.2020 is no bar to initiate criminal prosecution and as such, this Court feels difficulty to hold that the transaction was of purely a civil nature and criminal prosecution cannot be initiated.
9. I can understand that filing a petition under Section 482 of CrPC for quashing an FIR and challenging the order passed by the trial Court exercising power under Sections 227 and 228 of CrPC are two distinct cause of action and there is no bar to challenge the proceeding at these two stages. But at the same time, Court cannot ignore the finding given by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in respect of available material so as to observe that prima facie, the contents of FIR are sufficient to draw an inference that offence of Sections 420 and 406 of IPC is made out and the further observation that the facts can be determined during the course of trial and on the basis of evidence adduced. Thus, in view of the aforesaid observation of the High Court, this Bench while entertaining the order of framing of charge by the trial Court has to see whether the trial Court has rightly exercised the power under Sections 227 and 228 of Cr.P.C. or not.
10. It is the settled principle of law that the trial Court while framing the charge exercising power under Section 228 Cr.P.C. is having very limited scope to hold that on the basis of facts available, the accused can be discharged because material available is not sufficient to convict him but the Court has to see whether on the basis of material available, the Court can presume that the offence has been committed or not.
11. This Court had already considered the scope of the trial Court to interfere in the matter at the time of exercising jurisdiction under Section 228 of Cr.P.C. The observation made by the Court was based upon several Supreme Court decisions. This Court in Criminal Revision No.972/2024-Abdul Rajjak Alias Rajjak Pahalwan Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another decided on 26.11.2024 has observed as under:-
6M.Cr.C.-29714.2020 "............It is imperative to quote the provisions of Section 228, which enable the court to exercise such power, which read as under:-
228. Framing of charge,- (1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which--
(a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate or any other Judicial Magistrate of the first class and direct the accused to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or, as the case may be, the Judicial Magistrate of the first class, on such date as he deems fit, and thereupon such Magistrate shall try the offence in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant-cases instituted on a police report;
(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused.
(2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of Sub-
Section (1), the charge shall be read and explained to the accused and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.
On the face of above provisions, the trial court after considering the material produced by the prosecution should draw an opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence. The the court will not go to the extent whether the collected material shall lead to conviction of the accused. Here in this case, as per the seizure made by the prosecution of the relevant documents from the applicant and his memorandum prima facie gives a notion that the accused must have committed the crime and it is not the duty of the trial Court to evaluate whether such material would be sufficient to lead conviction in the trial for the charges levelled against the accused.
9. Of-late, this court in Criminal Revision No.3144/2022 (Hiralal Ahirwar & others v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Another) decided on 12.11.2024 while examining the scope of Section 228 of CrPC, has observed as under:-
9. Learned counsel for the respondent/State has submitted that the order of framing charge cannot be quashed at this stage because the trial court at the time of framing charge has to see whether the material produced before the court prima-facie sufficient to register an offence or not. The Court at the time of framing of charge does not evaluate the sanctity of evidence. He has also placed reliance upon a judgment reported in (2009) 16 SCC 605 - Chitresh Kumar Chopra vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and (2012) 9 SCC 734 - Praveen Pradhan Vs. State of Uttaranchal and Another.
10. I have examined the view of the Supreme Court, according to which, the onus is on the prosecution to show the circumstances 7 M.Cr.C.-29714.2020 which compelled the deceased to take the extreme step to bring an end to his life. At the same time, the Supreme Court has also observed that the duty of the trial court is to presume something at the time of framing of charge and exercising the power under Section 228 of CrPC. The Supreme Court in case of Chitresh Kumar Chopra (supra) dealing with the provisions of Section 228 of Cr.P.C. has observed as under:
"25. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences. For this limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. At this stage, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is ground for "presuming" that the accused has committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction. (See Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya [(1990) 4 SCC 76 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 47] .)
26. In Som Nath Thapa [(1996) 4 SCC 659 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 820] a three-Judge Bench of this Court explained the meaning of the word "presume". Referring to dictionary meanings of the said word, the Court observed thus: (SCC p. 671, para 32) "32. ... if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the court were to think that the accused might have [Ed.: The words "might have" were emphasised in the original.] committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has [Ed.: Emphasis in original.] committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of a charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage.
(emphasis supplied)"
11. From the observation made by the Supreme Court, it is clear that the trial court is required to evaluate the material and the documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences. It is further observed by the Court that for such limited 8 M.Cr.C.-29714.2020 purpose, the court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. The Supreme Court also observed that "the Court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is a ground for 'presuming' that the accused has committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction".
12. In Chitresh Kumar Chopra (supra), the Supreme Court has also relied upon a case of State of Maharashtra vs. Som Nath Thapa reported in (1996) 4 SCC 659 and observed that if the court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence, it can frame the charge.
10. Thus, in my opinion, on the basis of seizure of the documents and memorandum of the accused, I do not find any illegality in the impugned order inasmuch as it was not a case in which request made by the accused for his discharge could have been accepted. Albeit, it was argued on behalf of the respondents that when the petition under Section 482 of CrPC for quashing the FIR has already faced dismissal, the scope of Section 228 becomes narrower and only on that ground this revision can be dismissed, but I am not convinced with the said submission because the scope of exercising power under Section 482 of CrPC and the scope of exercising power under Section 228 are altogether different. Obviously, the power provided under Section 482 of CrPC is exercised by the High Court, whereas the power enshrined under Section 228 of CrPC is exercised by the trial Court that too on the basis of material placed before it along with the charge-sheet................."
12. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, the power provided under Section 228 of Cr.P.C. and the order passed by the trial Court, I do not find that the trial Court has committed any illegality to hold that material before the Court is sufficient to draw an inference that offence under Sections 420 and 406 of IPC is made out. The High Court while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC has observed that the contents of FIR are sufficient to form an opinion that the offence of Sections 406 and 420 of IPC is rightly made out and no observation was made by the Court that it was a civil transaction and, therefore, criminal prosecution cannot be initiated but at the same time, stand of malicious prosecution has been rejected by the Court and stand of initiating prosecution with mala fide intention was also not considered by the Court saying that the same can 9 M.Cr.C.-29714.2020 be tested only when evidence is led. Therefore, at this stage, considering the observation made by the Co-ordinate Bench and the order passed by the trial Court, I am of the opinion that the trial Court while framing the charge did not commit any wrong as the Court has observed that whatever documents produced before the Court along with the charge-sheet, no inference until evidence is led, can be drawn in respect of those documents.
13. In view of the aforesaid observation, the petition, being misconceived, is hereby dismissed.
(SANJAY DWIVEDI) JUDGE rao SATYA SAI RAO 2025.03.13 16:58:36 +05'30'