Gauhati High Court
Shri Nalini Ranjan Sirkar vs The Superintendent Of Taxes And Ors. on 10 February, 1986
Equivalent citations: [1986]62STC21(GAUHATI)
Author: B.L. Hansaria
Bench: B.L. Hansaria
JUDGMENT K. Lahiri, J.
1. We propose to dispose of the writ petitions by a common' order as they involve common questions of law and fact.
2. The core question in the writ petitions :
Whether egg, live poultry and dressed poultry are 'meat' within the meaning of item 11 of Schedule III to the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947, as amended ?
3. The relevant facts necessary for disposal of the petitions :
At all relevant times the petitioner was a "registered dealer" under the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947, for short "the Act" and registered army contractor for supply of food-stuff to the armed forces in the region on contract basis. The contracts in question were for supply of "food-stuff" including potato, fish, vegetable, eggs and poultry. The Superintendent of Taxes assessed the petitioner to sales tax on poultry and eggs for the period ending 31st March, 1967, 30th September, 1967, and 31st March, 1968, by his orders dated 15th September, 1967, 21st February, 1968, and 18th August, 1969, respectively. In all the cases the petitioner had claimed that poultry, live or dressed and eggs were exempt from sales tax under item 11 of Schedule III to "the Act". The contention raised was turned down by the Superintendent in all the cases. On appeal the Commissioner of Taxes rejected the said plea in all the three appeals but he ordered that appeals pertaining to the periods ending 31st March, 1967, and 30th September, 1967, wherein the petitioner had claimed that he was entitled to exemption under item 34 of Schedule III to "the Act" to the effect that he had sold the edibles to the Defence Services Installations and, therefore, not liable to be taxed was not enquired into by the Superintendent. Accordingly the Commissioner directed the Superintendent of Taxes to enquire into and determine the question. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the appellate orders, preferred three separate appeals before the Assam Board of Revenue which were registered as 34 STA/69, 35 STA/69 and 36 STA/69. The Board of Revenue also rejected the plea of the petitioner that poultry and eggs were "meat" in all the appeals. However, in Appeals Nos. 34 STA/69 and 35 STA/69 "the Board" directed the Superintendent of Taxes to examine the claim of the petitioner as to whether the victuals were sold in Defence Services Installations in NEFA, Lekhabali and Lekhapani, if so, whether item 34 of the Schedule attracted in those cases. The Board disposed the appeals by a common order.
4. The petitioner has questioned the validity of the orders of the taxing authorities claiming that the eatables are not exigible to tax yet the authorities below have made him liable in breach of the Constitution and the law. The petitioner claims that the food-stuffs are exempt from tax as they fall under item 11 of Schedule III to "the Act". The petitioner further claims that the authorities have acted without jurisdiction and made him liable on clear misconstruction of the term "meat" in item 11 of Schedule III to "the Act". The petitioner having exhausted all the statutory remedies provided under "the Act" has come up before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for writs of certiorari and/or mandamus for quashing the impugned orders with the direction to the taxing authorities not to make him liable to sales tax in respect of the items in question.
5. Whether the High Court is competent to entertain application under Article 226 of the Constitution and decide the questions posed by the petitioner:
Time out of number the Supreme Court has held that the question as to whether a particular commodity is subject to tax or it is covered by exemption can be determined in writ applications. To cite but just a few decisions, we refer to State of U.P. v. Indian Hume Pipe Company AIR 1977 SC 1132, Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. State of Bihar AIR 1976 SC 2478 and India Carbon Ltd. v. Superintendent of Taxes AIR 1972 SC 154. Apart from the cases alluded to, the Supreme Court has in a train of decisions held that the question whether an article falls within the exemption or not could be determined by the High Court in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. On the authority of the decisions of the Supreme Court we hold that the petitioner is entitled to raise the question posed by him in the writ petitions.
6. Contentions of the parties :
Mr. J. P. Bhattacharjee, learned Advocate-General, Nagaland, has contended that "eggs" and "poultry", whether dressed or live, are "meat" and fall under item 11 of Schedule III. The victuals are understood in the trade, i.e., in popular sense or common parlance, as "meat", submits learned counsel and refers several decisions of the Supreme Court wherein the golden rules of interpretation of the entries of the sales tax statutes have been settled, explaining the steps-in-aid to determine the true meaning of the words itemized in the schedules charging to or exempting from sales tax. In the course of submission learned counsel has referred to the dictionary meaning of the terms "eggs", "poultry" and "meat". Two decisions of the High Courts of Bombay and Calcutta have been placed wherein the High Courts have held that dressed poultry falls under the ilk of edible termed as "meat", itemized in the Sales Tax Acts. Mr. D. N. Choudhury, learned Additional Advocate-General, Assam, appearing for the respondents has submitted that the victual substance "meat" according to all standard English dictionaries specifically excludes "poultry" while defining the term "meat". Learned counsel submits that even a school-going child studying English is taught and knows that the term "meat" specifically excludes poultry. It has further been contended that no foundation has been laid by the petitioner either before the authorities below or in his writ petitions in support of the contention that in common parlance or in popular sense the eatables "poultry" and "egg" fall within the meaning of the term "meat".
7. Before dealing with the questions as to whether egg(s), live poultry and dressed poultry are exempt from payment of sales tax under "the Act" we extract below item 11 of Schedule III to "the Act" :
Schedule III * * *
11. Fish, ghee (but not vegetable ghee), dashi, butter, Except when sold in cream, casein, meat and vegetables (but not onion, sealed containers." garlic, spices and condiments).
The articles or commodities described in the item are food-stuffs or eatables. The contention is that eggs, poultry, live or dressed, are nothing but "meat". The base or the foundation of the argument is that the term "meat" means flesh of animals and birds. On this foundation it has been claimed that the articles are "meat".
8. Let us take each edible and decide whether it is meat.
A. Whether egg is meat within the meaning of item 11 of Schedule III ?
An egg is spheroidal body produced by a female bird, reptile or insect containing germ of new individual especially that of domestic fowl for eating. In common parlance or in popular sense in the State of Assam or as a matter of that in India, egg is never considered as "flesh". Even if we assume that flesh of domestic birds is meat we cannot accept that embryo enclosed in a shell produced by a hen, reptile or insect contains any flesh. It is the common knowledge that the fleshy substance between the skin and bones of animal bodies are known as flesh. Eggs do not contain any flesh. We cannot accept the proposition that an egg in due course of time shall turn out to be a bird, reptile or insect and as such it should be treated as a shell containing flesh to be. Before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana it was claimed that live animals, which is known in the army vocabulary as "meat on hoof" was "preserved meat", the preservation being the natural carton consisting of the skin of the animal. The contention was accepted by the High Court, but turned down by the Supreme Court in Daffadar Bhagat Singh & Sons v. Joint Excise and Taxation Commissioner AIR 1976 SC 2544, by observing thus :
that the skin covering the flesh of the animal preserves its life; to think that the skin is a carton for the flesh, which can be used for food after the animal is slaughtered, goes against commonsense.
We similarly hold that it goes against commonsense and logic to conclude that an egg in due course might turn out to be a bird, reptile or insect and, therefore, it should be treated as "flesh". We hold that the essential attribute of meat is absent in egg. There is no flesh content in egg. Learned counsel has failed to place before us any authority or decision showing that egg is meat for the purpose of the Sales Tax Acts. We find that in the sales tax statutes of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Delhi, Gujarat, Kerala and West Bengal, "fresh eggs" have been expressly and specifically exempted from tax, along with other edibles, like meat, etc. As such, it is evident that not only in this State but throughout India egg is never considered as meat or flesh. It connotes a different item. There is no material before us to show that in common parlance or in popular sense "egg" is anywhere understood as flesh or meat. For the foregoing reasons we reject the contention.
B. Whether live poultry are meat ?
In a sale transaction when live birds are sold and purchased they are purchased as "live birds". The question of sale of flesh does not arise. The sale of "live poultry" being sale of birds and not flesh or meat, cannot attract the item in question. At all relevant time "live birds" or "poultry" were not exempt from sales tax, only "meat" was exempt. In Daffadar Bhagat Singh AIR 1976 SC 2544 a similar question came up as to whether sale of "live animals" was meat under the Sales Tax Act wherein the Supreme Court has held that the sale of live animal or "meat on hoof" is not sale of "meat". "Meat on hoof" is an army term for goat and sheep. Flesh of slaughtered animal is meat and, as such, if live animals are sold they are not sale of meat or flesh of animal. If what is sold and purchased is live animals or live birds it would be sale of live animals or birds. However, if the birds or animals are slaughtered and price is paid for dressed meat of animals it may attract item 11 of Schedule III to "the Act", provided flesh of birds is meat. In Pradesh Palit v. Superintendent of Taxes [1985] 1 GLR 434, the Full Bench of the Court has held, on the authority of Daffadar Bhagat Singh AIR 1976 SC 2544, that the sale of live animals or meat on hoof is not sale of meat to attract item 11 of Schedule III to "the Act". In Chiranjit Lal v. State of Assam AIR 1985 SC 1387 the Supreme Court has held that if the transactions between the buyer and seller were for purchase and sale of meat and not for the sale of live animals item 11 of Schedule III to "the Act" would be attracted. Their Lordships have held that the "meat on hoof" becomes meat proper no sooner the goat is slaughtered, the skin is pulled off and the flesh is sold. We are, therefore, of the opinion that if the transactions between the parties are for the meat content, that is, if what is purchased is "dressed meat" but not "live animals" and the price is paid for the meat of the animals it will attract item 11 of Schedule III. We further hold that the sale of live animals or live birds cannot be sale of flesh, falling within the connotation of the term "meat". On the authority of the aforesaid decisions and for the reasons set out above we hold that the sale or purchase of live birds or live poultry did not attract item 11. We hasten to add that by notification dated 13th September, 1985, issued under Section 7(2) of "the Act" and published in the Assam Gazette dated 2nd October, 1985, Part IIA, page 1611, item 11-A has been inserted in Schedule III, which we extract hereinbelow :
1. After item 11 of the Schedule, the following shall be inserted as item 11-A, namely :-
'I1-A. Fresh eggs, poultry.' The notification brings to light that the edibles "fresh eggs" and "poultry", two distinct edibles, have been added in the Schedule. There is no wrangle at the Bar that the term "poultry" means "large domestic fowls, like hen, duck, geese, turkeys kept for eating or for egg-laying''. The inclusion of the items, fresh eggs and poultry, in item 11-A be speaks that the legislature were fully aware that the articles "fresh eggs" and "poultry" were distinct and different from the edible described as "meat" in item 11. The notification also lays bare that the legislature while using the word "meat" in the Schedule were fully aware that in common parlance it excluded "fresh eggs" and "poultry". The fact that the legislature have used three different and distinct items, i.e., meat in item 11, "fresh eggs" and "poultry", in item 11-A is indicative of the legislative intent that in common parlance the edible substance known as "meat" did not include eggs and poultry. In our opinion, therefore, eggs and live poultry were not exempt from tax at all relevant times. The view that we have taken finds ample support from the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramavatar Budhaiprasad [1961] 12 STC 286 (SC) wherein it was contended that "betel leaves" fell within the meaning of the term "vegetables". In the Sales Tax Act "vegetables" was included in item 6 and "betel leaves" in item 36. Later item 36 was omitted. Their Lordships held that "pans" were not food-stuffs and also considered the effect of the use of two distinct and different items in items Nos. 6 and 36 and concluded that the use of two distinct and different items had indicated the legislative intent that "betel leaves" were not vegetables. We extract the relevant observations :
The intention of the legislature in regard to what is vegetables is shown by its specifying vegetables and betel leaves as separate items in the schedule exempting articles from sales tax.
For the foregoing reasons we hold that 'live poultry' do not come within the term "meat".
C. Whether dressed poultry, i.e., flesh of domestic fowls like hens, ducks, etc., are exempt from taxation ?
It has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the word "meat" has not been defined in "the Act" and, as such, the word should be construed in the sense in which it is understood in the trade, by the dealer and the consumer, who are concerned with it. It has been contended that the term "meat" is an edible substance which subsumes flesh of animals as well as birds or poultry. The substance or "the meat of the contention" is that flesh of birds or poultry falls under the ilk of the edible substance described as "meat" in item 11 of the Schedule. The contention has been repelled by Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the respondents, who has contended that even a school child learning English knows that the current usage of the English word "meat" specifically and clearly excludes "fish" and "poultry". As such, the term could not gain the meaning sought to be applied in common parlance or in popular sense. The legislature could not have used the term "meat", which specifically excludes eggs and poultury according to the current meaning of the term, to include egg, poultry or flesh of birds. The words "meat", "eggs" and "poultry" being English words, learned counsel for both the parties have placed a number of English dictionaries in support of their contention. Learned counsel for the parties have placed before us a number of decisions of the Supreme Court, the High Courts as well as some English, American and Canadian decisions which are set out hereinbelow :
1. Ramavatar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer [1961] 12 STC 286 (SC).
2. Motipur Zamindari Co. v. State of Bihar AIR 1962 SC 660.
3. Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh [1967] 19 STC 469 (SC).
4. Sarin Chemical Laboratory v. Commissioner of Sales Tax AIR 1971 SC 65.
5. Sales Tax Commissioner, U.P. v. Ladha Singh AIR 1971 SC 2221.
6. India Carbon Ltd. v. Superintendent of Taxes, Gauhati AIR 1972 SC 154.
7. Income-tax Commissioner v. Taj Mahal Hotel [1971] 82 ITR 44 (SC).
8. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. S. N. Brothers [1973] 31 STC 302 (SC).
9. Mangulu Sahu Ramahari Sahu v. Sales Tax Officer AIR 1974 SC 390.
10. Avadh Sugar Mills v. Sales Tax Officer, Sitapur AIR 1973 SC 2440.
11. Daffadar Bhagat Singh and Sons v. Joint Excise and Taxation Commissioner AIR 1976 SC 2544.
12. State of West Bengal v. Washi Ahmed AIR 1977 SC 1638.
13. Porritts and Spencer (Asia) Ltd. v. State of Haryana; AIR 1979 SC 300.
14. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [1980] 46 STC 266 (SC).
15. Two hundred Chests of Tea (1824) 9 Wheaton (US) 430 (438).
16. Crawford v. Spooner (1846) 4 MIA 179 (181) (PC).
17. Grenfell v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1876) 1 Ex D 242.
18. Lion Insurance Association v. Tucker (1883-84) 12 QBD 176.
19. Attorney-General v. Milney (1914-15) All ER 1061 (1063) (HC).
20. Corporation of the City of Victoria v. Bishop of Vancouver Island AIR 1921 PC 240 (242).
21. Planters Nut & Chocolate Co. v. The King (1952) 1 Dom LR 385 (Canada).
22. Hardwick Game Farm v. Suffolk, Etc., Association Ltd. [1966] 1 All ER 309 (CA) (323, 324, 334).
23. Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. [1940] AC 1014.
24. Wilma E. Addition v. Holly Hill Fruit Producers 322 US 607 (618).
25. Observations of Holmes, J., extracted in Ponitts and Spencer (Asia) Ltd. v. State of Haryana AIR 1979 SC 300.
The clippings or paper cuttings and reference of :
26. Chiranjit Lal v. State of Assam, since reported in AIR 1985 SC 1387.
27. P. A. Thillai Chidambara Nadar v. Additional Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Madurai, since reported in AIR 1985 SC 1644.
28. Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd. v. Union of India, since reported in 1985 UJ (SC) 1070 AND Two decisions of the High Courts :
29. Collector of Sales Tax v. Gaurimal Mahajan & Sons [1959] 10 STC 452 (Bom).
30. Aloke Chand Mitra v. State of West Bengal [1973] 31 STC 474 (Cal).
There is no dispute at the Bar that the words "meat", "eggs", "poultry" are edibles of everyday use and reference to the dictionaries is essential to grasp or take the meaning of the words. Indeed to find out the general sense of English words we take resort to English dictionaries as they deal with the meaning of the words, their orthography, signification, use, derivation and history or at least some or most of these. Any standard English dictionary conveys the signification and the current usage of the words and expressions. The submissions find ample support in the binding decisions of the Supreme Court in Income-tax Commissioner, West Bengal v. Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy AIR 1957 SC 768 (772), Bhogilal Chunilal Pandya v. State of Bombay AIR 1959 SC 356 (357), Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa AIR 1975 SC 17 (25-26) and the cases alluded to in the list of decisions wherein asterisk marks have been put. These apart, we find that it is permissible to take resort to dictionary to resolve the point and make use of it under such circumstances in R. v. Peters (1886) 16 QBD 636 (641) (per Lord Coleridge) and Camden (Marquis) v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1914] 1 KB 641 (647) (per Cozens-Hardy, M. R.).
In Crawford v. Spooner (1846) 4 MIA 179 (181) (PC) it has been ruled that the words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases are understood according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary. "The true way", said Lord Brougham, is "to take the words as the legislature have given them, and to take the meaning which the words given naturally imply, unless where the construction of those words is either by the preamble or by the context of the words in question, controlled or altered".
In Attorney-General v. Milney (1914-15) All ER 1061 (1063) (HC) Lord Viscount Haldane, L. C, stated that if the word used "has a natural meaning we cannot depart from that meaning unless reading the statute as a whole, the context directs us to do so".
"In the construction of statutes, their words must be interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense unless there be something in the context, or in the object of the statute in which they occur, or in the circumstances in which they are used, to show that they were used in a special sense different from their ordinary grammatical sense", said Lord Atkinson in Corporation of the City of Victoria v. Bishop of Vancouver Island AIR 1921 PC 240 (242). The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning, said Viscount Haldane, L.C. in Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. [1940] AC 1014. Indeed, the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense, unless the context or object of the statute suggest the contrary. In construing the items in the sales tax enactment their Lordships of the Supreme Court have used various dictionaries. In our opinion, the words used in the statute should be given their usual, ordinary and natural meaning or signification according to the current use or usages of the words. In Porritts & Spencer (Asia) Ltd. v. State of Haryana AIR 1979 SC 300, P. N. Bhagwati, J. (as his Lordship then was), extracted a very pertinent observation of Holmes, J., which we quote hereinbelow :
A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.
Indeed, a word is a living thought which may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used. The meaning of a word is enlarged or constricted or entirely changed within a few decades. It is, therefore, necessary to take the current meaning of the word, i.e., at the time when it was used by the legislature. We consider that the modern use and usages of the terms used in the 20th Century should be the definitive index of the legislative intention. The English language of the 10th Century was totally different from the modern English. The signification or meaning of many words became archaic and obsolete in the middle English period when French words became more popular in use and usages. The modern English language discarded the old currency and usages and the words became classifiable according to the sphere of their currency and usage. According to the old English usage the term "meat" meant anything used as nourishment for men and animals; usually, solid food, in contradistinction to drink : it included the edible parts of fruits, nuts, eggs, etc., the pulp, kernel, yoke, etc. However, in due course the term "meat" in English language came to be known exclusively as "the flesh of animals used for food". It is now used in modern English language in a narrower sense in contradistinction to fish and poultry. In all modern English dictionaries the current meaning of the word "meat" is "flesh of animals" as opposed to fish and poultry. Now, in modern English the term "meat" excludes the flesh of "fish and poultry". The old meaning of the term "meat", which included the flesh of fish and poultry is now archaic. The obvious current meaning of the word "meat" is gathered from the Oxford English dictionary, Vol. VI (1933 Edition), page 282. However, in America, the current meaning of "meat" includes flesh of animals and birds. In the Concise Oxford Dictionary, the Chambers's Twentieth Century Dictionary, Funk and Wagnalls' Standard Dictionary, Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary (Unabridged) (Second Edition), Shorter Oxford English Dictionary and Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English-by A. S. Hornby and other standard English dictionaries, the current meaning of the word "meat" is flesh of animals or mammals as opposed to fish or poultry. The submission of Mr. Choudhury that the learner of English language is taught in school this current meaning of the term, has substance. However, this meaning of the term "meat" vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances as the idioms and phrases coined with the word "meat" may have no connection with flesh of animal, fish or bird, say, "sweet meat". Similarly, the meaning of the expressions "white meat" mean any article of food made with milk : vide the Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. VI, page 282. Similarly, the terms "white meat" may be used in contradistinction to "red meat". The technical expressions may be used by experts in culinary preparations to indicate the colour of the flesh. The flesh of animals is red, whereas flesh of fish and birds is white. In that sense an expert or connoisseur of food may indicate the colour of the flesh or food preparations by using expressions "white meat", "dark meat" or "red meat". Of course, in America the expressions "dark meat" mean meat of chickens, turkeys, except the breast and wings which are called "light meat". In "sweet meat" the word "meat" has been used as food but it has nothing to do with the flesh of animal, fish or bird. In our opinion, these are relevant for considering the decisions in Collector of Sales Tax v. Gaurimal Mahajan [1959] 10 STC 452 (Bom) and Aloke Chand Mitra v. State of West Bengal [1973] 31 STC 474 (Cal). It is evident that the current meaning of the term "meat" is understood by an ordinary English knowing person as the flesh of animals as distinguished from or opposed to poultry and fish. Should we construe the meaning of a common English word in its ordinary sense, i.e., in that sense which a ordinary educated Indian learner of English language would attach to the word or should we depart from ordinary sense of the word and accept the contention that the meaning of the word in common parlance or popular sense is converse or opposed to the ordinary meaning ? We are thus confronted with the problem that the word "meat" in its natural and ordinary sense means the flesh of animals as opposed to "fish and poultry". Can the ordinary meaning of a term gain a sense in common parlance or in popular sense which is totally opposed to the current meaning of the word ? In none of the reported decisions of the Supreme Court their Lordships have resolved the problem and, therefore, we do not get any light from the Apex Court. However, a similar problem arose in Hardwick Farm v. Suffolk [1966] 1 All ER 309 (323, 324, 334) (CA). The precise question posed was "Are pheasants poultry ?" The term "poultry" was not defined in the Act. Diplock, L. J., dealt with the problem thus :
The learned Judge was referred to a number of other statutes in which the word 'poultry' is used. He derived no assistance from them... 'Poultry' is a common English word. There is nothing in the statute to indicate that it should be construed in anything but its ordinary sense and this is for the court to decide. I do not think that the ordinary educated Englishman would call pheasants 'poultry'. If he consulted the Oxford Dictionary, as it is permissible for the court to do, he would find this view confirmed by the express exclusion of pheasants from the term... I do not think that in its ordinary sense the expression 'poultry' does include pheasants. I should so hold.
In our case "poultry", "eggs" and "meat" are common English words. There is nothing in "the Act" that it should be construed in anything but its ordinary sense. We think that the ordinary educated Indian conversant with the English words would call "poultry" or "egg" as "meat". If he consulted any standard English dictionary, he would find out the view confirmed by the express exclusion of "fish" and "poultry" from the term "meat". We do not think that the ordinary educated Indian knowing elementary English would consider "egg" and "poultry" as "meat". We are, therefore, of the view that when in its natural, ordinary or popular sense the word "meat" specifically excludes "fish" and "poultry", anyone conversant with ordinary English words would ever consider that "meat" includes "poultry" and "fish". The principles settled by the Supreme Court for interpreting undefined words and expressions in the sales tax enactments cannot be better expressed than what is stated by Pathak, J., in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. [1980] 46 STC 256 (SC) :
In determining the meaning or connotation of words and expressions describing an article or commodity the turnover of which is taxed in the sales tax enactment, if there is one principle fairly well-settled, it is that the words or expressions must be construed in the sense in which they are understood in the trade, by the dealer and the consumer. It is they who are concerned with it, and it is the sense in which they understand it that constitutes the definitive index of the legislative intention when the statute was enacted.
9. It is the well-settled rule which we find in Ramavatar Budhaiprasad [1961] 12 STC 286 (SC), Motipur Zamindari Company [1962] 13 STC 1 (SC), Commissioner of Sales Tax [1967] 19 STC 469 (SC), Sarin Chemical Laboratory AIR 1971 SC 65, Sales Tax Commissioner, U.P. AIR 1971 SC 2221, India Carbon Ltd. AIR 1972 SC 154, Income-tax Commissioner [1971] 82 ITR 44 (SC), Commissioner of Sales Tax [1973] 31 STC 302 (SC), Mangulu Sahu Ramahari Sahu [1973] 32 STC 494 (SC), Avadh Sugar Mills [1973] 31 STC 469 (SC), Daffadar Bhagat Singh & Sons [1976] 37 STC 527 (SC), State of West Bengal v. Washi Ahmed [1977] 39 STC 378 (SC), Porritts and Spencer (Asia) Ltd. [1978] 42 STC 433 (SC), Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. [1980] 46 STC 256 (SC), Chiranjit Lal , since reported in [1985] 60 STC 89 (SC), P. A. Thillai Chidambara, since reported in [1985] 60 STC 80 (SC) and Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd. 1985 UJ (SC) 1070. It is also well-settled rule that it is for the assessee who claims exemption to adduce evidence or material that a particular article is an exempted item.
10. In the cases in hand no material has been placed before us to show that in common parlance flesh of birds or poultry is understood as "meat". Apart from the American dictionaries we do not find any support for the proposition. In Washi Ahmed AIR 1977 SC 1638, the assessee placed material before the sales tax authorities that the railway authority had also treated "green ginger" as vegetables, even the Corporation of Calcutta included "green ginger" in the category of vegetables in the Market Bulletin. In Avadh Sugar Mills [1973] 31 STC 469 (SC) commercial journals and newspapers were placed and considered. In the decisions alluded to by us with asterisk marks, we find that their Lordships considered the plain meaning of the disputed words from the dictionaries. In the instant cases there is absolutely no material to support the contention from any journals, bulletin, clippings or paper cuttings, etc., to indicate that in common parlance the flesh of poultry is also known as "meat", we are of the view that the onus or burden of the petitioner is onerous when the plain or the current use of the term "meat" expressly excludes "fish and poultry". If we discard the natural, ordinary or popular meaning of the term and take the widest meaning to include flesh of "fish" and "poultry" which is now archaic, we find that we cannot take it. The term "fish" is very much there in item 11. As such, the term was never used in the wider or archaic sense. It is, therefore, difficult for us to accept the contention that the legislature have taken the wider or discarded meaning of the term "meat" to include "fish" and "poultry".
11. It has been ruled by the Supreme Court in the decisions referred above that the words and expressions must be construed in the sense in which they are understood in the trade, by the dealer and the consumer. The petitioner is the only dealer who claims that the term "meat" is understood in the trade as flesh of poultry as well, though the meaning is opposed to the ordinary or plain meaning of the term. Now, let us consider what the purchaser and the consumer understood by the meaning of the term "meat". The consumers are the members of the armed forces. We find that whenever the consumers required supply of the "flesh of animals" they specifically ordered for "flesh of meat on hoof" or "meat", vide Daffadar Bhagat Singh [1976] 37 STC 527 (SC), Chiranjit Lal , since reported in [1985] 60 STC 89 (SC) and Pradesh Palit v. Superintendent of Taxes [1986] 61 STC 255 (Gauhati) [FB]; (1985) 1 GLR 434. The same purchasers requiring supply of eggs and poultry they specifically tender for these articles as they have done in these cases. As such, the purchasers clearly classified their requirements according to the sphere of currency or usage. The purchaser knew the specific current meaning of the term "poultry" as flesh of birds, "egg" as egg and "meant" as only the flesh of animales The petitioner-dealer is a registered army contractor and, as such, we have no doubt that he was fully aware that the term "meat" was meat exclusively as the flesh of animals. The supply orders of the purchasers classified the victuals into three categories, e. g., "eggs", "poultry" and "meat" separately and as such, we are constrained to hold that the purchaser or the buyer knew that the term "meat" did not include poultry and so did the suppliers.
12. Further, we find that the widest meaning of the term is not the criterion to determine the meaning of the word understood in common parlance. The term "vegetable" is a term of the widest context to include all types or classes of vegetable but the term has been given a restricted meaning to include only "the vegetables grown in kitchen garden or farm and are used for the table", : vide Ramavatar [1961] 12 STC 286 (SC), Motipur Zamindari Co. [1962] 13 STC 1 (SC), Mangalu Sahu Ramahari Sahu [1973] 32 STC 494 (SC), State of West Bengal v. Washi Ahmed [1977] 39 STC 378 (SC), and P. A. Thillai Chidambara, since reported in AIR 1985 SC 1644. As such, the widest meaning of a term is not the popular meaning of the word used in the sales tax statute. The scientific and technical meaning of the term "vegetable" to include all kinds and classes was discarded and the limited meaning was applied because the legislatures are notto suppose our merchants to be naturalist, geologist or botanist. The scientific or technical meaning of the term was discarded by their Lordships and the limited or popular or ordinary meaning of the word was applied. Similarly, in Jaswant Singh Charan Singh [1967] 19 STC 469 (SC) the scientific or technical meaning of the term "coal" was discarded and construed according to their popular meaning, i.e., as they were understood in commerce. In Sarin Chemical Laboratory [1970] 26 STC 339 (SC), the expression "tooth powder" was considered to be one of the toilet requisites or toilet. In India Carbon Ltd. [1971] 28 STC 603 (SC), petroleum coke was considered to be included within the expression "coal" because the term "coal" was defined to include "coke" "in all its forms". In the instant cases the plain and ordinary meaning of the term "meat" specifically excludes eggs and flesh of poultry and as such, in our opinion, the term cannot take the items expressly excluded. The three words "meat", "eggs" and "poultry" have been defined differently and classified accordingly in all English dictionaries. Situated thus, we cannot assume that the legislature have taken the American meaning or the extended meaning of the term "meat". We are of the firm opinion that neither the dealer nor the consumer nor the legislature understood that the common meaning of the term "meat" includes flesh of poultry or eggs.
13. We, therefore, hold that in the instant cases the petitioner has failed to place before us any material to show that the edibles known as egg and poultry are understood in the trade, by the dealer and the consumer as "meat". We also hold that in its natural, ordinary or popular sense the term "meat'' means the flesh of animals as opposed to "fish" or "poultry". We hold that the legislature by using the term "fish" in item 11 have clearly indicated that the word "meat" was used in its natural, ordinary and popular sense, which specifically excludes fish and poultry. We also hold that the legislature by inserting "fresh eggs" and "poultry" in item 11-A have clearly expressed that they never used the word "meat" to include eggs and poultry. We further hold that when the obvious and current use of the term "meat" is opposed to flesh of poultry or egg, the term could not gain the extended meaning in common parlance or in the trade. We hold that nobody conversant in English words would ever call poultry or egg as "meat" in view of the plain meaning of the words in the English dictionaries. We also hold that the purchasers used to tender for supply of "meat", "meat on hoof", "fish", "eggs" and "poultry" by calling for tenders and classifying specifically the items required by them. We also hold that the petitioner being a registered army contractor was fully aware that the purchasers meant "meat", i.e., flesh of animals specifically stating so in the tenders, and, the suppliers including the petitioner were fully aware that when the purchasers desired to purchase eggs or flesh of poultry they called for tenders to supply eggs, live poultry or dressed poultry, and, as such, we hold that the purchasers as well as suppliers were fully aware that "meat" did not include eggs or flesh of poultry. We also hold that when the legislature have used "fish", "poultry", "eggs" and "meat" denoting four different and distinct items separately, the legislative intent is obvious. We also hold that the terms "meat", "eggs", "poultry" and "fish" have been defined differently and classified separately in all standard English dictionaries and the words convey different meanings. We further hold that the legislature when they used the term "meat" did not use the word as understood in America but which is used in English dictionaries. We are of the firm opinion that neither the dealer nor the consumer nor the legislature ever understood that the meaning of the common word "meat" could include flesh of fish, poultry and eggs.
14. We are yet to deal with the two decisions of the High Court wherein it has been held that the dressed poultry or flesh of birds is "meat". In Collector of Sales Tax, Bombay v. Gaurimal Mahajan [1959] 10 STC 452 (Bom), their Lordships considered the meaning of the expression "meat" as defined in Webster's New International Dictionary and found the meaning of the term as "flesh of animals used as food as distinguished from fish or fowl". Their Lordships held that:
Undoubtedly in common parlance and even commercially meat means flesh of cattle, swine, sheep, goats, etc., and may not include dressed poultry but the expression 'meat' in its wider connotation does include dressed poultry.
We respectfully agree with Shah, J., that in common parlance and even commercially "meat" means flesh of animals or mammals and excludes "poultry" whether live or dressed. However, with great respect we differ from the view that in departure to the meaning of a word in common parlance, i.e., in trade and commerce, we can accept any other meaning while construing an item in sales tax enactments. We respectfully differ from the view expressed that in departure to the meaning attributed to a word in common parlance we can take the meaning of the word defined in the wider sense in a dictionary. We respectfully differ from the view that the term "meat" may in its wider connotation includes dressed poultry and, therefore, the said meaning should be attributed to the word while construing an item of the sales tax enactments. In our opinion, the view expressed is opposed to the golden rule laid down by the Supreme Court. We are to take the meaning attributed to it in common parlance and the wider connotation of a word in a dictionary does not necessarily mean that it is so understood in common parlance. We are of the view that when the word "meat" in common parlance or even commercially means flesh of animals or mammals and excludes poultry, the matter comes to an end, and, we must give that meaning to the word used in the sales tax legislation. We, therefore, cannot accept the reasoning and the conclusion reached by the Bombay High Court in Gaurimal Mahajan [1959] 10 STC 452. In Aloke Chand Mitra [1973] 31 STC 474 (Cal), wherein the moot question was whether the expression "dressed poultry" came within the meaning of the term "meat" under the Sales Tax Act. The Calcutta High Court answered the question in the affirmative relying on Gaurimal Mahajan [1959] 10 STC 452 (Bom). It appears on a bare perusal of the decision that Banerjee, J., accepted the view that in common parlance "meat" means flesh of animals or mammals as distinguished from poultry. However, the learned Judge has accepted the proposition that in its wider connotation the word "meat" includes dressed poultry, on the sole ground that chicken is sometimes called "white meat". In short, it has been held that though in common parlance or popular sense the term "meat" specifically excludes flesh of poultry and fish, yet when chicken is sometimes called "white meat", so "dressed chicken" falls within the connotation of the term "meat". The basis of the finding is extracted below :
I have already said that the chicken is sometimes called 'white meat'.
Shortly put, the learned Judge reached the conclusion that chicken is sometimes called "white meat" and, therefore, dressed chicken, i.e., "white meat" is "meat" within the wider connotation of the word. We respectfully differ from the view expressed by his Lordship. If a word is sometimes used in a sense, the same cannot be said to be "the popular" meaning of the term. The meaning of the term should be as it is understood in the trade, by the trader and the consumer. A stray use of the word somewhere or sometimes cannot lead to the conclusion that it is so understood in common parlance. The phrase "white meat" is a technical word. Indeed an expert or connoisseur of food may call chicken or flesh of chicken as "white meat" or in culinary sense "the phrase" is technically understood as chicken but the said technical meaning of the word cannot be attributed as current in the trade. The phrase or the collocation of the words "white meat" is also known as "any article of food made with milk", vide Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. VI, page 282. The phrases or the collocation of the words "white meat", "baked meat", "milk meat" or "sweet meat" denote some classified food preparations. "Sweet meat" does not contain any "meat" at all. "Milk meat", "baked meat" or "white meat" may be preparations having nothing to do with the flesh of animals or birds. In our opinion, the combination of words, idioms or phrases may not convey the correct meaning of a word contained in it. We are of the firm view that if chicken is sometimes called somewhere as "white meat" we cannot take that it conveys the meaning as understood in common parlance. We are also of the view that the learned Judge has used a technical expression and deduced therefrom the meaning of the word "meat". A phrase or combination of words or word used in technical sense may convey a totally different meaning to a particular word contained in it, say, "the meat of the matter". In our view technical words or phrases cannot be taken as guide to interpret a word of everyday use contained in them. We respectfully differ from the view taken by Banerjee, J., in Aloke Mitra [1973] 31 STC 474 (Cal) for the reasons just alluded and the reasons set forth in the previous paragraph.
15. For the foregoing reasons we hold that "eggs", "live poultry" and "dressed poultry" are not "meat" within the meaning of the term used in item 11 of Schedule III to "the Act".
16. In the result, the petitions are dismissed. However, we make no order as to costs. The records of the Appeals Nos. 34 STA/69 and 35 STA/69 may be sent to the Superintendent of Taxes to examine the question referred to him by the appellate authority.
17. Before parting we acknowledge that there is some delay in delivery of the judgment. The reason is that in the course of the argument, clippings or newspaper cuttings and references of 3 (three) relevant decisions of the Supreme Court, namely, Chiranjit Lal , since reported in [1985] 60 STC 89 (SC), P. A. Thillai Chidambara, since reported in [1985] 60 STC 80 (SC) and Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd. 1985 UJ (SC) 1070, were placed and/or made and it was urged that the principles enunciated in those cases were relevant. No sooner had the decisions reported in the law journals we discussed and prepared the judgment. Hence the delay.
B.L. Hansaria, J.
I respectfully agree with my learned Brother in so far as the conclusion arrived at by him is concerned.
R.K. Manisana Singh, J.
I fully agree with the leading judgment of my learned Brother Lahri, J.