Madras High Court
The Executive Engineer vs K.Annalourdu ... 1St on 27 August, 2007
Author: K.Chandru
Bench: K.Chandru
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
DATED : 27/08/2007
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.CHANDRU
W.P.(MD)Nos.3815 of 2005
W.P.(MD)Nos.3816 to 3832 of 2005
and
W.P.M.P.Nos.4019, 4021, 4023, 4027, 4031,
4033, 4035, 4037, 4039, 4041, 4043,
4045, 4047, 4049, 4049, 4051 of 2005
and
M.P(MD)Nos.1 and 2 of 2006
1.The Executive Engineer,
Tamil Nadu Water Supply and
Drainage Board, Urban Division,
Kanaka Apartment,
Lady Tok College Road,
Madurai-2. ... Petitioner in all W.Ps
Vs.
1. K.Annalourdu ... 1st respondent in WP.3815/05
2. V.Veeran ... 1st respondent in WP.3816/05
3. K.Selvaraj ... 1st respondent in WP.3817/05
4. A.Arockiyadoss ... 1st respondent in WP.3818/05
5. K.Anandraj ... 1st respondent in WP.3819/05
6. A.Baskaran ... 1st respondent in WP.3820/05
7. S.Muthu ... 1st respondent in WP.3821/05
8. S.Nagarajan ... 1st respondent in WP.3822/05
9. V.Ramar ... 1st respondent in WP.3823/05
10.V.Muthukalvan ... 1st respondent in WP.3824/05
11.S.Sundarraj ... 1st respondent in WP.3825/05
12.N.Andavan ... 1st respondent in WP.3826/05
13.P.Venkidusamy (Died) ... 1st respondent in WP.3827/05
V.Lalitha W/o.Venkidusamy
(Died)
14.S.Chinnadurai ... 1st respondent in WP.3828/05
15.S.Murugesan ... 1st respondent in WP.3829/05
16.A.Balasubramanian ... 1st respondent in WP.3830/05
17.P.Alagarsamy ... 1st respondent in WP.3831/05
18.P.Alagarsamy ... 1st respondent in WP.3832/05
19.The Commissioner,
Dindigul Municipality Office,
Dindigul.
20.The Presiding Officer,
Labour Court, Tiruchirapalli
Dindigul Camp. ... 19th & 20th Respondents are
2nd & 3rd respondent
respectively in all W.Ps.
PRAYER IN ALL W.Ps: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, praying for the issuance of a Writ of Certiorari, to call for the records
in the impugned Award dated 23.12.2003 made in I.D.Nos.84/95, 85/95, 87/95,
89/95, 92/95, 93/95, 96/95, 97/95, 98/95, 99/05, 100/95, 101/95, 102/95, 103/95,
106/95, 107/95, 109/95, 113/95 on the file of the 3rd respondent
(I.D.Nos.131/91, 132/91, 134/91, 136/91, 139/91, 140/91, 143/91, 144/91, 145/91,
146/91, 147/91, 148/91, 149/91, 150/91, 153/91, 154/91, 156/91, 175/91 Labour
Court, Madurai) respectively and quash the same.
!For Petitioners ... Mrs.Jessi Jeeva Priya
^For Respondent-1 ... Mr.D.Rajendran
For Respondent-2 ... Mr.P.Srinivasa
:ORDER
The petitioner is a Statutory Board constituted by the State Government known as Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board (for short TWAD Board), created by the Tamil Nadu Act, 4 of 1971. The Board was created for the purpose of evolving Water Supply and Drainage Scheme and with their technical experts to execute such Schemes and if necessary to maintain the said Schemes in the State of Tamil Nadu.
2. Pursuant to the said enactment, the TWAD Board has been conceiving, executing and maintaining various Water Supply Schemes in the State of Tamil Nadu. In order to discharge its statutory obligations, the Board engages several workmen under various categories and are maintaining an administrative Secretariat at Chennai.
3.During the course of the executing their work, they had engaged many workers as Nominal Muster Roll (NMR) Workmen and this gave rise to several disputes between those workmen and the Board. Initially the TWAD Board took up contentions that various provisions of the labour laws will not apply to them. The first such plea was that the Industrial Employment Standing Order Act 1946 (for short IESO Act) will not apply to them since the Regulations made by them are statutory in character and that TWAD Board Act will over ride the provisions of the IESO Act. This contention was repelled by a Division Bench of this Court vide its Judgment in TWAD Board Vs. M.D.Vijayakumar & Ors. reported in 1991 (1) LLJ 260. Even thereafter, the Board had not gone in for certification of its standing orders in accordance with the said Act. In the light of Section 12A of IESO Act, the Model Standing Orders framed by the State Government will apply to the the workmen engaged by the Board.
4.The Board also took up the contention that the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 will not apply to the Workmen as it was not intended to make profit. The Division Bench accepted the stand of the workmen that the Bonus Act will apply vide its Judgment in TWAD Board Engineers Association Vs. State Government of Tamil Nadu & another reported in 1991(2) LLJ 394. Subsequently, the matter went upto the Supreme Court and it was held that the Board does not come within the exemptions provided under Section 32 (V) Payment of Bonus Act, 1965. It was held making profit was also a source of the funds created by the Board. The said Judgment is reported in 1998(1) LLJ 931 (TWAD Board Vs. TWAD Board Engineers Association) and Ors.
5. They also took up the contention that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Workmen Status Act) 1981, also will not apply to them. That was also repelled by a judgment of this Court in TWAD Board Employees Union Vs. TWAD Board reported in (1993 (1) LLJ 410). The TWAD Board's appeal was rejected by the Division Bench vide W.A.No.1191 of 1992 vide order dated 28.09.1992.
6. Therefore, ever since the inception of the Board they have been taking persistent of stand that no Labour enactments will apply to them. The Court also rejected the pleas made by them. It has now come to a situation that the TWAD Board has to meet is obligations covered by various labour enactments and there is no escape from the same.
7. In the present case, the writ petitioner/Board challenges a common Award passed by the 3rd respondent Labour Court, Trichirappalli, in the various Industrial Dispute raised by the first respondent-workmen in all the Writ Petitions regarding their non-employment. The Labour Court by its common Award, dated 23.12.2003, directed reinstatement of the respondent workmen with back wages.
8 Aggrieved by the same, the present writ petitions have been filed by them. There are altogether 18 writ petitions covered by the common Award. In one dispute, in I.D.No.102 of 2005, the Labour Court did not grant any relief and only a lumpsum payment of Rs.75,000/- was directed to be paid to the legal representatives of the second respondent. While the Legal Representatives of the deceased workmen C.Venkatasamy have not challenged the award, the petitioner- TWAD Board alone challenged that award in W.P.No.3827 of 2005.
9. The brief facts leading to the disputes are as follows:-
The respondent workmen were engaged as Watchmen, Cleaner, Electrician and Fitter. All of them were recruited calling for names through Employment Exchange. At the time of appointment it was stated that the workmen were engaged as NMR basis on daily wages and their appointment was only for a period of 90 days. In the case of Store Watchman it was stated that the post of watchman is for both night and day. It was also stated that the appointment was purely temporary that may be terminated at any time without prior notice and they have no right to make claim under any rules and regulations.
10. Even after the execution of the Water Supply Scheme for the Dindigul Municipality (the second respondent in all the writ petitions), the Municipality did not take over the Scheme for the purpose of maintenance. This necessitated the TWAD Board to continue the maintenance of the Scheme by the workmen recruited by them. Therefore not withstanding the original term of appointment for 90 days, the services of the first respondent workmen was continued
11. In view of the resolution passed by the Dindigul Municipality (Resolution No.134) and also the letter of the District Collector, dated 23.03.1987 the Pilot Scheme for Water Supply to Dindigul was brought into force from August 1987 for the purpose of handing over the said Scheme to the Dindigul Municipality. The TWAD Board wrote a letter dated 11.6.1987 by stating that they should appoint necessary maintenance staff and that without appointment of any separate staff, the Dindigul Municipality was enjoying the Water Supply.
12. According to the TWAD Board, in view of the public interest they retained the essential service for the purpose of maintenance of the Scheme on daily rate basis and because of that the water supply was continued. Despite the test run on 01.08.1989, where the Dindigul Municipality promised to take over the Scheme but did not do anything, thereafter.
13.On 05.02.1990 the TWAD Board wrote a letter to the Dindigul Municipality to take over the Scheme along with the existing staff. But, however, the second respondent Municipality by a letter dated 14.02.1990 informed that they will take over the Scheme on 16.02.1990 but insisted that the experienced daily wages will have to be discontinued from service. The Municipality has its own idea for engaging staff and hence they refused to take over the staff deployed by the TWAD Board.
14. In view of the Municipality taking over the maintenance of the Scheme from 14.12.1990 resulted in the disengagement of the first respondent workmen. But the stand of the second respondent Municipality was that the Municipality has to recruit the persons only in terms of the District Municipalities Act, and the Special Rules framed in respect of appointment of the staff and for that purpose, the order of the Government was necessary and once the Scheme is entrusted to them they will appoint their own staff. Notwithstanding the fact that the workmen were experienced for maintaining the Scheme, they refused to take over the staff.
15. On coming to know that the TWAD Board was trying to disengage the petitioner, the Trade Union to which they belong, raised an Industrial Dispute before the Labour Officer, Dindigul dated 14.2.1990 and the officer issued enquiry notice (marked as Ex.W8) to all the officers of the TWAD Board. There was also a further letter dated 14.02.1990 (marked as W.21) which was a letter sent by the Labour Officer to the trade Union to which the workmen belong. Therefore, on the date when the Scheme was handed over and when the TWAD Board proposed to disengage the first respondent workmen, there was a dispute pending before the conciliation officer and parties are bound by the obligation imposed under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act.
16.The petitioner also contended that in view of the Tamil Nadu Act 46 of 81 and they having completed 480 days' of service within a period of 24 calendar months, they deemed to be made permanent in terms of the Act and the question of disengaging from service does not arise. It was also contended that they are not project labour but all of them are either watchman or technical staff. Therefore, in view of the fact that the Board has been executing many Schemes and maintaining it on its own, they should be provided work by the Board. However, the Board notwithstanding the fact that the workmen have completed 240 days of service within a period of 12 months and notwithstanding the dispute relating to regularisation was pending before the Government Conciliation Officer, disengaged the workmen by its order dated 16.02.1990. In that order, it was stated that since the Water Supply Scheme has been handed over to the Dindigul Municipality, their service had been dispensed with effect from 16.02.1990.
17. It is an admitted case of the parties that neither prior approval as per Section 33 (1)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act was obtained from the Conciliation Officer nor the workman were paid severance pay in terms of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Workmen were forced to raise a dispute before the Labour Officer and the conciliation having failed claim statements before the Labour Court, Madurai were filed. On the transfer of the jurisdiction of Dindigul District to Trichirappalli Labour Court, the matter was transferred to the 3rd respondent Labour Court and all these disputes were taken on file as various industrial disputes.
18. Notice was ordered to the petitioner TWAD Board as well as the second respondent Municipality. Before the 3rd respondent-Labour Court, the second respondent Municipality took up the contention that they have engaged their own employees to maintain the Scheme and therefore, there is no obligation for them to undertake any procedure to dispense with the services of the workmen. This contentions was accepted by the Labour Court by its common Award. Therefore, the relief against the second respondent Municipality was rejected. No challenge to that portion of the Award is made in this Writ Petition.
19. However in so far as the writ petitioner TWAD Board is concerned, they took a plea before the Labour Court that they were forced to maintain the Scheme in view of the bottle neck created by the action of the Municipality. Since the workmen were appointed for a short period, a technical break was given to them and there is no question of following any procedure under the Industrial Disputes Act since, the scheme itself has been handed over and there was no question of retention of their service. Since the retention of their service was not guaranteed, the question of making them permanent does not arise.
20. All these contentions were rejected by the Labour court and the Labour Court held that in view of the fact that the TWAD Board had violated Section 33(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the Workmen having completed 240 days' of service and the non-fulfilment of the mandatory condition precedents provided under Section 25F(a)&(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, their termination was illegal and therefore, the Labour Court directed the reinstatement with back wages and other attendants benefits except in the case of Workman late Venkatasamy covered by I.D.102/05.
21. Aggrieved by the said common Award, dated 23.12.2003, the present Writ Petitions have been filed by the TWAD Board. This Court had passed an interim order, directing the TWAD Board to deposit the entire back-wages covered by the Award, within a period of eight weeks, but, however stayed the orders of reinstatement. The TWAD Board without any justification filed a Writ Appeal against the interim order being W.A.Nos.421 to 435 of 2006 before the Division Bench of this Court. The Division Bench, by a common order, dismissed all the writ appeals by its order dated 16.11.2006 and refused to interfere with the interim order and only stated that an early disposal of the writ petition may be desirable. In view of the same, the main writ petition itself is taken up for hearing.
22. I have heard Mrs.Jessi Jeeva Priya, learned counsel for the TWAD Board, Mr.D.Rajendran, learned counsel for the first respondent-workmen in all the Writ Petitions and Mr.P.Srinivas, learned counsel for the third respondent Municipality and have perused the records.
23. Mrs.Jessi Jeeva Priya, the learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that the Award of the Labour Court is inconsistent with the rulings of the Supreme Court. The first respondent workmen being only NMR workers paid on daily basis, they are not entitled for any relief and so far as the Scheme has been executed by the Board and handed over to the Municipality their engagement is only a stop gap arrangement and it does not create any right in their favour. She also submitted that since the workmen were engaged only by a specific order, the question of reinstatement that too with back wages does not arise.
24. The learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Lal Md Vs. Indian Railway Construction Company reported in (2007 (2) SCC 513) and contended that a person engaged in a Scheme does not have any right to continue in service. She also drew the attention of this Court more particularly to the passages found in paragraph 15 where it is stated that the employees of the Project Labours are only entitled to the benefits under Industrial Disputes Act and the question of there being engaged by the instrumentality of the State coming within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution does not arise.
25. The learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Hariyana Urban Deveopment Authority Vs. IN PAL reported in (2007 5 SCC 742) that there is no question of any continuity of service of workmen when there is a break in their service and for that proposition the learned counsel relied upon the said judgment. However, it can be safely stated that the facts of the case in Hariyana Urban Development Authority's may not apply to the case on hand. In that decision, the Supreme Court considered the engagement of Labourers by two establishments though owned by the same State and held that the term 'continuous service' provided under Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act will not apply to such workmen and therefore, the Labour Court cannot treat the service rendered in two separate establishments as a single service and then invoke the provision of the Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act.
26. The learned counsel also relied upon the Judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka Vs. Umadevi reported in (2006 (4) SCC 1) wherein a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that the temporary workmen are not entitled to have their case regularized by the orders of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and if any person is appointed in an irregular manner, the question of regularisation does not arise and no Writ of Mandamus can be issued in favour of those employees directing the State or Central Government to make those employees permanent and those employees do not have any enforceable legal right to be observed by the Government.
27. The learned counsel also relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Gurbajan Lal Vs. Regional Engineering College, Kurukshetra and Ors. (Civil Appeal No.1120/07) dated 1.3.2007 and she drew the attention of this Court to paragraph 15, where the Supreme Court earlier referred to the Judgment of the State of Himachal Pradesh Vs.Nodha Ram reported in (AIR 1997 SC 1445). It is stated therein that when a project is completed and closed due to non availability of funds, the employees will have to go along with closure and the High Court was not right in giving direction for regularisation and continue them in other places as no vested right is created under a temporary employment and direction cannot be given to regularise their service, in the absence of any existing vacancies nor a direction shall be given to the State to create posts to accommodate them.
28. There is no quarrel over the proposition laid down in all these judgments. The only question is whether the dicta laid down in those judgments referred to above are applicable to the facts of the present case. In the present case, the Labour Court had not granted any regularisation to workmen, who are first respondent in all these writ petitions. Here the Labour Court confined itself only to the non observance of the Industrial Disputes Act, when there is an infraction by the writ petitioner TWAD Board and it confined itself only to the points raised before it. The first point raised before the Labour Court on behalf of the first respondent workmen was the noncompliance with the provisions of the Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, which was admittedly not done in the present case.
29. The second point related to provision of Section 33(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. As the workmen have completed more than 240 days' of service in a period of 12 months, the Labour Court found fault with the petitioner-TWAD Board that when the regularisation of workmen is pending conciliation before the Government Labour Officer, Dindigul, the petitioner had not approached the Conciliation Officer seeking prior permission for dispensing with their service as mandated Section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Act, and such an infraction really goes to the route of the matter. In fact, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in its decision in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd Vs. Ram Gopal Sharma and Ors. reported in 2002(2) SCC 244 has held that the non-compliance of the Section 33 will make the order of termination void abinitio. In fact, the Constitution Bench had held that the workmen need not even get their case adjudicated by Labour Courts and they can even seek for monetary payments by having recourse to a claim petition filed under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
30. The Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. Sundaramoney reported in (AIR 1976 SC 1111) held that even a temporary workman with break in service is deemed to be in continuous service within the meaning of Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act and is entitled to have the benefit of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Non-compliance of the mandatory conditions precedents provided under that section, makes the order void abinitio. Therefore, the Labour Court duty bound by the two binding precedents of the Supreme Court had only set aside the order of the termination made against the fist respondent workmen in each of the Writ Petition.
31. I do not think there is any illegality or infirmity with the Award passed by the Labour court. In fact, it would not be out of place to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gurmail Singh Vs.State of Punjab reported in AIR (1996 SC 1388) where the Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with a similar subject matter where on the closure of one Corporation digging borewells was entrusted to other body of the State, the Supreme Court has taken a stand that such matters cannot be dealt with purely on the basis of Labour Law and the two entities being instrumentalities of the State must also confirm to principles of social justice. The relevant passage from the said judgment (cited supra) may be usefully extracted below:-
"11. This leaves for consideration the principal question in this case as to whether the circumstances such as these, the State is under an obligation to protect the terms and conditions of service of the tubewell operators. The State's case is that it had transferred its tubewells to the Corporation. The operators, therefore, became surplus and they were retrenched. Retrenchment compensation was duly paid to them. It is suggested that the State's obligation came to end with this. It was under no obligation to find any fresh or alternative employment to the workers. However, being a welfare State, it did arrange for such alternative employment. It was obviously under the State's directions that the Corporation went out of its way to confer a favour on the appellants by agreeing to take them into its service. It is submitted that the Corporation had its own terms and conditions of service for its employees and could not change those terms and conditions of service for the benefit of these few employees whose services had been taken over as an act of commiseration. It would be unfair on the part of the Corporation to give the appellants benefit of their earlier service in the Government and make them senior to other employees who had been serving in the Corporation right from the beginning. It is, therefore, submitted that the two chapters of service of the appellants, one with the Government and the other with the Corporation are two separate and independent chapters. The first chapter has come to a close because the State Government was not able to continue to operate the tubewells by itself. The second chapter has commenced with a totally independent offer by the Corporation to the erstwhile Government servants of an employment in the Corporation. This is a fresh employment subject to the normal Rules and Regulations of the Corporation. The appellants have no right to claim any continuity of service in the circumstances."
" 17. ...We think, that certainly, in such circumstances it will be open to this Court, to review the arrangement between the State Government and the Corporation and issue appropriate directions. Indeed, such directions could be issued even if the elements of the transfer in the present case fall short of a complete succession to the business or undertaking of the State by the Corporation, as the principle sought to be applied is a constitutional principle flowing from the contours of Art.14 of the Constitution which the State and Corporation are obliged to adhere to. We are making this observation because it was attempted to be argued on behalf of the State and the Corporation that only certain assets of the State 'industry', viz.the tubewells, were taken over by the latter and nothing more. We do not quite agree with this contention but, in view of the approach we propose to adopt, this aspect is not very material and need not be further discussed."
"17. ...It is true that the State Government was incurring losses and decided to transfer the tubewells to the Corporation. This decision would have been the most unexceptionable, prudent and perhaps the only decision that the Government could have taken, if it had decided to completely cut itself off thereafter from any responsibility or liability arising out of the operation of the tubewells. But that the Government did not do. As pointed out earlier, the State Government, although transferring the tubewells, undertook to recoup any losses that the Corporation might incur as a result of the transfer. The result, therefore, was that, despite the transfer of tubewells to the Corporation the Government continues to bear the losses arising from this activity. But, while doing so, it has abridged the rights of the appellants by purporting to transfer only the tubewells and retrenched the appellants from service as a consequence."
"17. ..... The conduct of the Government in depriving the appellants of substantial benefits which have accrued to them as a result of their long service with the Government, although the tubewells continue to be run at its cost by a Corporation wholly owned by it, is something which is grossly unfair and inequitable. This type of attitude designed to achieve nothing more than to deprive the employees of some benefits which they had earned, can be understood in the case of a private employer but comes ill from a State Government and smacks of arbitrariness. Acting as a model employer, which the State ought to be, and having regard to the long length of service of most of the appellants, the State, in our opinion, should have agreed to bear the burden of giving the appellants credit for their past service with the Government. That would not have affected the Corporation or its employees in any way-except to a limited extent indicated below-and, at the same time, it would have done justice to the appellants. We think, therefore, that this is something which the State ought to be directed to do. "
"21. ....It is open to a Court, in such a situation, to give appropriate directions to ensure that no injustice results from the change-over. In the present case, the parties to the transfer are a State on the one hand and a fully owned State Corporation on the other. That is why we have examined the terms and conditions of the transfer and given appropriate directions to meet the needs of the situation. We, therefore, direct the State Government and the Corporation-which is but a wholly owned State instrumentality bound to act at the behest of the State-- to carry out our directions above, the Corporation being at liberty to amend its rules and regulations, if necessary, to give effect to the same."
32. The decision cited by the learned counsel for the TWAD Board in Lal Md., case (cited supra) which also follows in Umarani's case (cited supra) may not have a direct bearing on an industrial adjudication based upon a specific provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act.
33. On the contrary, as stated in the beginning that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, Standing Orders Act and the Conferment of the Permanent Status Act squarely apply to the TWAD Board and the Tamil Nadu Act 46 of 1981 confers permanent status to workmen. The vires of the said act has also been upheld by the Supreme Court. It was not a subject matter of consideration by any of the Supreme Court decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It must also be stated that in the absence of the TWAD Board having any Certified Standing Order by virtue of Section 12A of the Industrial Employment Standing Order Act, the Model Standing Orders framed by the State Government will apply to the Workmen. Under the Model Standing Orders classification of workmen have been made such as permanent, probationer, temporary, etc., and they are defined in Model Standing Orders 2(a)(b)&(c) of the Tamil Nadu. Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Rules, 1947, which are as follows:-
"2.Definitions-(a) A 'permanent workman' is one who is employed on a permanent basis and includes any person who has satisfactorily completed the prescribed period of probation in the same or higher or equivalent category in the industrial establishment.
(b) A 'probationer' is one who is provisionally employed to fill a permanent vacancy in a post and has not completed the period of probation which shall be three months in the case of unskilled workmen and six months in respect of those other than unskilled:
Provided, in any particular case, the management may extend the period of probation of any workman upto a further period equivalent to the period of probation prescribed, if they are not satisfied with the wok and/or conduct of any workman during the period of probation. In any case where the period of probation is extended, the concerned workman shall be informed in writing at least one week before the normal date of the completion of probation and in the absence of any such intimation the workman shall be deemed to have satisfactorily completed his probation on the normal date. If a permanent workman is employed in a different post, he may, at any time during the probationary period, be reverted to his old permanent post.
"(c)A 'temporary workman' is one who has employed for work which is of an essentially temporary nature likely to be finished within a specific period".
34. Therefore, there is no scope for the TWAD Board to keep the workmen eternally on NMR basis with a view to deprive them the benefit accrued by the statutory service conditions provided under the Model Standing Orders. Secondly, the very object and aim of the Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 71, by which the TWAD Board is formed was with a view to conceive, execute and maintain Water Supply Schemes. Therefore, the petitioner TWAD Board cannot run away from the reality by saying on the closure of one Scheme, the worker will be left high and dry and they will be sent out and with the start of another Scheme some new labour force will be recruited.
35. In fact, in the written statement filed in all the Industrial Disputes, the stand of the petitioner-Board was that these workmen were recruited through Employment Exchange and they are experienced in maintaining the Scheme. But unfortunately, the Dindigul Municipality (second respondent) did not consider taking those workers before they want for direct recruitment. Therefore, the petitioner-Board has no particular grievance against the nature of the duties performed by the workmen.
36. On the contrary, they themselves recommended to the Municipality to absorb these workmen along with the maintenance work and when that was not forthcoming, it is incumbent upon the petitioner Board to dispense with the service of the workmen in the manner known to law. But, as found by the Labour Court, the workmen's service were dispensed with contrary to law and this necessitated the Labour Court in granting the relief in terms of its common Award.
37. Under these circumstances, there are no grounds to interfere with the Award passed by the Labour Court. The writ petitions are misconceived and will stand dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are also dismissed. The petitioner Board is directed to implement the Common Award of the Labour Court within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
Mpk To
1.The Executive Engineer, TWAD Board, Urban Division, Kanaka Apartment, Lady Tok College Road, Madurai-2
2.The Commissioner, Dindigul Municipality Office, Dindigul.
3.The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Tiruchirapalli Dindigul Camp.