Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Mangi Lal vs State Of Rajasthan on 19 February, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2002CRILJ3687
JUDGMENT Sharma, J.
1. Three appellants, namely, Mangi Lal, Banwari Lal and Hukam Singh have preferred separate appeals against the judgment and order dated 24.6.1999 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge Bandikui, district Dausa, whereby the learned Additional Sessions Judge has convicted the accused appellants under Section 376(2) IPC and sentenced each of them to undergo 10 years rigorous imprisonment, with a fine of Rs. 15000/- each, in default thereof, each was ordered to undergo three months imprisonment. Appellant Hukam Singh was further convicted under Section 392 IPC and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year with a fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default thereof, to further undergo imprisonment for one month. The sentences awarded to accused Hukam Singh were ordered to run concurrently. Since all the three appeals arise out of the same judgment, they are being heard and decided by a common judgment.
2. Briefly stated the facts of the prosecution case are that on 28.8.1996 complainant Pappu, PW-2 submitted a written report, Ex.P1 at Police Station Mandawar with the allegation that on 27.8.96 at 8.00 PM, he alongwith his wife had come to his in-laws in village Pakhar Chauraki from Delhi. At about 8.00 PM wile he and his wife were going on foot to the Dhani of his father-in-law and soon they reached near a field situated ahead Khara-Kua, he found the accused appellants consuming liquor at the field. The accused first gave him beating and then Banwari and Mangilal caught hold of him and threatened him to kill on his raising hue and cry. He then alleged that accused Hukam Singh took his wife to some distance and started committing rape on her. Thereafter Mangilal and Banwari committed rape on her by turn. After-committing rape, the accused snatched Rs. 850/- from his pocket and a HMT Kohinoor watch. They also took away a golen 'janler' from the neck of his wife. The accused threatened them not to disclose the incident to anyone, else they will kill them. Thereafter he alongwith his wife went to his in-laws in the Dhani, where he disclosed the incident to his father-in-law and other residents of Dhani.
3. On the basis of above written report, police registered a criminal case under Sections 376 and 379 IPC against the appellants vide FIR Ex.P4 and proceeded to investigate the case.
4. During investigation, the police prepared site plan Ex.P2, seized a broken bangle from the place of incident vide memo Ex.P3, arrested the accused Hukam Singh and recovered one HMT Kohinoor watch at his instance vide memo Ex.P5. After completion of investigation, police submitted a charge sheet against the appellants in the court of Judicial Magistrate, Mahva, who in turn committed the case to the court of Sessions.
5. The case came to be tried by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bandikui. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge, after hearing arguments of both the parlies, framed charges against the accused appellants for offence under Sections 392 and 376(2) IPC. The accused denied the charges and claimed trial.
6. During trial, the prosecution, in support of its case, examined as many as 10 witnesses and exhibited some documents. After the prosecution evidence was over, the accused appellants were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The accused in their explanation stated that prosecution allegation to be false and intended to produce evidence in their defence. However, despite sufficient opportunity having been granted to them, the accused failed to examine any witness in their defence.
7. At the conclusion of trial, the learned trial court vide its judgment under appeal found all the three accused appellants guilty under Section 376(2) IPC. The trial court also found appellant Hukam Singh guilty under Section 392 IPC and according convicted and sentenced them as aforesaid.
8. Feeling aggrieved by their conviction and sentences, the appellants have preferred these appeals under Section 374 Cr.P.C.
9. I have heard Mr. SR Bajwa, Sr. Advocate appearing for the accused appellants and Mr. B.M. Sharma, learned Public Prosecutor and carefully gone through the impugned judgment and the record of the case.
10. In assailing the conviction, the first argument advanced by the counsel for the appellants is that there is inordinate delay in informing the police about the commission of alleged offence, which creates doubt about the truthfulness of the prosecution case and that possibility of ropping the appellants in a false case, due deliberations cannot be ruled out. Learned counsel submitted that alleged incident took place on 27.8.1996 at 8.15 PM whereas report of the incident was lodged on the next day at about 3.15 PM i.e. after 19 hours of the alleged incident, and this delay remains unexplained.
11. I have considered the above argument. Having scanned the relevant evidence, it appears that the delay of about 19 hours in lodging the FIR has been satisfactorily explained by the prosecution. PW-2 Pappu, author of the FIR has stated in his examination in chief that after the incident he along with his wife PW-l Smt. Parwati went to his in-laws' house and narrated the incident to his in-laws and other members present there. Thereafter the members of his in-laws family went to the houses of all the three accused, but none of the accused was found present in the house. On the next day of incident, Panchayat was called in the village and accused were summoned, but none of the accused attended the Panchayat. Ultimately, they proceeded to the Police Station for loding the report. Thus, from the evidence of complainant Pappu, PW1 who is none other but a husband of the victim of sexual assault, it appears that immediately after coming to know about the incident, the members of his in-laws family first tried to reach the accused appellants in the same night and since none was found present in their bouses, a meeting of the panchayat was called on the next day and accused were summoned, but they did not present themselves in the said meeting of the Panchayat. Thereafter, a report, Ex.P1 of the incident was lodged. This statement of PW-2 Pappu stands fully corroborated by the statement of PW-l Smt. Parwati. Therefore, it is concluded that delay stands satisfactorily explained by the evidence of PW1 Parwati and PW2 Pappu. However, it need by observed that in cases involving sexual assault, the delay in reporting the matter to the police by itself is not fatal to the prosecution case. It is well settled that the Courts cannot over- look the fact that in sexual offences delay in loding of the FIR can be due to variety of reasons, particularly the reluctance of the prosecutrix or her family members to go to the police and complaint about the incident which concerns the reputation of the prosecutrix and the honour of her family. It is only after giving a cool thought that a complaint of sexual offence is generally lodged. Reference may be made to a decision of the Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Narayan (1), wherein their lordships have observed have observed as under:
"True it is that the complaint was lodged two days later but as stated earlier Indian society being what it is the victims of such a crime ordinarily consult relatives and are hesitant to approach the police since it involves the question of morality and chastity of a married woman. A woman and her relates have to struggle with several situations before deciding to approach the police, more so when the culprit happens to be related. In such cases the delays is understandable and hence merely on that account the prosecution version cannot be doubt."
12. It has also to be kept in mind that law has not fixed any time for loding the FIR and therefore it can be said that delayed FIR is not illegal, undisputedly, lodging the FIR immediately after the offence is committed is the ideal because that would give the prosecution a twin advantages. First is that Investigating Agency may proceed with investigation without any time lapse and second is that it rules out the opportunity for any concoction of a false version. Recently, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ravindra Kumar and Anr. v. State of Punjab (2), while considering the impact of both delayed and prompt FIRs, have observed as under:
"To attack on the prosecution case on the ground of delay in lodging FIR has almost bogged down as a stereotyped redundancy in criminal cases. It is a recurring feature in most of the criminal cases that there would be some delay in furnishing the first information to the police. It has to be remembered that law has not fixed any time for lodging the FIR. Hence a delayed FIR is not illegal. Of course, a prompt and immediate lodging of the FIR is the ideal as that would give the prosecution a twin advantage. First is, that it affords commencement of the investigation without any time lapse. Second is that it expels the opportunity for any possible conconction of a false version. Barring these two plus points for a promptly lodged FIR the demerits of the delayed FIR cannot operate as fatal to any prosecution case. It cannot be overlooked that even a promptly lodged FIR is not an unreserved guarantee for the genuiness of the version incorporated therein."
13. It is next contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that there are serious laches on the part of the investigating agency in conducting the investigation and trial of the case. Firstly, referring to the site plan, Ex.P2 of the place of incident, Mr. Bajwa has stated that it was prepared by the Investigating Officer after 3 days of incident and except one broken bangle nothing could be recovered from the place of incident that too after days of incident. Coming to the laches on the part of the prosecution during the course of trial, it has been argued that the Investigating Officer and the doctor who examined the prosecutrix have not been examined by the prosecution. That apart, it is contended that even some documents, viz., the FSL report and the receipt obtained therefrom have not been got exhibited by the prosecution. In this back-ground, learned counsel has contended with vehemence that for these lapses on the part of the prosecution during trial and while conducting investigation, the conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained and they deserve to be acquitted. In support of his arguments, learned counsel has placed reliance on Kanhai Mishra @ Kanhyaiya Misar v. State of Bihar (3) and Omwati v. Mahendra Singh (4).
14. Before proceeding further it may be observed that law is well settled on the point that prosecutrix complaining of having been a Victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice of the crime and there is no rule of law that testimony cannot be acted without corroboration on material particulars and her testimony has to be appreciated on the principles of probabilities just as the testimony of any other witness and further, if the court find it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value it may search for evidence direct or circumstantial which would lend assurance to her testimony.
15. To deal with the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the accused appellants, it would be profitable that this court being the first appellate court should first reappreciate the prosecution evidence.
16. PW1 Mst. Parwati, a young married woman of 25 years of age, who was a victim of rape has stated in her examination in chief that she alongwith her husband was going to her parents. On way, she found the accused appellants consuming liquor near a well. All the three accused caughl hold of her husband and started beating. Thereafter one of the accused caught hold of her and took her to the field and commitled rape on her. Another accused also came there and committed rape on her. Thereafter third accused came and he also committed rape on her. She further deposed the accused snatched Rs. 850/- from the pocket of her husband and also snatched his wrist watch. Accused also snatched a golden 'janter' from her neck. Thereafter both of them rushed to her parents house. Her father and uncle tried to trace the accused, but having failed to trace them out, a meeting of the Panchayat was called on the next day and the accused were also summoned. The accused did not present themselves in the meeting of Panchayat and thereafter, report of the incident was lodged. In cross-examination, the witness has stated that the accused first threatened to kill both the them and then caught hold of her husband. She stated that accused were not known to her prior to the incident nor she knew about their addresses. She stated that it was 8.00 PM in the night and their alarm did not attract any body. She then stated that all the three accused were heavily drunken and they committed rape on her by turn. As soon as she reached her parents' house, she disclosed the incident to her family members.
17. PW-2 Pappu, husband of the prosecutrix has given the same version as that of his wife PW-1 Parwati, except that he has named all the three accused and stated more specifically as to who caught hold of him and who snatched Rs. 850/-, wrist watch and a golen 'janter'. The witness has admitted his signatures of the written report, site plan and the recovery memo. In cross- examination, the witness has stated he knew the accused persons for last one year and all the three are Meena by caste. He has admitted the fact that his father-in-law has called the Panchayat meeting in the village.
18. PW-3 Ram Sahay, father of the prosecutrix has stated on oath the he had invited his daughter on the occasion of 'Raksha Bandhan'. He stated that his daughter told him about the commission of rape on her by all the three accused persons. In cross-examination, the witness has stated that his son-in-law reached the village at 7.30 PM and his daughter reached just after his son-in-law reached there.
19. PW-4 Lala Ram and PW-5 Moharpal have certified the site plan, Ex.P2 and recovery memo Ex.P3.
20. PW6 Ramjilal, uncle of the prosecutrix has stated that the prosecutrix had come to their village on the occasion of Raksha Bandhan. The witness stated that when he was having his dinner, his son-in-law Pappu informed about the prosecutrix being caught in the way. He has further stated that Parwati had informed his wife that accused had committed rape on her. In cross- examination, the witness has admitted that about 150 persons of different castes had collected in the meeting of the Panchayat. He further admitted that Parwati did not disclose anything while on way, but she disclosed the fact of commission of rape to his wife.
21. Having reappreciated the testimony of the prosecutrix in the background of the entire case, it appears that her evidence inspires confidence. Keeping in view the observations of the Apex Court, referred to above that testimony of a victim of sexual crime must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars, I am of the considered view that in the present case the testimony of the prosecutrix, a young married woman, who was subjected to gang rape by 3 accused can well be relied upon without seeking any corroboration by other evidence on material particulars. It is true that there are slight discrepencies but they are not of fatal nature to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. However, the evidence of the prosecutrix is fully corroborated by the evidence of her husband PW2 Pappu, on material particulars and therefore, there is no reason to discard or disbelieve her testimony and she can be considered to be a witness worthy credence. The trial court has, thus, correctly placed reliance on her testimony in arriving at a conclusion.
22. Now I shall proceed to deal with the arguments advanced by the counsel for the appellants. Coming to the lapses on the part of investigating agency while conducting investigation, suffice it to say that Inspecting the site and recovery of a broken bangle only from the place of incident after lapse of 3 days are not of much significance. It is true that there are some lapses while conducting investigation but the question that arises for consideration is whether any prejudice has been caused by reason of such lapse. My answer is in negative. By such lapses on the part of investigating agency no prejudice can be said to have been caused to the accused.
23. Similarly, so far as the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that there are laches on the part of the prosecution as to the non-examination of Investigating Officer and the Medical Officer, which has resulted in vitiating trial against the accused, is concerned, I have perused the record of the trial court. On a perusal of the order sheet dated 24.2.1999 drawn by the Presiding Officer of the trial court, it appears that the Investigating Officer did not appear in the court despite process issued to him several times by the trial court and that Dr. Omwati Gupta, Medical Officer could not be examined as her address and place of posting could not be traced. In the light of the evidence of the prosecutrix and in the circumstances of the case no adverse inference can be drawn by reason of non- production of these two witnesses.
24. In State of Punjab v. Gurmeet Singh (5), their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with the impact of lapses on the part of the Investigating Agency, held that negligence of an Investigating Officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix. The relevant observations in para 7 of the judgment are quoted below:
".....The Court overlooked the situation in which a poor helpless minor girl had found herself in the company of three desperated young men who were threatening her and preventing her from raising an alarm. Again, if the Investigating Officer did not conduct the Investigation properly or was negligent in not being able to trace out the driver of the car, how can that become a ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the negligence of an Investigating Officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix."
25. In Leela Ram v. State of Haryana (6), while dealing with a case involving offence under Section 302 IPC considered the effect of irregularity or even an illegality during investigation, held as under:-
"Before however proceeding with the matter on two counts as above, it would be convenient to note another aspect of the matter, namely the observations pertaining to the investigation by the investigating Agency. It is now a well settled principle that any irregularity or even an illegality during investigation ought not to be treated as a ground to reject the prosecution case and we need not dilate on the issue excepting referring a decision of this court vide State of Rajasthan v. Kishore (AIR 1996 SC 3035)."
26. Again in Sukhdev Yadav v. State of Bihar (7), a similar question as to when lapses on the part of prosecution do not affect the prosecution case arose before their Lordships of the Supreme Court and their Lordships in para 15 of the judgment observed as under:
"True, as notice above, there are lapses but the question that arises for consideration is whether any prejudice has been caused by reason of such a lapse; if the answer there is in the affirmative, obviously it will have serious impact on the trial but if in the event, however, it is in negative, no prejudice can be said to have been caused and correspondingly question of trial being vitiated would not arise. The eyewitnesses' account as available on record cannot but be termed to be trustworty and by reason therefor, the lapses stand overshadowed by the testimony of the eye witnesses. The observations above obtain support from the decision of this court in Baleshwar Mandal v. State of Bihar (AIR 1997 SC 3471)."
27. Thus the ratio of the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court is that lapses/laches on the part of the investigating agency and prosecution while conducting investigation or in trial is not fatal to the prosecution case unless a serious prejudice has been caused to the accused by reason of such lapses/laches and that it cannot be considered to be a ground for discrediting the testimony of the prosecutrix. True it is that in the case in hand there are some lapses/laches on the part of the prosecution not only in conducting investigation but also during trial as pointed out by Mr. Bajwa, Sr. Advocate, but keeping in mind the observation of the Apex Court and in totality of the circumstances of the case in hand where a married woman was subjected to gang rape, it can safely be concluded that no prejudice has been caused to the accused by reason of such lapses, which stand overshadowed by the testimony of the prosecutrix.
28. I have also considered the case laws cited on behalf of the appellants. In Kanhai Mishra @ Kanhaiya Misar (supra) the accused was tried for offence under Sections 302 and 376 IPC and the entire case rested on circumstantial evidence. Their lorshlps expressed unhappiness that such a ghastly crime of first committing rape upon a teenager and thereafter brutally murdering her was going unpunished because of laches on the part of the prosecuting agency in conducting the investigation and trial, and accordingly held that "we have no option but to painfully convert conviction of the appellants who was a condemned prisoner into acquittal as the solitary circumstance proved against him cannot form the basis of conviction. In the case before the Supreme Court, none of the circumstances except the one could be proved so as to sustain the conviction. In these circumstances, the Apex Court did not find it appropriate to confirm the conviction solely on the solitary circumstance. Thus, in my respectful opinion, this case is of no help to the accused appellants.
29. In Omwatl v. Mahendra Singh (supra), which arises out of offence under Section 302 IPC. the trial court itself pointed out that Dr. Santosh of Bilary was a very important and material witness and ought to have been examined but it opined that failure to do so was only due to carelessness of the Investigating Officer and it would not impair the evidence of the eye witnesses. In these circumstances, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that evidence of the said doctor would have proved to be an important connecting link and in the absence thereof, the testimony of PWs 1 and 3 lacks credence, particularly because there is a vital discrepancy between the two witnesses in the matter of the time at which they proceeded to village Bilary. Thus, the facts involved in this case being entirely different to those involved in the present case, this case is also of no help to the appellants.
30. In State of Haryana v. Ashok Kumar @ Billu (8), the accused was tried for offence under Section 302 and 498A IPC. The trial court acquitted the accused of the charge under Section 498A IPC, but it found the accused guilty under Section 302 IPC and accordingly convicted and sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, the High Court acquitted the accused of the charge under Section 302 IPC. The State went in appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court after considering various circumstances, namely, FIR lacking the allegation of demand of dowery, post mortem was conducted twice, cause of death in both the reports was different, no ligature or external injury marks in both the reports, the dead body claimed to be lying outside the house whereas the site plan showing it to be inside the house, held that all showing it to be inside the house, held that all these factors create doubt about the truthfulness of the prosecution case as also about the fireness of the investigating agency and accordingly, upheld the judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court. In the case in hand, the facts are entirely different than those involved in Ashok Kumar's case. That apart, in the case in hand, keeping in view the testimony of the prosecutrix which has been held to be worthy of credence, no prejudice could be said to have been caused to the accused appellants by reason of lapses on the part of the Investigating Agency. Therefore, in my respectful opinion, the Ashok Kumar's case (supra) is also of no help to the appellants.
31. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that PW1 Parwati, prosecutrix has not named the accused nor the identification parade so as to get the real culprits identified was got conducted during investigation and therefore, according to the learned counsel, it cannot be believe that the culprits were the present appellants who committed alleged offence.
32. From the prosecution evidence, particularly the evidence of prosecutrix, it is evident that the prosecutrix was not knowing the appellant and therefore, no question of the accused being named by prosecutrix does arises. However, it is clear from the evidence on record that she identified the accused in the trial court. That apart, PW2 Pappu, husband of the proseculrix was well conversant with the accused appellants and that he identified all of them on the spot and in the court as well. He also disclosed the names of the accused to his in-laws, namely PW6 Ramjilal and PW3 Ram Sahai immediately on reaching his in-laws house after the commission of offence and that both PWs 6 and 3 have fully supported the statement of PW2 Pappu. To be more specific, both these witnesses have deposed that Pappu informed the commission of rape on the prosecutrix by the present appellants. In the circumstances, aforesaid it must be held that failure on the part of the prosecution in not holding identification parade is not fatal to the prosecution case.
33. So far as absence of injuries on the body of prosecutrix as pointed out by Mr. Bajwa, is concerned, suffice it to say that version of the prosecutrix in itself is sufficent to believe that rape was committed on her by the appellants. It is not always necessary that in all cases of sexual assault, injuries must be there on the body of a victim of rape. In the present case the prosecutrix was in clutches of 3 able bodied youth and they had over powered her by a threat to kill her on her raising hue and cry. The prosecutrix, a young 25 years old married lady, in these circumstances, fell victim to their sexual lust. The absence of injuries on her body is thus, understandable.
34. My attention has also been drawn to some discrepencies in the statements of witnesses e.g. whether prosecutrix or her husband reached their house first, difference as to the exact time of commission of offence etc. Undisputedly, there is bound to be some discrepancies between the bound to be some discrepancies between the narrations of different witnesses when they speak on details and unless the contradictions are of a material dimension, the same should not be used to discard the evidence on its entirety. Generally, the evidence is recorded after a considerable delay and it is not expected that one would give the exact narration of the fact as to what had happened on a particular day. In the present case the discrepancies pointed out by the learned counsel are of trivial natures and the same, in my considered view are not of much significance and the same cannot obliterate an otherwise acceptable evidence. I am fortified in my view by the following observations of the Apex Court in Leela Ram v. State of Haryana (supra) :
"Be it noted that the High Court is within its jurisdiction being the first appellate court to re-appreciate the evidence, but the discrepancies found in the ocular account of two witnesses unless they are so vital, cannot affect the credibility of the evidence of the witnesses. There is bound to be some discrepancies between the narrations of different witnesses when they speak on details, and unless the contradictions are of a material dimension, the same should not be used to petition the evidence in its entirety. Incidentally, corroboration of evidence with mathematical niceties cannot be expected in criminal cases. Minor embellishment, there may be, but variations by reason therefor should not render the evidence of eye witnesses unbelievable. Trival discrepancies ought not to obliterate an otherwise acceptable evidence."
35. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that Smt. Rajanti W/o PW 6 Ramjilal has not been examined by the prosecution. Referring to the statement of PW6 Ramjilal, it has been submitted that Smt. Rajanti was a relevant witness before whom the prosecutrix disclosed the fact of commission of rape on her as is evident from the statement of.PW6 Ramjilal, in which he has categorically stated that prosecutrix and had informed his wife that accused had committed rape on her.
36. While dealing with the above argument, it may be stated at the out set mat fact as to the commission of offence was disclosed by PW2 Pappu, husband of the prosecutrix to his father-in-law and other family members present there immediately on his reaching in-laws' house after the commission of offence as it evident from the statements of PW2 Pappu and PW3 Ram Sahay. So far as examination of witnesses in criminal cases is concerned, what has to be seen is the quality of the evidence and not the Plurality of the witnesses, which can be the only important aspect in appraisal of evidence. Even the testimony of a single witness can be sufficient to prove the guilt against the accused if the witness is found to be entirely reliable and worthy of credence. Even under the provisions of Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, it is not necessary that a particular number of witnesses will have to be examined so as to prove any fact. Even a single witness, if found trustworthy arid reliable can be sufficient to base conviction even without corroboration. Thus, in my view, what is material is the quality of evidence and that the number of witnesses. In the case in hand, keeping in view the evidence of prosecutrix, which has been held to be reliable and truthful, as also the other corroborating evidence discussed above, it must be held that non-examination of Rajanti was not of much significance, inasmuch as it may be reiterated that the fact as to the disclosure of commission of offence stands proved by the evidence of PW2 Pappu and PW3 Ramjilal.
37. Lastly, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the accused appellants have been implicated in a false case because of party politics in the elections of Sarpanch. Learned counsel has referred the statement of the accused wherein, they have stated that a false case has been foisted against them because of vengience as a result of parly politics. Suffice it to say that in cross-examination a suggestion was put to the prosecutrix that a false case was lodged due to enmity and similarly a suggestion was also put to PW.2 Pappu that his wife is a lady of bad character and that a false report was lodged as a result of sexual intercourse on his wife having been witnessed by some persons. Thus, it is evident that there is no specific defence to suggest a particular cause for false implication of the accused appellant in such a heinous offence of gange rape. On the one hand, the defence taken in that the accused have been involved in a false case because of party politics and on the other hand the defence taken is that FIR was lodged as a result of intercourse having been witnessed by other persons. In my considered view, the enmity sought to be proved has not been proved at all.
38. It may also be noticed that the site plan Ex.P.2 fully supports the prosecution version, If considered in the light of the evidence of the prosecutrix. The site plan shows that there were foot prints and the prints of shoes and chappal on the spot where offence was committed.
39. The learned trial Court relying upon the evidence of PW.1 Parwati, the prosecutrix, PW.2 Pappu, husband of the prosecutrix and the supporting evidence of PW.3 Ram Sahai, PW.5 Mohar Pal and PW.6 Ramji lal has come to a right conclusion as to the guilt of the accused that a group of persons acting in furtherance of their common intention committed rape on a young married women. The conviction of the appellants under Section 376(2) therefore, deserves to be maintained.
40. So far as conviction of appellant Hukum Singh under Section 392 IPC is concerned, I am of the considered view that the learned trial Court on appreciation of evidence has correctly arrived at a conclusion that it was appellant Hukum Singh who committed robbery, as the prosecution has been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused Hukum Singh forcibly snatched the wrist watch of Pappu which was recovered from his possession vide recovery memo, Ex.P.55.
41. For the foregoing reasons, the appeals of the appellants fail and are hereby, dismissed. The judgment of the learned trial convicting and sentencing the appellants is maintained.