Madras High Court
S.Ponnusamy @ S.P.Samy vs K.Mani on 7 November, 2014
Author: R.S.Ramanathan
Bench: R.S.Ramanathan
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 07.11.2014 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R.S.RAMANATHAN CRIMINAL APPEAL No.495 of 2008 S.Ponnusamy @ S.P.Samy .. Appellant ..vs.. K.Mani .. Respondent Criminal Appeal filed under Section 397 and 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code against the judgment dated 05.07.2007 made in Criminal Appeal No.44/2007 by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, (Fast Track Court No.II), Coimbatore reversing the judgment dated 20.1.2007 made in C.C.No.60 of 2004 by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Mettupalayam. For Appellant : Mr.Mukunth for M/s.Sarvabhauman Associates For respondent : Mr.G.Karthikeyan JUDGMENT
The complainant in C.C.No.60 of 2004 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, Mettupalayam is the appellant. The complainant filed the above complaint against the respondent for offence under Section 138, 141 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The learned Judicial Magistrate, on perusal of the oral and documentary evidence, found the respondent guilty under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and convicted him and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a sum of Rs.10,000/- as compensation to the complainant under Section 357(3) of the Cr.P.C.,.
2. The respondent challenged the above judgment of the learned Judicial Magistrate by filing Criminal Appeal No.44 of 2007 on the file of the Additional District & Sessions Judge, (Fast Track Court No.II), Coimbatore. The learned lower appellate Judge allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the learned Judicial Magistrate and acquitted the respondent. Aggrieved by the same, the present Appeal is filed by the appellant.
3. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the lower appellate Court without properly appreciating the well considered the judgment of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Mettupalayam, allowed the appeal by relying upon the judgment reported in 2005 (1) CTC 416 in the matter of Rajendra Finance V. S. Alosius Thairiyanatham and held that even according to the appellant amount was borrowed by the respondent and his wife and the cheque was issued by the respondent alone and therefore, the cheque cannot be stated to be issued for legally enforceable liability payable by the respondent. He submitted that when two persons borrowed money, they are jointly and severally liable as per the Provisions of the Contract Act and if any one of them issued a cheque towards that liability, that is legally valid and this aspect was not properly appreciated by the lower appellate Court. He also submitted that the lower appellate Court also erroneously held that the cheque was filled by the complainant and that was proved by difference in ink in the writings on the cheque as well as in the signature and therefore, the cheque is invalid by relying upon the judgment reported in 2006 (5) CTC 296 in the matter of P.Eswaran Vs. J.A.Abdul Hameed. He also submitted that the lower appellate Court erred in holding that the appellant did not prove passing of consideration without properly appreciating Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, by which the presumption can be drawn in favour of payee when the signature is admitted in the cheque and therefore, he submitted that the judgment of the lower appellate Court is liable to be set aside.
4. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the lower appellate court rightly set aside the conviction and allowed the appeal by relying upon the judgments in 2005 (1) CTC 416 in the matter of Rajendra Finance v. S.Alosius Thairiyanatham; 2006 (5) CTC 296 in the matter of P.Eswaran vs. J.A.Abdul Hameed and 2006 (3) CTC 730 in the matter of Narayana Menon @ Mani, M.S. v. State of Kerala. He submitted that the appellant failed to prove passing of consideration of Rs.80,000/- on 1.7.2001 and issuance of the chque by the respondent on that date and that was also made probable by the cheque wherein the contents of the cheque was written in one ink and the signature was in a different ink and that was rightly appreciated by the lower appellate Court by relying upon the judgment reported in 2006 (5) CTC 296 supra. He further submitted that the presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act cannot be drawn in favour of the complainant/appellant in the absence of any proof produced by the appellant that he had the means to give Rs.80,000/- to the respondent and only after the appellant discharges the onus of him, the respondent has to rebut the presumption. In this case, the appellant has not proved the passing of consideration under the cheque. Therefore, mere issuance of cheque by the respondent will not lead to the presumption that the cheque was issued towards legally enforceable liability and these aspects were properly appreciated by the lower appellate Court and therefore, the judgment of the lower appellate Court does not call for any interference by this Court and the appeal may be dismissed.
5. On the basis of the above submission, it has to be seen whether the lower appellate Court was right in allowing the appeal by holding that the appellant failed to prove passing of consideration, the cheque is invalid by reason of difference in ink in the contents of the cheque as well as in the signature and whether the cheque was issued by one person is invalid when admittedly liability was payable by two persons.
6. The complainant examined himself as PW.1 and marked 9 Exhibits. Ex.P1 is the promissory note executed by the respondent and his wife who was arrayed as A.2. Ex.P.2 is the cheque issued by respondent. Ex.P.3 is the counterfoil of the cheque. Ex.P.4 is the memo issued by the Central Bank of India, Manjoor Branch. Ex.P.5 is the Debit advvice. Ex.P.6 is the legal notice dated 22.12.2003. Exs.P.7 & P.8 are the acknowledgments. Ex.P.9 is the reply notice dated 5.1.2004. On the other hand, the respondent examined himself as DW.1 and marked 7 Exhibits. Exs.D1 to D3 are the pocket notes. Ex.D.4 is the Application for the account number 7745. Ex.D.5 is the Account Statement. Ex.D.6 is the cheque issue register copy. Ex.D.7 is the cheque return register copy.
7. PW.1 has reiterated the averments made in the complaint in the chief examination and stated that the respondent and his wife borrowed Rs.80,000/- on 1.7.2001 executed a promissory note Ex.P.1 and on 1.12.2003, they settled the account and on that date, the amount payable was Rs.1,26,400/- and they issued cheque for Rs.1,25,000 and promised to pay balance Rs.1,400 later. He also deposed regarding issuance of cheque and other averments. Ex.D.1 to D.3 Pocket Books produced by the accused / respondent were marked and it was not suggested that no promissory note was executed by the respondent and his wife. The only suggestion put to PW.1 was that the amount was borrowed by the respondent and his wife and both of them are jointly liable to pay the amount and any one person cannot issue a cheque for the amount and a blank cheque was obtained and that was filled later.
8. On the other hand, the respondent examined himself as DW.1 and he admitted that he borrowed a sum of Rs.10,000/- and Rs.1,000/- was detected towards interest initially, and he was paying Rs.100 per day for 100 days. He also admitted that he executed promissory note in the year 1998 in favour of the appellant and at the time of executing promissory note, the appellant took them to the bank and asked them to open an account and as per the direction of the appellant, he opened an account and he got a cheque book and the appellant obtained two cheque leaves with his signature and it was later misused and he also denied the case of the appellant that he borrowed Rs.80,000/-, and executed the promissory note.
9. The sealed cover containing Exs.D1 to D3 along with lower Court records was opened in the Court and perused the records.
10. It is admitted that the signature found in the cheque is that of the respondent. The respondent also admitted the execution of promissory note but only disputed the date and receipt of consideration stated therein. Once the signature is admitted, the presumption can be drawn under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and it is for the respondent/accused to rebut the presumption, though it is well settled that the burden is not so heavy on the respondent/accused to prove the rebuttal presumption and it is sufficient if he is able to make out a probable case.
11. The law relating to presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is discussed in the following judgments:-
(i) In Bharat Barrel and Drum Manufacturing Company v. Amin Chand Payrelal [AIR 1999 SUPREME COURT 1008], it has been held as follows:-
12. Upon consideration of various judgments as noted hereinabove, the position of law which emerges is that once execution of the promissory note is admitted, the presumption under Section 118(a) would arise that it is supported by consideration. Such a presumption is rebuttable. The defendant can prove the non-existence of consideration by raising a probable defence. If the defendant is proved to have discharged the initial onus of proof showing that the existence of consideration was improbable or doubtful or the same was illegal, the onus would shift to the plaintiff who will be obliged to prove it as a matter of fact and upon its failure to prove would dis-entitle him to the grant of relief on the basis of the negotiable instrument. The burden upon the defendant of proving the non-existence of the consideration can be either direct or by bringing on record the preponderance of probabilities by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies. In such an event the plaintiff is entitled under law to rely upon all the evidence led in the case including that of the plaintiff as well. In case, where the defendant fails to discharge the initial onus of proof by showing the non-existence of the consideration, the plaintiff would invariably be held entitled to the benefit of presumption arising under Section 118(a) in his favour. The court may not insist upon the defendant to disprove the existence of consideration by leading direct evidence as existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated and even if led is to be seen with a doubt. The bare denial of the passing of the consideration apparently does not appear to be any defence. Something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the benefit of shifting the onus of proving to the plaintiff. To disprove the presumption the defendant has to bring on record such facts and circumstances, upon consideration of which the court may either believe that the consideration did not exist or its non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would, under the circumstances of the case, shall act upon the plea that it did not exist. We find ourselves in the close proximity of the view expressed by the Full Benches of the Rajasthan High Court and Andhra Pradesh High Court in this regard.
(ii) In Hiten P.Dalal Versus Bratindranath Banerjee [2001 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 960], it has been held as follows:-
20. ....The presumption which arises under Section 138 provides more specifically that where any cheque drawn by a person on an account for payment of any amount of money for the discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability, is returned by the drawee bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque, such persons shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both. The nature of the presumption under Section 138 is subject to the three conditions specified relating to presentation, giving of the notice and the non payment after receipt of notice by the drawer of the cheque. All three conditions have not been denied in this case.
21. The appellant's submission that the cheques were not drawn for the 'discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability' is answered by the third presumption available to the Bank under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. This section provides that "it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability". The effect of these presumptions is to place the evidential burden on the appellant of proving that the cheque was not received by the Bank towards the discharge of any liability.
22. Because both Sections 138 and 139 require that the Court "shall presume" the liability of the drawer of the cheques for the amounts for which the cheques are drawn, as noted in State of Madras vs. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer AIR 1958 SC 61, it is obligatory on the Court to raise this presumption in every case where the factual basis for the raising of the presumption had been established. "It introduces an exception to the general rule as to the burden of proof in criminal cases and shifts the onus on to the accused" (ibid). Such a presumption is a presumption of law, as distinguished from a presumption of fact which describes provisions by which the court "may presume" a certain state of affairs. Presumptions are rules of evidence and do not conflict with the presumption of innocence, because by the latter all that is meant is that the prosecution is obliged to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The obligation on the prosecution may be discharged with the help of presumptions of law or fact unless the accused adduces evidence showing the reasonable possibility of the non-existence of the presumed fact.
23. In other words, provided the facts required to form the basis of a presumption of law exists, no discretion is left with the Court but to draw the statutory conclusion, but this does not preclude the person against whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it and proving the contrary. A fact is said to be proved when, "after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists".
Therefore, the rebuttal does not have to be conclusively established but such evidence must be adduced before the Court in support of the defence that the Court must either believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably probable, the standard of reasonability being that of the 'prudent man'.
24. Judicial statements have differed as to the quantum of rebutting evidence required. In Kundan Lal Rallaram vs Custodian, Evacuee Property, Bombay AIR 1961 SC 1316, this Court held that the presumption of law under Section 118 of Negotiable Instruments Act could be rebutted, in certain circumstances, by a presumption of fact raised under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. The decision must be limited to the facts of that case. The more authoritative view has been laid down in the subsequent decision of the Constitution Bench in Dhanvantrai Balwantrai Desai vs State of Maharashtra AIR 1964 SC 575, where this Court reiterated the principle enunciated in State of Madras vs Vaidyanath Iyer (Supra) and clarified that the distinction between the two kinds of presumption lay not only in the mandate to the Court, but also in the nature of evidence required to rebut the two. In the case of a discretionary presumption the presumption if drawn may be rebutted by an explanation which "might reasonably be true and which is consistent with the innocence" of the accused. On the other hand in the case of a mandatory presumption.
"the burden resting on the accused person in such a case would not be as light as it is where a presumption is raised under S.114 of the Evidence Act and cannot be held to be discharged merely by reason of the fact that the explanation offered by the accused is reasonable and probable. It must further be shown that the explanation is a true one. The words 'unless the contrary is proved' which occur in this provision make it clear that the presumption has to be rebutted by 'proof' and not by a bare explanation which is merely plausible. A fact is said to be proved when its existence is directly established or when upon the material before it the Court finds its existence to be so probable that a reasonable man would act on the supposition that it exists. Unless, therefore, the explanation is supported by proof, the presumption created by the provision cannot be said to be rebutted. (AIR p.580, para 12)"
12. Therefore, having regard to the facts of this case, it has to be seen whether the complainant is entitled to draw presumption as per Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and whether the respondent/accused has let in rebuttal proof.
13. As stated supra, the respondent deposed in evidence that in the year 1998 he borrowed money from the appellant and at the instance of the appellant, he and his wife were taken to the Central Bank of India, Manjoore Branch and he was directed to open an account and thereafter, the appellant obtained two signed blank cheques from him. It is seen from Ex.D.4 Application form for account opening that the account was opened in the year 1994 by the respondent. Ex.D.4 is dated 16.9.1994. Therefore, the story stated by the respondent in the evidence that in 1998, he was taken by the appellant to the bank and asked to open account and thereafter, the appellant obtained blank cheques cannot be accepted.
14. As stated supra, in this case, the complainant / appellant proved the passing of consideration by marking Ex.P.1 promissory note and the cheque and the issuance of cheque is admitted by the respondent and therefore, the presumption can be drawn in favour of the appellant regarding the passing of consideration and the respondent failed to rebut the presumption by producing adequate evidence and as a matter of fact, the evidence adduced by the respondent giving explanation for the issuance of cheque cannot be accepted.
15. Further, in the judgment rendered by the High Court of Delhi reported in CDJ 2008 DHC 861 in the matter of Ravi Chopra versus State and another relied upon a judgment of a Division Bench of Kerala High Court in Lillykutty v. Lawrance [2003 (2) DCR 610] wherein it is held as follows:-
21. In the instant case, signature is admitted. According to the drawer of the cheque, amount and the name has been written not by the drawer but by somebody else or by the payee and tried to get it encashed. We are of the view, by putting the amount and the name there is no material alteration on the cheque under Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. In fact there is no alteration but only adding the amount and the date. There is no rule in banking business that payee's name as well as the amount should be written by drawer himself. In the instant case Bank has never found that the cheque was tampered with or forged or there is material alteration or that the handwriting by which the payee's name and the amount was written was differed. The Bank was willing to honour the cheques if sufficient funds were there in the account of the drawer even if the payee's name and the amount was written by somebody else other than the holder of the account or the drawer of the cheque. The mere fact that the payee's name and the amount shown are not in the handwriting of the drawer does not invalidate the cheque. No law provides in the case of cheques the entire body has to be written by the drawer only. What is material is the signature of the drawer and not the body of the instrument. Therefore when the drawer has issued the cheque whether the entire body was written by the drawer written beyond the instructions of the drawer, whether the amount is due or not, those and such matters are defenses which drawer has to raise and prove it. Therefore the mere fact that the payee's name and the amount shown in the cheque are in different handwriting is not a reason for not honouring the cheque by the Bank. Banks would normally see whether the instrument is that of the drawer and the cheque has been signed by the drawer himself. The burden is therefore entirely on the drawer of the cheque to establish that the date, amount and the payee's name are written by somebody else without the knowledge and consent of the drawer. In the instant case, the drawer of the cheque has not discharged and burden. Apart from the interested testimony of the drawer, no independent evidence was adduced to discharge the burden.
16. Therefore, I hold that the appellant has proved passing of consideration and the respondent failed to rebut the presumption and these aspects were properly appreciated by the trial Court and the respondent was convicted and the lower appellate Court without properly appreciating the law as well as the facts of the case erred in allowing the appeal.
17. The lower appellate Court relied upon the judgment reported in 2005 (1) CTC 416 supra to hold that when two persons were jointly liable to pay, the same cannot be discharged by one person by issuing a cheque. According to me, the finding of the lower appellate Court cannot be sustained. As per Section 43 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, when two or more persons make a joint promise, the promisee may, in the absence of express agreement to the contrary, compel any one or more of such joint promisors to perform the whole of the promise. It is not the case of the respondent that there was any agreement between the appellant and the respondent that both of them were jointly liable and one person is not liable to discharge the debt. Therefore, the debt incurred by two persons or promise made by two persons can be discharged by any one person and in this case, according to the appellant, the respondent and his wife incurred the debt and towards the discharge of the debt, the cheque was issued by the respondent. Therefore, the lower appellate Court is not right in holding that the issuance of cheque by the respondent towards the liability incurred by him and his wife cannot be towards legally enforceable liability.
18. Similarly, the lower appellate Court erred in relying upon the judgment reported in 2006 (5) CTC 296 supra. In that judgment, the learned Judge relied upon the judgment reported in AIR 1999 SUPREME COURT 1008 and 2001 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 960 supra and having regarding to facts of that case, accepted the explanation given by the respondent/accused. As stated supra, in this case, the explanation given by the respondent regarding the issuance of cheque cannot be accepted.
19. Hence, the judgment of the lower appellate Court is set aside and the judgment of the trail Court is restored and the respondent is convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay compensation of Rs.10,000/- as ordered under Section 357(3) of the Cr.P.C.,. The Criminal Appeal is allowed.
07.11.2014 Index: yes Internet: yes asvm To
1.Additional District & Sessions Judge, (Fast Track Court No.II), Coimbatore.
2.The Judicial Magistrate, Mettupalayam R.S.RAMANATHAN, J.
(asvm) Crl. Appeal No.495 of 2008 07.11.2014