Allahabad High Court
Lokman Singh Son Of Tota Ram vs Deputy General Manager, ... on 20 September, 2006
Author: Tarun Agarwala
Bench: Tarun Agarwala
JUDGMENT Tarun Agarwala, J.
1. A checking squad of the U.P. State Roadways Transport Corporation stopped Bus No. UGE 507 on 18.12.1993 and upon checking, found that out of 95 passengers, 48 passengers were travelling without tickets. On the basis of the checking report, the petitioner was suspended on 14.12.1993 and a charge sheet dated 11.1.1994 was issued. The charges against the petitioner was that 47 persons were travelling without tickets and that the petitioner had manhandled the checking staff and had also incited the passengers, who in turn, misbehaved with the checking staff and that the petitioner indulged in indiscipline and violated the Rules and Regulations of the Corporation. The petitioner denied the allegations and submitted that he was in the process of issuing the tickets when the bus was stopped by the checking staff and, at that stage, he had already issued several tickets. He further submitted that he did not misbehave with the checking staff nor had incited the passengers and, in fact, was instrumental in assuaging the tempers of the passengers. The disciplinary authority found that the reply of the petitioner was not satisfactory, and decided to hold an oral enquiry and appointed an enquiry officer to conduct an enquiry. The enquiry officer conducted the enquiry and submitted a report and found that the petitioner had not done his duty in accordance with the Rules and Regulations and therefore found him guilty of this charge. The enquiry officer found that the petitioner was issuing the tickets at the time when the bus was stopped by the checking squad and that there was some misunderstanding between him, the passengers and the checking staff. The enquiry officer consequently exonerated the petitioner from the remaining charges. The disciplinary authority disagreed with the enquiry report and issued a show cause notice dated 12.8.1994 to the petitioner to show cause why his services should not be dismissed. The petitioner submitted a detailed reply. The disciplinary authority after considering the matter, passed an order of dismissal dated 26.9.94. The petitioner filed a departmental appeal which was dismissed. Consequently, the writ petition praying for the quashing of the impugned orders.
2. Heard Sri Satyanshu Ojha, the learned Counsel holding the brief of Sri R.K. Ojha, the learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri Sheshshadri Dwivedi, the learned Counsel holding the brief of Sri Sameer Sharma, the learned Counsel for the respondents.
3. A Preliminary objection was raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents, namely, that the petitioner had a remedy of filing a reference under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act for adjudicating upon the legality and validity of the order of the dismissal, and therefore, submitted that the writ petition should be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy.
4. No doubt, the petitioner has a remedy of raising a dispute under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. However, since the petition was entertained in the year 1997 and counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged, it would not be proper for the Court to relegate the petitioner to an alternative remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act at this stage, and that too, after a period of almost 10 years. Consequently, the preliminary objection made by the learned Counsel for the respondents is rejected.
5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was exonerated of the charges levelled against him by the enquiry officer except for one charge, which by itself, was not that grievous, warranting an order of dismissal. Further, the disciplinary authority, while disagreeing with the enquiry report did not specify any reason for disagreeing with the enquiry report, nor such reasons were communicated by the disciplinary authority while issuing the show cause notice to the petitioner. Consequently, the show cause notice issued by the disciplinary authority was exfacie illegal. The learned Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that even in the order of dismissal, no reason had been given by the disciplinary authority for disagreeing with the enquiry report nor the disciplinary authority found that the petitioner was guilty of the charges levelled against him. Consequently, in the absence of any finding that the petitioner was guilty of the charges, the order of the disciplinary authority dismissing the petitioner from the services of the respondents was wholly illegal and was liable to be set aside.
6. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the disciplinary authority had full power to disagree with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and that he had recorded the reasons for such disagreement while issuing the show cause notice. The learned Counsel further submitted that assuming that the disciplinary authority did not give cogent reasons in the show cause notice, the reasons so given were only tentative in nature which, in any case, was supplied by the disciplinary authority in the order of dismissal. The learned Counsel for the respondents, therefore submitted, that there was no error in the order of the dismissal and that the same was liable to be confirmed and that the Court should not interfere in the decision of the authority or substitute its decision with the decision of the authority.
7. In support of his submission, the learned Counsel placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in V. Ramana v. A.P.S.R.T.C. and Ors. , wherein the Supreme Court held:
11. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case the court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision for that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision making process and not the decision.
12. To put it differently unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further to shorten litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof, m a normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.
8. In the opinion of the Court, the aforesaid principle, as enunciated by the Supreme Court is not applicable in the present case, inasmuch as, the decision of the disciplinary authority is vitiated on account of the fact that the order of dismissal is disproportionate to the charge found proved against the petitioner and also on account of the fact that the disciplinary authority while disagreeing with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer had neither given any reasons nor had found that the charges levelled against the petitioner stood proved.
9. In National Fertilizers Ltd. and Ors. v. P.K. Khanna , the Supreme Court held that it was necessary for the disciplinary authority to record its reasons for such disagreement as well as give its own findings on such charges, if it disagreed with the findings of the enquiry officer.
10. In Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. 1999(83) FLR 534, the Supreme Court held that when the disciplinary authority disagreed with the findings of the enquiry officer, he was required to record his own findings that the charges were established and that the delinquent officer was liable to be punished. The Supreme Court held:
it is open to the Disciplinary Authority either to agree with the findings recorded by the Inquiring Authority or disagree with those findings. If it does not agree with the findings of the Inquiring Authority, it may record its own findings. Where the Inquiring Authority has found the delinquent officer guilty of the charges framed against him and the Disciplinary Authority agrees with those findings, there would arise no difficulty. So also, if the Inquiring Authority has held the charges proved, but the Disciplinary Authority disagrees and records a finding that the charges were not established, there would arise no difficulty. Difficulties have arisen in all those cases in which the Inquiring Authority has recorded a positive finding that the charges were not established and the delinquent officer was recommended to be exonerated, but the Disciplinary Authority disagreed with those findings and recorded its own findings that the charges were established and the delinquent officer was liable to be punished.
11. The learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the disciplinary authority while disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer tentatively recorded its reasonings in the show cause notice and after giving full opportunity to the petitioner, the disciplinary authority, after considering the reply of the petitioner, recorded its reasons for disagreeing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and thereafter, passed the order of dismissal. The submission of the learned Counsel for the respondents is bereft of merit. A perusal of the show cause notice indicates that no reasons had been given by the disciplinary authority while disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer. The show cause notice only quotes the charges levelled against the petitioner which, by itself, did not amount to a disagreement with the findings given by the enquiry officer, nor would it amount to a disclosure of the reasons of the disciplinary authority.
12. Further, the order of dismissal does not indicate that the disciplinary authority had found that the charges against the petitioner stood proved. Consequently, in the absence of any findings that the charges stood proved against the petitioner, the Court is of the opinion that the order of dismissal against the sole charge that was found proved by the enquiry officer, by itself, could not be a ground for the dismissal of the petitioner.
13. For the reasons stated aforesaid, the order of termination as well as the appellate order cannot be sustained and are quashed. The writ petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner within one month from the date of the production of a certified copy of this order before the authority concerned. Since, no relief for back wages has been claimed, this Court is therefore not inclined to grant any relief of back wages. Even otherwise, in the opinion of the Court, since the petitioner had not worked during the interim period, no wages can be granted on the basis of the principle of 'No work no Pay'.
14. Since, only one charge levelled against the petitioner had been proved, consequently, the petitioner would not be entitled to receive the balance pay during the suspension period other than the subsistence allowance. The period of suspension from the date of the dismissal till the date of reinstatement would however be counted towards his length of service. In the circumstances of the case, parties will bear their own cost.