Karnataka High Court
Vijayakumar Shankarayya Sardar vs State Of Karnataka on 16 August, 1993
Equivalent citations: ILR1993KAR2586
ORDER Rajendra Babu, J.
1. The petitioner purchased land comprised in R.S.No. 78/2 of Dombargop measuring about 10 acres 03 guntas on 7.4.1982. The Assistant Commissioner made an order on 5.4.1991 holding that the transaction in question is hit by the provisions of Section 79A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act (hereinafter called as 'the Act' for short) as the income of the petitioner is more than Rs. 12,000/- from non-agricultural sources. The correctness of the said order is called in question. The petitioner is also calling in question the constitutional validity of Sections 79A, 79-B and 79-C of the Act as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
2. Section 79 of the Act as stood originally, was introduced into the Act by Act 1 of 1974 and read as follows:-
"79(1) On and from the commencement of the Amendment Act, no person who or a family or a joint family which has an assured annual income of not less than rupees twelve thousand from sources other than agricultural lands shall be entitled to acquire any land whether as land owner, landlord, tenant or mortgagee with possession or otherwise or partly in one capacity and partly in another."
The said provision came to be amended by Act 1 of 1991 i.e. (Second Amendment) Act 1991 to the effect that in the Sub-section (1) of Section 79 of the Act, for the words 'rupees twelve thousand', the words 'rupees fifty thousand' shall be substituted. By Act 31 of 1991, the Act was further amended to rectify the omission in Act 1 of 1991 so as to bring it in conformity with the amendment therein so as to read "in all the provisions of Section 79A the words 'Rs. 50,000/-' in place of words 'Rs. 12,000/-'. The Amending Act (1 of 1991) and (31 of 1991) in regard to Section 79-A is stated to have come into force with effect from 5th February, 1991.
3. Considering the importance of the matter, we have heard several learned Counsel appearing in similar matters and their names are all shown in the cause title as assisting the Court as Amicus Curiae.
4. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner and other learned Counsel that Section 79A(1) of the Act as amended by Act 1 of 1991 is effective right from the inception of the said provision, that is, 1.3.1974 and the provisions will have to be read as imposing a restriction on those having annual income in excess of Rs. 50,000/-per annum from sources other than agricultural lands from purchasing agricultural lands. It is submitted that by increasing the amount from Rs. 12,000/- to Rs. 50,000/- the rigour of the restriction is reduced and therefore the amendment is a beneficial provision.
5. The learned Government Pleader who appeared for the respondents, relying upon a Decision of this Court in GAYATHRI RAMASWAMY v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND TWO ORS., W.P.No. 16976 of 1986 DD. 20.12.1991, contended that the provisions of Act 1 of 1991 are prospective in operation and therefore the benefit of the provisions of Section 79A as amended by Act 1 of 1991 cannot be given to persons who have purchased properties prior to 5.2.1991 on which date the Amending Act (1 of 1991) came into force.
6. Learned Counsel appearing for different parties impressed upon us that the Decision rendered in W.P.No. 16976/86 - Gayathri Ramaswmy's case referred to supra - is wrongly decided and it does not deal with the matter in the right perspective. It is submitted that Section 79A of the Act read as it is, must be that the amended provision by Act 1 of 1991stood introduced into the Act even from 1.3.1974 for, the Section itself declares the date on which the said provision comes into force, that is, "on and from, the commencement of the Amended Act." A person is disabled from acquiring land who has an assured annual income of not loss than Rs. 50,000/- from sources other than agricultural lands. It is submitted that subsequent to the amendment of Section 79 of the Act, the amended provisions have to be read along with unamended provisions of the Sections and if so read, no other view is possible except to hold that all transactions that have taken place from 1.3.1974 are governed by the amended provisions.
7. The learned Counsel referred to various Decisions of this Court and of the Supreme Court on the manner of interpretation and of understanding as to when an Amendment Act comes into force and how such provisions have to be interpreted, so on and so forth. It was also argued that the provision is penal in nature and therefore has got to be read in a restrictive manner and the rigour of restriction has been reduced by reason of the amendment of the provisions and therefore the benefit thereof will have to be given even to anterior facts though the law is prospective in operation, It is also suggested where two constructions are possible, that one which is more beneficial to those who are intended to be benefited, should be given rather than a construction which defeats such a course. It is unnecessary to refer to these aspects of the matter or to the Decisions referred to or relied upon in support of these propositions.
8. In Gayathri Ramaswamy's case it is held that law is always prospective in operation unless stated to be retrospective in the Act itself or inferred by necessary implication arising therefrom. With respect we agree with this statement of the law.
9. For proper appreciation of the matter, the provisions of Section 79A of the Act can be read as follows:-
"On and from 1st March 1974, no person who or a family or a joint family which has an assured annual income of not less than rupees Fifty thousand from sources other than Agricultural lands shall be entitled to acquire any land whether as land owner, landlord, tenant or mortgagee with possession or otherwise or partly in one capacity and partly in another."
10. In Gayathri Ramaswamy's case, Act 31 of 1991 and the provisions thereto are referred to, to hold that the said provisions will come into effect from 5.2.1991, which only means, that these provisions get incorporated into the parent Act as from 5.2.1991 and no more. The criticism of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and those assisting as Amicus Curiae is that, the attention of this Court was not drawn to the provisions of the Parent Act after amendment at all but only to the date on which the Amending Act came into force.
11. In Statutory Constructions by Crawford at Section 78 it is stated:-
"Where a Section or a statute is amended, the original ceases to exist and the new Section supersedes it and becomes a part of the law just as if the amendment had always been there."
On the rule of Statutory Constructions it is useful to refer to SHAMRAO v. PARULEKAR v. THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, THANA, BOMBAY, wherein it is observed:-
".... The rule is that when a subsequent Act amends an earlier one in such a way as to incorporate itself, or a part of itself, into the earlier, then the earlier Act must thereafter be read and construed (except where that would lead to a repugnancy, inconsistency or absurdity) as if the altered words had been written into the earlier Act with pen and ink and the old words scored out so that thereafter there is no need to refer to the amending Act at all."
In SHRI RAM NARAIN v. THE SIMLA BANKING AND INDUSTRIAL CO. LTD., , it was stated that:-
"Now there is no question about the correctness of this dictum. But it appears to us that it has no application to this case. It is perfectly true as stated therein that whenever an amended Act has to be applied subsequent to the date of the amendment the various unamended provisions of the Act have to be read along with the amended provisions as though they are part of it. This is for the purpose of determining what the meaning of any particular provision of the Act as amended is, whether it is in the unamended part or in the amended part."
The upshot of this discussion is that whenever an amended Act has to be applied subsequent to the date of amendment, the various unamended provisions of the Act have to be read along with the amended provision as though they are the part of it." The amended part of the provision having got incorporated into the Act the provision of Section 79A of the Act as such should be read. Section 79A of the Act has the opening words on and from the commencement of the Amended Act". The amended Act, as stated earlier, is defined to be Act 1 of 1974 which came into effect from 1.3.1974. From that date, no one can acquire an agricultural land if his income from sources other than agricultural lands is in excess of Rs. 50,000/-. If the interpretation given in Gayathri Ramaswamy's case is to be adopted, then it gives rise to two sets of transactions:-
(1) those by which from the commencement of the amendment Act, i.e. from 1.3.1974, acquired lands prior to 5.2.1991, and (2) those by which acquired lands subsequent to 5.2.1991.
But Section read as it is subsequent to amendment, does not give scope for such a construction at all. If the amended provision were to be effective from 5.2.1991, then the expression "on and from the date of commencement of Amended Act i.e. 1.3.1974." will have no meaning at all. Legislature, noticing that the Section itself has provided as to in respect of what transactions the restriction is applicable which are entered into from particular date, there was no necessity to make the same retrospective at all. We cannot attribute either ignorance to the Legislature of the opening words of Section 79A of the Act or treat the same as surplusage. Section simply stated "from the date of the commencement of the Amended Act which is 1.3.1974", those having annual income in excess of Rs. 50,000/- from non-agricultural sources cannot acquire agricultural lands. It is not a case where the Legislature classifies transactions depending upon a particular date. On the other hand, the Legislature gives rise to certain consequences that would follow if a transaction takes place after a particular date. It is only a restriction in relation to a transaction. If that is so, there is no scope for interpretation that there can be two classes of transactions. As the provision stands, the date of the commencement of the entire provision is 1.3.1974 and none other. In this view of the law, with great respect to the learned Judge who decided Gayathri Ramaswamy's case, we must say that the said case is not correctly decided and the interpretation to be placed on Section 79A of the Act is only by reference to the entire provisions of the Section as amended by Act 1 of 1991 and it must be held that the said words "Rs. 50,000/-" as always being there in the enactment because the language of the Section permits no other construction. In view of this state of law, it is unnecessary to examine the constitutional validity of the provisions raised herein. We refrain from doing so. If and when necessary, the petitioner is at liberty to raise the same. In the circumstances, the Petition stands allowed in part. The impugned order at Annexure 'K' shall stand quashed and the matter shall stand remitted to the Assistant Commissioner for fresh consideration in accordance with law and in the light of this order. Rule is absolute accordingly.