Allahabad High Court
Smt Saavan Sri vs State Of U.P. And 3 Others on 30 March, 2022
Author: Saumitra Dayal Singh
Bench: Saumitra Dayal Singh
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD A.F.R. Court No. - 38 Case :- WRIT - C No. - 5791 of 2022 Petitioner :- Smt Saavan Sri Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 3 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Vishal Tandon Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C. Hon'ble Saumitra Dayal Singh,J.
1. Heard Sri Vishal Tandon learned counsel for the petitioner, Ms. Archana Tyagi learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State respondents and Sri Pankaj Kumar Gupta learned counsel for the Gaon Sabha.
2. Present writ petition has been filed against the order dated 28.12.2021 passed by the Additional Commissioner (Judicial) Aligarh Division, Aligarh. whereby the said authority has allowed Appeal No. 00288 of 2021 (Sarvesh Vs. State of U.P.). It has set aside the order dated 25.1.2021, passed by the SDM, Jalesar and restored the fair price shop agreement of respondent No.4.
3. At the outset, a preliminary objection has been raised by learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel and learned counsel for the Gaon Sabha, to the maintainability of the present petition. It has been thus submitted; the petitioner was the complainant before the licensing authority; acting on his complaint, proceedings were initiated by the competent authority against the original fair price shop agent - Sarvesh/respondent No.4; thereafter, the fair price shop agreement of the said respondent was cancelled on 25.1.2021; the said respondent preferred Second Appeal No. 00288 of 2021; it has been allowed. Therefore, the petitioner - who was merely the complainant, has no locus to maintain the present writ petition.
4. Meeting that preliminary objection, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed heavy reliance on Clause-13 of the Uttar Pradesh Essential Commodities (Regulation of Sale and Distribution Control) Order, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Control Order'). Relying on the Hindi version of clause 13(1) of the Control Order, it has been vehemently urged, the right of appeal has been created by the Control Order against an order of ''Bahali' i.e. restoration of a fair price shop agreement, besides creating a right of appeal against an order of suspension and cancellation of a fair price agreement. In support of such submission, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Smt. Farzana Vs. State of U.P. and Others, 2018(7) ADJ 767, to contend, in case of ambiguity in the English version of a Notification or statute etc., the Hindi version of the same may be looked into and relied to cure that ambiguity. In the same vein, reliance has also been placed on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Ram Surat Mishra Vs. State of U.P., 2013(6) ADJ 503 (FB)(LB). Reliance has also been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Trade Tax Uttar Pradesh Vs. Associated Distributors Limited, (2008) 7 SCC 709.
5. By way of second limb to his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit, in any case, the law that existed earlier - giving the complainant no right of appeal against an order or restoration of fair price shop, is no longer good law, in view of statutory change made by the Control Order. Thus, referring to clause 13(3) of the Control Order, it has been submitted, the right of appeal has been given to 'any person aggrieved'. Earlier, the right of appeal was conferred exclusively on the fair price shop agent and on no other person. Therefore, the remedy of appeal has now been made available to a larger body of individuals who may be aggrieved by an order of ''Bahali'/restoration, suspension or cancellation of a fair price shop agreement. Clearly, the complainant who may have brought evidence before the licensing authority and/or the appeal authority - against an erring fair price shop agent was a person having a grievance against the fair price shop agent. Therefore, he would be a person aggrieved by the order granting restoration of fair price shop agreement. Such view is stated to have been taken by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Akhlaq Vs. State of U.P. and Others, Writ-C No. 43188 of 2017 decided on 05.2.2019 and Smt. Muneeta Vs. State of U.P. and Others, Writ-C No. 21915 of 2019, decided on 06.2.2020.
6. Last, it has also been submitted, the appeal authority has grossly erred in allowing the appeal on merits. The only defect noted by it was with respect to procedural compliance. If the enquiry report had not been confronted to the private respondent, the only course open to the appeal authority was to remit the matter to the original authority or to entertain the matter on merits itself and, pass a reasoned order, thereafter.
7. On the other hand, vehemently opposing the petition, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel and the learned counsel for the Gaon Sabha have submitted, it is no longer res integra that a complainant has no right of appeal. Consequently, he can never claim to be a person aggrieved by the order passed by the appeal authority. In that regard, reliance has been first placed on a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Ashfaq Vs. State of U.P. and Others, 2008(4) ADJ 416. Then, reliance has been placed on a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Dharam Raj Vs. State of U.P. Through District Magistrate and Others, 2009(77) ALR 564. Doubt, if any, in that regard is stated to have been removed by a further decision of the learned Single Judge in the case of Sriram Prasad and another Vs. State of U.P. and 3 Others, (2016) 3 ALJ 308 and Neeraj Kumar Mishra Vs. Dy. Commissioner (Food) Region Allahabad and Others, 2017(3) ADJ 834 and Gram Vikash Sewa Samiti Vs. State of U.P. and 4 Others, Writ-C No. 19941 of 2018, decided on 30.8.2018. Thus, it has been submitted, the decision of the learned Single Judge referred to and relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner in the cases of Akhlaq (supra) and Smt. Muneeta (supra) are per incuriam. Those decisions have not considered the binding ratio of the division bench decision in Dharam Raj (supra). As to the distinction attempted by learned counsel for the petitioner, based on the difference of language used in the English and Hindi versions of the Control Order, it has been submitted, the Hindi version of the official legislative publication, be it an Act, Notification etc., may be relied only in the event of an ambiguity arising upon reading of such publication in English itself.
8. Thus, reliance has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in M/s Park Leather Industry (P) Ltd and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Others, (2001) 3 SCC 135 as also a division bench decision of the Uttarakhand High Court in Smt. Shahjahan Baigam Vs. District Magistrate Udham Singh Nagar and Others, AIR 2017 Uttarakhand 200. To that extent the decision of the learned single-Judge in the case of Smt. Farzana (supra) is described as not laying down the correct law.
9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, in the first place, it would be appropriate to quote and compare the provisions of Clause 13 of the Control Order, as published in the English and Hindi. They read as below:
Clause 13 of the Control Order English Hindi Appeal.-(1) Appeal in relation to action or subject covered under the National Food Security Act, 2013 and rules framed under it shall lie before the authority mentioned in sub-clause (10) of Clause 11 of this order but appeal against appointment, suspension and cancellation of fair price shop by the competent authority shall lie before the Divisional Commissioner.
13. अपील- (1) राष्ट्रीय खाद्य सुरक्षा अधिनियम, 2013 और उसके अधीन बनायी गयी नियमावलो के अधीन आच्छादित कार्यवाई या विषय के सम्बन्ध में इस आदेश के खण्ड 11 के उपखण्ड (10) में उल्लिखित प्राधिकारी के समक्ष अपील की जायेगी, किन्तु सक्षम प्राधिकारी द्वारा उचित मूल्य की दुकान की बहाली, निलम्बन और निरस्तीकरण के विरुद्ध सम्भागीय आयुक्त के समक्ष अपील की जायेगी।
(2) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Designated Authority denying the issue or renewal of a ration card or cancellation of the ration card under the National Food Security Act, 2013 may appeal to the Appellate Authority within thirty days of the date of receipt of the order.
(2) राष्ट्रीय खाद्य सुरक्षा अधिनियम, 2013 के अधीन किसी राशन कार्ड को जारी करने या नवीकरण करने से इन्कार या राशन कार्ड का निरस्तीकरण करने से सम्बन्धित पदाभिहित अधिकारी के आदेश द्वारा व्यथित कोई व्यक्ति आदेश की प्राप्ति के दिनांक के तीस दिनों के भीतर अपीलीय प्राधिकारी को अपील कर सकता है।
[(3) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Competent Authority denying the issue or renewal of the agreement to the fair price shop owner, suspension or cancellation of the agreement may appeal to the Appellate Authority namely the Divisional Commissioner or the Divisional Additional Commissioner, Joint Commissioner/Deputy Commissioner (Food) authorized by him in writing to hear and dispose appeal within thirty days of the date of receipt of the order and the Appellate Authority shall, as far as practicable, dispose the appeal within a period of sixty days:
Provided that once an appeal has been disposed of by the Appellate Authority, the time for issue or renewal of the agreement of the fair price shop owner by the Competent authority referred to in sub-Clause (9) of Clause 10 shall begin from the date of decision of the Appellate Authority on the appeal.] Provided further that an appeal pending before an Appellate Authority appointed under the Uttar Pradesh Schedule Commodities Distribution Order, 2004 shall be disposed of by such authority as if this Order had not been made.
(3) उचित मूल्य की दुकान स्वामी को अनुबन्ध जारी करने या नवीकरण करने, अनुबन्ध को निलम्बित या रद्द करने हेतु सक्षम प्राधिकारी के किसी आदेश द्वारा व्यथित कोई व्यक्ति अपीलीय प्राधिकारी अर्थात् सम्भागीय आयुक्त या सम्भागीय अपर आयुक्त या उसके द्वारा लिखित रूप में अपील की सुनवाई और निपटान के लिए प्राधिकृत संयुक्त आयुक्त/उपायुक्त (खाद्य) के आदेश प्राप्त होने की तारीख से तीस दिन के भीतर अपील कर सकेगा तथा अपीलीय प्राधिकारी, जहाँ तक व्यवहार्य है, साठ दिन के भीतर अपील का निपटान करेगा:
परन्तु यह कि अपीलीय अधिकारी द्वारा एक बार अपील का निपटान किए जाने पर खण्ड-10 के उपखण्ड (9) में निर्दिष्ट सक्षम प्राधिकारी द्वारा उचित मूल्य की दुकान स्वामी का अनुबन्ध जारी करने या उसका नवीकरण करने का समय अपील प्राधिकारी द्वारा अपीलीय पर विनिश्चय की तारीख से प्रारम्भ होगा :
परन्तु यह और कि उत्तर प्रदेश अनुसूची वस्तु वितरण आदेश, 2004 के अधीन नियुक्त किसी अपीलीय प्राधिकारी के सम्मुख लम्बित किसी अपील का निपटान ऐसे प्राधिकारी द्वारा किया जायेगा मानो यह आदेश न किया गया हो।] (4) No appeal shall be disposed of unless the aggrieved person has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
(4) किसी अपील का निपटान तब तक नहीं किया जाएगा जब तक कि व्यथित किसी व्यक्ति को सुने जाने का उचित अवसर न दिया गया हो।
(5) Pending the disposal of an appeal, the Appellate Authority may direct that the order under appeal shall not take effect for such period as the authority may consider necessary for giving a reasonable opportunity to the other party under sub-clause (4) or until the appeal is disposed or, whichever is earlier.
(5) अपीलीय प्राधिकारी, किसी अपील के निपटान के लम्बित होने पर यह निदेश दे सकेगा कि अपील के अधीन आदेश उस अवधि के लिए प्रभावी नहीं होगा, जो प्राधिकारी उपखण्ड-(4) के अधीन अन्य पक्षकार को सुने जाने का उचित अवसर प्रदान करने के लिए आवश्यक समझे या जब तक कि अपील का निपटारा न हो जाए, इसमें से जो भी पूर्वोत्तर हो।
10. The dispute in the present case revolves around interpretation to be given to Clause 13(1) of the Control Order. Admittedly, there is no ambiguity or discrepancy arising from reading of the Hindi and/or English versions of Clause 13(3) of the Control Order.
11. Read in entirety, Clause 13(1) of the Control Order seeks to provide for two different forums of appeal. In the first place, a forum of appeal has been provided in relation to action or subject matter covered under the National Food Security Act 2013 and the Rules framed thereunder. That forum of appeal has been provided before the Officer appointed or designated as the District Grievance Redressal Officer under the U.P. Food Security Rules, 2015. In that regard, the description of Clause 11(10) of the Control Order [in Clause 13(1)] appears to suffer from an apparent typographical/print error. There is no Clause 11(10) of the Control Order. That appeal forum appears to exist under Clause 9(10) of the Control Order. The other forum of appeal created is with respect to orders against appointment, suspension and cancellation of fair price shop agreement, described in the Hindi version of the Control Order as ''Bahali'; ''Nilamban' and ''Nirastikaran'. That appeal forum has been created before the Divisional Commissioner.
12. By very nature, different rights are to be contested before the two different forums provided under Clause 13(1) of the Control Order. Before the first forum, the rights of the beneficiaries are to be contested with respect to issuance of ration cards etc. Before the other/second forum, the rights with respect to the fair price shop agency alone are to be contested. On a plain reading of Clause 13(1) of the Control Order (either in English or Hindi), there appears no legislative intent to confer a right of appeal on any person. The said Clause only speaks of appeal forums, with respect to two entirely different rights, vested in two entirely different class of citizens.
13. It may have been another case if Clause 13(1) existed without Clause 13(3) of the Control Order. That situation may have been akin to the one that existed under the earlier Control Order dated 03.07.1990. Under Clause 11 thereof, it was not specified, to whom the right of appeal was granted. For ready reference, Clause 11 of that Government Order is quoted below:
"जिलाधिकारी द्वारा दुकान नियुक्ति/निलंबन/निरस्तीकरण/नवीनीकरण न करने संबंधी पारित आदेश के विरुद्ध अपील संबंधित की जाएगी। इन मामलों में द्वितीय अपील की वयवस्था नहीं होगी।"
14. However, in the present case, Clause 13(3) of the Control Order specifically provides such right of appeal to 'any person aggrieved' against an order of the competent authority. That right of appeal has been given with respect to orders of denial or renewal of agreement to a fair price shop owner or an order of suspension or an order of cancellation of agreement of fair price shop. No other or further order has been made appealable. Thus, an order of revocation of suspension of a fair price shop agreement is not made appealable under Clause 13 (3) of the Control Order.
15. Other than that, the said sub-clause provides for period of limitation to avail that right of appeal, being 30 days from the date of receipt of the order passed by the competent authority. Then sub-clause 4 of the said Clause 13 of the Control Order further stipulates, no appeal (filed under Clause 13) shall be decided unless 'aggrieved person' has been given reasonable opportunity of being heard. Last, sub-clause 5 grants power to the Appeal Authority, to grant stay, pending an appeal.
16. Examined in that light, the first issue that may be dealt with is the interpretation to be given to Clause 13(1) of the Control Order in that it describes the nature of orders that may be appealed before the Divisional Commissioner. If the Hindi version of the Control Order were to be read to confer a right of appeal against an order of revocation of a suspension order, a conflict would arise between Clause 13(1) and 13(3) of the Control Order with respect to the right of appeal given against certain orders passed by the Competent Authority. While sub-clause (1) would provide for a forum of appeal against such order, sub-clause (3) would restrict/prevent filing of such appeal. A court may never read a statute in a manner as may give rise to a conflict between two provisions of the same enactment, existing for the same purpose.
17. While the English version of Clause 13(1) of the Control Order uses the words 'appointment', 'suspension' and 'cancellation', the Hindi version chooses to use the words 'bahaali', 'nilamban' and, 'nirastikaran' to describe the nature of orders against which appeal may lie to the Divisional Commissioner. There is no dispute between the parties that the word suspension translates accurately to the word 'Nilamban' and the word cancellation translates accurately to the word 'Nirastikaran'. The parties are at variance as to the meaning to be given to the word 'appointment' as compared to the word 'Bahaali' used in the Hindi version under Clause 13(1) of the Control Order.
18. Appointment of a fair price shop agent is an executive act. The selected/preferred applicant enters into an agreement with the respondent State authorities to run the designated fair price shop agency. Under Section 16 of the U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904, the power to appoint includes the power to suspend, dismiss, remove etc. On the other hand, ''Bahaali' is a Hindi word only. It means and refers to an act of restoration or revival of a thing, arrangement, status, right etc. It is always used with reference to what existed before - that which had been interrupted or obstructed or removed or changed or replaced, immediately before it was restored or revived. Therefore, the genus is ''appointment', ''Bahaali' i.e., restoration or revival, is a species. Therefore, appointment would always include ''Bahaali', yet ''Bahaali' does not include original appointment made.
19. Therefore, ''Bahaali' may arise only in the event of a pre-existing fair price shop agreement - because of revocation of the earlier order of suspension passed by the Competent Authority. The event of revocation of a suspension order (passed earlier) may be described as ''Bahaali'. If the word appointment appearing in Clause 13(1) of the Control Order is read to include ''Bahali', necessarily, clear conflict would emerge from a plain reading of the English and the Hindi versions of Clause 13 (1) of the Control Order.
20. On the other hand, it may be noted here itself, a plain reading of the English version of the Control Order gives rise to no ambiguity. For any ambiguity to exist, it must be first inferred by the Court that there are plural interpretation/meaning possible or permissible to be given to the language used by the legislature. If only one meaning can be inferred from the reading of the statute and the legislative Act remains functional on that reading, the Court may never explore a possibility of, or cull out an ambiguity in the legislative enactment. In that case, the interpretative exercise must remain simple and clear to read the intent of the legislature from the plain meaning of the words chosen by it. No other intendment is to be searched where the words used by the legislature offer a unique or clear grammatical and functional sense. No unworkability may ever be claimed because the legislature did not provide a right of appeal against an order of revocation of suspension order. It is so because appeal is a creature of statutes and not an inherent right.
21. Even in the Full Bench decision of this Court in Ram Rati & Ors. Gram Samaj, Jehwa & Ors., AIR 1974 (All) 106 referred to in Smt. Farzana (supra), the question framed was as below:
"Whether it will be a sound rule of interpretation or construction of Statutes that if there appears to be some doubt or ambiguity in the authorized text in English language of an Act enacted in Hindi by the Legislature of Uttar Pradesh, then for resolving the ambiguity or doubt and for ascertaining the correct meaning thereof, reference can be made to the corresponding Hindi text and reliance placed thereon?"
22. Having considered the submissions advanced, the Full Bench observed as below:
10. We may, at the very outset, mention that if the distinction between "conflict" in the Hindi text and the authoritative text in English and "ambiguity or doubt" in the authoritative text in English is kept in mind, the apparent conflict in the decisions of this Court will disappear. A "conflict" between the Hindi text and the authoritative English text is different from a "doubt or ambiguity" in the authoritative English, text. There will be conflict between the provisions of the two texts when it is not possible to reconcile or harmonize them and then the question will arise as to which of the two shall prevail. Such a conflict does not by itself result in a "doubt or ambiguity" in the authoritative English text. The principles applicable to the resolution of "conflict" are not applicable to the resolution of "doubt or ambiguity". The normal rules of interpretation of statutes will have to be applied in the case of "doubt or ambiguity" in any provision of the authoritative English text.
17. We are, therefore, of opinion that where there is some doubt or ambiguity in any provision in the authoritative English text, it is permissible to look into the Hindi text to remove the doubt or ambiguity. We accordingly answer the question referred to this Bench in the affirmative."
(emphasis supplied)
23. Then, in M/s Park Leather Industry (P) Ltd (supra) the issue was resolved thus:
"Of course an English version is simultaneously published. Undoubtedly, if there is conflict between the two then the English version would prevail. However, if there is no conflict then one can always have assistance of the Hindi version in order to find out whether the word used in English includes a particular item or not. In the Hindi version the word used is "Chamra". There can be no dispute that the term "Chamra" would include "leather" in all its forms.
In this view of the matter the appeal stands dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs."
24. In face of the above dictum of the Supreme Court and of the seven- Judge Full Bench decision of this Court, the following ratio in Ram Surat Mishra (supra) runs contrary to that binding law. Therein, it has been observed as below:
"Since the official language of the State of U.P., has been declared Hindi Devnagri script in pursuance of power conferred by Article 345 of the Constitution, and the original bill passed by the Legislature is also in Hindi, in the event of conflict between Hindi and English version, the Hindi version of the statute shall prevail over the English version. The English version of the statutory provisions are mere translation of the Hindi version. Since entire proceeding of State Legislature is executed in Hindi and notifications are issued accordingly, the English version is mere translation of Hindi version. Therefore, in the event of language conflict, the Hindi version of statutory notification shall prevail over the English version."
25. As to Associated Distributors Limited (supra), it was observed as under:
"It is pertinent to mention here that the official language of the State of Uttar Pradesh is Hindi. If any difference is found between the notifications in English and Hindi, the notification issued in Hindi will be applicable. On the said notification, the courts have decided that confectionery comes within sweets (mithai) and sweetmeat, but it has not been mentioned that bubblegum comes within the category of a sweet."
26. It may be noted, in that decision, the Supreme Court did not consider the issue of conflict between the official English and Hindi versions of legislative publications rather, that ratio arose upon a ''difference' noted in those publications. A difference may give rise to both, ambiguity and conflict. In so far as the Supreme Court has not spoken any further, it must be assumed, it had applied the rule - rely on the Hindi text to cure the ambiguity, only. Any other reading of that decision of the Supreme Court would create a conflict between two decisions of the Supreme Court. The real issue was as has been noted in the opening passage of judgement.
27. Therefore, the true rule to be applied remains one, being - in case the English version of the legislative publication, read on its own offers any ambiguity or doubt, its Hindi version may be read to cure that ambiguity, and no further. If however, no ambiguity emerges from a plain reading of the English version of the legislative publication, then, despite any conflict arising on a comparative reading of the English and Hindi version of the same legislative publication, its English version would prevail. That is the only consistent ratio pronounced and consistently applied by the Supreme Court and the larger Full Bench of this Court.
28. Thus, with all respects, I am unable to subscribe to the view taken by the learned single-Judge in Smt. Farzana (supra). That view appears to have arisen contrary to the binding decision of the Supreme Court and the seven-Judge Full Bench decision of this Court. Therefore, I also do not find it necessary to refer the matter to a larger bench strength.
29. Being bound by the dictum of the Supreme Court and the Full Bench of this Court, the true meaning to be given to the Clause 13(1) of the Control Order is found to be a one contained in the English version of the Control Order. Consequently, the word 'Bahaali' used in the Hindi version of the Control Order being in conflict with the world ''appointment' used in the English version of that Control Order must and would necessarily, be read as 'appointment' only. No right of appeal has been granted (under that clause of the Control Order), against an order of revival or restoration of a fair price shop agreement. That beside the reason, Clause 13(1) of the Control Order only provides a forum of appeal but does not seek to create a right of appeal. Thus, provisions of Clause 13 (1) and 13 (3) of the Control Order are found to be wholly consistent to each other.
30. Consequently, Clause 13(1) of the Control Order does not grant a right of appeal, to any person, against any order contrary to such right provided under Clause 13(3) of the Control Order. Clause 13 (1) only refers to the nature of orders made appealable by referring to their genus - appointment, suspension, and cancellation whereas Clause 13(3) of the Control Order refers to the species of such orders, made appealable, by any person who may be aggrieved by such order/s. Thus, both - denial of issuance and denial of renewal of a fair price shop agreement, have been made appealable. However, other types of appointments such as revocation of suspension have not been made appealable.
31. As to the right of appeal to be availed, the same has been granted only to any 'aggrieved person'. As to the true meaning to be given to the words 'aggrieved person' (synonymous to ''person aggrieved'), there is a consistent line of decisions. While the decision in the case of Ashfaq (supra) may no longer be good law in view of the changed provision of the Control Order viz-a-viz the right of appeal given to 'any person aggrieved' yet, that inherent principle in the earlier Control Order/s survives. Specifically, to the interpretation to be given to the word 'person aggrieved', I am bound by the dictum of the division bench of this Court in Dharam Raj (supra). In that case, the fair price shop agreement of the original agent was first suspended but later restored. Against such order, the writ petition had been filed by the complainant. The observations made in that decision are pertinent to the dispute at hand. Mainly, in paragraph nos.9, 10, 12 and 17, it was observed as below:
"9. As evident from narration of the facts given above, it is evident that the petitioner was one of the complainants in the complaint made against the respondent no. 4 on 12.13.2008. The action has since been taken on the complaint so made by the petitioner and others against the respondent no. 4, and fine of Rs. 5,000/-has been imposed.
10. In the circumstances, the petitioner cannot have any grievance in the matter, and he is not an aggrieved person, rather he is a person annoyed.
12. According to our opinion a "person aggrieved", means a person who is wrongly deprived of his entitlement which he is legally entitled to receive and it does not include any kind of disappointment or personal in convenience. "Person aggrieved" means a person who is injured or he is adversely affected in a legal sense.
17. The view taken by us that the petitioner is not a person aggrieved, thus he has no locus standi to file the present writ petition thereby challenging the order dated 16.3.2009 passed by Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Jal Singh Pur, District Sultanpur is also supported by the decision of this Court in the case of Suresh Singh v. Commissioner, Muradabad Division,7 where it was held that in an inquiry under section 95 (g) of the V.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 947, the complainant who was Vp-Pradhan could be a witness in an inquiry but had no locus standi to approach this Court against the order of the State authorities, for the reasons that none of his personal statutory right are affected."
32. The issue was then dealt with elaborately by a learned single-Judge of this Court in Sriram Prasad (supra) wherein besides the following the division bench decision in Dharam Raj (supra), the learned Single Judge made pertinent observation as below:
"The meaning of the expression person aggrieved will have to be ascertained with reference to the purpose and the provisions of the statute. One of the meanings is that person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him. The restricted meaning of the expression requires denial or deprivation of legal rights. A more legal approach is required in the background of statutes which do not deal with the property rights but deal with professional misconduct and morality. (Refer-Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V.Dabholkar, (1975) 2 SCC 702, 710-11, paras 27 & 28).
Broadly, speaking a party or a person is aggrieved by a decision when, it only operates directly and injuriously upon his personal, pecuniary and proprietary rights (Corpus Juris Seundem. Edn. 1, Vol.IV, p.356, as referred in Kalva Sudhakar Reddy v.Mandala Sudhakar Reddy, AIR 2005 AP 45,49 para 10) The expression 'person aggrieved' means a person who has suffered a legal grievance ie a person against whom a decision has been pronounced which has lawfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something. The petitioner is not an aggrieved person by merely filing a complaint. The order of revocation of cancellation of fair price shop license do not affect him in any manner.
The Division Bench in Dharam Raj Versus State of U.P. and others, 2010 (2) AWC 1878 (LB), held that the petition on behalf of the complainant against the licensee of fair price shop is not maintainable against the final order passed by the competent authority as the complainant cannot be said to have any grievance in the matter being not an aggrieved person rather is a person annoyed.
Recently Supreme Court in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir versus District Collector, Raigad and others (2012) 4 SCC 407 was dealing with the removal of the President of Uran Municipal Council under the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965. The ex-President was the complainant, the Court was of the opinion that the complainant cannot be party to the lis as he could not claim the status of an adversarial litigant. The relevant extract is as follows:
"58. Shri Chintaman Raghunath Gharat, Ex-President was the complainant, thus, at the most, he could lead the evidence as a witness. He could not claim the status of an adversial litigant. The complainant cannot be the party to the lis. A legal right is an averment of entitlement arising out of law. In fact, it is a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. Thus, a person who suffers from legal injury can only challenge the act or omission. There may be some harm or loss that may not be wrongful in the eyes of law because it may not result in injury to a legal right or legally protected interest of the complainant but juridically harm of this description is called damnum sine injuria.
59. The complainant has to establish that he has been deprived of or denied of a legal right and he has sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In case he has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on, he cannot be heard as a party in a lis. A fanciful or sentimental grievance may not be sufficient to confer a locus standi to sue upon the individual. There must be injuria or a legal grievance which can be appreciated and not a stat pro ratione valuntas reasons i.e. a claim devoid of reasons.
60. Under the garb of being necessary party, a person cannot be permined to make a case as that of general public interest. A person having a remote interest cannot be permitted to become a party in the lis, as the person wants to become a party in a case, has to establish that he has a proprietary a right which has been or is threatened to be violated, for the reason that a legal injury creates a remedial right in the injured person. A person cannot be heard as a party unless he answers the description of aggrieved party. (Vide: Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seerval, Advocate General of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 385; Jasbihai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed & Ors, AIR 1976 SC 578; Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors, AIR 1976 SC 2602; Ghulam Qadir x. Special Tribunal & Ors., (2002) 1 SCC 33; and Kabushiki Kanha Toshiba v. Tosiba Appliances Company & Ors, (2008) 10 SCC 766). The High Court failed to appreciate that it was a case of political rivalry. The case of the appellant has not been considered in correct perspective at all."
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan versus State of Maharashtra and others (2013) 4 SCC 465, 466 was dealing with the issue of caste certificate being challenged by a person who did not belong to the reserved category. The Apex Court imposed exemplary cost of one lakh upon the stranger to the lis as he abused the process of the Court to harass the appellant.
The Court held as follows:
"9. It is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to meddle in any proceeding, unless he satisfies the Authority/Court, that he falls within the category of aggrieved persons. Only a person who has suffered, or suffers from legal injury can challenge the act/action/order etc. in a court of law. A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable either for the purpose of enforcing a statutory or legal right, or when there is a complaint by the appellant that there has been a breach of statutory duty on the part of the Authorities. Therefore, there must be a judicially enforceable right available for enforcement, on the basis of which writ jurisdiction is resorted to. The Court can of course, enforce the performance of a statutory duty by a public body, using its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided that such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such performance. The existence of such right is a condition precedent for invoking the writ jurisdiction of the courts. It is implicit in the exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that, the relief prayed for must be one to enforce a legal right. In fact, the existence of such right, is the foundation of the esercise of the said jurisdiction by the Court. The legal right that can be enforced must antinarily be the right of the appellant hutself, who complains of infraction of soch right and approaches the Court for relief as regards the same. (Vide State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Runga, Allt 1952 SC 12; Saghir Ahmad & Anr: v. State of UP, AIR 1954 SC 728; Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal & On, AIR 1962 SC 1044; Rajendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 2736 and Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Association (2) v. S.C Sekar & Ors. (2009) 2 SCC 784).
10.A "legal right", means an entitlement arising out of legal rules. Thus, it may be defined as an advantage, or a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. The expression, "person aggrieved" does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury, a person aggrieved must therefore, necessarily be one, whose right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardised. (Vide: Shanti Kumar R. Chanji v. Home Insurance Co. of New York, AIR 1974 SC 1719; and State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1977 SC 1361)."
A Division Bench in Amin Khan versus State of U.P and others 2008(2) AWC 2002: (2008) 2 UPLBEC 1256 was of the opinion that a complainant had no locus to challenge the order of the District Magistrate withdrawing the administrative and financial powers of the Pradhan. The Court placed reliance upon Suresh Singh's case (Supra) as well as Smt. Kesari Devi versus State of U.P & others 2005(4) AWC 3563.
This Court in Ram Baran Versus State of U.P. and others, 2010(2) AWC 1947 (LB), again reiterated the principle that a complainant would have no locus to maintain the petition against the final order passed by the District Magistrate pursuant to direction in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against the Pradhan.
In the case of R. v. London Country Keepers of the peace of Justice, (1890) 25 Qbd 357, the Court held:
"A person who cannot succeed in getting a conviction against another may be annoyed by the said findings. He may also feel that what he thought to be a breach of law was wrongly held to be not a breach of law by the Magistrate.
He thus may be said to be a person annoyed but not a person aggrieved, entitle to prefer an appeal against such order."
The petitioner complainant shall have an opportunity during the course of regular enquiry to lead oral and documentary evidence if provided under the rules, but would have no locus to assail the final order passed by the authority on the complaint."
33. Similar view was taken by another learned single-Judge of this Court in Neeraj Kumar Mishra (supra) and by yet another learned single-Judge of this Court in Gram Vikash Sewa Samiti (supra).
34. In view of that law laid down by the Supreme Court as applied by the division bench of this Court and a long line of decisions (of learned single-Judge bench), the observations made to the contrary in Akhlaq (supra) and Smt. Muneeta (supra) giving the right of appeal to the complainant is clearly contrary to the binding principle and reasoning on that issue. In the context of disputes involving revocation of suspension of a fair price shop agreement, a ''aggrieved person' or ''person aggrieved' must be a person whose rights have been prejudiced by such order. Clearly, the present petitioner/complainant is not that person.
35. As held in Ashfaq (supra), the beneficiary cannot be a 'person aggrieved'. He only has right to receive essential commodities food grains, fuel, etc. on assured basis. However, he cannot choose his fair price shop agency. The difference between the 'person aggrieved' and a 'person annoyed' was also noted by the division bench of this Court in Dharam Raj (supra). Though, a complainant may qualify as a 'person annoyed', yet, he may never be a 'person aggrieved' (by an order passed in favour of the private respondent). Consequently, the petitioner could neither have filed an appeal and he has no locus to maintain the present petition.
36. What then survives for consideration is - if the Court may offer any consideration in such matters. Here, another learned Single Judge of this Court in Yogendra Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., Misc. Single No. 23298 of 2016, vide order 27.9.2016, allowed such petition. However, it was not by way of right given to the complainant, rather, in that case, interference was made more by way of suo moto exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, on the intimation received by the petitioner who also happened to be the complainant. Therefore, the ratio in that case only provides for an exception rather than a rule to be applied in such cases.
37. Also, it cannot be overlooked, it stands generally recognized that the State Government and/or the Gaon Sabha are the collective bodies entrusted and interested in the enforcement of the rights of the beneficiaries for whose benefit the fair price shop machinery exists. They may, if not satisfied with the order of the appeal authority, approach this Court, in appropriate case. Leaving that right intact, no interference is warranted at the instance of the present petitioner, in the instant case. The objection being raised as to the procedure adopted may not allow the Court to create a locus with the present petitioner to maintain the present writ petition. It is also not a ground as may commend to the Court to set aside the fair price shop arrangement, for that reason alone. Sufficient punishment appears to have been dealt out to the private respondent by suspension served out. It is expected, the said respondent would conduct his activity in accordance with law or face fresh suspension proceedings, in face of fresh breach.
38. Consequently, leaving that course open, the writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.
Order Date :- 30.3.2022 Abhilash/Prakhar