Karnataka High Court
Smt. Fouzia Shahi Nazeer vs B.K. Lingappa And Others on 5 January, 1990
Equivalent citations: [1990]182ITR342(KAR), [1990]182ITR342(KARN)
JUDGMENT M.P. Chandrakantaraj Urs, J.
1. The petitioner is the purchaser of an immovable property situate in Hassan District the value of which exceeds Rs. 50,000. The registration of the deed of conveyance in such cases warrants the production of a certificate to be issued by the Income-tax Officer having jurisdiction in terms of section 230A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").
2. The first respondent who is the seller, for reasons best known to him, did not or could not contain that certificate enabling registration. On that account, the Sub-Registrar, the third respondent, has declined to complete the registration formalities until and unless the petitioner who has presented the document for registration produces the certificate required under section 230A of the Act. In that circumstances, the petitioner approached the second respondent-Income-tax Officer, Ward-II, Hassan, for issuance of a certificate under section 230A of the Act, undertaking to pays all taxes liable to be paid by the vendor, the 1st respondent. The Income-tax Officer, namely, respondent No. 2, has declined to grant the certificate on the ground that the applicant is not the vendor. Therefore, this petition is presented in this court for a mandamus directing the 2nd respondent to issue the necessary certificate under section 230A of the Act.
3. After notice, the parties have entered appearance. So far as the competent person to make an application for grant of a certificate under section 230A of the Act is concerned, the matter is no longer res integra in so far as this High Court is concerned. Puttaswamy J., as he then was, in the case of Smt. Indira v. ITO [1984] 150 ITR 351 (Kar) has taken the view that "any person" occurring in section 230A of the Act can only have reference to the transferor and cannot by any stretch of imagination include the transferee as well.
4. On the other hand, as pointed by Shri H. B. Datar, learned counsel for the petitioner, Varadarajan J., as he then was in the High Court of Madras in the case of Mrs. Helen Jayaraj v. Sub-Registrar of Mylapore , in similar circumstances, took the view that the transferee also has the right to present an application for grant of certificate and the Income-tax Officer concerned had to take into count the circumstances of the case and decide whether to grant a certificate or deny the same when the execution of the document has been held to be proper.
5. Therefore, I am of the view that though a reference is made to the Madras High Court's decision in Indira's case [1984] 150 ITR 351 (Kar), one must take a practical view of the compulsion of obtaining the certificate under section 230A of the Act for registration of a document. The conduct of the Income-tax Officer should be such that he shall not impede or enable the contracting parties to escape any liability imposed by law by not applying for the certificate under section 230A of the Act. If the construction put by this court in Indira's case [1984] 150 ITR 351, is correct, then many contracts which are required to be registered compulsorily under the Registration Act can be avoided by one of the contracting parties by refusing to obtain the certificate. To my mind, having regard to the intention of the Legislature in enacting section 230A of the Act which is no more than to protect the interest of the Revenue to recover all taxes due and to hold accountable the person who is the purchaser as to the source of his funds for purchase which forms the consideration for the sale, a more liberal view is called for.
6. However, I feel compelled and bound by the decision already rendered by this court subject to the view I have expressed as to the more liberal view which is needed to be taken on the rule of construction in favour of the affected persons in fiscal statutes.
7. I, therefore, dismiss the writ petition. If an appeal is presented to the Division Bench, the Division Bench is bound to consider the two views expressed. Subject to the above observation, this petition is dismissed.