Punjab-Haryana High Court
Vinod Kumar Arora vs Smt. Santosh Kumari And Anr. on 2 December, 2004
Equivalent citations: AIR2005P&H169, (2005)139PLR540, AIR 2005 PUNJAB AND HARYANA 169, (2005) 1 PUN LR 540, (2005) 1 CURLJ(CCR) 200, (2005) 1 CIVILCOURTC 752, (2005) 1 RECCIVR 649, (2005) 2 ICC 668
JUDGMENT M.M. Kumar, J.
1. This petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution prays for quashing orders dated 18.10.2004 and 26.5.2004 passed by the Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Faridabad. According to the first order, the application filed by the defendant-petitioner for expunging the amended plaint from the original plaint and striking it off from the pleadings was dismissed, whereas by order dated 26.5.2004, the costs of Rs. 10,000/- which was imposed by this Court vide order dated 22.4.2004 passed in Civil Revision No. 278 of 2004 was ordered to be deposited with the Legal Aid.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the defendant-petitioner filed a civil suit for declaration with consequential relief of permanent injunction. It was claimed that he was owner in possession of the suit property. The aforementioned suit has been contested by the defendant-petitioner. During the course of proceedings of the suit, the plaintiff-respondent 1 filed an application under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity, 'the Code') seeking amendment of the plaint to incorporate the plea that if she was not found in possession of the suit property, then in the alternative a decree for possession as a consequential relief be passed. She also sought an amendment in the valuation of the suit for the purpose of relief of possession. The suit was valued at Rs. 1,25,000/- over which an advalorum court fee of Rs. 9,370/- has been paid. The learned trial Court dismissed the application of plaintiff-respondent 1 on 22.12.2003. The aforementioned order was set aside by this Court in C.R. No. 278 of 2004 titled as Smt. Santosh Kumari v. Balbir Singh and Anr., decided on 22.4.2004. The operative part of the order reads as under: -
"In view of the aforesaid discussion, the present revision petition is allowed and the order dated December 22, 200.3 passed by the learned trial Court is set aside subject to payment of Rs. 10,000/- as costs, Consequently, the amendment application filed by the plaintiff is also allowed. The costs would be a condition precedent for permitting the plaintiff to file the amended plaint."
3. When the matter came up before the Trial Court on 26.5.2004, an order was passed directing the deposit of costs of Rs. 10,000/- with the Legal Aid. The aforementioned course appears to have been adopted because in its order dated 22.4.2004, this Court has not specified as to whom the costs were to be paid. Accordingly, the costs were deposited with the Legal Aid and the case was adjourned for filing amended plaint which was subsequently filed on 6.10.2004 and the case was fixed for filing the written statement.
4. The defendant-petitioner instead of filing the written statement, moved an application before the trial Court with a prayer that the averments made in the amended plaint be expunged and only the original averments could legally be kept in the plaint. The aforementioned prayer was based on the provisions of Order VI Rule 18 of the Code which provided that in the absence of any order to the contrary, the amended pleadings have to be filed by the party concerned within a period of 14 days from the date of passing of the order. However, the trial Court rejected the aforementioned plea of the defendant-petitioner by holding that the amended plaint was taken on record on 6.10.2004 and from 26.5.2004 to 6.10.2004, no objection was raised despite the fact that the period of 14 days had expired on 26.5.2004 by considering the order dated 22.4.2002 passed by this Court as the base (C.R. No. 278 of 2004). It was further observed that there was no objection raised with regard to payment of costs also.
5. Mr. R.K. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the provisions of Order VI Rule 18 of the Code are mandatory and unless the amended plaint was filed within 14 days, the Court should not have accepted the same. According to the learned counsel, it is an obligation cast on the plaintiff-respondent to file an appropriate application if the statutory period of 14 days prescribed by order VI Rule 18 of the Code has elapsed and in the absence of such an application condoning the delay, the amended plaint could not be taken on record. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Gurdial Singh and Ors. v. Raj Kumar Aneja and Ors., (2002-1)130 P.L.R. 835 (S.C.).
6. After hearing the learned counsel, I am of the considered view that the instant petition deserves to be dismissed. In order to decide the controversy raised it would be appropriate to refer to the provisions of Order VI Rule 18 of the Code which read as under:-
ORDER VI PLEADINGS GENERALLY "18. Failure to amend after order.- If a party who has obtained an order for leave to amend does not amend accordingly within the time limited for that purpose by the order, or if no time is thereby limited then within fourteen days from the date of the order, he shall not be permitted to amend after the expiration of such limited time as aforesaid or of such fourteen days, as the case may be, unless the time is extended by the Court."
7. A perusal of Order VI Rule 18 of the Code shows that ordinarily the amended plaint should be filed within the period specified in the order granting permission to make such an amendment. In the absence of any time fixed in the order, a maximum period of 14 days has been prescribed. It has further been provided that the Court is competent to extend the time limit of 14 days in case there is a delay.
8. In the present case, the order permitting the amendment was passed by this Court on 22.4.2004 and no time for presenting the amended plaint was prescribed. In other words, the statutory time of 14 days provided by Order VI Rule 18 of the Code was to operate and the amended plaint was to be filed by 6/7.5.2004. When the case was fixed on 26.5.2004, it was directed that the costs of Rs. 10,000/- be deposited with the Legal Aid Services Authority and the plaintiff-respondent 1 followed that direction. However, no objection was raised by the defendant-petitioner either at the stage of passing order dated 26.5.2004 directing the deposit of costs with the Legal Aid Services Authority nor any objection was raised when the amended plaint was filed on 6.10.2004. However, when the case was fixed for filing of the written statement, an application was filed on 13.10.2004 (Annexure P-3) for expunging the averments incorporated by way of amendment in the plaint which was allowed to be taken on record on 6.10.2004 in pursuance to order passed by this Court on 22.4.2004 in Civil Revision No. 278 of 2004. In the absence of any objection to the order dated 26.5.2004 directing the deposit of costs in the Legal Aid Services Authority or any objection to the acceptance of the amended plaint on 6.10.2004 on the ground of time limit imposed by Order VI Rule 18 of the Code, it cannot be successfully urged later that the amended plaint has been filed beyond the period of 14 days. Once there is a provision in Order VI Rule 19 of the Code for permitting the extensions of time by the Court, then it has to be presumed that there was a condonation of delay in permitting the amendment of the plaint. I am further of the view that in any case it would be a mere irregularity which does not arm the defendant-petitioner with an argument that he has suffered a manifest injustice warranting interference of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. It is also well settled that this Court would not interfere in an interlocutory order unless it is shown that manifest injustice is likely to be caused to the party invoking that jurisdiction. The aforementioned proposition has been settled by the Supreme Court in the case of Ouseph Mathus v. M. Abdul Khadir, (2002)1 S.C.C. 319 and Virendra Kashinath Ravat and Anr. v. Vinayak N. Joshi and Ors., (1999)1 S.C.C. 47. It has been observed by their Lordships in Virendra Kashinath Ravat's case (supra) that the High Courts would not be competent to interfere in every illegal or irregular order unless a finding is recorded that refusal to exercise jurisdiction would occasion failure of justice. The observations of their Lordships read as under: -
"It was the case of the appellants that during the pendency of the suit the first respondent and his sister (second respondent) were unlawfully inducted into possession of the building. So the appellants moved an application for amendment of the plaint and the same was granted by the trial Court. In the plaint so amended para 5-A was inserted, the material portion of which reads thus:
"The plaintiffs say that pending the suit the defendants have or any of them has inducted in the suit premises Defendants 1 and 5 unlawfully."
Learned Single Judge, treated the aforesaid pleading as insufficient to make out a case for sub-letting. This was not a point considered by or even raised before the two fact-finding forums. Order 6 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short "the Code") confers powers on the court to order a party to make a further statement or even a better statement or further and better particulars of any matter already mentioned in the pleadings. This is incorporated in the Code to indicate that no suit shall be dismissed merely on the ground that more particulars are not stated in the pleadings. If the contesting respondents, or any of them, had raised objection that the pleadings was scanty, perhaps the appellants would have further elaborated it as provided in Rule 5 above. At any rate this should not have been a premise on which interference by the High Court should have been made in exercising a jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution "
9. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Gurdial Singh's case (supra) on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel would not require any detailed consideration because in that judgment emphasis has been laid on the procedure which is required to be followed after the amendment of pleadings has been allowed. The aforementioned guidance has been furnished by the Supreme Court on the basis of local amendment incorporated within these jurisdiction i.e. Punjab, Haryana and Union Territory, Chandigarh and the same reads as follows:-
"17. Thus, once a prayer for amendment is allowed the original pleadings should incorporate the changes in a different ink or an amended pleadings may be filed wherein, with the use of a highlighter or by underlining in red the changes made may be distinctly shown. The amendments will be incorporated in the pleading by the party with the leave of the court and within the time limited for that purpose or else within fourteen days as provided by Order 6, Rule 18 of the C.P.C.. The court or an officer authorised by the Court in this behalf, may compare the original and the amended pleading in the light of the contents of the amendment application and the order of the Court permitting the same and certify whether the amended pleading conforms to the order of the court permitting the amendment. Such practice accords with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure and also preserves the sanctity of record of the Court. It is also conducive to the ends of justice in as much as by a bare look at the amended pleadings, the court would be able to appreciate, the shift in stand, if any, between the original pleading and the amended pleading. These advantages are in addition to convenience and achieving maintenance of discipline by the parties before the court. Amendments and consequential amendments, allowed by the court and incorporated in the original pleadings, would enable only one set of pleadings being available on record and that would avoid confusion and delay at the trial......."
10. The above extracted view of the Supreme Court does not have any bearing on the controversy raised in the present petition. Therefore, I am unable to proceed myself to accept the plea that the period of 14 days as provided by Order VI Rule 18 of the Code is mandatory in character. The plea raised by the learned counsel is without any substance and is hereby rejected.
11. In view of the above, I do not find any merit in this petition and the same is dismissed.