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[Cites 13, Cited by 0]

Orissa High Court

Sarat Chandra Panigrahi vs State Of Orissa on 9 December, 2025

         THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

                          CRA No.199 of 1996

(In the matter of an application under Section 374(2) of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973)

Sarat Chandra Panigrahi               .......               Appellant
                                 -Versus-
State of Orissa                   .......                  Respondent

      For the Appellant    : Mr. Pritam Kumar Mallick, Advocate

      For the Respondent : Mr. Ashok Kumar Apat,
                           Additional Government Advocate

CORAM:
  THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA
 Date of Hearing: 20.11.2025     ::    Date of Judgment: 09.12.2025

S.S. Mishra, J.    The present Criminal Appeal is directed against the

judgment and order dated 29.06.1996 passed by the learned Special

Judge, Balasore in Spl. Case No.29 of 1994, whereby the appellant-

accused has been convicted under Section 3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled
 Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for

short the "SC/ST Act") and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment

for six months, with no separate sentence under Section 354 IPC on the

reasoning that the offences are pari materia.

2.   Heard Mr. Pritam Kumar Mallick, learned Advocate, for the

appellant and Mr. Ashok Kumar Apat, learned Additional Government

Advocate for the State.

3.    The prosecution case, in brief, is that P.W.3, the husband of the

prosecutrix (P.W.1), was a retained labourer of the appellant and the

accused allegedly owed some arrear wages in the form of rice. On

19.03.1994, when P.W.3 was ailing, he sent P.W.1 to bring the due rice.

It is alleged that during this visit the appellant took her inside the house,

sent his wife/mother outside, tore her blouse, dragged her sari, sat on her

thighs, squeezed her right breast and attempted to outrage her modesty.

She claimed to have escaped and that while running away, she was

assaulted and abused as "Sali Chamara".




                                                              Page 2 of 16
 4.     The F.I.R. was lodged on the next day at 11 A.M. As per the

prosecution, torn clothes were seized and later on given in zima to the

prosecutrix. P.Ws. 2 and 4 were post-occurrence witnesses. The trial

culminated in conviction.

5.    Six witnesses were examined for the prosecution. The defence

took the plea of false implication due to an alleged dispute regarding

repayment of advance wages.

6.    The learned trial Court, upon appreciation of the oral and

documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution, recorded a finding of

guilt against the accused. The Court held that the testimony of the

prosecutrix was cogent and trustworthy and that her version regarding

the alleged assault and use of criminal force stood sufficiently

corroborated by the evidence of P.Ws. 3 and 4, who claimed to have

witnessed parts of the occurrence. The trial Court further observed that

the caste certificate of the victim, marked as Ext-4, established that she

belonged to a Scheduled Caste community, and relying upon this,

proceeded to invoke the provisions of Section 3(1)(xi) of the SC/ST




                                                           Page 3 of 16
 (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. It was concluded that the acts attributed

to the accused, namely pulling the victim by her hair, tearing her blouse

and saree, and touching her inappropriately, amounted to an assault

intended to outrage her modesty. The relevant portion of the aforesaid

judgment is extracted herein below for ready reference: -

        "10. P.W.1 belongs to schedule caste community as
        admitted by the accused while answering to question
        No.16 in the statement recorded under section 313
        Cr.P.C. Sub-caste "Chamara" belongs to schedule
        caste community as per the certificate granted by the
        Tahasildar (Ext.4) which was obtained by the I.0.
        during investigation. P.W.1 deposed that while
        committing the crime the accused abused her saying
        as "Sali Chamara". According to the defence, this
        statement was not made by her before the I.0;
        therefore, it is an improvement and not acceptable.
        Non-utterance of the expression "Sali Chamara" by
        the accused does not debar the application of section
        3 of the Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe
        (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. Section 3 of the Act
        provides that whoever not being a member of
        scheduled caste or scheduled tribe assaults or uses
        criminal force on any woman belonging to scheduled
        caste or scheduled tribe with intent to dishonour or
        outrage her modesty would be liable for punishment.
        From the conjunction "or" between the expressions
        "dishonour and outrage her modesty" it may be
        naturally construed that if the accused uses criminal
        force with the intent to either outrage her modesty or



                                                            Page 4 of 16
         to dishonour her, the offence is attracted. The
        provision in section 3(1) (xi) of SC & ST (Prevention
        of Atrocities) Act is parimateria to section 354 of the
        Indian Penal Code where also there is no provision
        that modesty should be outraged to dishonour a
        woman. Accordingly, therefore, even if it is said that
        P.W.1 has made an improvement at the evidence
        stage that the accused while committing the crime has
        abused her saying "Sali Chamara" and hence it has to
        be discarded, the fact that the accused outraged her
        modesty by squeezing her right breast and sitting on
        her thighs cannot be discarded, and for this the
        offence under section 3(1)(xi) of S.C. and S.T.
        (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is found to have been
        established.
                               ..................

12. On the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I am of the view that the prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt. Therefore, the accused is liable for conviction. In the result, I hold the accused guilty of the offence under section 3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and convict him thereunder. No separate conviction is awarded for the offence under section 354 of Indian Penal Code as it is parimateria to the offence under section 3(1)(xi) of the S.C. & S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act."

7. Mr. Mallick, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that the impugned conviction is wholly unsustainable as the prosecution has failed to establish the mandatory ingredients of the Page 5 of 16 offence under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. It is contended that there is no evidence whatsoever, either oral or documentary, to prove that the accused does not belong to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, which is a sine qua non for attracting Section 3 of the Act, as repeatedly held by the Supreme Court and this Court. He also relied on several judgments to affirm this.

8. He further urged that the prosecutrix introduced material improvements for the first time during the trial, such as allegations of being dragged outside the house, assault and abuse, none of which formed part of her earlier statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. On these grounds, it is asserted that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt.

9. I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned counsel for the State, and perused the entire lower Court records, including the depositions of the prosecution witnesses and the reasoning assigned by the learned trial Court.

Page 6 of 16

10. In evaluating the legality of the conviction under Section 3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, this Court finds it necessary to restate the settled legal position that the provision mandates the presence of specific statutory ingredients which must be strictly proved by the prosecution. Section 3(1)(xi) explicitly requires that the accused, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, assaults or uses criminal force against any woman belonging to an SC/ST community with the intention to dishonour or outrage her modesty on the ground of her caste identity. The Supreme Court in Dashrath Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 72, after a detailed examination of the language of Section 3(1)(xi), unequivocally held that a mere allegation of assault or misconduct is insufficient unless it is demonstrably established that the offending act was committed because the victim belonged to the Scheduled Caste community. The Court held that even the highest version of the prosecutrix merely disclosed a personal misdemeanor unconnected with caste identity and, therefore, fell outside the ambit of Page 7 of 16 Section 3(1)(xi). The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said judgment in paragraphs-7, 8, 9 and 10 has held as under:-

"7. Section 3(1)(xi) of the SC/ST Act reads as below:--
"3. Punishments for offences of atrocities.--(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,--
(i)-(x).....
(xi) assaults or uses force to any woman belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe with intent to dishonour or outrage her modesty;

...

shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to five years and with fine."

8. A plain reading of the section makes it clear that the offence of outraging the modesty should be committed with the intention that the victim belonged to the Scheduled Caste category.

9. We have gone through the FIR and the sworn testimony of the prosecutrix/complainant as extracted in the judgments of the High Court as well as that of the trial Court. The case as projected in the FIR and the sworn testimony of the prosecutrix would reveal that the prosecutrix/complainant was engaged for doing household jobs in the house of the accused appellant who tried to outrage her modesty while the prosecutrix/complainant was doing the household chores. Apparently thus, even from the highest allegations of the prosecutrix, the offending act was not committed by the accused with the intention that he was doing so upon a person belonging to the Scheduled Caste. This issue was dealt with by this Court in the case of Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman v. State of Maharashtra1 wherein it was held as below:--

Page 8 of 16

"9. Section 3(2)(v.) of the Act provides that whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, commits any offence under the Penal Code, 1860 punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more against a person or property on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member, shall be punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine. In the present case, there is no evidence at all to the effect that the appellant committed the offence alleged against him on the ground that the deceased is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. To attract the provisions of Section 3(2)(v.) of the Act, the sine qua non is that the victim should be a person who belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and that the offence under the Penal Code, 1860 is committed against him on the basis that such a person belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. In the absence of such ingredients, no offence under Section 3(2)(v.) of the Act arises. In that view of the matter, we think, both the trial court and the High Court missed the essence of this aspect. In these circumstances, the conviction under the aforesaid provision by the trial court as well as by the High Court ought to be set aside."

(Emphasis supplied)

10. In the said judgment, this Court dealt with a case involving offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act. The language of Section 3(1)(xi) of the SC/ST Act is pari materia as the same also provides that the offence must be committed upon a person belonging to Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes with the intention that it was being done on the ground of caste."

11. The same interpretation has consistently been adopted by this Court. In Bibudhendra Dash v. Bibhuti Bhusan Behera, reported in Page 9 of 16 2024 (93) OCR 173, it was categorically held that unless complaint/FIR/witness testimony reveals that the accused does not belong to SC/ST, the basic ingredient fails. Relevant part of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder for convenience of ready reference:-

"10. As already stated, neither the FIR nor the complaint petition nor even the initial statement of the complainant and the statements of the witnessed examined on his behalf contain a whisper that the accused persons do not belong to the scheduled caste. Obviously in the absence of any such averment/statement it is not for the Court to draw any presumption as regards the caste of the accused persons. Thus, this Court finds that the basic ingredient necessary to constitute the offence under Section 3 of the S.C. & S.T. (PoA) Act is not made out."

12. Similarly, in Sibananda v. State, reported in 2024 (94) OCR 792, it was reiterated that mere proof that the victim belongs to an SC/ST community is insufficient. The prosecution must affirmatively establish that the accused is a non-SC/ST person. It was further held that in the absence of such evidence, no conviction under Section 3(1)(xi) is legally permissible. For ready reference. Paragraph-12 of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder:-

"12. One of the prime ingredient of Section 3 of the S.C. & S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is that, the victim must have become a member of Schedule Caste or Schedule Page 10 of 16 Tribe and the accused must not have become a member of scheduled caste or scheduled tribe. So, in order to penalise an accused under Section 3 of the S.C. & S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, it should be the duty of the prosecution to bring material into the record either through oral or through documentary evidence that, the victim is a member of S.C. or S.T. and the accused is not a member of S.C. or S.T. Unless and until, it is established/proved on behalf of the prosecution by bringing material into the record that, the victim is a member of S.C. or S.T. and the accused is not a member of S.C. or S.T., no conviction under Section 3(1)(xi) of the S.C. & S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 can be made against an accused.
xxx xxx xxx xxx"
These principles squarely govern the present case. While the prosecution has produced documentary material (Ext-4) establishing the caste status of P.W.1, not a single piece of evidence, either in the FIR, Section 161 Cr.P.C. statements, or trial depositions, could lead to establish that the appellant is not a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. This omission strikes at the very root of the prosecution case and renders the conviction under Section 3(1)(xi) fundamentally unsustainable.
13. Moreover, the prosecutrix has made material improvements at the stage of deposition, such as allegations of being dragged by hair, slapped and abused outside the house, none of which form part of her earlier Page 11 of 16 version to the Investigating Officer. P.W.4, projected as an eyewitness to such assault, also did not state such facts before the I.O., which reflects significant embellishment. The seized torn blouse and saree, which the prosecution relied upon to indicate use of force and assault, were never produced before the Court, depriving the prosecution case of crucial corroborative evidence. The delay of nearly 24 hours in lodging the FIR, coupled with the prosecutrix's refusal to undergo medical examination, further weakens the prosecution version. These inconsistencies are not minor omissions but substantive contradictions that cast serious doubt on the credibility of the prosecutrix version.
14. Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid, this Court concludes that the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(xi) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act are completely absent in the present case. The conviction recorded by the learned Special Judge is thus legally unsustainable and cannot be allowed to stand. The appellant is acquitted of the said charge.
Page 12 of 16
15. However, in so far as the offence under Section 354 of I.P.C. is concerned, the evidence of P.W.1 that she was called inside the house by the appellant and in various manners, her modesty was outraged finds corroboration with the testimony of P.Ws.2, 3 and 4.
P.W.2 is a post occurrence witness. She in her evidence has deposed that she had gone to press black grams to the house of the accused. At that time, she found the victim (P.W.1) coming from the house of the accused crying.
Similarly, P.W.3 also deposed that on the date of incident he sent P.W.1 to fetch the wages from the accused. P.W.1 when questioned the measurement of the paddy, accused outraged her modesty and criminally intimidated her.
P.W.4 is an independent witness, who has also testified that on the date of incident, he had gone to the house of the accused and heard alarm in the house of the accused. Hence, he went to the house of the accused and found that P.W.1 coming from the bari side weeping. The accused following her and he dealt two slaps on the back and hand of P.W.1. He Page 13 of 16 also found that the cloth put on by P.W.1 had been torn. He asked about the incident to P.W.1. She narrated the entire incident.
These witnesses were subjected to extensive cross-examination, but have not shaken their testimony to create any dent. P.W.5, the I.O., who has also testified regarding the incident in the similar manner.
P.W.6 is the scribe of the F.I.R., who has stated that at the instance of P.W.1, he had scribed the F.I.R., which is Ext.1/3.
16. The testimony of all the witnesses are unimpeachable in so far as the incident of outraging the modesty by the appellant is concerned. Therefore, there is no option left rather to affirm the conviction recorded by the learned trial Court in regard to the guilt of the appellant under Section 354 of I.P.C.
17. Coming to the sentence, Mr. Mallik, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the incident relates back to the year 1996. At that point of time, appellant was 36 years of age. At present, he is about 65 years of age. Over the years, he has led a dignified life, integrated well into society, and is presently leading a settled family life. Page 14 of 16 Incarcerating him after such a long delay, it is argued, would serve little penological purpose and may in fact be counter-productive, casting a needless stigma not only upon them but also upon their family members, especially when there is no suggestion of any repeat violation or ongoing non-compliance with regulatory norms. Therefore, he submitted that, a lenient view should be taken.
18. It is pertinent to mention that before the amendment to Section 354 of I.P.C. in the year 2013, the prescribed sentence on the commission of offence under Section 354 of I.P.C. was imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or fine or both.
19. Taking into consideration the entire conspectus of the matter, the gravity of the offence, age of the appellant and the fact that the incident relates back to the year 1996 and in between three decades have already passed, while affirming the conviction recorded against the appellant for the offence under Section 354 of I.P.C., I impose a fine of Rs.10,000/- (rupees ten thousand) on the appellant, in default of which, the appellant Page 15 of 16 shall undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for fifteen days. The fine amount shall be realized to the victim (P.W.1) within one month as per the procedure established under Section 357 Cr.P.C. If the fine amount is not deposited within the stipulated time framed, it is open for the trial Court to issue warrant and take the appellant to custody to serve out the awarded sentence.
20. Accordingly, the CRA is partly allowed.
(S.S. Mishra) Judge The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack.
Dated the 9th Day of December, 2025/ Subhasis Mohanty Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SUBHASIS MOHANTY Page 16 of 16 Designation: Personal Assistant Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack.
Date: 10-Dec-2025 10:12:57