Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
M. Malla Reddy vs T. Venkatrama Reddy And Anr. on 23 September, 1999
Equivalent citations: 2000(1)ALD(CRI)32, 1999(6)ALT200, 2000CRILJ1086
Author: B.S. Raikote
Bench: B.S. Raikote
JUDGMENT B.S. Raikote, J.
1. This writ appeal is preferred by the original complainant - Sri M. Malla Reddy, former Vice-Chancellor, Osmania University, Hyderabad being aggrieved by the judgment and order of the learned single Judge dated 4-2-1999 passed in W.P.No. 28387/1998. By the impugned order, the learned single Judge allowed the W.P.No. 28387/1998 and quashed the proceedings so far as it related to accused No. 1, T. Venkatrama Reddy, in C.C. No. 730/1996 on the file of X Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad.
2. The learned senior Counsel Sri Malla Reddy appearing for the appellant - complainant contended that the learned single Judge has erred in quashing the complaint against the accused No. 1. He submitted that the complaint and the sworn statement recorded Under Section 200 Cr.P.C. disclose a triable offence Under Section 501 I.P.C. even as against accused No. 1. He elaborated his argument by taking us through the entire complaint and the sworn statement of the complainant and contended that on the basis of this complaint and sworn statement, an offence against accused No. 1 Under Sections 500, 501 and 502 I.P.C. read with Section 499 I.P.C. is made out. He further submitted that at the relevant point of time, the accused No. 1 was the Editor-in-Chief and his name as Editor-in-Chief was printed in the newspaper as required by the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Press Act')- He further stated that a conspiracy is pleaded between the accused No. 1 and other accused, in publishing the defamatory articles against the complainant in "Deccan Chronicle". He stated that accused No. 1 was admitted to be the Chief Editor at the time the articles were published, even though the complainant alleged that he was the owner. The allegations whether there was or there was not a conspiracy can be ultimately decided only during the trial on the basis of the evidence and at this stage, the-complaint cannot be quashed at all. The accused No. 1 as Editor-in-Chief was also liable along with the other Editor and Printer, who were also accused in the case. In support of his contentions, he relied upon certain decisions of the Supreme Court, which we will be considering in the course of this judgment.
3. The learned senior Counsel Sri Mohamood Ali appearing for the accused No. 1 opposed the appeal and strenuously supported the impugned order of the learned single Judge. He stated that as held by the learned single Judge, the complaint does not disclose any offence as against accused No. 1 and accordingly the learned single Judge rightly quashed the impugned proceedings. He also relied upon certain judgments and these judgments also we will be considering in the course of this judgment.
4. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, we summarily note the facts of this case. We refer to the parties as complainant and accused No. 1 as per their ranking in the criminal case. The complainant filed a private complaint Under Section 200 read with Section 190 (1) (a) Cr.P.C. for offence Under Section 500 I.P.C, alleging that the accused 1 to 3 being the Owner, Publisher and Editor of 'Deccan Chronicle' newspaper have carried on a vilification campaign against the complainant with an intention to defame and degrade the reputation of the complainant, by published articles. He stated that those articles are defamatory and intended only to assassinate the character of the complainant and to bring down the reputation of the complainant. He stated that the language used in the newspaper clearly shows that the accused intentionally and deliberately published those articles with a view to create negative impression and to portray a corrupt image of the complainant amongst one and all. In the complaint he referred to number of articles published on different dates under the captions "Dons take over O.U.", "V.C. BLEEDS", "O.U. to Reward Dons", "No Audit in O.U. after Malla Reddy takes over", "O.U.V.C. in big fraud" etc. In those articles, the accused attributed fraud and 420 orders to the complainant as Vice-Chancellor in the University. They even conveyed the meaning that the complainant received kickbags before he relinquished his office as Vice-Chancellor. In the complaint he further stated that all the accused published those malicious and defamatory news items "knowing fully well that the published news items are false and defamatory" and those statements are intentionally published by the accused to bring disrespect and to defame the complainant and accordingly the complainant has been defamed in the eye of the public. It is stated in the complaint that the complainant issued a legal notice through a lawyer asking them to publish a statement in the newspaper stating that the above news items were false and the accused after receiving those notices have published a statement in the newspaper dated 10-3-1996 stating that they have published true facts and they have inside information and based on that they have published those news items. The complainant stated the same facts even in the sworn statement recorded Under Section 200 Cr.P.C. before the Court.
5. The learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that all the material taken together would definitely disclose an offence Under Section 501 I.P.C. even as against accused No. 1. Admittedly the accused No. 1 was the Chief Editor as per the statement in the newspaper, in which the articles were published, and in these circumstances, it is clear that accused have conspired to publish those articles to defame the complainant. He further stated that by the reply statement published by the accused in their newspaper dated 10-3-1996, all the accused including accused No. 1 have admitted the publication of those articles, but put up a false defence that they published true facts on the basis of inside information. Whether the facts were true or not, it is ultimately for the Court to consider and judge at the time of trial. As against this, the Counsel for the accused No. 1 submitted that the accused No. 1 was only one of the partners of partnership firm running the English Daily 'Deccan Chronicle'. As per the complaint, the accused No. 1 is the Owner/Proprietor and the accused 2 and 3 are the publisher and printer and as a owner accused No. 1 is not liable for such publications. He further stated that the reply statement published in the newspaper on 10-3-1996 was only on behalf of the accused 2 and 3, but not on behalf of the accused No. 1. In the circumstances it shall be taken that the accused No. 1 has not simply replied to the legal notice issued and not replying would not tantamount to admitting the allegations made in the notice. As the complaint does not disclose any offence as against accused No. 1, the learned single Judge has rightly quashed those proceedings.
6. Having regard to the pleadings on record and also the sworn statement of the complainant, now we have to see whether the learned single Judge was right in quashing the complaint as against accused No. 1.
7. The Counsel on both sides have admitted certain facts. It is admitted that the articles referred to in the complaint by the complainant were published in 'Deccan Chronicle' on different dates. It is also admitted that with reference to the legal notices sent to the accused, a reply statement was published in the newspaper on 10-3-1996. But the contention of the Counsel for the accused No. 1 is that the said reply was not for and on behalf of the accused No. 1 whereas the Counsel appearing for the complainant submits that the said reply statement does not say that it was for and on behalf of accused 2 and 3 only. The same notice was issued to all the three accused and in these circumstances, it shall be taken that the statement is published on behalf of all the accused persons. He further stated that whether accused No. 1 was or was not a party to the reply statement published in the newspaper is again a matter of evidence in the case and at this stage the complaint against him cannot be quashed. He stated that it is clearly a case of 'conspiracy' amongst the accused persons in publishing those articles and the complainant has clearly alleged in his complaint at paragraph No. 19 that all the accused published malicious and defamatory articles "knowing fully well" that those news items are false and defamatory.
8. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, we would like to refer to the recent judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, , in which Their Lordships keeping in view of their earlier judgment in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, , have held that the complaint need not necessarily reproduce all the ingredients of the offence alleged, nor it is necessary that the complaint should state in so many words that the intention of the accused was dishonest and fraudulent. In that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court also has pointed out that the High Court should not have quashed the complaint by adopting strictly hyper-technical approach. We think it appropriate to extract the relevant part of the judgment as under:-
"9. It is not necessary that a complainant should verbatim reproduce in the body of his complaint all the ingredients of the offence he is alleging. Nor is it necessary that the complainant should state in so many words that the intention of the accused was dishonet or fraudulent. Splitting up of the definition into different components of the offence to make a meticulous scrutiny, whether all the ingredients have been precisely spelled out in the complaint, is not the need at this stage. If factual foundation for the offence has been laid in the complaint the Court should not hasten to quash criminal proceedings during investigation stage merely on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated with details. For quashing an FIR (A step which is permitted only in extremely rare cases) the information in the complaint must be so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal this Court laid down the premise on which the FIR can be quashed in rare cases. The following observations made in the aforesaid decisions are a sound reminder:
(SCC p. 379. para 103) "103. We also give a notice of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceedings should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the realiability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice".
As against this ruling of the Supreme Court, the learned Counsel for the accused No. 1 relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Mohammad Koya v. Muthukoya, , contending that the accused No. 1 as the Chief Editor or owner cannot be said to have committed any offence for publishing certain articles in the newspaper and Under Section 7 of the Press Act, presumption is against the Editor for the offence, if any. He further contended that in the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has ruled that for publishing the articles in the newspaper, no such presumption arises against the Chief Editor, who is not shown as Editor, since under the Press Act, such a presumption is drawn only against the Editor. He also relied upon another judgment of the Supreme Court reported in K.M. Mathew v. State of Kerala, , contending that the same principle is reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the latter case also.
9. From a reading of all the three judgments of the Supreme Court cited 1, 3 and 4 supra, it is clear that the complaint need not disclose all the ingredients of the offence and if any fraudulent intention is alleged, that would be a matter of evidence, and in case any offence is committed by publishing the articles in newspaper, there could be a presumption against the Editor that he committed such offence, but not against the Chief Editor and such presumption is a rebuttable presumption. In the decision reported in Sewakram v. R.K. Karanjiya, , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has further pointed out that where the offence of defamation is alleged regarding publication of certain articles in the newspaper, the High Court would not be justified in taking into account the exceptions provided to Section 499 I.P.C., for the purpose of quashing such criminal proceedings. Keeping in mind these principles, we will proceed to consider the present case.
10. The relevant newspaper, in which the articles were published is produced is this case. The said newspaper contains the following declaration:-
"Printed and Published by O. Thomas on behalf of Deccan Chronicle at 36, Sarojini Devi Road, Secunderabad-500003. Phone Editorial: 803930-Fax : 040-805256. Telex : 4256644 CQ Grams : CHRONICLE Editor-in-Chief : T. Venkatram Reddy. Editor: P.N.V. Nair."
From this fact it clearly follows that on the relevant dates of publishing those articles, accused No. 1 was the Chief Editor. In view of the judgments of the Supreme Court cited 3 and 4 supra, as a Chief Editor, he would not be liable for publication of certain articles in the newspaper and the person liable is only the Editor. In the instant case, the other accused by name O. Thomas was the Printer and Publisher and P.N.V. Nair was the Editor of the "Deccan Chronicle" Newspaper. Therefore, now we have to find out whether there are any allegations which implicate the Chief Editor in order to rebut the presumption arising Under Section 7 of the Press Act, under which there would not be any presumption against the Chief Editor. As we have noted above, in the complaint, the complainant at paragraph No. 19 has specifically alleged that malicious and defamatory news items were published by the accused persons knowing fully well that the published items are false and defamatory. In paragraph No. 20 of the complaint, it is further stated that the accused published the above statements intentionally to bring down the repute and to defame the complainant. In paragraph No. 23 the complainant averred that the accused, after receipt of the notice sent by the complainant to all the accused, calling upon them to publish a statement in their newspaper, stating that those news items were false, by way of reply, the accused have published a reply statement on 10-3-1996 stating that they have stated true facts and they have inside information. From these averments in paragraphs 19, 20 and 23 particularly, it is clear that all the accused intentionally published those articles so as to defame the complainant. Whether the said reply statement was published only on behalf of the other accused persons and not on behalf of accused No. 1, would be a matter of evidence. At this stage it is not possible for us to ascertain whether such a statement was on behalf of all the accused persons or it was only on behalf of accused 2 and 3.
11. The things do not stop at this stage. If we refer to the sworn statement made by the complainant before the X Metropolitan Magistrate Under Section 200 Cr.P.C, we find that the complainant has stated as under:-
"A-1 to A-3 are the Owner, Publisher and Editor of Deccan Chronicle Newspaper respectively. The news covered in Deccan Chronicle on various dates in respect of me, are all defamatory, concocted, fabricated and were intended to assault my character. It was a conspiracy against me."
From this sworn statement it is further clear that the complainant also has alleged conspiracy amongst all the three accused persons. But the learned single Judge in the impugned order has observed as under:-
"No where the criminal liability is fastened on the owner/partner of the firm which publishes the daily newspaper and therefore this Court is of the considered view that the complainant himself did not allege in the complaint that the owner/partner of the firm had conspired with the other accused in defaming the complainant."
From the above observation of the learned single Judge, it appears that the sworn statement of the complainant has not been specifically brought to the notice of the learned single Judge. It is not disputed, nor can it be disputed that Under Section 203 Cr.P.C, the Magistrate on consideration of the statement on oath of the complainant and all the witnesses made Under Section 200 Cr.P.C. is of the opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall accordingly issue process Under Section 204 Cr.P.C. and if he is of the opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall dismiss the complaint. (For immediate reference the attention may be invited to the judgment of the High Court of Madras reported in In Re Arunachalam Chetty, AIR 1924 Madras 323) From this it follows that the Magistrate has to consider both the allegations made in the complaint as well as in the sworn statement made before him. In the instant case, the complainant has specifically alleged in paragraphs 19, 20 and 23 of the complaint that the accused persons intentionally published those articles so as to defame the complainant in the eye of the common man. In the sworn statement, the complainant alleges conspiracy amongst the accused persons. Taking the allegations made in the complaint and the conspiracy stated by him on oath, it is difficult at this stage to hold that no offence is made out against accused No. 1 on the basis of the material. Whether the conspiracy specifically alleged by the complainant in his sworn statement would be proved or not is definitely a matter for trial. In view of the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, not only in the recent judgment referred to above, but also in other judgments, it is not possible for us to take a hyper technical view of the material on record at this stage. The scrutiny of the material whether acceptable or not would be the one impermissible under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. A complaint can be quashed only if no offence at all is made out against the accused persons and not otherwise. Therefore, even whether the theory of conspiracy is acceptable or not cannot be considered at this stage. As pointed out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Bajaj case (cited 1 supra) it is not necessary that the complainant should verbatim reproduce all the ingredients of the offence alleged against the accused persons, nor it is necessary that the complainant should state in so many words that the intention of the accused was dishonest and fraudulent etc. Applying these principles, we are of the opinion that the complaint filed Under Section 200 Cr.P.C. along with the sworn statement is not the one which can be quashed by exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. If the sworn statement alleging conspiracy against the accused persons were to be specifically brought to the notice of the learned single Judge, we do not think that he would have quashed the present complaint. In this view of the matter, in our humble opinion, the order of the learned single Judge cannot be sustained. Accordingly, we pass the order as under:-
The writ appeal is allowed and the order of the learned single Judge passed in W.P.No. 28387/1988 dated 4-2-1999 is set aside. No costs.