Karnataka High Court
Lakshminarayana vs Karnataka State Seeds Corporation Ltd. on 17 April, 1996
Equivalent citations: ILR1996KAR2809, 1996(5)KARLJ653
Author: H.L. Dattu
Bench: H.L. Dattu
ORDER H.L. Dattu, J.
1. Petitioner, while working as Regional Officer of the respondent-corporation at Mysore was proceeded against departmentally for several irregularities committed by him and removed from service on 10.5.1988. Aggrieved by this serious punishment imposed by the respondent - corporation, petitioner is before this Court in a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
2. Brief facts are, petitioner was working as Regional Officer in the respondent-corporation. While posted as Regional Officer at Mysore, he was served with a charge sheet dated 19th June, 1987, containing ten charges of misconduct as Regional Officer at Mysore. Pending enquiry, he was kept under suspension. Petitioner by his explanation dated 6.7.1987 filed before the Disciplinary Authority denied the allegations made in the charge memo and satisfactorily explained each one of the charges. Thereafter, Disciplinary Authority appointed one Sri R. Ramamurthy, Deputy Chief Marketing Officer as the enquiry officer. The enquiry officer conducted an enquiry into the charges levelled against the petitioner on 12th and 13th August, 1987 and submitted his report together with the records of the enquiry proceedings and other documents to the Disciplinary Authority. While submitting his report, the enquiry officer gave a finding that the charge sheeted officer is guilty of the charges 1 to 3, 6, 8 to 10 and exonerated the petitioner from the other charges. The Disciplinary Authority by its second show cause notice dated 10.3.1988 accepted the findings of the enquiry officer and directed the petitioner to show cause why the penalty of removal from service as a specific punishment for the charges proved should not be imposed against him. Before petitioner could file his explanation to the second show cause notice the Disciplinary Authority after considering the report of the enquiry officer and record of the proceedings passed an order dated 10.5.1988 removing petitioner from the service of the corporation in terms of Rules 59, 60 and 61 of the Karnataka State Seeds Corporation Ltd., Service Rules, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as 'Service Rules'). It is the aforesaid order which has brought the petitioner to this Court being aggrieved by the same.
3. Sri D. Leelakrishnan, the learned Counsel for petitioner, contended that the charge memo served on the petitioner does not contain material particulars and specific instances. As a result the charges are vague which have prevented. The petitioner from making effective representation and this clearly amounts to miscarriage of justice. That the enquiry conducted by the enquiry officer suffers from many procedural irregularities, illegalities and infirmities which has vitiated the entire enquiry proceedings. That the Disciplinary Authority without independently examining the findings on each one of the articles of charge and without proper application of mind has mechanically accepted the findings of the enquiry officer and this has resulted in grave injustice to the petitioner. That the Disciplinary Authority is not justified in passing the impugned order without even waiting for the reply to the show cause notice and the same would be opposed to principles of natural justice. That the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority is opposed to and in contravention of Rule 61 of Service Rules. In support of his legal contentions, the learned Counsel would rely upon the following decisions: 1) , Meenglas Tea Estate v. The Workmen, 1963 II LLJ 396, A.C.C. Ltd. v. Workmen , , Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer, , St. of U.P. v. O.P. Gupta at 683 and , Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan. It was therefore contended that the departmental enquiry proceedings requires to be set aside.
4. Sri V. Sathyanarayana, learned Counsel for respondent Corporation on the other hand submitted that the charges alleged and proved against the petitioner are serious and grave and the corporation rightly has imposed major penalty. In so far as the procedure adopted by the enquiry officer is concerned, the learned Counsel would submit, that the delinquent official at the time of preliminary enquiry, and while filing his reply to the charge memo had accepted the allegations made against him and as such, the procedure adopted by the enquiry officer in examining the petitioner in the beginning of the enquiry has not caused any prejudice to the delinquent official and in no way is opposed to well established principles of fair play in action. In so far as charge memo is concerned he would suggest that it is specific and gives all material particulars to the delinquent official to make proper representation and the Disciplinary Authority after independently examining the finding of the enquiry officer has imposed punishment as provided in the Service Rules, It was ultimately submitted by Sri V. Sathyanarayana, learned Counsel for respondent - Corporation that on the scheme of Service Rules of the Corporation, the order of the Disciplinary Authority is perfectly justified.
5. Having heard the respective contentions for the parties to the list and after carefully considering the rival contentions, I am of the view that the impugned order of the Disciplinary Authority dated 10.5.1988 is in accordance with law, Service Regulations of the Corporation and in no way opposed to rules of natural justice.
6. Before adverting to contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties, let me first peep into allegations made by the respondent-corporation against its employee in their charge memo. There are ten charges. The charges relate to temporary misappropriation of funds and properties of the corporation, misuse of power, wilful dis-obedience and dereliction of duties which are all misconducts as per Service Rules of the corporation. Charge memo had been served on the charge-sheeted officer. To the said charge memo petitioner had filed a detailed reply by way of, explanation denying each one of the allegations made therein. It is well accepted principle that when an employer proposes to dismiss a workman on a charge of misconduct, not only charges should be given to the delinquent official in writing but also charges should not be vague. The charges should contain full particulars and should be specific; otherwise there is no reasonable opportunity to show cause and any punishment imposed basing ort such charges would not be justified. In the case on hand, the delinquent official has given his elaborate explanation to the charge memo. This is one of the circumstances to inter that the charge sheeted officer understood charges in the charge memo and in that reply, if he had not complained about the vagueness of the charges, then, at a later stage, he cannot contend about the vagueness of the charges and further when this objection is not raised by the charge sheeted officer before the disciplinary proceedings, it cannot be raised for the first time in a Writ Petition. Assuming the charges are cumbersome, the enquiry proceedings are not vitiated in the absence of any objection by the delinquent official at the proper time and in the absence of any material from which prejudice to the accused can be inferred. In my view, the charge sheet furnished to the petitioner not only gives full particulars but also specific and by no stretch of imagination the charge memo could be characterised as vague. In view of this, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner about the vagueness of the charge memo cannot be accepted.
7. Now coming to the next contention of the learned Counsel for petitioner with regard to the procedure adopted by the enquiry officer in recording the evidence and statement of the delinquent official in the beginning of the enquiry before management led its evidence in support of the charges alleged in the charge memo. According to the learned Counsel, the same is opposed to principles of natural justice and in contravention of the well accepted principles in departmental enquiry proceedings. The rule that the charge -sheeted employee should not be asked to lead evidence in the beginning is not absolute rule and the rule has some exceptions also. The burden of proving every charge during enquiry proceedings rests on the employer and unless the evidence in support of the charge is led during enquiry, the charge sheeted employee has nothing to explain, but this rule would not apply when the charge sheeted officer had admitted the guilt during preliminary investigation and in the replies filed to the charge memo when the accused official accepted guilt on his own without duress, pressure or coercion from any quarters, to insist upon the management to lead evidence would be empty formality. In a case of this nature, if the enquiry officer seeks the explanation of delinquent official by way of directing him to lead his evidence, in my view, it does not amount to violation of principles of natural justice or the well accepted procedure in departmental enquiry proceedings. Keeping this in view let me now look into the statement recorded during preliminary investigation by an officer of the respondent-corporation and also reply filed by accused-official to the charge memo. The statement of the delinquent official found in the enquiry records produced by the learned Counsel appearing for the corporation. In the statement recorded by the investigating authority/CAO on 3.5.1987 much before the commencement of enquiry proceedings, the delinquent official has stated as under:
"...Kum. Radhika has produced evidence showing that she has paid Rs. 7700/- oft 23.10.86 which was collected from dealers. The amount collected from the dealers has not been remitted back to office and even to-day the bill is not raised. This is a clear incidence of mis-utilisation of sale proceeds. Explain the circumstances and when are you going to remit back?
The reasons of collections made and circumstances is already given as per my letter given to S.D.C (Miss Radhika). This was done with the intention of finalising the transaction of dealers quickly. Since the dealers did not give response, there is delay. This was done only with the intention of liquidating as much of paddy seed as possible. This will be finalised within a week after contacting the dealers.
During January 1987 on 13th and 14th you have collected Rs. 1000/- from Sri A.B. Nagaiah. Subsequently, you have paid Rs. 200/- and asked him to settle the account out of the money paid by Sri H.T. Das and same was remitted back on 25.2.1987. Under what circumstances it has been done? Is it not misutilisation of funds?
I had taken Rs. 1000/- from sales point towards imprest expenditure and the details will be furnished.
Further it is not correct to say that it is adjusted out of the amount collected from Sri H.T. Das.
The details of expenditure incurred will be submitted by a D.O. letter.
The above facts are made clear and true and abide by the same."
Again, in the reply filed on 6.7.1987 to the charge memo, petitioner has to say only this:
"The amounts is still in suspense, since the transaction is still in suspense. This is being done as per the business term's in vogue by the corporation.
The amount of Rs. 7700/- (Rs. Seven thousand seven hundred only) taken is still kept in suspense, because the dealers have stated that the stock is left over with them without sales, and the dealers have requested to give time till the end of July, 87. The transaction will be settled within July, 1987. Hence, I fully deny this charge"
2. It is true that I have collected Rs. 1000/- from sales point for immediate expenses in imprest. The amount drawn in suspense by me was given to S.P. unit for meeting the expenditure, and subsequently the vouchers were submitted by the S.P. unit directly to centre and the amount drawn is remitted back to corporation on 25.2.87. Since the amount was drawn in suspense it is not accounted in the books of accounts, while at the time of receipt of while submitting vouchers.
Hence, I fully deny the charge and it cannot be accepted as temporary misappropriation and misconduct.
3. Since formation of independent seed corporation in the year 1978 it was practice to extend credit facilities to the dealers in order to:
1) increase the turnover of a newly formed corporation;
2) popularise the brand name;
3) Develop and expand the market.
The system of credit sales was also being encourage orally by the previous Managing Director's Chief Marketing Officer's and Deputy Chief Marketing Officer, only to achieve the targets and to expand the market. As per this seed was issued to M/s Basaveswara Agro Centre, Sidhanoor on credit basis. I do not know whether the dealer has paid the money or not. If the same is not settled. I will take the responsibility of recovering the same and making good the value of seed costs, if the amount is not remitted.
The procedure of supplying seeds under credit is being followed by all the centres and is not a specific incidence only in my case.
Hence, I fully deny the charge made against me."
A reading of the statement and replies filed by the accused officer would give an indication that the delinquent official not only accepts the allegation in the charge memo, but also the guilt. In such circumstance, if the Enquiry Officer has led the evidence of the accused official before taking the evidence of the management witnesses, in my view would not oppose the rule of natural justice nor violate the basic procedures adopted in departmental proceedings. At this stage it is useful to refer to the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Employers of FIRESTONE TYRE AND RUBBER CO. (PRIVATE) LTD. v. THE WORKMEN, , wherein their Lordships have observed as follows:
"(9) This leaves over the contention that before examining the witnesses Subramaniam was subjected to a cross-examination. This was said to offend the principles of natural justice and reliance was placed on, Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, 1963-2 Lab LJ 78 (SC); Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Ltd. v. Their Workmen, ; Meenglas Tea Estate v. Its Workmen, ; and Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, 1963-2 Lab LJ 396 (SC). These cases no doubt lay down that before a delinquent is asked anything, all the evidence against him must be led. This cannot be an invariable rule in all cases. The situation is different where the accusation is based on a matter of record or the facts are admitted. In such a case it may be permissible to draw the attention of the delinquent to the evidence on the record which goes against him and which if he cannot satisfactorily explain must lead to a conclusion of guilt. In certain cases it may even be fair to the delinquent to take his version first so that the enquiry may cover the point of difference and the witnesses may be questioned properly on the aspect of the case suggested by him. It is all a question of justice and fair play. If the second procedure leads to a just decision of the disputed points and is fairer to the delinquent, than the ordinary procedure of examining evidence against him first, no exception can be taken to it. It is, however, wise to ask the delinquent whether he would like to make a statement first or wait till the evidence is over but the failure to question him in this way does not ipso facto vitiate the enquiry unless prejudice is caused. It is only when the person enquired against seems to have been held at a disadvantage or has objected to such a course that the enquiry may be said to be vitiated. It must however, be emphasised that in all cases in which the facts in controversy are disputed the procedure ordinarily to be followed is the one laid down by this Court in the cited cases. The procedure of examining the delinquent first may be adopted in a dear case only. As illustration we may mention one such case which was recently before us. There a bank clerk had allowed over-drafts to customers much beyond the limits sanctioned by the bank. The clerk had no authority to do so. Before the enquiry commenced he admitted his fault and asked to be excused. He was questioned first to find out if there were any extenuating circumstances before the formal evidence was led to complete the picture of his guilt. We held that the enquiry did not offend any principles of natural justice and was proper."
However, the learned Counsel for the petitioner filed upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. Their workman and Anr. In the said decision the Apex Court was pleased to observe as under:
"It is necessary to emphasize that in domestic enquiries the employer should take steps first to lead evidence against the workman charged, give an opportunity to the workman to cross-examine the said evidence and then should the workman be asked whether he wants to give any explanation about the evidence led against him. It seems to us that it is not fair in domestic enquiries against the industrial employees that at the very commencement of the enquiry, the employee should be closely cross-examined even before any other evidence is led against him. In dealing with domestic enquiries held in such industrial matters, we cannot overlook the fact that in a large majority of cases, employees are likely to be ignorant, and so, it is necessary not to expose them to the risk of cross-examination in the manner adopted in the present enquiry proceedings. Therefore, we are satisfied that Mr. Sule is right in contending that the present enquiry proceedings by which Malak Ram was elaborately cross-examined at the outset constitutes another infirmity in this enquiry."
In the case of Meenglas Tea Estate v. The Workmen , the Supreme Court was pleased to observe as under:
" (4) The Tribunal help, that the enquiry was vitiated because it was not held in accordance with the principles of natural justice, It is contended that this conclusion was erroneous. But we have no doubt about its correctness. The enquiry consisted of putting questions to each workman in turn. No witness was examined in 'support of the charge before the workman was questioned'. It is an elementary principle that a person who is required to answer a charge must know not only the accusation but also the testimony by which the accusation is supported. He must be given a fair chance to hear the evidence in support of the charge and to put such relevant questions by way of cross-examination as he desires. Then he must be given a chance to rebut the evidence led against him. This is the barest requirement of an enquiry of this character and this requirement must be substantially fulfilled before the result of the enquiry can be accepted. A departure from this requirement in effect throws the burden upon the person charged to repel the charge without first making it out against him. In the present case neither was any witness examined nor was any statements made by any witness tendered in evidence. The enquiry, such as it was, made by Mr. Marshal or Mr. Nichols who were not only in the position of judges but also of prosecutors and witnesses. There was no opportunity to the persons charged to cross-examine them and indeed they drew upon their own knowledge of the incident and instead cross-examined the persons charged. This was such a travesty of the principles of natural justice that the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the findings and asking the Company to prove the allegation against each workman de novo before it."
In the above referred cases on which strong reliance is placed by learned Counsel, the Apex Court was considering a situation where the delinquent official had not accepted the allegation and the irregularities alleged in the charge memo issued and served by the employer on the accused official. In my view, those decisions on which teamed Counsel relies on in support of his contentions will not assist him in any way whatsoever and further the assertion of the learned Counsel that the burden is always on the management to prove the charges alleged against the delinquent official and that onus they should discharge before directing delinquent official to lead evidence by way of rebuttal evidence is only the normal rule, but exceptions are also possible and in this view of the matter the contention of the learned Counsel has no merit and cannot be accepted.
8. The next contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is with regard to non-supply of preliminary investigation report recorded by C.A.O on different dates which the Enquiry Officer has relied upon in his report and the copy of the enquiry report to the delinquent official. According to the learned Counsel, this has vitiated the entire enquiry proceedings, in so far as the non-supply of copies of the investigation report is concerned, the facts would disclose otherwise. Before the commencement of the enquiry proceedings, the Enquiry Officer specifically had asked whether the delinquent official had taken extracts from such relevant official records as desired by him. The answer to the query was:
"I have not taken/but extract copy. I have the information required but in the course of enquiry, if need be, I may be permitted to refer the records."
When the delinquent himself had stated before the Enquiry Officer that he has all the information and if necessity arises he would refer to the records, now to contend otherwise is only an afterthought and the petitioner cannot be permitted to take a different stand contrary to what the records would disclose. Even otherwise supply of the copy of the preliminary report is not a mandatory requirement flowing from the principles of natural justice. Even if the report is considered by the Enquiry Officer, no prejudice may be caused, if the report does not contain any additional allegation. The supply of the report will not be necessary when it is confined only to the allegation mentioned in the charge sheet served to the delinquent official. In the present case, the charge-sheet is based on the preliminary investigation and the report. The charge memo had been served on the delinquent official for which he had replied in detail. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the non-supply of the preliminary enquiry report has caused any prejudice to the delinquent official and has vitiated the enquiry. In so far as the other contention that the non-supply of Enquiry Officer's report before imposing the penalty vitiates the order of punishment, it must be held to be not sustainable in law in view of the decision of the Constitution Bench of Apex Court in MANAGING DIRECTOR, ECIL, HYDERABAD v. B. KARUNAKAR, , inasmuch as the order of punishment in this case in prior to November 20, 1990. In so far as the other infirmities pointed out by the learned Counsel for petitioner in the enquiry proceedings, I can only say that all the documents which were marked during the enquiry were done in the presence of the delinquent official. He had ample opportunity either to seek for copies of the documents or to cross-examine the witnesses through whom the documents were marked. Similarly ail the management witnesses were examined in presence of delinquent official. This can be inferred from the records produced by the management at the time of hearing of the petition and if for any reason delinquent official did not choose to cross-examine the management witnesses, nobody could be blamed arid at any rate this would not vitiate the enquiry proceedings. In so far as the report of the enquiry officer, in my view he has discussed each one of the article of charges alleged against the petitioner, the statements of management witnesses and the delinquent official before giving his findings on each charge. In my view he is not expected to write a thesis but only to give a specific finding on each one of the charges with the available material and evidence on record. Such a thing has been done in the present case. In my view that the conclusion of the enquiry officer is not perverse and that there is no basic error in the approach adopted by the enquiry officer,
9. The Disciplinary Authority after receipt of the enquiry report together with records of the enquiry proceedings and other documents issued a second show cause notice to the charge sheeted officer to show cause about the proposed punishment. In response to the show cause notice, petitioner sought for time by sending a telegram and the Board did grant time to the petitioner to make his representation. In spite of granting adjournment and sufficient opportunity to file his reply, delinquent official sought further time which was rejected and the Disciplinary Authority proceeded to pass the impugned order. When an application for granting more time is rejected and the punishing authority proceeds to pass the order, then it cannot be said that it violates principles of natural justice and further it cannot be said sufficient opportunity had not been given to delinquent official in response to the second show cause notice. The main purpose of issuing second show cause notice is to enable the employee to make representation against the penalty proposed and if the delinquent official does not make use of the opportunity and goes on requesting for adjournment on one ground or other, the management cannot be blamed. The delinquent official has also an obligation to discharge for completion of the enquiry proceedings instituted by the management at the earliest. This would be not only in his interest but also would facilitate the management for speedy disposal of the enquiry proceedings. In my view, in the present case Disciplinary Authority had given sufficient time to the delinquent official to make representation to the proposed penalty and it is only thereafter the impugned order is passed and this in my view is in accordance with rules of natural justice. The second show cause notice dated 10.3.1988 clearly intimates the employee of the grounds on which penalty is proposed to be taken and the notice also gives a clear indication to the delinquent official the proposed penalty, which the corporation intends to make. In my view the charge sheeted officer would be in a position to explain why he does not deserve the punishment at all. In order to explain this, necessarily the delinquent official has to comment on the report and the findings of the Enquiry Officer and persuade the Disciplinary Authority that he does not deserve the punishment at all or deserve lesser punishment. The present show cause notice also indicates the reasons on which the Disciplinary Authority has tentatively come to the conclusion that the charge-sheeted officer is guilty of the charges alleged in the memo. In my view the essential requirements of a show cause notice are present in the final show cause notice issued by the Corporation dated 10.3.1988. Contentions contrary expressed by learned Counsel for petitioner has no substance and accordingly it is rejected,
10. Nextly the learned Counsel would contend that the enquiry report is not a reasoned one and as such it is opposed to rules of justice. In support of his contention the learned Counsel would rely upon the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer. The enquiry report is part of pleadings and it is produced as one of the annexures in the Writ Petition. I have carefully perused the said report. I find that the enquiry officer before coming to any conclusion and drawing up his findings has critically analysed the evidence adduced by the parties and also documents marked during the enquiry proceedings and after adverting specifically to each one of the charges alleged has given his reasoned findings. It is one of those rare cases where the enquiry officer has taken sufficient pains to write a well considered and reasoned order arrived at an judicious appraisal of evidence. A reasonable expectation of the Apex Court from an Enquiry Officer in the aforesaid decision has been fulfilled by the Enquiry Officer in the present case. At any rate any minor irregularity in the matter of conducting the enquiry cannot vitiate a finding which is obviously correct.
11. Nextly the learned Counsel contended that the Board of Directors (Disciplinary Authority) has not applied its mind independently before accepting the so called findings of the Enquiry Officer, but has mechanically accepted the same. This is one of those routine and often repeated contentions that is urged before this Court in almost all the cases of a departmental enquiry proceedings. But in my view this sort of contentions is now set at rest in view of the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of STATE BANK OF BIKANER & JAIPUR AND ORS. v. SRI PRABHU DAYAL GROVER, wherein it is observed as under:
"12. In view of the answers so given, it has to be now seen whether under the Regulations, the concerned authorities are required to give reasons for their decisions. Regulation 68(3) lays down the procedure the Disciplinary Authority is required to follow after it receives the proceedings of the enquiry including the report of the Enquiry Officer. On careful perusal thereof we find that only in those cases where the Disciplinary Authority considers it necessary to direct fresh or further enquiry or disagrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, it has to record the reasons of its such directions, but there is no such obligation if it agree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. It can, therefore, be legitimately inferred that when express provisions have been made in the Regulations for recording reasons in only the first two of the three fact situations - and not the other - there is no implied obligation also to record the reasons in case of concurrence with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. Even if we proceed on the basis that such an obligation is implicit, still the order of the Disciplinary Authority cannot be held to be bad as, on perusal thereof, we find that before concurring with the findings of the Enquiry Officer it has gone through the entire proceeding and applied its mind thereto. In our considered opinion, when the Disciplinary Authority agrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and accepts the reasons given by him in support of such finding, it is not necessary for punishing authority to reappraise the evidence to arrive at the same findings. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Mr. Dutta that the order of punishment was liable to be struck down as it was a non-speaking order and did not contain any reason."
In my view, even otherwise also the Disciplinary Authority has applied its mind to the proceedings of the enquiry report before passing the impugned order. Therefore, no exception could be taken to the order framed by the Disciplinary Authority. Accordingly the contention of the learned Counsel cannot be accepted.
12. Lastly it was contended by the learned Counsel for petitioner that 'removal from service' is not one of the penalties enumerated under Rule 61 of the Service Regulation and that therefore the punishing authority could not propose and inflict the said penalty on the petitioner. In support of his contention the learned Counsel relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in the case of GLAXO LAB (I) v. LABOUR COURT, 1984(1) LLJ 16, KALRA v. PROJECT EQUIPMENT CORPORATION, 1984(2) LLJ 186 and the decision in R.V. PATEL v. AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 1985(1) LLJ 527. Per contra Sri V. Satyanarayana, learned Counsel for respondent would submit that there is not much difference between the punishments, viz., dismissal from service and removal from service in service laws. In the first case it disqualifies the employee from any future employment and removal ordinarily does not and if the authority could impose severe punishment of dismissal, he can definitely impose lesser punishment of removal from service. In support of his contention the learned Counsel would rely on the decision of Bombay High Court in the case of VASANT GOPAL GAURAV AND ANR. v. F.M. LYLA AND ORS., 1968 II LLJ 182., wherein it is observed as under:
"We refuse to accept the argument that the only punishment that could be imposed is one of suspension or dismissal. There may be cases which do not call for extreme punishment of dismissal and unless there is anything which prevents the employers from imposing a lesser punishment, there is no reason why the standing orders should be construed in this limited way."
13. According to the learned Counsel, the imposition of penalty as done by Disciplinary Authority is in accordance with Rule 61 of the Service Regulation of the Corporation.
14. Rule 61 of the Service Regulations prescribes major penalties. It provides for dismissal, reduction in rank etc. as several types of major penalties. The penalty of removal from service is less severe than the penalty of dismissal and therefore if a person is found guilty of serious misconduct for which the penalty of dismissal is provided, then he can also be removed from service even such a penalty is not provided, in view of this, if a particular authority is competent to dismiss, it cannot be said that he is not competent to remove the employee concerned from service.
15. The learned Counsel for petitioner did not raise any other contention before this Court. As I have already held that the issues raised by the learned Counsel has no merit whatsoever, Writ Petition fails and accordingly it is dismissed. Rule discharged. In the facts and circumstances of the case parties are directed to bear their respective costs.