Allahabad High Court
Director Indira Gandhi Rashtriya Udan ... vs Sheo Narain Chaudhary on 26 February, 2020
Author: Abdul Moin
Bench: Abdul Moin
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH A.F.R. Court No. - 22 Case :- SPECIAL APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 619 of 2010 Appellant :- Director Indira Gandhi Rashtriya Udan Academy 5775(S/S)2000 Respondent :- Sheo Narain Chaudhary Counsel for Appellant :- O.P.Srivastava,Virendra Kumar Dubey Counsel for Respondent :- N.N.Jaiswal,Anupam Verma,Rajan Singh Hon'ble Abdul Moin,J.
C.M. Application No.8909 of 2020.
1. Heard.
2. This is an application filed by the applicant, inter alia, praying for initiation of proceedings under Article 215 of the Constitution of India against the respondents No.1, 2, 3 and 4 for having filed the special appeal by purporting to hold an authority and post which is non existent in the Indira Gandhi Rashtriya Udan Academy (hereinafter referred to as the Academy), whereby committing contempt.
3. Sri Anupam Verma, learned counsel for the applicant contends that Special Appeal Defective No.619 of 2010 had been allowed on 7.4.2015 whereby the order passed in the writ petition in favour of the applicant was set-aside. It is only now that the applicant has come to know of the aforesaid fact of the special appeal having been filed by persons alleging themselves to be holders of such posts which have neither been created nor approved in the Academy.
4. The present application has been filed on 22.1.2020 while the special appeal had been decided on 7.4.2015 i.e. the application is being filed after a period of more than four and half years. Upon a pointed query being put to the learned counsel for the applicant as to how the present application could be said to be within the limitation prescribed in Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the applicant upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Pritam Pal vs. High Court of M.P. reported in AIR 1992 SC 904, judgment of the Full Court of the Kerala High Court in the case of A. Mayilswami vs. State of Kerala and others reported in 1995(2) KLJ 255 and the judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Nallamala Venkateswara Rao and another vs. P. Pradhakar and another reported in 1998(1) ALD 370 to contend that the period of limitation prescribed under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1971) shall not be applicable on an application filed under Article 215 of the Constitution of India.
5. Having heard the learned counsel for the applicant and having perused the record what emerges is that the application under Article 215 of the Constitution of India has been filed by alleging that the special appeal had been filed by the persons alleging themselves to be holders of such posts which have neither been created nor approved in the Academy and thus this Court has been mislead in entertaining the said special appeal. However, the fact of the matter remains that the present application under Article 215 of the Constitution of India is being filed after a period of more than four and half years of the final judgment and more than nine and a half years of the filing of the special appeal inasmuch as the judgment in the special appeal had been delivered on 7.4.2015, the special appeal was filed on 27.8.2010 while the application under Article 215 of the Constitution of India has been filed on 22.1.2020.
6. Section 20 of the Act, 1971, which is relevant for the purpose of deciding the controversy, reads as under:-
"20. Limitation for actions for contempt. No court shall initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed."
7. A perusal of Section 20 of the Act, 1971 thus indicates that limitation for action of contempt has been specified as one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. The filing of special appeal by persons alleging themselves to be holders of such posts which have neither been created nor approved in the Academy is said to be a contempt for which the present application has been filed.
8. Whether the provisions of Section 20 of the Act, 1071 would be attracted in applications filed under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, would be next question to be considered by this Court.
9. The aforesaid question is no longer res-integra taking into consideration the three Judges judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Others reported in (2001)7 SCC 549, wherein the following has been held:-
"The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 was enacted, as per the Preamble, with a view "to define and limit the powers of certain Courts in punishing Contempts of Courts and to regulate their procedure in relation thereto". It provides for action being taken in relation to civil as well as criminal contempt. It is not necessary, for the purpose of this case, to analyse various Sections of the Act in any great detail except to notice that Sections 3 to 7 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides for what is not to be regarded as contempt. Section 8 specifies that nothing contained in the Act shall be construed as implying that any other valid defence in any proceedings for Contempt of Court ceases to be available merely by reason of the provisions of the 1971 Act. Section 9 makes it clear that the Act will not to be implied as enlarging the scope of contempt. Section 10 contains the power of the High Court to punish contempts of subordinate Courts, while Section 12 specifies the punishment which can be imposed for Contempt of Court and other related matters. Procedure to be followed where contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court or a High Court is provided in Section 14, while cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases is dealt with by Section 15. Section 15 has to be read with Section 17 which provides for procedure after cognizance has been taken under Section 15. A decision of the High Court to punish for contempt is made appealable under Section 19 of the Act.
Sections 20 and 22, with which we are concerned in the present case, read as follows:
"20. Limitation for actions for contempt.- No court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.
22. Act to be in addition to, and not in derogation of, other laws relating to contempt.- The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the provisions of any other law relating to contempt of courts."
Learned counsel for the parties have drawn our attention to various decisions of this Court in support of their respective contentions. While the effort of both Mr. Venugopal and Mr. Bobde on behalf of the Appellant was that even in exercise of the power under Article 215 of the Constitution the provisions ofSection 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 prohibited any action being taken for contempt if a period of one year had elapsed, as was contended in the present case, Mr. Rustomjee submitted that the constitutional power contained under Article 215 could not in any way be stultified or curtailed by any Act of Parliament including Section 20 of the 1971 Act.
It will be appropriate to refer to some of the decisions which have a bearing on the point in issue in the present case.
In Sukhdev Singh Sodhi vs. The Chief Justice and Judges of the Pepsu High Court this Court was concerned with the issue whether this Court could transfer contempt proceedings from Pepsu High Court to any other High Court. For transfer reliance had been placed on Section 527 of the Criminal Procedure Code. While holding that Section 527 did not apply in case where a High Court has initiated proceedings for contempt of itself, it was held that even the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 recognised the existence of a right to punish for contempt in every High Court and this right is vested in it in the High Court by the Constitution. This Court referred to Article 215 of the Constitution and observed that so far as contempt of a High Court itself is concerned, the Constitution vests this right in every High Court and no Act of a legislature could take away that jurisdiction and confer it afresh by virtue of its own authority. It, accordingly, came to the conclusion that the Code of Criminal Procedure did not apply in matters of contempt triable by the High Court which could deal with it summarily and adopt its own procedure which had to be fair and that the contemner was to be made aware of the charge against him and given a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Reliance was placed by Mr. Venugopal on a decision in Baradakanta Mishra vs. Mr. Justice Gatikrushna Misra, Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court and it was contended that it was held in this case that Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provided a period of limitation by saying that no Court shall initiate any proceeding for contempt either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. In Baradakanta Mishra's case (supra) the Appellant had filed an application before the High Court for initiating contempt proceedings against the Chief Justice and other Judges in their personal capacity. A Full Bench of three Judges were of the opinion that no Contempt of Court had been committed and the application was rejected. The Appellant then purported to avail the right of appeal under Section 19(1) of the Act and filed an appeal in this Court. A preliminary objection was taken by the State against the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that where the High Court had not initiated proceedings and had refused to take action, no appeal as of right would lie under Section 19(1) . This was the only issue which arose for consideration of this Court in Baradakanta Mishra's case and this Court upheld the preliminary objection and held that no appeal under Section 19(1) was maintainable. It is no doubt true that during the course of discussion reference was made to Sections 15, 17 and 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 but this Court was in that case not called upon to consider the effect of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act vis-à-vis inherent powers of the High Court to punish for contempt. No reference is made in the judgment to Article 129 or Article 215 of the Constitution. Furthermore interpretation of Section 20 was not an issue and no question of limitation arose therein. Under the circumstances, we hold that the observations made by this Court with reference to Section 20 were in the nature of obiter dicta and not binding on this Court in the present case. In any case, Baradakanta Mishra's case decision does not specifically deal with the question as to when or how proceedings for contempt are initiated for the purposes of Section 20 and nor has it considered the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, to which we shall presently refer.
In Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar vs. Kalu Ram & Ors. where an Order of this Court ordering delivering of premises had not been complied with, an application was filed for initiation of contempt proceedings. A contention was raised on behalf of the alleged contemner based on Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Dealing with this contention, this Court observed as follows:
"Another point was taken about limitation of this application under section 20 of the Act. S.20 states that no court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. In this case, the present application was filed on or about 3rd November, 1988 as appears from the affidavit in support of the application. The contempt considered, inter alia, of the act of not giving the possession by force of the order of the learned Sr. Sub-Judge, Narnaul dated 12th February, 1988. Therefore, the application was well within the period of one year. Failure to give possession, if it amounts to a contempt in a situation of this nature is a continuing wrong. There was no scope for application of s. 20 of the Act."
The abovementioned observations indicate that the contention based on Section 20 was not accepted for two reasons firstly that the application for initiating action for contempt was filed within one year of the date when the contempt was alleged to have been committed and secondly failure to give possession amounted to continuing wrong and, therefore, there was no scope for application of Section 20 of the Act. This case is important for the reason that the Court regarded the filing of the application for initiating contempt proceedings as the relevant date from the point of view of limitation.
The power of this Court and the High Court under the Constitution for taking action for contempt of subordinate court came up for consideration in Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi vs. State of Gujarat and Others etc. It referred to Sukhdev Singh Sodhi's case (supra) and held that even after codification of the law of contempt in India the High Courts jurisdiction as the Court of Record to initiate proceedings and take seisin of the matter remained unaffected by the Contempt of Courts Act. It also referred to R.L.Kapur vs. State of Madras and by following the said decision observed as follows:
"... The Court further held that in view of Article 215 of the Constitution, no law made by a legislature could take away the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court nor it could confer it afresh by virtue of its own authority".
Referring to the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 it observed with relation of the powers of the High Court as follows:
"...Inherent powers of a superior Court of Record have remained unaffected even after codification of Contempt Law. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 was enacted to define and limit the powers of courts in punishing contempts of courts and to regulate their procedure in relation thereto. Section 2 of the Act defines contempt of court including criminal contempt. Sections 5,6,7,8 and 9 specify matters which do not amount to contempt and the defence which may be taken. Section 10 relates to the power of High Court to punish for contempt of subordinate courts. Section 10 like Section 2 of 1926 Act and Section 3of 1952 Act reiterates and reaffirms the jurisdiction and power of a High Court in respect of its own contempt and of subordinate courts. The Act does not confer any new jurisdiction instead it reaffirms the High Court's power and jurisdiction for taking action for the contempt of itself as well as of its subordinate courts...."
The view in Delhi Judicial Service Association's case (supra) was reiterated and reaffirmed in the case of In re: Vinay Chandra Mishra and it was held that the amplitude and power of this Court to punish for contempt could not be curtailed by the law made by the Parliament or State Legislature. As observed in Income Tax Appellate Tribunal through President vs. V.K. Agarwal and Another at page 25 that the judgment in Vinay Chandra Mishra's case was partially set aside in Supreme Court Bar Association. vs. Union of India and Another on the question of power to suspend an advocate's licence under contempt jurisdiction, the observation in Vinay Chandra Mishra's case with regard to amplitude of the courts power under Article 129 not being curtailed by a law made by the Central or a State Legislature remained unaffected. It was in exercise of the powers under Article 129 that this Court held the respondent in V.K. Agarwal's case (supra) guilty of Contempt of Court as he had tried to influence or question the decision making process of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
The applicability of the Limitation Act to Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 came up for consideration inState of West Bengal and Others vs. Kartick Chandra Das and Others . In that case against a notice of contempt which had been issued by the Single Judge a Letters Patent Appeal were filed under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act which was dismissed on the ground that the delay was not condonable as Section 5 of the Limitation Act did not apply. While reversing this decision of the Calcutta High Court, this Court observed at page 344 as follows:
"7. In consequence, by operation of Section 29(2) read with Section 3 of the Limitation Act, limitation stands prescribed as a special law under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act and limitation in filing Letters Patent appeal stands attracted. In consequence, Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act stands attracted to Letters Patent appeal insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded either by special or local law. Since the rules made on the appellate side, either for entertaining the appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent or appeals arising under the contempt of courts, had not expressly excluded, Section 5 of the Limitation Act becomes applicable. We hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does apply to the appeals filed against the order of the learned Single Judge for the enforcement by way of a contempt. The High Court, therefore, was not right in holding that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply. The delay stands condoned. Since the High Court had not dealt with the matter on merits, we decline to express any opinion on merits. The case stands remitted to the Division Bench for decision on merits."
A Constitution Bench in the case of Supreme Court Bar Association's case (supra) while considering this Court's power to punish for contempt at page 421 observed as follows:
"21. It is, thus, seen that the power of this Court in respect of investigation or punishment of any contempt including contempt of itself, is expressly made "subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament" by Article 142(2). However, the power to punish for contempt being inherent in a court of record, it follows that no act of Parliament can take away that inherent jurisdiction of the court of record to punish for contempt and Parliament's power of legislation on the subject cannot, therefore, be so exercised as to stultify the status and dignity of the Supreme Court and/or the High Courts, though such a legislation may serve as a guide for the determination of the nature of punishment which this Court may impose in the case of established contempt. Parliament has not enacted any law dealing with the powers of the Supreme Court with regard to investigation and punishment of contempt of itself, (we shall refer to Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, later on) and this Court, therefore, exercises the power to investigate and punish for contempt of itself by virtue of the powers vested in it under Articles 129 and 142(2) of the Constitution of India. "
"24. Thus, under the existing legislation dealing with contempt of court, the High Courts and Chief Courts were vested with the power to try a person for committing contempt of court and to punish him for established contempt. The legislation itself prescribed the nature and type, as well as the extent of, punishment which could be imposed on a contemner by the High Courts or the Chief Courts. The second proviso to Section 4 of the 1952 Act (supra) expressly restricted the powers of the courts not to "impose any sentence in excess of what is specified in the section" for any contempt either of itself or of a court subordinate to it."
Referring to the powers of the High Court under Article 215 to impose punishment with reference to Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 at page 428, the Court held as follows:
"37. The nature and types of punishment which a court of record can impose in a case of established contempt under the common law have now been specifically incorporated in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 insofar as the High Courts are concerned and therefore to the extent the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 identifies the nature or types of punishments which can be awarded in the case of established contempt, it does not impinge upon the inherent powers of the High Court under Article 215 either. No new type of punishment can be created or assumed."
In Dr L.P. Misra vs. State of U.P. a contention was raised that while exercising powers under Article 215 in punishing the Appellant therein for Contempt of the High Court the procedure contemplated by Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 had not been followed. This Court, dealing with this contention, observed as follows:
"12. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after going through the materials placed on record, we are of the opinion that the Court while passing the impugned order had not followed the procedure prescribed by law. It is true that the High Court can invoke powers and jurisdiction vested in it under Article 215 of the Constitution of India but such a jurisdiction has to be exercised in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. It is in these circumstances the impugned order cannot be sustained."
In the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal vs. D.K.Mittal and Another a Division Bench of this Court was called upon to interpret Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. In that case an undertaking had been given before the High Court on 19th December, 1986 that the Municipal Corporation would not demolish or disturb a construction till disposal of the writ petition. Despite this undertaking, demolition took place on 11th January, 1987. Soon thereafter the Appellant filed an application before the High Court seeking the initiation of proceedings under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. On 15th January, 1987 the High Court issued a show-cause notice to the opposite party as to why contempt proceedings should not be initiated against him for defiance of the Court's order dated 19th December, 1986. On 6th January, 1988, on a concession being made by the Advocate-General the High Court ordered that notices be issued to show-cause why the opposite party be not punished for disobeying the order dated 19th December, 1986.
Subsequently, on 23rd November, 1989 the High Court came to the conclusion that issuing of a show-cause notice did not amount to initiation of proceedings and, therefore, the bar enacted by Section 20 of the Act was attracted and the application was liable to be rejected.
This Court had to consider whether the order of 6th January, 1988 amounted to initiation of proceedings for contempt. Dealing with the question of initiation of proceedings the relevant observations of the judgment are as follows:
"14. In order to appreciate the exact connotation of the expression "initiate any proceedings for contempt" we may notice several situations or stages which may arise before the court dealing with contempt proceedings. These are:
(i) (a) a private party may file or present an application or petition for initiating any proceedings for civil contempt; or
(b) the court may receive a motion or reference from the Advocate General or with his consent in writing from any other person or a specified law officer or a court subordinate to the High Court;
(ii) (a) the court may in routine issue notice to the person sought to be proceeded against;
or
(b) the court may issue notice to the respondent calling upon him to show cause why the proceedings for contempt be not initiated;
(iii) the court may issue notice to the person sought to be proceeded against calling upon him to show cause why he be not punished for contempt.
15. In the cases contemplated by (i) or (ii) above, it cannot be said that any proceedings for contempt have been initiated. Filing of an application or petition for initiating proceedings for contempt or a mere receipt of such reference by the court does not amount to initiation of the proceedings by court. On receiving any such document, it is usual with the courts to commence some proceedings by employing an expression such as "admit", "rule", "issue notice" or "issue notice to show cause why proceedings for contempt be not initiated". In all such cases the notice is issued either in routine or because the court has not yet felt satisfied that a case for initiating any proceedings for contempt has been made out and therefore the court calls upon the opposite party to admit or deny the allegations made or to collect more facts so as to satisfy itself if a case for initiating proceedings for contempt was made out. Such a notice is certainly anterior to initiation. The tenor of the notice is itself suggestive of the fact that in spite of having applied its mind to the allegations and the material placed before it the court was not satisfied of the need for initiating proceedings for contempt; it was still desirous of ascertaining facts or collecting further material whereon to formulate such opinion. It is only when the court has formed an opinion that a prima facie case for initiating proceedings for contempt is made out and that the respondents or the alleged contemners should be called upon to show cause why they should not be punished; then the court can be said to have initiated proceedings for contempt. It is the result of a conscious application of the mind of the court to the facts and the material before it. Such initiation of proceedings for contempt based on application of mind by the court to the facts of the case and the material before it must take place within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed failing which the jurisdiction to initiate any proceedings for contempt is lost. The heading of Section 20 is "limitation for actions for contempt". Strictly speaking, this section does not provide limitation in the sense in which the term is understood in the Limitation Act. Section 5of the Limitation Act also does not, therefore, apply. Section 20 strikes at the jurisdiction of the court to initiate any proceedings for contempt."
It was contended by Mr. Venugopal that Section 20 was mandatory and it imposes a prohibition on the Court in taking action once a period of one year had elapsed. He submitted that Section 20 of the Act nowhere mentions the filing of an application for initiating proceedings of contempt and, therefore, the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act would have no application. Relying upon Baradakanta Mishra's case, he submitted that an action of contempt was between the Court and the alleged contemner and hence the date of filing of the petition was not relevant. He submitted that the judgment in Om Prakash Jaiswal's case (supra) had not been correctly decided to the extent that the judgment held that mere issuance of a show-cause notice was not the initiation of contempt proceedings by the Court. He, however, submitted that contempt proceedings are initiated within the meaning of Section 20when the Court, on the application of mind, issued even a show-cause notice within a period of one year of the committal of alleged contempt.
There can be no doubt that both this Court and High Courts are Courts of Record and the Constitution has given them the powers to punish for contempt. The decisions of this Court clearly show that this power cannot be abrogated or stultified. But if the power under Article 129 and Article 215 is absolute can there be any legislation indicating the manner and to the extent that the power can be exercised? If there is any provision of the law which stultifies or abrogates the power under Article 129 and/or Article 215 there can be little doubt that such law would not be regarded as having been validly enacted. It, however, appears to us that providing for the quantum of punishment or what may or may not be regarded as acts of contempt or even providing for a period of limitation for initiating proceedings for contempt cannot be taken to be a provision which abrogates or stultifies the contempt jurisdiction under Article 129 or Article 215 of the Constitution.
This Court has always frowned upon the grant or existence of absolute or unbridled power. Just as power or jurisdiction under Article 226 has to be exercised in accordance with law, if any, enacted by the legislature it would stand to reason that the power under Article 129 and/or Article 215 should be exercised in consonance with the provisions of a validly enacted law. In case of apparent or likelihood of conflict the provisions should be construed harmoniously.
The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 inter alia provides for what is not to be regarded as contempt; it specifies in Section 12 the maximum punishment which can be imposed; procedure to be followed where contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court or in the High Court or cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases is provided by Sections 14 and 15; the procedure to be followed after taking cognizance is provided by Section 17; Section 18 provides that in every case of criminal contempt under Section 15 the same shall be heard and determined by a Bench of not less than two Judges;Section 19 gives the right of appeal from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. There is no challenge to the validity of any of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act as being violative or in conflict with any provisions of the Constitution. Barring observations of this Court in the Supreme Court Bar Association's case (supra), where it did not express any opinion on the question whether maximum punishment fixed by the 1971 Act was binding on the Court, no doubt has been expressed about the validity of any provision of the 1971 Act. In exercise of its constitutional power this Court has, on the other hand, applied the provisions of the Act while exercising jurisdiction under Article 129 or 125 of the Constitution. In Sukhdev Singh Sodhi's case (supra) it recognised that the 1926 Act placed a limitation on the amount of punishment which could be imposed. Baradakanta Mishra's case was decided on the interpretation of Section 19 of the 1971 Act, namely, there was no right of appeal if the Court did not take action or initiate contempt proceedings. In the case of Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar's case (supra) the Court did not hold that Section 20 of the 1971 Act was inapplicable. It came to the conclusion that the application for initiating contempt proceedings (was within time and limitation had to be calculated) as for the purpose of limitation date of filing was relevant and furthermore that was a case of continuing wrong. In Kartick Chandra Das case (supra) the provisions of the Limitation Act were held to be applicable in dealing with application under Section 5 in connection with an appeal filed under Section 19 of the Limitation Act. A three-Judge Bench in Dr L.P.Misra's case (supra) observed that the procedure provided by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 had to be followed even in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 215 of the Constitution. It would, therefore, follow that if Section 20 is so interpreted that it does not stultify the powers under Article 129 or Article 215 then, like other provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act relating to the extent of punishment which can be imposed, a reasonable period of limitation can also be provided."
10. From the aforesaid judgment, it emerges that even for application filed under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, the procedure prescribed under the Act, 1971 has to be adhered to.
11. This would be amply clear from a perusal of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case in the case of Dr. L.P. Misra vs. State of U.P. reported in 1998(7) SCC 375, wherein the Apex Court held as under:-
"6. Mr. Dwivedi, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant in Crl. Appeal No. 483 of 1994 assailed the impugned order principally on the ground that the court while passing the said order did not follow the procedure prescribed by law. Counsel urged that the court had failed to give a reasonable opportunity to the appellants of being heard. Assuming that the incident as recited in the impugned order had taken place, the court could not have passed the impugned order on the same day after it reassembled without issuing a show cause notice or giving an opportunity to the appellants to explain the alleged contemptuous conduct. The minimal requirement of following the procedure prescribed by law had been over looked by the Court. In support of his submission, Counsel drew our attention to Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 as also to the provisions contained in Chapter XXXV-E of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952. Emphasis was laid on Rule 7 and 8 which read as under :-
"7. When it is alleged or appears to t he Court upon its own view that a person has been guilty of contempt committed in its presence or hearing, the Court may cause such person to be detained in custody, and at any time before the rising of the Court, on the same day or as early as possible thereafter, shall-
(a) cause him to be informed in writing of the contempt with which he is charged, and if such person pleads guilty to the charge, his plea shall be recorded and the Court may in its discretion, convict him thereon,
(b) if such person refuses to plead, or does not plead, or claims to be tried or the Court does not convict him, on his plea of guilt, afford him an opportunity to make his defence to the charge, in support of which he may file an affidavit on the date fiked for his appearance or on such other date as may be fiked by the court in that behalf.
(c) after taking such evidence as may be necessary or as may be offered by such person and after hearing him, proceed either forthwith or after the adjournment, to determine the matter of the charge, and
(d) make such order for punishment of discharge of such person as may be just.
8. Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 7, where a person charged with contempt under the rule applies, whether orally or in writing to have the charge against him tried by some Judge other than the Judge or Judges in whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have been committed, and the court if of opinion that it is practicable to do so and that in the interests of proper administration of justice the application should be allowed, it shall cause the matter to be placed together with a statement of the facts of the case, before the Chief Justice for such directions as he may think fit to issue as respects the trial thereof."
Counsel urged that the impugned order is totally opposed to the principles of natural justice and, therefore, unsustainable on this score alone. He, therefore, urged that the impugned order be quashed and set aside.
7. Learned Counsel appearing for the other appellants adopted the same arguments.
8. We heard Learned Solicitor General who was requested to appear and assist the Court.
9. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after going the rough the materials placed on record, we are of the opinion that the Court while passing the impugned order had not followed the procedure prescribed by law. It is true that the High Court can invoke powers and jurisdiction vested in it under Article 215 of the Constitution of India but such a jurisdiction has to be exercised in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. It is in these circumstances, the impugned order cannot be sustained."
12. From the judgment in the case of Dr. L.P. Misra (supra), it comes out that though this Court can invoke powers and jurisdiction vested in it under Article 215 of the Constitution of India but the same has to be exercised in accordance with the procedure prescribed under law. In view of the aforesaid judgments in the case of Pallav Seth and Dr. L.P. Misra (supra), even though this Court finds that it can exercise jurisdiction but the said jurisdiction can only be exercised in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and consequently Section 20 of the Act, 1971 would be the limitation for entertaining an application under Article 215 of the Constitution of India.
13. Admittedly, the special appeal was filed on 27.8.2010 while the judgment in the special appeal was pronounced on 7.4.2015 and thus the present application, as per the averments contained therein of the special appeal having been filed by holders of such posts which have neither been created nor approved in the Academy whereby committing contempt, would clearly be hit by the limitation prescribed under Section 20 of the Act, 1971.
14. So far as the judgment in the case of Pritam Pal (supra), as relied on by the learned counsel by the applicant is concerned, suffice to state that the said judgment was delivered by two Judges while the judgments in Pallav Seth and Dr. L.P. Misra (supra) were both delivered by three Judges and were also of the subsequent dates.
15. Accordingly, taking into consideration the aforesaid judgments, the judgments in the case of A. Mayilswami and Mallamala Venkateswara Rao (supra) as relied by the learned counsel for the applicant, would also have no applicability in the present case.
16. Taking into consideration the aforesaid discussion, this Court clearly finds that the present application is hit by delay and is accordingly dismissed.
Order Date :- 26.2.2020 Rakesh (Abdul Moin, J.)