Madhya Pradesh High Court
Devi Prasad Ahirwar vs The State Of M.P.And Ors. on 20 October, 2016
W.P.(S) No.481/2005 1
(Devi Prasad Ahirwar Vs. State of M.P. & Ors.)
20.10.2016
Shri Jitendra Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner.
Shri C.R.Roman, learned Govt. Advocate for the
respondents/State.
Petitioner has filed this petition being aggrieved by order dated 22.11.1984 discharging the petitioner on being not found to be possessing capacity to shape into a good Constable in a disciplined force. Thereafter, petitioner filed an application for reinstatement which too has been rejected vide order dated 9.3.1990.
Brief facts leading to the present case are that petitioner was appointed on the post of Constable on 4.10.1982 in the respondent/department. While petitioner was posted in the Police Training School, Indore, on 13.7.1983, he absented from the training school without any permission from the competent authority and remained absconding for a period of 105 days. Therefore, the period of absence was decided by the Commandant, 26th Bn. SAF, Guna, vide order dated 11.6.1984. Again petitioner was sent for training vide letter dated 15.6.1984 and movement order was issued by the Commandant, but in the meanwhile the petitioner got involved in a criminal case under the provisions of Arms Act which was tried in the Court of JMFC. Because of this criminal case, petitioner was placed under suspension and while petitioner was under suspension and his headquarters was fixed at Guna vide letter dated 22.9.1984 passed by Deputy Inspector General of SAF Training college Indore, the petitioner again absented from his headquarters, therefore, looking to the conduct of the petitioner he was discharged from service vide order dated 22.11.1984. It is mentioned that as per the proviso to Section 28(1) of the Police Regulations services of the W.P.(S) No.481/2005 2 petitioner were discharged in the interest of the State while the petitioner was still under probation and had not completed his training.
It is the case of the petitioner that vide order dated 3.1.1987, petitioner was discharged from the criminal case, and therefore, after acquittal in the criminal case, he had sought reinstatement, but the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed by the appellate authority vide order dated 9.3.1990.
It is the case of the petitioner that once he was acquitted in criminal case, there was no reason not to revoke the order of discharge and reinstate the petitioner in service. It is also submitted that the impugned order of discharge is illegal and arbitrary, so also order rejecting his request for reinstatement inasmuch as sole ground for his discharge was pendency of criminal case, and therefore, he should have been reinstated.
Learned counsel for the State has drawn attention of this Court to the fact that though petitioner was discharged in the year 1984 and in the criminal case he was acquitted in the year 1987, still this petition has been filed after almost 18 years in the year 2005 and there is no explanation for the delay in filing the writ petition. It is only mentioned that there is no limitation for filing writ petition before this Hon'ble Court and further the delay in filing the present petition is liable to be condoned. But no circumstances have been explained seeking condonation of delay to show bonafide of the petitioner in approaching this Court after lapse of almost a period of 18 years. Alongwith list of documents petitioner has filed copy of an OA dated 9.7.2001, but neither it bears any registration number, nor there is any explanation as to for what purpose petitioner wishes to use this OA. Learned counsel for the respondents has also submitted that it is not only registration of criminal case which resulted in discharge of the petitioner invoking proviso to W.P.(S) No.481/2005 3 Section 28(1) of the Police Regulations, but also overall conduct of the petitioner in unauthorizedly absenting himself from the training programme for a long duration of 105 days in relation to which he was declared as absconder, copy of which is available on record as Annexure R/2, and also the fact that petitioner after his suspension had again absconded from his headquarters w.e.f. 24.10.1984 as is apparent from order dated 26.11.1984 enclosed by the respondents as Annexure R/6.
Learned counsel for the respondents has also placed reliance on document Annexure R/10 wherein it is mentioned that Deviprasad had absconded from training w.e.f. 20 th September, 1984 forenoon for a period of 8 days and reported back on 27.9.1984 afternoon. Thus, in view of these documents, it is submitted that conduct of the petitioner was not befitting to allow him to continue in a disciplined uniformed police force, and therefore, acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case will have no bearing on the aspect of reinstatement.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in fact petitioner has died on 29 th September, 2009 and his legal heirs are already on record. If petitioner's case is considered sympathetically, then reinstatement may provide service benefits to the members of the family of the deceased employee.
After considering the rival submissions, it is necessary to examine the law in the aforesaid factual backdrop that the petitioner was admittedly an employee who was not confirmed as he had not completed training. In the case of Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vs. Devendra Kumar Jain and Ors. as reported in (1995) 1 SCC 638 it has been held by the Supreme Court that in the cases where appointment was on W.P.(S) No.481/2005 4 temporary basis, services being terminable without notice or assigning reason, following the formalities of Article 311 is not necessary for termination. Similarly in the case of Commissioner, Food and Civil Supplies, Lucknow, UP and another vs. Prakash Chandra Saxena and Anr. as reported in (1994) 5 SCC 177 the Supreme Court has held that termination simpliciter of services of a temporary employee is permissible. In the present case, the proviso to Section 28(1) of the Police Regulations is crystal clear where on the basis of unsuitability a person can be discharged from service. Since the present case squarely falls within the four corners of unsuitability of the petitioner in terms of proviso to Section 28(1) of the Police Regulations, the impugned order does not call for any interference, specially when petitioner himself was not vigilant about his rights and slept over the same for a period of 18 years before approaching this Court.
As far as issue of limitation is concerned, in the case of Chandigarh Administration and another Vs. Jagjit Singh and another as reported in (1995) 1 SCC 745 the Supreme Court has held that for the reason of unexplained delay and laches, writ petition is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution. In that case, order of cancellation of lease of plot by government was not challenged and instead part amount remaining of forfeiture was accepted as refund by the respondent. The writ petition was filed by the respondent against the order of cancellation of lease after a lapse of 17 years and to explain the delay, it was mentioned that he spent time in filing revision before government and awaiting its decision. It was held that such explanation was not acceptable and writ petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches. Thus, it cannot be said that in a writ petition under Article 226 W.P.(S) No.481/2005 5 of the Constitution an aggrieved person can approach the Court at any point of time without giving reasonable explanation for such delay.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, the petition being devoid of merits is hereby dismissed both on merits so also due to delay & laches.
(Vivek Agarwal) Judge ms/-