Bombay High Court
Maharashtra State Road Transport ... vs Raju Mahadeorao Bhagwatkar on 24 January, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2003(5)BOMCR335, (2003)IIILLJ913BOM, 2003(2)MHLJ769
Author: V.C. Daga
Bench: V.C. Daga, V.M. Kanade
JUDGMENT V.C. Daga, J.
1. Rule, made returnable forthwith by consent of parties. Perused appeal. Heard rival contentions.
2. This Letters Patent Appeal is at the instance of Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation against the order dated 30th April 2002 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 672 of 2002 to the extent it directs reinstatement of the original petitioner/respondent herein; in service within a period of three weeks from the date of order.
3. The facts giving rise to this appeal in nut-shell are as under.
The respondent herein had filed Complaint (ULPA) No. 593 of 1994 under Section 28 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 ("the Act" for short) challenging the order of dismissal with effect from 23-6-1994. The said complaint, after the trial, was partly allowed by the 2nd Labour Court, Nagpur vide its judgment and order dated 17-6-1996 and directed reinstatement of the complainant/respondent on his former post with continuity in service, but without payment of backwages.
4. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, MSRTC, the appellant herein preferred a revision being Revision (ULPN) No. 273 of 1996 before the Industrial Court at Nagpur. At the same time, respondent/complainant also filed revision being Revision (ULPN) No. 332 of 1996 challenging the part of the order by which he was deprived of the payment of backwages. The Industrial Court was pleased to allow Revision (ULPN) No. 273 of 1996 filed by the appellant/MSRTC and dismissed the Revision (ULPN) No. 332 of 1996 filed by the present respondent/original complainant.
5. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Industrial Court, Nagpur, the workman/respondent herein preferred petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. It is not in dispute that initially when the writ petition was heard for admission, the learned Single Judge had directed the parties to maintain status-quo vide order dated 11-2-2002. The petitioner/respondent herein obtained Hamdast and served the appellant on the same day i.e. on 11-2-2002 at about 5.15 p.m.
6. It appears that the order of dismissal came to be passed prior to the order of status-quo and came to be served on the petitioner before the service of the order of status-quo on the appellant/MSRTC The order of termination dated 9-2-2002 came to be served on the respondent on 11-2-2002 at 2.45 p.m. whereas the order of status-quo was served on the appellant Corporation at about 5.30 p.m. on 11-2-2002. It is thus clear that the order of termination had operated little before the service of interim order of status-quo.
7. The writ petition again came up for motion hearing before the learned Single Judge on 30-4-2002 who was pleased to grant rule with direction to reinstate the petitioner/original complainant/respondent herein. The said order dated 30-4-2002 reads as under :--
"Rule. The petitioner to be reinstated in service within a period of three weeks. The reinstatement of the petitioner will be subject to hearing and final disposal of this writ petition ........"
The above order is a subject-matter of challenge in this appeal.
8. It appears from the record of the petition that a wrong statement came to be made in the synopsis of the petition that the Labour Court had reinstated the petitioner by way of interim relief and since then the petitioner was in the employment of the MSRTC and that he is in continuous employment on and from 10-2-1998. This wrong statement appears to have created an impression that the petitioner/respondent herein was in service during the pendency of the complaint and this aspect of the matter appears to have weighed with the learned Single Judge in granting interim relief of reinstatement.
9. Apart from the above, having seen the findings of the Courts below, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not think that the direction to reinstate the respondent by interim order was proper. If at all the original petitioner succeeds in the petition, he would be entitled to get reinstatement with other reliefs as may be available in law. In this behalf it would be useful to extract the observations made by Justice M.B. Shah (as he then was) in the case of M.D. Parmar v. State of Gujarat reported in 7997 (6) SLR 129 which reads as under:--
"The question at this stage is whether an employee, who is dismissed from service on the ground of corruption, serious misconduct or lack of honesty and integrity, should be foisted on the department without setting aside the dismissal order. There is no such law that as soon as the matter is admitted, interim relief should be granted in such manner that without deciding that impugned order is illegal and void, the Court should permit the petitioner to continue in service by granting interim relief and permit him to commit some further misdeeds. Presuming that even if he does not commit further misdeeds, the order imposing penalty cannot be set aside even temporarily till the petition is decided. In the rarest of rare cases the Court may exercise such jurisdiction. Further, if the petition is finally allowed, then the order of reinstatement with full back wages can be passed and the petitioner would not suffer any loss. As against this, if the order passed by the departmental authority holding the petitioner guilty of charges of corruption or other serious misconduct, is stayed without deciding it, it may result in serious prejudice to the society at large and the administration may suffer irreparable loss which cannot be imagined and remedied subsequently by the Court."
10. Following the above view, we quash and set aside the impugned order dated 30th April 2002 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 672 of 2002 to the extent it grants interim direction directing reinstatement of the respondent/workman during the pendency of the writ petition.
11. In the result, appeal is allowed to that extent with no order as to costs. We hope that the learned Single Judge will hear the writ petition as expeditiously as possible if joint request is made by the parties to the petition.