Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Dr Sushree Swarupa Tripathy vs Union Of India on 27 February, 2026
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench,
New Delhi
O.A. No.2035 of 2025
Orders reserved on : 12.02.2026
Orders pronounced on : 27.02.2026
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ranjit More, Chairman
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A)
Dr. Sushree Swarupa Tripathy,
Sr. Principal Scientist
W/o Late Dr. Sunil Dutta Sharma
R/o Flat No. TRSA-76 NPL Colony,
New Rajender Nagar, New Delhi: - 110060
...Applicant
(By Advocate: Ms. Aanchal Anand)
VERSUS
1. Union of India, Through Secretary,
Ministry of Science & Technology,Anusandhan Bhawan, Rafi Marg,
E-mail- [email protected] [email protected]
2. Council of Science and Industrial Research (CSIR)
Through Director General
Ministry of Science & Technology,Anusandhan Bhawan, 2 Rafi Marg,
E-mail- [email protected]
3. National Physical Laboratory
Through its Director, Prof. Venugopal Achanta
Dr. K.S. Krishnan Marg, New Delhi- 110012
Email: director@nplindia. Org
4. Controller of Administration
National Physical Laboratory
Dr. K. S. Krishnan Marg, New Delhi- 110012
Email: coa@nplindia. Org
5. Head of BND Division, Dr S. P. Singh
National Physical Laboratory
Dr. K.S. Krishnan Marg, New Delhi- 110012
Email: [email protected], [email protected]
6. Mr. Arvind Gautam
Principal Scientist
National Physical Laboratory
Dr. K.S. Krishnan Marg, New Delhi- 110012.
Email: arvind.gautam(cvnplindia.org
...Respondents
(By Advocate: Shri Bhuvnesh Satija with Shri Aniket Khanduri and Ms. Priya
Shukla for Shri Thakur Vinrender Pratap Singh Charak)
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Item No.35/C-1 2 OA No.2035/2025
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A):
By filing the instant OA under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant is seeking the following reliefs:-
"A) To call for records and quash impugned office memorandum No. 6/Misc. Committee/2020-E.II, dt.30.04.2025 as well as circular no.4-38/2002-EII(PD) dated 07.03.2013, with all consequential benefits; and/ or B) pass any order or orders, which this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem just & equitable m the facts & circumstances of the case.
2. Pursuant to notice respondents have filed their reply. The applicant has also filed rejoinder. During the course of hearing, both the parties have also filed their written submissions. SUBMISSIONS OF APPLICANT'S COUNSEL
3. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that applicant is a Senior Principal Scientist with National Physical Laboratory (NPL), Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) since 2007. She was made Head of the Chemical and Food Section (Division 5.03) on 29.10.2020 (Annexure A-4 of OA) and had been holding the charge since 1.11.2020. She is highly qualified and meritorious and was given accelerated merit-based promotion on 10.4.2024 w.e.f. 24.01.2022. Applicant's APARs are all outstanding and excellent. (Annexure A-5 of OA).
3.1 Learned counsel also submitted that vide impugned order dated 30.04.2025, applicant has been reverted and reduced to just being a member of the sub-division that she headed since 2020 and placed under the direct supervision of a junior, who is in lower pay scale, educationally less qualified, less experienced and has negligible 2026.03.03 RAVI KANOJIA16:01:27 +05'30' Item No.35/C-1 3 OA No.2035/2025 domain experience. To substantiate, the same, the applicant annexed comparative qualifications and seniority chart of applicant and Respondent No.6- as Annexure Rejoinder-1. 3.2 Learned counsel further submitted that the respondents' actions are arbitrary, punitive and vindictive, as she has been made answerable for her day-to-day activities to a junior, who assigns her work and ironically, also now monitors her competence and work even though he is less qualified and lacks domain expertise. 3.3 Learned counsel argued that junior cannot supervise a senior and assess the competence of senior, as the Head of the sub-division not only has administrative role but also a technical role. As per clause 5.5 of Quality Manual System (QMS) of NPL, the duty of the sub-divisional head is to "supervise the scientific and technical operations in the sub-division." He supervises the day-to-day calibrations/testing/BND activities and other scientific work related to respective sub-division. If the sub-divisional head has to supervise the work of the sub-division, his efficiency is not dependant on his administrative and managerial skills but his domain knowledge in that particular stream. The division of work, among the sub- divisions and its members, is also based on domain expertise and specialisation because of the technical nature of work. This pre- condition is true for all the members of the group, including the head of the sub-division. In this regard, reliance is placed on QMS- Annexure-Rej-2, page 15 onwards in Rejoinder. 3.4 Learned counsel also submitted that as per Quality Manual System clause 6.2.5, Head of the sub-division, is responsible for, 2026.03.03 RAVI KANOJIA16:01:27 +05'30' Item No.35/C-1 4 OA No.2035/2025 "training, supervision, authorization, monitoring competence of personnel on the basis of day-to-day work." It is undisputed in the present case that the Respondent No.6 is not only junior but even less meritorious and less experienced than the applicant. QMS clause 6.2.3 also clearly states that the head of the sub-division has to ensure that personnel engaged in calibration/testing/BND activities are 'competent'. Thus, it is inherent that the sub divisional head has to be competent himself and of higher merit and seniority to enable him to judge the competence of others in the sub division. Merit is an important consideration for each and every member of the sub-division, then it cannot be bypassed as a consideration for appointment of sub-divisional head.
3.5 Learned counsel for the applicant also submitted that Head of the sub-division has higher duties and responsibilities, which in service jurisprudence is the real and important test for a 'higher post'. The role of the sub-divisional head is substantially different from the member of the sub-division. His functions entail duties of supervision, monitoring competence, authorization, allocation of work to the members of the sub-division. Thus, there is a presumption that he has to be more qualified and senior than the members of the group. The respondents have failed to justify how a junior can have higher supervisory role not only in terms of administrative functions, but day-to-day technical and scientific operations of the group without any domain expertise. 3.6 Learned counsel further submitted that Clause 6.2.1 read with 6.2.5 of the QMS stipulates that for determining competence and 2026.03.03 RAVI KANOJIA16:01:27 +05'30' Item No.35/C-1 5 OA No.2035/2025 selection of the personnel involved in sub-division for calibration/testing/BNDs activities the CSIR Recruitment rules have to be followed. RRs thus read with the QMS, clearly mean that the hierarchy and structure in the sub-divisions will also have to be in consonance with the RRs for division of work and responsibilities amongst its members. In the nutshell, Division of the responsibilities/duties within a sub-division has to be necessarily aligned with the QMS and RRs.
3.7 Learned counsel argued that it is settled law that any executive instruction cannot override statutory rules. RRs being juristically superior, their scope cannot be narrowed down by executive instructions in the nature of circulars/OMs. The recruitment rules prescribe hierarchy of posts and the division of work necessarily has to follow seniority principle. Any circular contrary to the recruitment rules or whittling down the scope of the Recruitment Rules through backdoor cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. Contrary and arbitrary actions of the respondents are a clear lapse on their part and they cannot take the advantage of their own wrong. 3.8 Learned counsel also submitted that the head of the sub- division is the only authorised person, who puts his final signature on the Testing report,which is issued to the customer.Learned counsel also submitted that financial contribution and generation of revenues by activities/experiments is an important criteria, for performance mapping of the scientists. Head of the sub-division takes the credit of all the Extra Cash Flows generated by the activities/projects by the whole group whereas the members are only 2026.03.03 RAVI KANOJIA16:01:27 +05'30' Item No.35/C-1 6 OA No.2035/2025 credited with their individual contributions. It is extremely relevant to note that in present case, because of the domain expertise the applicant is the one who is practically carrying all the work on her shoulders but whether it's the testing report or the credit for extra financial flows are all being taken by the Respondent No.6, who cannot independently even conduct specific activities entrusted with the sub-division because of lack of domain expertise. 3.9 Learned counsel also argued that the reversion of the applicant from head of the sub-division to a mere member of the group is not only arbitrary, unfair and vindictive but a complete violation of Principles of Natural Justice. No show cause was ever given to the applicant before taking the arbitrary action of reversion against her. As such bias is writ large on the actions of the respondents. Furthermore, the respondents have failed to demonstrate any administrative exigency - much less a genuine one that would warrant such an arbitrary action of reversion. There has to be fairness in actions of the respondents, especially, if it is an undisputed fact that she is better on merit, seniority, domain expertise. The fairness of the decision should be demonstratable in action and must satisfy the test of transparency, reasonableness and non-arbitrariness.
SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT NOs.2 to 6
4. Learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.2 to 6 submitted that the applicant is currently serving as a Senior Principal Scientist at the CSIR-National Physical Laboratory (NPL).The present dispute arises from the Office Memorandum (O.M.) dated 30.04.2025, 2026.03.03 RAVI KANOJIA16:01:27 +05'30' Item No.35/C-1 7 OA No.2035/2025 which pertains to the administrative re-organization of the Bhartiya Nirdeshak Dravya (BND) Division. Under this re-organization, Respondent No.6 was assigned as the Head of Sub-Division, while the applicant continues to serve in her substantive rank of Senior Principal Scientist. The respondents maintain that this is a routine functional arrangement made in the interest of the laboratory's scientific objectives and in accordance with long-standing CSIR policies.
4.1 Learned counsel for the respondents raised preliminary objections:-
(i) the present Original Application is fundamentally not maintainable, as it seeks to challenge Circular No. 4-38/2002-E-
II(PD) dated 07.03.2013 (Annexure A/2) after an inordinate and unexplained delay of over twelve years. Under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the Tribunal shall not admit an application, unless it is made within one year from the date on which the final order was made. The applicant was fully aware of the contents and implications of 2013 Circular since its issuance and throughout her tenure; however, she chose not to challenge it for over a decade, especially during the period she herself benefited from the headship. Furthermore, the challenge to the Office Memorandum dated 30.04.2025 is devoid of a cause of action, as it does not infringe upon any vested service conditions, pay, or seniority of the applicant. Consequently, the O.A. is hit by the doctrine of laches and the statutory bar of limitation, and in the 2026.03.03 RAVI KANOJIA16:01:27 +05'30' Item No.35/C-1 8 OA No.2035/2025 absence of any 'sufficient cause' shown for this decade-long delay, the instant OA is liable to be dismissed in limine.
(ii) Learned counsel also submitted that the present OA is premature and legally non-maintainable, as the applicant has bypassed the mandatory internal grievance redressal mechanism available at CSIR-NPL. As such In accordance with the provisions of Section 20 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, this Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application, unless it is satisfied that the applicant has exhausted all remedies available under the relevant service rules. The applicant has failed to submit any formal representation or appeal to the Local Grievance Committee or the Competent Authority prior to directly approaching this Tribunal. As the issues raised pertain to routine administrative restructuring and functional assignments, which fall within the exclusive domain of internal management the failure to utilize the primary forum for redressal constitutes a fundamental procedural flaw. Consequently, in the absence of a final order or the expiry of the statutory waiting period following a representation, the present O.A. is liable to be dismissed on the grounds of non-exhaustion of statutory remedies. The Applicant's contention that the Grievance Committee cannot hear 'policy matters' is misplaced; while the validity of the 2013 Circular is a policy matter, the specific administrative grievance concerning her functional assignment and allegations of malafide/harassment was certainly a matter for which the internal grievance mechanism was the primary and mandatory forum.
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Item No.35/C-1 9 OA No.2035/2025
(iii) Learned counsel submitted that the applicant seeks to challenge Circular No.4-38/2002-E-II(PD) dated 07.03.2013, which mandates the rotation of headship. In this regard, it is contended that:
a. This policy has governed the institute for over 12 years. The applicant herself enjoyed the position of "Head of Sub- Division" from 2020 to 2025 by virtue of this very administrative framework. The transition to Respondent No. 6 is a lawful and routine application of the "Rotational Headship" policy.
b. Crucially, the applicant never challenged the validity of this Circular during the five years, she held the headship. c. It is only now, when the policy has been applied to rotate the responsibility to a Principal Scientist in the interest of the laboratory, that she has approached this Tribunal. A settled administrative practice cannot be suspended at the behest of an individual, who has already derived benefits from the same system for several years.
d. It is pertinent to note that the Office Memorandum dated 16.11.2023 (Annexure A/6), which reorganized the Divisional Headships, explicitly relied upon the CSIR Circular dated 07.03.2013. The applicant accepted the authority of the 2013 Circular when it was applied generally in 2023. She cannot now claim that the said Circular is hit by the doctrine of desuetude merely because it has now been applied to her specific Sub-Division.
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(iv) Learned counsel argued that the present OA is fundamentally misconceived, as it fails to demonstrate any infringement of a legally vested right or any 'civil consequence' arising from the impugned Office Memorandum. Thus, it is contended that :
i. Protection of Substantive Rank and Benefits: The applicant continues to hold the substantive rank of Senior Principal Scientist (Group IV-5) with her pay scale, seniority, and future promotional avenues remaining entirely undisturbed and protected. There has been no 'demotion' in either status or emoluments.
ii. Functional Assignment vs. Substantive Post: It is a well-settled principle of service jurisprudence that 'Headship' or the charge of a 'Sub-Division' is merely a functional assignment or an internal administrative arrangement; it is not a 'post' to which an employee can claim a perpetual or vested right. In scientific institutions like CSIR, such assignments are delegated by the Director to ensure the efficient functioning of specialized divisions and do not constitute a promotion or a change in cadre.
iii. Settled Position of Law: The law is clear that as long as an employee's rank, pay, and seniority are not adversely affected, the employer in the interest of administrative exigency retains the absolute prerogative to assign specific duties, portfolios, or 'desks' to its officers. The Hon'ble Supreme Court and various Benches of this Tribunal have consistently 2026.03.03 RAVI KANOJIA16:01:27 +05'30' Item No.35/C-1 11 OA No.2035/2025 held that an employee cannot insist on performing a specific functional role or holding a particular charge indefinitely. iv. Lack of Vested Right: Since the assignment of 'Head of Sub-Division' was never a product of a selection process for a promotional post, its withdrawal or rotation does not amount to a penalty or a reduction in rank. Consequently, the applicant has no locus standi to challenge a routine administrative reorganization that seeks to optimize the laboratory's scientific output without causing any financial or career-related prejudice to her.
v. Competence of R-6: The applicant's repeated attempts to question the technical competence of Respondent No.6 are irrelevant to the administrative charge. The role of 'Head of Sub-Division' is primarily one of administrative coordination of resources, manpower, and strategic direction, for which Respondent No.6, being a qualified chemical engineer with significant experience, is demonstrably competent. The assignment is based on administrative capability to lead the unit, not merely technical peer seniority in a specific domain. 4.2 Learned counsel for the respondents also argued that the appointment of a Principal Scientist, as the Head of Sub-Division 5.03 is a strictly lawful exercise of administrative power, executed in accordance with the CSIR Circular No. 4-38/2002-E-II(PD) dated 07.03.2013, which mandates the rotation of headship among eligible scientists to ensure equitable opportunity. Thus, the applicant's prayer for reinstatement based on her seniority is legally untenable 2026.03.03 RAVI KANOJIA16:01:27 +05'30' Item No.35/C-1 12 OA No.2035/2025 because the sub-division includes, Dr. Nahar Singh, who holds the rank of Chief Scientist. Since Dr. Nahar Singh is substantively senior to the applicant and is currently serving in the capacity of Deputy Head, the applicant cannot claim a preferential right to the Headship based on seniority. To grant the applicant's prayer would require the respondents to ignore the presence of a higher-ranking Chief Scientist within the same unit, thereby creating an organizational inconsistency that contradicts the very seniority-
based arguments the applicant herself relies upon. 4.3 Learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that the re- organization of the BND Division was a comprehensive administrative exercise conducted across all units and was not directed specifically or exclusively at the applicant. A perusal of Annexure A-1, i.e., Office Memorandum dated 30.04.2025 reveals that similar functional assignments were made in other sub- divisions. For instance, in Sub-Division #05.02, Dr. S.P. Singh, a 'Senior Principal Scientist', has been placed as Deputy Head under Dr. Vidyanand Singh, a 'Principal Scientist'. This demonstrates a uniform administrative policy where functional leadership is decoupled from substantive rank. Furthermore, in the applicant's own Sub-Division (#05.03), Dr. Nahar Singh, a 'Chief Scientist' (senior to the Applicant) is also placed under the Headship of Respondent No.6. If the strict hierarchy argued by the applicant were applied, Dr. Nahar Singh would be the rightful Head, not the applicant. This conclusively proves that Headship is a rotational administrative assignment, not a hierarchy-based right. This 2026.03.03 RAVI KANOJIA16:01:27 +05'30' Item No.35/C-1 13 OA No.2035/2025 demonstrates that the Respondents have consistently applied the CSIR Circular No.4-38/2002-E-II(PD) dated 07.03.2013 across the board, prioritizing rotational leadership and institutional requirements over individual seniority in functional charges. The fact that these changes were implemented uniformly across different groups further refutes any allegation of personal bias or mala fides, proving that the impugned order is a standard application of established CSIR policy for the greater interest of the laboratory's scientific mandate.
4.4 Lastly, learned counsel argued that the present OA being bereft of merit deserves to be dismissed by this Tribunal. REBUTTAL TO RESPONDENTS' CONTENTIONS
5. Learned counsel for the applicant argued that applicant was never given the benefit of circular dated 07.03.2013. It is submitted that in 2020, Dr. Nahar Singh was elevated to the position of Divisional Head subsequent to the superannuation of Chief Scientist Dr. R. P. Pant. Thus, the entire Sub-Division 5.0, which includes sub-divisions-5.01, 5.02, 5.03, 5.04 came to be headed by Dr. Nahar Singh. Applicant was made head of Sub-Div. 5.03 vide the same order dated 29.10.2020, which was under direct supervision of the Divisional head Dr. Nahar Singh. She continued to work under Dr. Nahar Singh only. Therefore, there was no violation of seniority principle. Most importantly, applicant was senior-most in her subdivision and no one with same domain experience or merit was available within the sub-division. Thus, the applicant never was the beneficiary of circular dated 07.03.2013 as is projected by the 2026.03.03 RAVI KANOJIA16:01:27 +05'30' Item No.35/C-1 14 OA No.2035/2025 respondents. This fact is clearly demonstratable from (Annexure - 4, page 30 of OA).
5.1 Learned counsel for the applicant also submitted that in Para 23 of their counter reply, the respondents have said that the selection of sub-division head is 'merit-based' and in para 24, respondents have averred that it is 'routine administrative restructuring.' These averments are not only contradictory but amount to pulling wool on the court's eyes. If the selection of respondent No.6 was merit based then applicant was higher in merit and there is complete non-application of mind on the part of the respondents. If it was a routine administrative restructuring, then it was for the respondents to show the administrative exigency and justifiable reason to act against the QMS in the first place. It was also for the respondents to show why respondent No.6 from a different group, who does not even have relevant domain expertise in a highly technical field, was made the head of the sub-division and how respondent No.6 can have a supervisory role over the applicant in utter violation of seniority principle.
5.2 Learned counsel for the applicant also submitted that in para 19 of the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, they claimed that the 'functional headship is a matter of administrative discretion'- it is settled law that discretion cannot be exercised arbitrarily. The role of the sub-divisional head is not only administrative or managerial, it is a technical and supervisory role. Therefore, any discretion exercised cannot be arbitrary.
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Item No.35/C-1 15 OA No.2035/2025
5.3 Learned counsel also submitted that the email dated 2nd Sept 2024 filed by the respondents in their counter affidavit is an old communication which has been quoted out of context. The peer review takes years to be completed and is a work in progress and there were crucial installations, which were subsequently done in the interim period between the e-mail communication and the impugned reversion. To put the record straight, there was much progress made for Peer Review such as (i) Procurement of standards from NIST, US in March 2025; (ii) Procurement & installation of Fume Hood in March 2025, which will be used for witness test before Peer Reviewer; (iii) Procurement & installation of Balance in March 2025. All the reports have been signed by Dr S. P. Singh, Divisional Head himself. Further, as early as 18.6.2025, thousands of documents and equipment were handed over by the applicant to Respondent No.6 (Annexure Rej-6 of Rejoinder). This includes crucial documents required in the Peer review activity of "Procedures for Aqueous elemental solutions." Neither this peer review activity nor the handing over of the papers have been denied by the respondents. Respondents in their counter on one hand admit that "owing to internal reorganisation of the division only a revision of the relevant quality documentation was necessitated which was to be carried out in consultation with the manager." Essentially admitting that the Respondent No.6 is in custody of the documents since June 2025 along with the team and resources (because he allocates work and personnel). On the other hand, respondents contradict themselves by saying that "the responsibility 2026.03.03 RAVI KANOJIA16:01:27 +05'30' Item No.35/C-1 16 OA No.2035/2025 for initiation and coordinating the peer review process- including preparation of technical documentation and alignment with quality system requirements squarely rests with the her." When the charge, the team, equipment, resources and all the relevant documentation is in the custody and supervision of Respondent No.6, it is most egregious to make the contradictory averment that responsibility for peer review is with the applicant, which has been made impossible to carry out. It is reiterated, because of this mid- stream shift and the relevant permissions lapsing, years of hard work and all the efforts and money already invested into the peer review is going down the drain and the fault of the same lies at the doorstep of the respondents.
5.4 Learned counsel also argued that the impugned Circular dated 7.3.2013 cannot be dehors the rules or override Recruitment Rules. In this regard, it is contended that :
(i) The impugned circular is violative of seniority principle and cannot override RRs, thus, it is clearly unsustainable in law. It is trite, that a circular cannot be used by backdoor attempt to amend the RRs or dilute the effect of RRs;
(ii) The malafides of the respondents are apparent on the face of the record because they have rotated the headship of the sub-
division under the guise of impugned circular dated 7.3.2013. However, Respondent No. 6 bestowed with the headship wasn't even part of the same sub-division 5.03. Thus, the actions of the respondents itself is violation of impugned circular dated 7.3.2013 which only contemplates rotation of 2026.03.03 RAVI KANOJIA16:01:27 +05'30' Item No.35/C-1 17 OA No.2035/2025 sub-divisional headship among the members of the same group. The headship itself could not have been bestowed upon Respondent no. 6, who was paradropped into the sub- division 5.03 directly, as the head of the sub-division with nil experience in sub division 5.03, as he belonged to the Sub- division 5.01, i.e., in-house BND Group (Annexure A-9 Colly- Page 50 of the OA). The impugned circular dated 7.3.2013 perhaps while contemplating rotation of headship within the same group somewhere itself recognised that the activities of a particular group are highly technical and specialised that's why rotates headship within the sub- division;
(iii) To the best of knowledge of the applicant, the impugned circular dated 7.3.2013 issued by the CSIR Headquarters and circulated among all the labs has not been implemented in the Headquarters itself. It has not been implemented in many notable labs under CSIR and has been lying defunct. In fact, the respondents themselves admit in a roundabout way that there was a delay in invocation of the impugned circular; AND
(iv) It is also submitted that circular dated 7.3.2013 is completely arbitrary and non-reasoned fails to specify any objective it seeks to achieve by mere rotation of group members within a sub-division. It bears no rational nexus with any long or short-term objective that might be achieved by rotation of members within sub-division. Other than arming the 2026.03.03 RAVI KANOJIA16:01:27 +05'30' Item No.35/C-1 18 OA No.2035/2025 authority with wanton powers to take arbitrary actions against the likes of applicant and a tool of harassment or circumvent the statutory rules, it does not seem to serve any purpose.
5.5 Learned counsel further submitted that the applicant has rendered long, meritorious and diligent service and her credentials speak for themselves. Thus, it is her legitimate expectation that her seniority is not rendered meaningless and she should be able to enjoy the status and dignity of higher duties and responsibilities.It is settled law, that seniority is a valuable right gained through the length of service and has to commensurate with the duties and responsibilities of the post.Although the general and most accepted connotation of promotion in service law is moving up to higher post or office thereby implying the existence of a vertical hierarchy of posts in the service, yet there are certain non-vertical movements and non-post wise vertical movements, which are considered as promotions. A useful test for determining whether a particular movement is a promotional movement or not would be - does the movement lead to a career advancement whether by way of office or by way of emoluments? If the answer to both or either of the situations is in the affirmative then the movement must be considered as promotion.
5.6 So far as preliminary objections raised by the learned counsel for the respondents, i.e., limitation, it is submitted that the applicant has challenged the impugned Order dated 30.4.2025 by filing the present OA within a month of the impugned order being passed. The 2026.03.03 RAVI KANOJIA16:01:27 +05'30' Item No.35/C-1 19 OA No.2035/2025 impugned circular dated 7.3.2013 is in the nature of executive instruction/policy, which formed the basis of the impugned order of 30.4.2025. It is trite that the policy can be challenged anytime especially when a person is directly aggrieved. The applicant came to the court when directly aggrieved by both. There was no occasion prior to 30.4.2025 to challenge the impugned circular. This is a service dispute and not a PIL. Besides, the applicant has repeatedly averred in the OA itself that the impugned circular had been lying dormant since 07.03.2013. The applicant approached this Tribunal when direct prejudice was caused to her. Respondent's contention of delay is absurd, because it turns logic on its head. It is not possible that every time the department issues some circular, employee should not only foresee it but rush to court in apprehension that it may affect him prejudicially in future and not when the actual cause of action arises.
5.7 So far another preliminary objection about Grievance Redressal mechanism existing within NPL is concerned, learned counsel contended that the applicant has challenged the circular dated 07.03.2013 which forms the basis of the impugned order dated 30.04.2025 reverting the applicant. It is humbly submitted, that as per the OM dated 09.10.2023 pertaining to the Grievance Redressal mechanism (Annexure Rej-4, last line on page 39 of the rejoinder), the procedure itself clearly stipulates "where the grievance is of general applicability or of collective nature, it shall fall outside the scope of this procedure." Clearly, impugned circular dated 07.03.2013, which is in nature of an executive instruction of 2026.03.03 RAVI KANOJIA16:01:27 +05'30' Item No.35/C-1 20 OA No.2035/2025 'general applicability and collective nature' and could only be addressed in the court of law as it involves questions of law and interpretation of recruitment rules. Additionally, the committee that took the impugned decision dated 30.04.2025 of reversion of the applicant as well as the committee constituted to address the grievances of the employees are headed by the same persons thereby creating conflict of interest. The existing committees of NPL dealing with the grievance are not competent to redress the grievances arisen on account of the decision of the Director. 5.8 Learned counsel also submitted that the impugned order dated 30.4.2025 is challenged qua the applicant. In no other division/sub- divisions of the NPL are such anomalous situations created. Examples cited by the respondents are also untenable because many persons heading the Division/sub-division are holding multiple portfolios, which is not the case with the applicant. The respondents themselves during the course of hearing relied and handed over a chart, which gives a complete status of all the sub-divisions and divisions. The said Chart clearly depicting the status of Div.1- Div.6 is annexed as Annexure Rej-6, page 54 of the Rejoinder. It is prima facie clear that in all the other divisions either the Chief Scientist or Sr. Principal Scientist is heading the sub-divisions. In none of the sub-divisions, a Principal Scientist is the head of the sub- division except sub-division 5.03, now headed by Mr. Arvind Gautam (under challenge) and sub-division 1.02- Ms. Girija Moona, who is senior-most in her sub-division with over 15-year domain expertise.
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Item No.35/C-1 21 OA No.2035/2025
5.9 Learned counsel thus submitted that the respondents cannot be allowed to take the benefit of their own wrong. Learned counsel reiterated that recruitment rules and seniority principles cannot be circumvented and administrative discretion exercised arbitrarily to cause prejudice to the applicant. The applicant cannot be forced to work under the supervision of a junior in violation of merit as well as seniority.
5.10 In support of the claim of the applicant, reliance has been placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court's judgment in the case of Vice Chancellor, L.N. Mithila University vs. Dayanand Jha, reported in (1986) 3 SCC 7.
ANALYSIS:
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings available on record as well as the above mentioned judgment on which reliance placed by the learned counsel for the applicant.
7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and based on the pleadings, extracted above, the following issues arise for adjudication in this case:-
(i) Whether the Original Application is barred by limitation under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 insofar as it challenges Circular dated 07.03.2013?
(ii) Whether the applicant has exhausted the alternative remedy as enumerated under Section 20 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985?
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(iii) Whether withdrawal/rotation of functional headship amounts to a civil consequence or reduction in rank?
(iv) Whether executive circular dated 07.03.2013 can validly regulate rotational headship without violating Recruitment Rules?
(v) Whether alleged violation of seniority principle renders the administrative decision illegal?
(vi) Whether absence of show cause notice vitiates the impugned action?
9. With regard to issue (i) as mentioned in para 8 above, i.e., whether the Original Application is barred by limitation under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 insofar as it challenges Circular dated 07.03.2013, we observe that the applicant has also challenged Circular No.4-38/2002-E-II(PD) dated 07.03.2013 (Annexure A-2) after more than twelve years of its issuance. Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 mandates that an application shall not be admitted unless made within one year from the date on which the final order was made. 9.1 It is profitable to note that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in D.C.S. Negi v. Union of India, reported in (2018) 16 SCC 721, held that a tribunal has no jurisdiction to admit a belated application unless the applicant seeks condonation of delay and provides a satisfactory explanation to challenge a particular order/circular. It emphasized that statutory time limits are mandatory and not mere procedural formalities. Failure to comply renders the application 2026.03.03 RAVI KANOJIA16:01:27 +05'30' Item No.35/C-1 23 OA No.2035/2025 incompetent. The decision underscored that Tribunals, though quasi-judicial, cannot ignore express statutory bars. The relevant portion of which reads as under:-
"12. Before parting with the case, we consider it necessary to note that for quite some time, the Administrative Tribunals established under the Act have been entertaining and deciding the applications filed under Section 19 of the Act in complete disregard of the mandate of Section 21, which reads as under:
"21. Limitation.--(1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application--
(a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made;
(b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where--
(a) the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates; and
(b) no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court, the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in clause (a), or, as the case may be, clause (b) of sub-section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-
section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period."
13. A reading of the plain language of the above reproduced section makes it clear that the Tribunal cannot admit an application unless the same is made within the time specified in clauses (a) and
(b) of Section 21(1) or Section 21(2) or an order is passed in terms of sub-section (3) for entertaining the application after the prescribed period. Since Section 21(1) is couched in negative form, it is the duty of the Tribunal to first consider whether the application is within limitation. An application can be admitted only if the same is found to have been made within the prescribed period or sufficient cause is 2026.03.03 RAVI KANOJIA16:01:27 +05'30' Item No.35/C-1 24 OA No.2035/2025 shown for not doing so within the prescribed period and an order is passed under Section 21(3).
14. In the present case, the Tribunal entertained and decided the application without even adverting to the issue of limitation. The learned counsel for the petitioner tried to explain this omission by pointing out that in the reply filed on behalf of the respondents, no such objection was raised but we have not felt impressed. In our view, the Tribunal cannot abdicate its duty to act in accordance with the statute under which it is established and the fact that an objection of limitation is not raised by the respondent/non- applicant is not at all relevant."
9.2 Similarly, in Union of India v. M.K. Sarkar, reported in 2010 (2) SCC 59, , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that stale claims cannot be revived merely because representations are made or because the applicant becomes subsequently aggrieved by its implementation. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under:-
"14. The order of the Tribunal allowing the first application of respondent without examining the merits, and directing the appellants to consider his representation has given rise to unnecessary litigation and avoidable complications. The ill-effects of such directions have been considered by this Court in C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining [(2008) 10 SCC 115 :
(2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 961] : (SCC pp. 122-23, para 9) "9. The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly, they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any 'decision' on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realise the consequences of such a direction to 'consider'. If the representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to 'consider'. If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored."
9.3 As such the challenge to the Circular dated 07.03.2013 (Annexure A-2) has been governed the institution/respondents' 2026.03.03 RAVI KANOJIA16:01:27 +05'30' Item No.35/C-1 25 OA No.2035/2025 organisation for over a decade. It cannot be disputed that headship from 2020-2025 under the same administrative framework held by the applicant in terms of the provisions contained in the said Circular dated 07.03.2013 and never questioned the Circular during that period. Therefore, the challenge to the said Circular dated 07.03.2013 that too when the applicant herself has availed of the benefit of Headship of sub-Division is clearly barred by limitation and hit by the doctrine of laches.
10. So far as issue (ii) as mentioned in para 8 above, i.e., whether the applicant has exhausted the alternative remedy as enumerated under Section 20 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, is concerned, Section 20 of the Act ibid requires exhaustion of available departmental remedies before approaching the Tribunal. 10.1 In S.S. Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (1989) 4 SCC 582, the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasized that cause of action arises only after departmental remedies are exhausted. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under:-
"15. In several States the Conduct Rules for government servants require the administrative remedies to be exhausted before the disciplinary orders can be challenged in court. Section 20(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 provides:
"20. (1) A Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application unless it is satisfied that the applicant had availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances."
.....
18. We are satisfied that to meet the situation as has arisen here, it would be appropriate to hold that the cause of action first arises when the remedies available to the public servant under the relevant Service Rules as to redressal are disposed of.
19. The question for consideration is whether it should be disposal of one appeal or the entire hierarchy of reliefs as may have been 2026.03.03 RAVI KANOJIA16:01:27 +05'30' Item No.35/C-1 26 OA No.2035/2025 provided. Statutory guidance is available from the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 20 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. There, it has been laid down:
"20.(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), a person shall be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances,--
(a) if a final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order under such rules, rejecting any appeal preferred or representation made by such person in connection with the grievance; or
(b) where no final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order with regard to the appeal preferred or representation made by such person, if a period of six months from the date on which such appeal was preferred or representation was made has expired.
(3) For the purposes of sub-sections (1) and (2), any remedy available to an applicant by way of submission of a memorial to the President or the Governor of a State or to any other functionary shall not be deemed to be one of the remedies which are available unless the applicant had elected to submit such memorial."
20. We are of the view that the cause of action shall be taken to arise not from the date of the original adverse order but on the date when the order of the higher authority where a statutory remedy is provided entertaining the appeal or representation is made and where no such order is made, though the remedy has been availed of, a six months' period from the date of preferring of the appeal or making of the representation shall be taken to be the date when cause of action shall be taken to have first arisen. We, however, make it clear that this principle may not be applicable when the remedy availed of has not been provided by law. Repeated unsuccessful representations not provided by law are not governed by this principle.
21. It is appropriate to notice the provision regarding limitation under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. Sub-section (1) has prescribed a period of one year for making of the application and power of condonation of delay of a total period of six months has been vested under sub-section (3). The civil court's jurisdiction has been taken away by the Act and, therefore, as far as government servants are concerned, Article 58 may not be invocable in view of the special limitation. Yet, suits outside the purview of the Administrative Tribunals Act shall continue to be governed by Article 58.
22. It is proper that the position in such cases should be uniform. Therefore, in every such case only when the appeal or representation provided by law is disposed of, cause of action shall first accrue and where such order is not made, on the expiry of six months from the date when the appeal was filed or representation was made, the right to sue shall first accrue. Submission of just a memorial or representation to the head of the establishment shall not be taken into consideration in the matter of fixing limitation."
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10.2 The respondents in the instant case have specifically pleaded existence of a grievance redressal mechanism within NPL. The applicant approached this Tribunal without filing a formal representation before the concerned authority. Thus, where a statutory alternative remedy exists, judicial intervention is ordinarily declined unless exceptional circumstances are shown. However, no such exceptional ground has been demonstrated. Hence, the OA suffers from premature invocation of jurisdiction. 10.3 At this stage, we deem it appropriate to refer the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court also in the case of Union of India v. T.R. Varma, reported in 1957 AIR SUPREME COURT 882, wherein it has been held that when statutory remedies exist, parties must ordinarily exhaust them, the relevant portion of which reads as under:-
"6. At the very outset, we have to observe that a writ petition under Article 226 is not the appropriate proceeding for adjudication of disputes like the present. Under the law, a person whose services have been wrongfully terminated, is entitled to institute an action to vindicate his rights, and in such an action, the Court will be competent to award all the reliefs to which he may be entitled, including some which would not be admissible in a writ petition. It is well-settled that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. It is true that the existence of another remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to issue a writ; but, as observed by this Court in Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana1 "the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs". Vide also K.S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission2. And where such remedy exists, it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition under Article 226, unless there are good grounds therefor. None such appears in the present case. On the other hand, the point for determination in this petition whether the respondent was denied a reasonable opportunity to present his case, turns mainly on the question whether he was prevented from cross-examining the witnesses, who gave evidence in support of the charge. That is a question on which there is a serious dispute, which cannot be satisfactorily decided without taking evidence. It is not the practice 2026.03.03 RAVI KANOJIA16:01:27 +05'30' Item No.35/C-1 28 OA No.2035/2025 of courts to decide questions of that character in a writ petition, and it would have been a proper exercise of discretion in the present case if the learned Judges had referred the respondent to a suit. In this appeal, we should have ourselves adopted that course, and passed the order which the learned Judges should have passed. But we feel pressed by the fact that the order dismissing the respondent having been made on September 16, 1954, an action to set it aside would now be time-barred. As the High Court has gone into the matter on the merits, we propose to dispose of this appeal on a consideration of the merits."
(emphasis supplied)
11. So far as issue (iii) as mentioned in para 8 above, i.e., whether withdrawal/rotation of functional headship amounts to a civil consequence or reduction in rank, is concerned, we find that it is undisputed that applicant continues as Senior Principal Scientist, pay scale remains unchanged, seniority remains intact, and promotional avenues are unaffected. The law is well settled that transfer of charge, withdrawal of additional duties, or reshuffling of work does not amount to reduction in rank. Since, in the instant case, it is admitted position that the post of "Head of Sub-Division"
is not a promotional cadre post but a functional assignment, no statutory rule confers vested right over such headship. Therefore, no civil consequence is demonstrated.
12. So far as issue (iv) as mentioned in para 8 above, i.e., whether executive circular dated 07.03.2013 can validly regulate rotational headship without violating Recruitment Rules, is concerned, we observe that the Recruitment Rules govern cadre hierarchy and promotions. The impugned Circulars relates to rotational functional headship, not promotion. The impugned Circulars, on the other hand, pertain only to rotational functional headship and does not confer any promotional benefit or alter the existing cadre position of an incumbent. In that view of the matter, we deem it appropriate to 2026.03.03 RAVI KANOJIA16:01:27 +05'30' Item No.35/C-1 29 OA No.2035/2025 reproduce the relevant portion of the said circular dated 7.3.2013 for proper appreciation and adjudication of the issue involved, which reads as follows:-
"Sub: Guidelines for effective leadership in CSIR-reg. Sir.
In supersession of CSIR circular letters No. 4-37(1)/2001-E-Il dated 12.12.2001 and No. 4-10(14)/2003-E-II dated 24.12.2003, DG, CSIR has approved the following guidelines for adoption in CSIRLabs/Instts./Centres:
......
3. The position of Head of Division/Head of Group should be rotated amongst Chief Scientist, Sr.Principal Scientist and Principal Scientist in PB-4 atleast once in two/three years. If such Scientists are not available in any particular Division or Group, then the position of Head of Division/Head of Group should be given to a Sr. Scientist of that Division or Group...."
12.1 From a plain reading of the above, it is evident that the said guidelines were issued by the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), in supersession of earlier circulars dated 12.12.2001 and 24.12.2003, lays down a mandatory administrative guidelines regarding rotation of the post of Head of Division/Head of Group. The above quoted clause 3 provides that the position of Head of Division/Head of Group "should be rotated" amongst Chief Scientist, Sr. Principal Scientist and Principal Scientist in PB-4 at least once in two/three years. Further, in absence of such officers, it may be given to a Senior Scientist of that Division/Group. The purpose of this policy appears to be to ensure rotation of administrative responsibility, to prevent concentration of power in one individual, to provide equal opportunity in leadership exposure, and to maintain fairness and transparency in internal administration. Thus, the said circular is an administrative instructions issued by the competent authority, i.e. CSIR. The expression "should be rotated" when read with "approved 2026.03.03 RAVI KANOJIA16:01:27 +05'30' Item No.35/C-1 30 OA No.2035/2025 guidelines for adoption" indicates that it is not merely advisory but intended to be followed uniformly by all CSIR Labs/Institutes/Centres. Once adopted, such executive instructions are binding unless shown to be arbitrary or contrary to statutory rules. Courts/Tribunals generally hold that administrative guidelines cannot be ignored arbitrarily, especially where they create legitimate expectation among eligible officers. 12.2 In the case of K. Nagaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in 1985 AIR Supreme Court 551, the Hon'ble Supreme Court ruled that policy decisions can be interfered with only if arbitrary or unconstitutional. Keeping in view the factual matrix of the case, we observe in this case that there is no material to show that the said Circular alters pay, rank, cadre structure, or promotional hierarchy. Rather, it merely regulates internal administrative functioning. Thus, it supplements, not overrides, the Recruitment Rules.
13. So far as issue (v) as mentioned in para 8 above, i.e., whether alleged violation of seniority principle renders the administrative decision illegal, is concerned, we observe that seniority governs promotion unless otherwise provided. However, headship here is not a promotional post. The Hon'ble Supreme Court's Constitutional Bench decision in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (1974) 4 SCC 3, clarified that administrative discretion is permissible so long as it is not arbitrary or mala fide. The relevant portion of which reads as under:-
2026.03.03 RAVI KANOJIA16:01:27 +05'30' Item No.35/C-1 31 OA No.2035/2025 "85. ..... Article 16 embodies the fundamental guarantee that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Though enacted as a distinct and independent fundamental right because of its great importance as a principle ensuring equality of opportunity in public employment which is so vital to the building up of the new classless egalitarian society envisaged in the Constitution, Article 16 is only an instance of the application of the concept of equality enshrined in Article 14. In other words, Article 14 is the genus while Article 16 is a species. Article 16 gives effect to the doctrine of equality in all matters relating to public employment. The basic principle which, therefore, informs both Articles 14 and 16 is equality and inhibition against discrimination. Now, what is the content and reach of this great equalising principle? It is a founding faith, to use the words of Bose. J., "a way of life", and it must not be subjected to a narrow pedantic or lexicographic approach. We cannot countenance any attempt to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude.
Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be "cribbed, cabined and confined" within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14, and if it effects any matter relating to public employment, it is also violative of Article 16. Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. They require that State action must be based on valid relevant principles applicable alike to all similarly situate and it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations because that would be denial of equality. Where the operative reason for State action, as distinguished from motive inducing from the antechamber of the mind, is not legitimate and relevant but is extraneous and outside the area of permissible considerations, it would amount to mala fide exercise of power and that is hit by Articles 14 and 16. Mala fide exercise of power and arbitrariness are different lethal radiations emanating from the same vice: in fact the latter comprehends the former. Both are inhibited by Articles 14 and
16."
13.1 Keeping in view above guiding observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we observe that the respondents have demonstrated that Rotation is institutional policy. Other Sub-Divisions were also restructured. As per the rotational policy, even a Chief Scientist was placed under another functional head. This negates selective targeting. As such, we hold that this Tribunal do not sit as appellate authorities over administrative wisdom unless decision is perverse or illegal. However, no material establishes mala fide except bald 2026.03.03 RAVI KANOJIA16:01:27 +05'30' Item No.35/C-1 32 OA No.2035/2025 allegations. Thus, we conclude this issue that seniority governs promotion, not internal allocation of duties.
14. So far as issue (vi) as mentioned in para 8 above, i.e., whether absence of show cause notice vitiates the impugned action, is concerned, we observe that principles of natural justice apply where civil consequences occur, or penal action is taken. Since no demotion occurred, no adverse entry recorded, no pay reduction imposed, natural justice in the form of prior hearing is not mandatory. 14.1 In Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, reported in (1985) 3 SCC 398, the Hon'ble Supreme Court clarified that natural justice requirements depend on context and statutory framework. Rotation of functional duty does not require pre-decisional hearing.
15. From the above analysis, we conclude that challenge to 2013 (7.3.2013) Circular in the year 2025 is barred by limitation. Further, the instant OA is premature for non-exhaustion of statutory remedy. It is admitted position that no civil consequence or reduction in rank established. The said circular does not override Recruitment Rules. Through the said circulars, the Administrative discretion exercised uniformly.
16. So far as reliance placed by the applicant on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vice Chancellor, L.N. Mithila University vs. Dayanand Jha (supra) is concerned, we have carefully perused the same. However, we find that the said decision is not relevant to the factual matrix of the present case and thus distinguishable.
17. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, and for the reasons elaborately recorded hereinabove, we are of the considered 2026.03.03 RAVI KANOJIA16:01:27 +05'30' Item No.35/C-1 33 OA No.2035/2025 opinion that the present Original Application is liable to be dismissed, being barred by limitation; and the applicant has failed to exhaust the statutory remedy available under the relevant rules; and, in any event, the instant OA is premature. Even otherwise, the Original Application is devoid of merit. Accordingly, the Original Application stands dismissed.
18. There shall be no order as to costs.
19. Pending MA(s), if any, shall stand disposed of accordingly.
(Rajinder Kashyap) (Justice Ranjit More)
Member (A) Chairman
/ravi/
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