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[Cites 13, Cited by 0]

Tripura High Court

Smt. Prama Chakraborty vs Union Of India on 28 May, 2019

Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2019 TRI 154, 2019 LAB IC 4683

Bench: Chief Justice, Arindam Lodh

                                                    Page 1 of 11




                HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
                      AGARTALA

               W.P(C)(CAT) NO.01 OF 2018

Smt. Prama Chakraborty,
Wife of Shri Uttam Chakraborty,
Residential Complex of AG‟s Staff
Qr. No.8 (Type-IV), 79 Tilla,
Kunjaban, Agartala,-799006.

                                              ----Petitioner

                            Versus
1. Union of India,
Represented by the Secretary
to the Government of India,
Ministry of Communication & I.T.
Dak Bhavan, Samsad Marg,
New Delhi-110001.

2. The Director General,
Department of Posts,
Government of India,
Dak Bhavan, Samsad Marg,
New Delhi-110001.

3. The Chief Postmaster General,
Department of Posts,
Government of India,
N.E. Circle,
Shillong-793001.

4. The Director Postal Services,
Government of India,
Agartala-799001.
                                          ----Respondents.

For the petitioner : Sri Praloy Saran Chakraborty, For the Respondent(s) : Mr. H. Deb, Asstt. S.G. Date of hearing : 30.04.2019.

Date of delivery of
Judgment & Order             : 28.05.2019

Whether fit for reporting    : YES.



Page 1 of 11
                                                                      Page 2 of 11




              HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARINDAM LODH

                  JUDGMENT & ORDER

Arindam Lodh.J

By means of filing the present writ application the writ petitioner has challenged the legality, validity and constitutionality of the judgement and order dated 30.07.2018 passed in Original Application No.041/00182/2017, whereby and whereunder the Central Administrative Tribunal, Guwahati Bench, dismissed the prayer for promotion and transfer as they found no ground to entertain the matter and in their opinion, the case was absolutely barred by limitation.

2. The petitioner, Smt. Prama Chakraborty, is represented by her father, Sri Praloy Sharan Chakraborty. This court, at the very outset, had apprised Mr. Chakraborty that the court would provide him a learned counsel of his choice, if he so desired, but he preferred to argue the case in person. As such, on the prayer of the petitioner, this court has proceeded to dispose of the case at the stage of admission.

3. It is the case of the petitioner, a postal assistant, that on 14.03.2008 she was declared qualified in the all India Postal Department written examination for Departmental promotion to the post of inspector (for short, „IPO‟). She underwent the requisite departmental training and after completion of the said training the petitioner had submitted a representation on 22.07.2008 to the Department, the respondents herein, to give effect of the above promotion to the post of IPO with effect from 26.02.2008 i.e., the date of the Page 2 of 11 Page 3 of 11 result of the written examination for the said post. According to the petitioner, without effecting the formal promotion order of the petitioner, she was directed to work temporarily as the IPO at Santirbazar, a place of 84 km away from the place of work of the petitioner at Agartala, but she expressed her unwillingness by letter dated 22.07.2009. The petitioner had again prayed to the Department by her letter dated 28.07.2009 for effecting the appointment to the promotional post of IPO with effect from 01.07.2008, when she fulfilled the criteria to get appointment to the post. She has referred an office memorandum dated 30.09.2009 issued by the DOPT, Government of India, for posting the husband-and-wife at the same station. The petitioner had again submitted a representation to the respondents to post her at Agartala as the IPO, appreciating her certain genuine difficulties, and simultaneously considering that her husband, a central government officer, was permanently posted at Agatala in the office of the Accountant General, Government of India. But the respondents concerned on 18.01.2010 had posted her as the IPO at Shantirbazar, with further stipulation that the appointment to the post of IPO would become effective from the date of joining of the petitioner to that office. Being aggrieved by the said order dated 18.01.2010, the petitioner had submitted an appeal dated 31.03.2010 to the highest functionary of the Department for setting aside the above order of posting and for posting her to Agatala, and also for giving effect of her promotion to the post of IPO with effect from 01.07.2008 as stated above, and since then, the petitioner had been pursuing her claim, even to the Page 3 of 11 Page 4 of 11 President of India. At last, the petitioner had approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Guwahati Bench.

4. The Central administrative Tribunal, Guwahati disposed of the application of the petitioner with the following observations: -

"3. We have heard the applicant in person and perused the documents placed on record. Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 provides for limitation of filing an OA as under :-
"21. Limitation -
(i) A Tribunal shall not admit an application, -
(a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in caluse (a) of subsection (2) of section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made;
(b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months."

Further, sub-section 3 of Section 21 of the said Act, provides as under:-

(3) Notwithsatnding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfied the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period."

In the case of Bhoop Singh Vs. Union of India & Others, 1992 AIR 1414, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has observed as under:-

".....Inordinate and unexplained delay or laches is by itself a ground to refuse relief to the petitioner, irrespective of the merit of his claim. If a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable belief in the mind of others that he is not interest in claiming that relief."

4. We have noted that the applicant was sleeping over the matter for long years. The principle canonized in well common law maxim „vigilantibus, non dermientibus, jura sub-veniunt‟ meaning thereby that law assist those who are vigilant not those who are sleeping over their rights is applicable in this case.

5. We do not f ind any sufficient reason to entertain the matter as prayed by the applicant and in our opinion, the case is hopelessly barred by limitation. Accordingly, O.A. is dismissed. No order as to costs."

5. We have given our thoughtful considerations to the aforesaid order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Page 4 of 11 Page 5 of 11 Guwahati Bench. According to us, the order passed by the Central administrative Tribunal does not suffer from any infirmity.

6. We have noticed as is revealed from the communication dated 11.04.2012 to the petitioner, where the exact contents of Postal Directorate letter No.7-28/2011-SPB-II dated 10/01/2012 issued by ADG(SPN), are as under: -

"Sir, I am directed to refund to use letters number staff/8- 239/08 dated 29.06.2010, 15.07.2011 & 25.10.2011 on the subject mentioned above and to say that as per Sub Rule 9(c) of Rule 279/1 of P&T Vol.IV, candidates brought on the approved list, before being appointed, will be required to undergo a course of training. In the instant case, Smt. Prama Chakraborty has completed her induction training in two phases i.e. from 27.05.2008 to 30.6.2008 and 09.11.2009 to 23.01.2010. therefore, the competent authority has considered representation dated 31.03.2010 of Smt. Chakraborty for giving effect to her promotion to the post of Inspectors of Posts from 01.07.2008 and rejected the same. The official may be informed accordingly.
So far as request of Smt. Chakraborty for her promotion posting to Agartala Town is concerned, you are requested to post her in Agartala Town in any vacancy of Inspectors of Posts exists there."

7. From the said communication dated 10.01.2012, it is apparent that the said letter itself appears to be vague. While in para-1 it shows that the request for giving effect at promotion to the post of IPO with effect from 01.07.2008 was rejected, in para-2 it is mentioned that if there is any vacancy of IPO, then she might be posted there.

8. In our considered view, it was at that juncture itself the petitioner should have taken the recourse of law. However, we have perused the entire records attached to the petition filed before the Central Administrative Tribunal. It is found that the petitioner had been pursuing her case by submitting Page 5 of 11 Page 6 of 11 representations repeatedly, and we find one such response dated 01/03/2013 by the office of the Directorate of Postal Services wherein she was communicated the decision of the competent authority that if she did not join in her place of posting at Shantirbazar within 30 days it would be deemed that she was not interested in accepting the post of IPO. It is further revealed from one of the communications dated 23/04/2012 (Annexure-A/22 of the petition before CAT) wherein the claim of the petitioner to give her promotion with effect from 01.07.2008 was not conceded for the reason that she completed her training on 23/01/ 2010. Even after that, we have noticed, that the petitioner went on submitting the representations to various authorities including asking for various information through RTI. But, even after the rejection of her claims by the concerned respondents, the petitioner did not think it necessary to avail the course of law before the appropriate forum for the reasons best known to her.

9. It is no more res integra that, even where no limitation period is prescribed by the statute, courts apply doctrine of delay and laches/acquiescence and non-suit litigants who approach court belatedly without justifiable explanation. True it is, delay and laches are to be examined with reference to facts of each case. What is unmistakably evident in the case at hand is that the petitioner was passionately pursuing her claim to get appointed on promotion to the post of IPO with effect from 01.07.2007 which was rejected substantially by the respondents in the year 2012 itself, but, she had taken the recourse of submitting representations to various authorities Page 6 of 11 Page 7 of 11 even up to the President of India, which, according to us, does not call for any reasonable justification.

10. We may gainfully take note of a decision of the Apex Court rendered in Prabhakar vs Joint Director Sericulture Department and others, reported in (2015) 15 SCC 1, wherein their Lordships held as under:-

"38. It is now a well recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statue relating to certain proceedings, in such cases courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delays as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after a unreasonable delay. Doctrine of laches is in fact an application of maxim of equity "delay defeats equities".

11. In the case in hand, the conduct of the petitioner as evinced is that she was not at all vigilant to her constitutional and legal right as well as to take the recourse of law in time and by the lapse of time, the matter of promotion, perhaps, has already been settled. In the writ petition, we find no such averment that the said post of IPO is still lying vacant. More so, the petitioner was informed long back i.e. on 23.04.2013, pursuant to an instruction issued by the Circle Office, Shillong, to the effect that if she did not join to her place of posting at Shantirbazar as IPO, it would be deemed that she was not interested in accepting her promotion to the post of IPO. It has further come to light that the respondents wanted to fill up the post of IPO at Shantirbazar considering better interest of the Department as well as the public interest. That apart, we find that the claim of the petitioner was virtually rejected vide office letter dated 10.01.2012, and finally, vide letter dated Page 7 of 11 Page 8 of 11 23.04.2012 the competent authority had intimated her that any further representation on the subject would not be entertained (Annexure-A/20 of the petition before CAT). In our opinion, the petitioner instead of submitting further representations should have approached the Court for her appropriate redress. After the said communication, we are at a loss to understand what prevented the petitioner to approach the Court, if, she at all had any reasonable claim.

12. The extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India shall not be ordinarily exercised to assist the tardy and the Golden of the efficient and the 30 litigants. The court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. Representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. This was first stated in K. V. Raja Lakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore, reported in AIR 1967 SC 993 (Refer:

Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd and another v. K. Thangappan and another reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322)

13. In the case of Rabindranath Bose Vs. Union of India, 1970 (1) SCC 84 reiterating the same principles drawn in K. V. Raja Lakshmiah(Supra) has stated that there is a limit to the time which can be considered reasonable for making representation and if the Government had turn down one Page 8 of 11 Page 9 of 11 representation, the making of another representation on similar line will not explain the delay.

14. In State of Orrisa Vs. Pyarimohan Samantaray reported in (1977) 3 SCC 396 making of repeated representation was not considered as satisfactory explanation because the Apex Court had dismissed the petition on the ground of delay and laches.

15. Mr. Chakraborty, appearing for the daughter- petitioner has painstakingly argued that the CAT has dismissed the petition only on technical ground of limitation. In our considered view, it would not be proper to say that the doctrine of delay and laches is an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Taking a queue from the principles delineated above in this regard, we, without any hesitation may hold that filling of series of representation cannot extend the period of limitation to condone the delay. Delay or laches always is a relevant factor available for the Court of law to determine the question as to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves consideration. It is well known that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant (Ref. State of T.N. Vs. Seshachalam reported in (2007) 10 SCC 137).

16. In furtherance thereof, the reply of such representation cannot give rise to a fresh cause of action or revive a stale claim.

17. A seven-Judges Bench in S. S. Rathore vs State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (1989) 4 SCC 582 while dealing with the cause of action in a case of service related Page 9 of 11 Page 10 of 11 dispute in view of the special limitation prescribed under section 21(1)(3) of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 and Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963, inter alia, held that the repeated unsuccessful representation would not give rise to cause of action nor would condone the delay.

18. In the instant case, admittedly, the cause of action arose in the year 2010 since she completed her training on 23.01.2010, but she was claiming her promotion with effect from 01.07.2008. Thereafter, the petitioner started to submit representations, which were rejected in the first part of 2012, but, she continued to pursue her claim by way of filing repeated representations even to the concerned Minister, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and even to the President but not felt it necessary to file appropriate application before the appropriate forum. She is an educated lady and is well aware of rights conferred upon her under the Constitution. In our considered view, the plea of representations falling on deaf ears is not sufficient to explain the delay in approaching the court, particularly, when it was clearly communicated to her vide letter dated 23.04.2012 to the effect that "no further representation in this regard shall be entertained". It is in this backdrop and keeping in view the overall conduct of the petitioner as encapsulated above we cannot hold that she is entitled to any particular indulgence or concession to pursue her claim at such a belated stage.

19. In otherwise too, we are constrain to say that despite categorical rejection of the representation of the petitioner vide communication dated 23.04.2012 by her Page 10 of 11 Page 11 of 11 employer, she went on complaining her issue to the concerned Minster of the Government of India and even to the President of India, which, according to us is not expected from a Government employee. More so, before doing such acts, it is the solemn duty and obligation of the petitioner to keep in mind that she is an employee in such a Government Department, which is rendering „Public Utility Service'. According to us, the respondents tried their best to post the petitioner in the State of Tripura where her husband was working being transferred from another State.

20. Having due regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, this court in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India, declines to interfere with the order dated 30.07.2018 passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Guwahati Bench being bereft of merit.

21. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. However, there shall be no order to costs.

                  (ARINDAM LODH)J                               (SANJOY KAROL)CJ




suhanjit




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