Karnataka High Court
Sri. T. Nagaraju vs The State Of Karnataka on 31 May, 2017
Author: R.B Budihal
Bench: R.B Budihal
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
Dated this the 31st day of May 2017
Before
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BUDIHAL R.B.
Criminal Revision Petition No.935/2016 C/w
Criminal Revision Petition No.1040/2016 and
Criminal Revision Petition No.1233/2016
In Crl.R.P. No.935/2016
Between:
Sri. T.Nagaraju,
Aged about 66 years,
Assistant Engineer,
Karnataka State Construction
Corporation Limited,
Rajajinagar, Bengaluru,
R/a No.64/02, Gurumurthappa
Garden, Sarakki Main Road,
Banashankar, Bengaluru-560078. ...Petitioner
(By Sri Sudhakar M., Advocate)
And:
The State of Karnataka,
Rep. By Police Inspector,
Karnataka Lokayuktha Police,
City Wing, Bengaluru,
Rep. By Spl. PP. High Court,
MS Building, Bengaluru-560001. ...Respondent
(By Sri Venkatesh S.Arbatti, Spl. PP)
This criminal revision petition is filed under Section
397 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. by the advocate for the
petitioner praying that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased
to set aside the order dated 25.06.2016 passed by the
2
LXXVII Addl. City Civil and S.J. & Spl. Judge, Bengaluru
(CCH-78) in Spl. C.C. No.83/2006 and consequently
discharge the petitioner from the case.
-----------
In Crl.R.P. No.1040 /2016
Between:
Mr. Arun Kumar,
S/o Krishnamurthy Shetty,
Aged about 59 years,
Assistant Executive Engineer,
BBMP Office, Rajajinagar,
Bengaluru-10. ...Petitioner
(By Sri P.N.Hegde, Advocate)
And:
State by Karnataka Lokayuktha Police,
Bengaluru Urban District,
Represented by its SPP,
High Court of Karnataka,
Office at MS Building,
Bengaluru-560001. ...Respondent
(By Sri Venkatesh S.Arbatti, Spl. PP)
This criminal revision petition is filed under Section
397 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. by the advocate for the
petitioner praying that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased
to set aside the order dated 23.07.2016 passed by the
LXXVII Addl. City Civil and S.J. & Spl. Judge (PCA), Mayo
Hall Unit, Bangalore on the application filed by the
petitioner under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. in Spl. CC.
No.46/2010 and consequently discharge the petitioner
from the alleged offences under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read
with Section 13(2) of P.C. Act.
3
In Crl.R.P. No.1233/2016
Between:
Panchalingaiah, S/o Venkatappa,
Aged about 49 years,
Occupation: Agriculturist,
Resident of Hemigapura Village,
Vidyapeeta Post, Kengeri Hobli,
Bangalore south Taluk,
Bangalore-560060. ...Petitioner
(By Sri C.H.Jadhav, Senior Counsel for Sri. Prasanna
Kumar P., Advocate,)
And:
State of Karnataka,
By Karnataka Lokayukta Police,
Bangalore City, Bangalore,
Represented by Police Inspector,
Karnataka Lokayukta Police Wing,
City Division, MS Building,
Dr. Ambedkar Veedhi,
Bengaluru-560001. ...Respondent
(By Sri Venkatesh S.Arbatti, Spl. PP)
This criminal revision petition is filed under Section
397 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. by the advocate for the
petitioner praying that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased
to set aside the order dated 30.08.2016 passed by the 23rd
Addl. City Civil and S.J. & Spl. Judge, Bengaluru, in Spl.
C.C. No.188/2013 thereby rejecting the application filed by
the petitioner under Section 227 of Code of Criminal
Procedure and consequently discharge the petitioner/
accused No.1 for the offences alleged under Sections 464,
466, 468, 471, 474 and 120B of IPC.
4
These criminal revision petitions having been heard
and reserved for orders, coming on for Pronouncement this
day, the Court, made the following:
ORDER
The revision petitioners/accused, in all these three criminal revision petitions, had filed applications under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, before the concerned Special Courts, seeking their discharge from the proceedings on the grounds mentioned in the said applications. The prosecution had opposed the said applications before the said Special Courts. The Special Courts, after considering the merits of the said applications, ultimately, rejected all those applications holding that there was prima facie material to frame the charge and to proceed against the revision petitioners/accused. Being aggrieved by the said orders, the revision petitioners have preferred these criminal revision petitions.
2. Since common questions of law and facts are involved in all the above three revision petitions and in 5 order to avoid the repetition of discussions, all the revision petitions are taken up together for disposal by this common order.
3. In Crl.R.P. No.935/2016, chargesheet was filed against the revision petitioner/accused for the offences under Sections 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, 'the PC Act'). In Crl.R.P. No.1040/2016, chargesheet was filed against the revision petitioner/accused for the offences under Sections 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. In Crl.R.P. No.1233/2016, chargesheet was filed against the revision petitioner for the offences under Sections 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(1)(2) of the PC Act and also under Sections 167, 177, 465, 466, 468, 471, 472, 473, 474 read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code.
4. When these criminal revision petitions were filed, in all the three revision petitions, office has raised the objection regarding maintainability of the criminal revision petitions. Therefore, in all the above petitions, the matters 6 were heard only on the office objections regarding maintainability of the criminal revision petitions and not on the merits. In all the above three revision petitions, the concerned Special Courts held that the revision petitioners/accused have not made out a case for their discharge from the proceedings; and also held that looking to the prosecution material there is a prima facie case to frame the charge and to proceed with the trial of the case in all the three matters.
5. Learned counsel, Sri P. N. Hegde, representing the petitioner/accused in Crl.R.P. No.1040/2016, during the course of his arguments, made the submission that the revision petition is maintainable against the order passed by the Trial Court. He submitted that the order passed by the Special Court is not in the nature of an interlocutory order, which is hit by Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C., but it is in the nature of the order which finally determines the rights of the parties, and, if not the final order, it can be an intermediate order but not an interlocutory order. He made the submission that as the applications have been 7 dismissed, at least, an opportunity has to be given to the revision petitioners/accused to challenge the validity and correctness of the said order by preferring the criminal revision petition, otherwise, the revision petitioner/accused have to unnecessarily face the trial, which will be waste of time and energy of the Hon'ble Court. He made the submission that had the application filed under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. been allowed, the accused would have been discharged from the proceedings, in which event, admittedly, the criminal revision petition is maintainable. Hence, he submitted that, as the application has been rejected, the accused is having every right to question the legality of the said order by preferring the criminal revision petition. He further made the submission that if, in the opinion of the Revisional Court, the Trial Court has committed an error in rejecting the said application, and the revision petition is allowed, in that event, the accused is going to be discharged from the proceedings. He also made the submission that till date, against the orders passed by the Special Courts rejecting the application filed 8 under Section 227 of Cr.P.C., revision petitions were being filed, which were considered by the Hon'ble High Court in many cases up till now and even on the long-standing practice the revision petition is maintainable. He also made the submission that the order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Crl. R.P. No.703/2009 (disposed of on 24.02.2010) clearly goes to show that the criminal revision petition is very much maintainable. He made the submission that the learned Single Judge had taken into consideration all the objections raised by the prosecution and passed the detailed order referring to the judgments of the Hon'ble High Courts and also the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court. Hence, the learned counsel submitted that there is no merit in the contention raised by the prosecution that, in view of the provisions under the PC Act i.e., Section 19(3)(c), no criminal revision petition is maintainable against the order passed by the learned Special Judge rejecting the application filed under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. Hence, he submitted to overrule the office objections and thereby to hold that the revision petition is 9 maintainable as against the order passed by the learned Special Judge. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner in the petition relied upon the following decisions and enactment:
1) V.C.Shukla vs. State through C.B.I. reported in AIR 1980 SC 962
2) Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 1978 Cri. L. J. 165 = AIR 1978 SC 47
3) Jarnail Singh vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 1992 Cri. L. J. 810
4) Crl. R. P. No.703/2009 disposed of on 24.02.2010 (Karnataka High Court).
5) Special Court Act, 1979
6. Learned counsel, Sri Sudhakar M., appearing for the revision petitioner/accused in Crl.R.P. No.935/2016 submitted that he adopts the arguments of learned counsel, Sri P. N. Hegde. He also submitted that the revision petitions are maintainable as against the order passed by the Special Judge rejecting the application filed under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. In support of his contention, 10 the learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of P.Thangaraju vs. State reported in 2011 Cri.L.J.1044.
7. Learned Senior Counsel, Sri C. H. Jadhav, appearing for the learned counsel for the petitioner, during the course of his arguments, made the submission that Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C. and Section 19(3)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act are consistent with each other. He also made the submission that even according to Section 22 of the PC Act, the procedure for preferring the appeals and revision petitions which is laid down under the Code of Criminal Procedure is made applicable. He also drew the attention of this Court to Section 27 of the PC Act and made the submission that Section 27 of PC Act is in consonance with Sections 397(1), 401 and 403 of Cr.P.C. Regarding the contention of the prosecution that in order to speed-up the trial of the case under the PC Act, the criminal revision petitions are not maintainable, learned Senior Counsel made the submission that there are other provisions under the PC Act to speed-up the trial of the 11 case and only on that ground it cannot be said that revision petition is not maintainable. Learned Senior Counsel further made the submission that it is a long-standing practice that the orders passed on the applications under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. even in respect of the cases under the provisions of PC Act also, revision petitions were filed, they were considered by the Courts of law and decided on merits. It is also his contention that though in the case of V.C.Shukla supra it is held that as against the orders passed by the Special Judge under the Special Courts Act the revision petition is not maintainable, looking to the provisions under the Special Courts Act, the Officer of the Special Courts used to be the High Court Judges and against the orders passed by such Special Judge under the Special Courts Act, an appeal was provided directly to the Supreme Court and that was the reason to hold that the revision petition against such orders were not maintainable. He also made the submission that under the PC Act, the Special Judge is of the cadre of District and Sessions Judge just like the other 12 Sessions Judge who tries the Sessions cases; that there is no provision that the orders passed by the Special Judge under the PC Act are directly appealable to the Supreme Court; and that now, the Special Courts Act is repealed. Therefore, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the contention of the prosecution that as against the orders passed by the Special Courts under the provisions of the PC Act rejecting the application filed under Section 227 of Cr.P.C., revision petition is not maintainable, is not sustainable in law. Hence, learned Senior Counsel made the submission that looking to the orders by the co-ordinate benches of this Court and also the orders passed by other High Court and of the Hon'ble Apex Court, revision petitions are maintainable and he too submitted to overrule the office objection regarding maintainability of the criminal revision petition by rejecting the contention of the prosecution. In support of his contention, learned Senior Counsel also relied upon the following decisions and enactment:
1) V.C.Shukla Vs. State though C.B.I reported in 1980 Supp SCC 92.13
2) Crl. R. P. No.703/2009 disposed of on 24.02.2010 (Karnataka High Court).
3) The Special Courts Act, 1979.
4) The Special Courts (Repeal) Act, 1982.
8. Per contra, Sri Venkatesh S. Arbatti, learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent- Lokayukta, in all the three revision petitions, made the submission that the revision petitions against the order of the Special Judge are not at all maintainable and the office has rightly raised the objection regarding maintainability of the criminal revision petitions. He made the submission that the PC Act is a special enactment enacted with the main object of speedy disposal of cases relating to the offences under the said act. It is also his contention that the interpretation of the expression 'interlocutory order' for the purpose of Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C. is different from the interpretation of the expression 'interlocutory order' used in Section 19(3)(c) of the PC Act. He made the submission that there is no fundamental or inherent right of appeal or revision which is a creature of the statute. In 14 relation to PC Act is concerned, filing of the appeal or revision is provided under Section 27 of the PC Act. Hence, he submitted that this right to file a revision as provided under Section 27 is limited by the phrase "subject to the other provisions of this Act". The other provisions referring to the restrictions for filing the revision petition is to be found in Section 19(3)(c) of the PC Act. Hence, he submitted that Section 19(3)(c) of the PC Act starts with a non-obstante clause which excludes the provisions of criminal procedure code to the extent provided in the PC Act. It is also his further submission that a harmonious reading of Sections 19(3)(c), 22, 27 and 28 of the PC Act would not, in any way, lead to the interpretation that the provisions of the PC Act would permit a party to challenge an interlocutory order by way of filing a revision petition. Hence, he submitted that there are specific provisions in the PC Act, and also as per Section 19(3)(c) of the said Act which imposes a bar/restriction to prefer and maintain a revision petition. Hence, he submitted that there is no merit in the contentions raised by the petitioners in the 15 above three revision petitions regarding the maintainability of such revision petitions. Hence, he submitted that in view of the statutory bar under the PC Act, the above revision petitions are not at all maintainable. He lastly submitted that the office objections raised regarding maintainability of the revision petitions may be held as sustainable and prayed to reject the revision petitions on the ground of maintainability. In support of his contentions, learned Special Public Prosecutor relied upon the following decisions:
1) V.C.Shukla vs. State through C.B.I. reported in AIR 1980 SC 962.
2) Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1978 SC 47
3) Jarnail Singh vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 1992 Cri. L. J. 810
4) P.V. Amarnath v. State by CBI ACB, Bangalore reported in 2012(4) Kar. L.J. 483.
5) Usman Bhai vs. State of Gujarat reported in AIR 1988 SC 922
6) Satyanarayan Sharma vs. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 2001 SC 2856 16
7) Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander & Another reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460
8) State of Tamil Nadu by Inspector of Police Vigilance and Anti Corruption vs. N.Suresh Rajan & Others reported in (2014)11 SCC 709.
9) Crl.R.P. No.703/2009 disposed of on
24.02.2010 (Karnataka High Court).
10) Crl.R.P. No.432/2013 C/w Crl.
P.No.2313/2016 disposed of on 03.11.2016 (Karnataka High Court).
11) Crl.R.P. No.1652/2016 disposed of on 06.01.2017 (Karnataka High Court)
12) Judgment dated 06.01.2010 passed in Puneet Sabharwal Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation (Delhi High Court).
9. I have perused the grounds urged by the revision petitioners/accused in the above three petitions, the orders passed by the Special Courts, which are challenged in the above petitions, the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel on both the sides, and also considered the arguments advanced by the learned Senior Counsel, learned counsel and also the learned Special Public Prosecutor at the Bar.
17
10. Sri C. H. Jadhav, learned Senior Counsel, in support of his arguments relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of V.C. Shukla Vs. State Through C.B.I, reported in 1980 Supp SCC 92. The learned Special Public Prosecutor also relied upon the said decision in support of his contentions.
11. The contention of the petitioners that the decision in the case of V.C.Shukla supra pertains to the order passed by the Special Court which is established under the Special Courts Act, 1979. Hence, it is the contention of the learned Senior Counsel, Sri C. H. Jadhav, that the Special Judge of the said Court used to be sitting Judge of the High Court; and regarding the appeal provision against the order of the Special Court, appeal lies only to the Supreme Court and not to the High Courts. Therefore, it is the contention of the learned Senior counsel that the ratio in the said decision is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand. It is his contention that, now, the Special Judge is of the cadre of District and Sessions Judge who presides over the 18 Special Court which deals with the matters pertaining to PC Act; and that now the Special Courts Act has been repealed by The Special Courts (Repeal) Act, 1982. In view of the said contention advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner in the respective petition, let me consider the applicability or otherwise of the said decision to the facts of the present case. It is necessary to refer to the relevant paragraphs of the said decision. In para 14 of the said decision it is observed as under:
" 14. The effect of the speech given by the Home Minister and the recitals in the Preamble bring out the following special features of the Act :-
(1) That the Act makes a distinct departure from the trial of ordinary offences by criminal courts in that the trial of the offences is entrusted to a very high judicial dignitary who is a sitting Judge of the High Court to be appointed by the Chief Justice concerned on the recommendations of the Chief Justice of India.
This contains a built-in safeguard and a safety valve for ensuring the independence of judiciary on the one hand and a complete fairness of trial on the other. In appointing the Special Judge, the Government has absolutely 19 no hand or control so that the Special Judge is appointed on the recommendations of the highest judicial authority in the country, viz., the Chief Justice of India. This would naturally instill great confidence of the people in the Special Judge who is given a very elevated status.
(2) Secondly, whereas in ordinary cases the matter is straightway brought to the court after the investigation is completed, the Act requires certain preliminary safeguards before the matter is placed before the Special Court. In the first place, the allegations made against the accused have been scrutinised by a High Powered Commission, presided over by Mr. Justice Shah, a retired Judge of the Supreme Court, as indicated by the Home Minister in his speech while introducing the Bill. Secondly, the matter does not rest there but a thorough investigation has been made not by the ordinary police but by the C.B.I. Thirdly, after the investigation is made, the matter is placed before the Central Government which makes a declaration after being satisfied about existence of prima facie evidence of the commission of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused. It is only after such a declaration is made that the matter is 20 brought before the Special Court, designated by the Central Government. It thus appears that before a case to the Court a three-tier system has already been adopted which eliminates any possibility of miscarriage of justice or any element of unfairness or foul play. Furthermore, although the Special Judge functions as a Sessions Judge for the purposes of the trial and follows a procedure provided for the trial of warrant cases, the fact remains that the Judge is a high judicial dignitary, being a sitting Judge not subordinate in any way to the Government. The Special Judge appointed, therefore, is a very experienced judicial officer who must be presumed to act in an extremely just and equitable manner keeping himself alive to the rules of natural justice and fair play."
12. Looking to the observations of their Lordships in para 14 of the decision of V.C.Shukla supra, it is, no doubt, true that learned Senior Counsel is justified in making the submission that because of these reasons, the orders passed by the Special Judge were not revisable. It is also true that the Special Court Act, 1979, has been repealed in the year 1982 and now, the Special Courts dealing with 21 the cases under the provisions of the PC Act are manned by the Judicial Officers of the cadre of District and Sessions Judge, who also try other sessions matters. But, the question is, whether only because of the reason that the Special Courts under the Special Courts Act were manned by the sitting Judge of the High Court and the Special Courts under the Prevention of Corruption Act at present are manned by the Sessions Judges, who are considered to be the Special Judges while dealing with the matters under the Prevention of Corruption Act, can it be said that against the orders passed by the Special Judge under the PC Act, a revision petition is maintainable?
13. To ascertain whether a revision petition is maintainable against the orders passed by the Special Judge in connection with the matters under the PC Act, it is relevant to refer to some of the important legal as well as the factual aspects. In the Criminal Procedure Code, as per Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C. revision petitions are not maintainable as against the interim orders passed. Sub- section (2) of Section 397 of Cr.P.C. reads as under: 22
" 397. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.- (1) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-
section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding."
Coming to the Special enactment - The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Section 19(3)(c) of this Act reads as under:
" 19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution. -(1) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.
(2) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),-
(a) xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
(b) xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
(c) no Court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no Court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings."23
14. The orders impugned in all the above three maters are the orders passed by the Special Judge while exercising his jurisdiction under the PC Act. In all the three matters, applications came to be filed by the petitioners under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. seeking their discharge from the proceedings on the ground that there is no prima facie case made out by the prosecution and hence, they are entitled for discharge from the proceedings. After considering the objection statement filed by the prosecution and so also the grounds urged in the application, ultimately, the learned Special Judge rejected the applications in all the above three matters. Therefore, before coming to the conclusion that the revision petitions are maintainable, as contended by the petitioners, the Court has to examine the nature of orders passed by the Special Judge which are challenged in the above petitions. Whether the impugned orders come within the ambit of interlocutory orders or not is the point for consideration before this court. If the orders are really in the nature of interlocutory orders, the revision petitions are not 24 maintainable, otherwise, the revision petitions are maintainable.
15. Though the case of V.C.Shukla supra was one dealing with the provisions of Section 11(1)(2) of the Special Courts Act, 1979, their Lordships have also referred to Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C., while ascertaining the meaning of 'interlocutory order' and 'final order'. Therefore, it is useful for this Court to refer to the relevant paragraphs of para 23 of the said decision, which are as under:
" Thus, the expression 'interlocutory order' is to be understood and taken to mean converse of the term 'final order'. Now, let us see how this term has been defined in the dictionaries and the textbooks. In Webster's Third International Dictionary (Vol. II, p. 1179) the expression 'interlocutory order' has been defined thus:
Not final or definitive: made or done during the progress of an action:
INTERMEDIATE, PROVISIONAL.
Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (Fourth Edition, Vol. 3, p. 1410) defines interlocutory order thus:25
"Interlocutory order" Judicature Act, 1873 (Clause
66), Section 25(8) was not confined to an order made between writ and final judgment, but means an order other than final judgment."
Thus, according to Stroud, interlocutory order means an order other than a final judgment. This was the view taken in the case of Smith v. Cowell and followed in Manchester & Liverpool Bank v. Parkinson. Similarly, the term 'final order' has been defined in volume 2 of the same Dictionary (p. 1037) thus:
"The judgment of a Divisional Court on an appeal from a county court in an interpleader issue was a 'final order" within the old R.S.C, Order 58, Rule 3 (Hughes v. Little); so was an order on further consideration (Cummins v. Herron), unless action was not thereby concluded..... But an order under the old R.S.C., Order 25, Rule 3, dismissing an action on a point of law raised by the pleadings was not 'final" within the old Order 58, Rule 3, because had the decisions been the other way the action would have proceeded."
Halsbury's Laws of England (Third Edition, Vol. 22, pp. 743-744) describes an interlocutory or final order thus:
"Interlocutory judgment or order: An order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but either (1) is made before judgment, and gives no final decision on the 26 matters in dispute, but is merely on a matter of procedure, or (2) is made after judgment, and merely directs how the declarations of right already given in the final judgment are to be worked out, is termed 'interlocutory'. An interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals.....
In general a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed 'final'.
At page 743 of the same volume, Blackstone says thus:
Final judgments are such as at once put an end to the action by declaring that the plaintiff has either entitled himself, or has not, to recover the remedy he sues for........ Four different tests for ascertaining the finality of a judgment or order have been suggested: (1) Was the order made upon an application such that a decision in favour of either party would determine the main dispute? (2) Was it made upon an application upon which the main dispute could have been decided? (3) Does the order, as made, determine the dispute? (4) If the order in question is reversed, would the action have to go on."
Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol. 49 p. 35) defines interlocutory order thus:
A final judgment is one which disposes of the cause both as to the subject-matter and the parties as far as the court has power to dispose of it, while an interlocutory judgment 27 is one which reserves or leaves some further question or direction for future determination ........ Generally, however, a final judgment is one which disposes of the cause both as to the subject-matter and the parties as far as the court has power to dispose of it, while an interlocutory judgment is one which does not so dispose of the cause, but reserves or leaves some further question or direction for future determination..... The term "interlocutory judgment" is, however, a convenient one to indicate the determination of steps or proceedings in a cause preliminary to final judgment, and in such sense the term is in constant and general use even in code states.
Similarly, Volume 60 of the same series at page 7 seeks to draw a distinction between an interlocutory and a final order thus:
The word "interlocutory", as applied to rulings and orders by the trial court, has been variously defined. It refers to all orders, rulings, and decisions made by the trial court from the inception of an action to its final determination. It means, not that which decides the cause, but that which only settles some intervening matter relating to the cause. An interlocutory order is an order entered pending a cause, deciding some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit and collateral to the issues formed by the pleadings and not a final decision or judgment on the matter in issue .. An intermediate order has been defined as one made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment.28
16. In para 24 of the said judgment (V.C.Shukla's case), it is observed by their Lordships thus:
" To sum up, the essential attribute of an interlocutory order is that it merely decides some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit or collateral to the issues sought but not a final decision or judgment on the matter in issue. An intermediate order is one which is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment. Untwalia, J. in the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra clearly meant to convey that an order framing charge is not an interlocutory order but is an intermediate order as defined in the passage, extracted above, in Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 60. ........ "
It is further observed by their Lordships in the said para 24 that, "........ We find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations made in Corpus Juris Secundum. It is obvious that an order framing of the charge being an intermediate order falls squarely within the ordinary and natural meaning of the term 'interlocutory order' as used in Section 11(1) of the Act."
29While summing up, the further observation made by their Lordships is that, ".......... the natural and logical meaning of an interlocutory order, the conclusion is inescapable that an order which does not terminate the proceedings or finally decides the rights of the parties is only an interlocutory order. In other words, in ordinary sense of the term, an interlocutory order is one which only decides a particular aspect or a particular issue or a particular matter in a proceeding, suit or trial but which does not however conclude the trial at all. This would be the result if the term interlocutory order is interpreted in its natural and logical sense without having resort to Criminal Procedure Code or any other statute."
17. Paras 30, 32, 34 and 37 of the said decision (V.C. Shukla's case) are also relevant for the purpose of discussion to ascertain whether the impugned orders passed by the learned Special Judge are 'interlocutory orders' or 'final orders'.
30
18. Looking to the observations made by their Lordships, referring to so many authorities and also the dictionary meaning regarding the meaning of the terms 'interlocutory order' and 'final order', their Lordships have ultimately held that the order is interlocutory in nature.
19. It is, no doubt, true that if the applications filed by the revision petitioners/accused under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been allowed, the order passed by the Court would have concluded the entire proceedings and would have become a final order. But, as the applications have been rejected, one thing is sure that though it will not terminate the entire proceedings, the order that has been passed is little more than the 'interlocutory order' which can be termed as an 'intermediate order' or a 'quasi-final order'. Even if it is so, and as the order will not conclusively determine the right of the parties and leaves the matter to be proceeded with in order to ascertain whether accused is guilty or is entitled for acquittal, the said order rejecting the application 31 seeking discharge from the proceedings will come within the purview of interlocutory orders.
20. I have also perused the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1978 SC 47. In this decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the scope of Section 482 and so also Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C. But, in this case, the offence alleged was under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code and not under the provisions of the PC Act. Therefore, the question of considering the bar under Section 19(3)(c) of the PC Act did not arise in the said case. As the criminal revision petitions are filed challenging the orders passed by the Special Judge while dealing with the offences under the provisions of PC Act, I am of the opinion that the said decision will not come to the aid and assistance of the revision petitioners in contending that the revision petitions are maintainable. The interpretation of the expression 'interlocutory' for the purpose of Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C. is different from the 32 interpretation of 'interlocutory' used in Section 19(3)(c) of the PC Act.
21. Considering the entire materials placed on record. So also the decisions of the Hon'ble High Court and Hon'ble Apex Court and also some of the decisions of the English Courts as referred to by their Lordships in the decision of V.C.Shukla supra, I am of the opinion that the though the orders rejecting the applications of the revision petitioners/accused seeking their discharge may be termed as 'intermediate order' or 'quasi-final order', it still comes within the purview of the 'interlocutory order', and the said order will not conclusively determine the rights of the parties and leaves the matter to go on further to ascertain the guilt or otherwise of the accused. Apart from that since the alleged offences are under the provisions of the PC Act the Court has also to see the object and reason for introducing the bill before the enactment of the said Act. The main object of the Prevention of Corruption Act is to expedite the proceedings, provision for day-to-day trial of the cases and prohibitory provisions with regard to grant 33 of stay and exercise of powers of revision on interlocutory have also been included while introducing the enactment, keeping in mind that it is not only sufficient to launch the prosecution against the accused person but the speedy disposal of such cases is considered to be the heart and soul of the said Act.
22. There is no fundamental or inherent right of appeal or revision, which is only a creature of the statute. In relation to the PC Act, 1988, the filing of appeal or revision is provided under Section 27 of the PC Act which reads as under:
" 27. Appeal and Revision:- Subject to the provisions of this Act, the High Court may exercise, so far as they may be applicable, all the powers of appeal and revision conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) on a High court as if the Court of the special Judge were a Court of Session trying cases within the local limits of the High Court."
Looking to this provision, which starts with the words "Subject to the provisions of this Act", it goes to show that 34 preferring of an appeal or a revision under the PC Act is subject to any other provisions of the said Act. When that is so, the other provision in the said Act which puts a bar or restriction for preferring the revision is Section 19(3)(c) which has already been referred to above. It is no doubt true, while arguing the case, Sri C.H.Jadhav, learned Senior Counsel, drew the attention of this Court to Sections 22 and 28 of the PC Act and submitted that in view of the said provisions, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are equally made applicable and hence, the revision petition is maintainable. But, when there is a specific provision in the PC Act dealing with appeal and revision under Section 27 of the said Act and which provision starts with the words "Subject to the provision of this Act", it indicates that for maintainability of either the appeal or revision, the Court has to see what are the other provision of the said Act imposing a bar or restriction on the said right of appeal or revision. As I have already observed above, Section 19(3)(c) of the PC Act is a specific provision wherein a restriction/bar is imposed on preferring 35 a revision petition against the interlocutory orders. When such a provision is there in the PC Act itself, the question of placing reliance either on Section 22 or on Section 28 of the PC Act does not arise at all and hence, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned Senior Counsel in this regard. Section 19(3)(c) of the PC Act starts with a non-obstante clause which excludes the provisions of Cr.P.C. to the extent provided in the PC Act. Hence, a harmonious reading of Section 19(3)(c), 22, 27 and 28 of the PC Act would not, in any way, lead to the interpretation that the provisions of the PC Act would permit the challenge to an interlocutory order by way of filing a revision petition.
23. Even perusing the judgment in the case of Madhu Limaye supra, the Hon'ble Apex Court while holding that the revision petition is maintainable in relation to the revision petitions filed under Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C., laid down the principles at paragraph 8 as under:
" 8. ............................At the outset the following principles may be noticed in relation to the 36 exercise of the inherent power of the High Court which have been followed ordinarily and generally, almost invariably, barring a few exceptions :-
(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party;
(2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice;
(3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code".
24. Even looking to the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Puneet Sabharwal vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, the Delhi High Court framed the question for its consideration in para 10 and, while answering the said question, it has observed that, if the meaning of the term "interlocutory order" as used in Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. is the same as term as used in Section 19(3)(c) of the PC Act, then there was no requirement for the legislature to again enact Section 19(3)(c) and the legislature could not have intended to give the same 37 meaning to the term "interlocutory order" as has been given in Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C."
25. One of the rules of interpretation of statutes is the purposive construction. Before the PC Act of 1988 came into force, the restrictive provisions as per Section 19(3) of the present PC Act were not found in the earlier enactment of 1947, which was also amended subsequently. This led to several revision petitions being filed, interim orders of stay granted and also original records were also called from the Trial Court. This leads to substantial delay in the progress of the trial. By incorporating Section 19(3)(c), so also by the use of the words at the beginning of Section 27 of the PC Act i.e., "Subject to the provisions of the Act", restriction was imposed for the grant of interim stay order and also against the exercise of the right of revisional jurisdiction. As per the settled law relating to purposive construction, the statute and its provisions will have to be construed and interpreted, so as to serve the purpose for which they were enacted. While enacting the PC Act, 1988, the 38 Parliament was aware about the meaning of the term "interlocutory order" as stated in the case of Amar Nath's of 1977 and Madhu Limaye's case of 1977 which were duly distinguished in V.C.Shukla's case of 1980. It is no doubt true that there is a bar under Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C., but in the PC Act, 1988, as per Section 19(3)(c), an additional safeguard has been provided to plug the gaps which are not meant to be covered by Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C. Any other interpretation for Section 19(3)(c) will definitely defeat the purpose of enacting the same in the PC Act, 1988. Therefore, while understanding the true meaning of the term 'interlocutory order' appearing in Section 19(3)(c) of the PC Act, it is necessary to apply the same principles as in the case of V.C.Shukla wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has interpreted the said terms in the light of Section 11 of the Special Courts Act, 1979. Only by giving such an interpretation, the rule of purposive construction would be complied with for the purpose of advancing the legislative intent instead of perpetuating the defect. Therefore, considering the factual matrix involved 39 in the case and so also the legal principles which are referred to above referring to the various cases of other Hon'ble High Courts and so also the Hon'ble Apex Court, which are discussed above, I am of the opinion that the office objection raised regarding the maintainability of all the above three revision petitions, and also as contended by the prosecution, are sustainable.
The revision petitions are not maintainable and accordingly, all the three revision petitions are hereby rejected.
Sd/-
JUDGE Kms