Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Smt. Vandana vs Government Of Nct Of Delhi Through ... on 14 January, 2008
ORDER Meera Chhibber, Member (J)
1. By this OA applicant has sought following relief:
Quash the impugned order dated 19.6.2007 passed by Respondent 2;
Direct Respondents to grant Extra-ordinary Family pension to the applicant w.e.f. 25.1.2004;
Direct respondents to pay ex-gratia compensation of Rs. Five lakhs to the applicant;
Direct Respondents to pay interest on the arrears of extra ordinary family pension at the rate of 9% per annum;
Award exemplary cost against the respondents and in favour of the applicant;
Any other or further relief which this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper may also be granted to the applicant.
2. It is stated by the applicant that her husband late Constable Suresh Kumar was serving with Delhi Police as a Constable in Traffic Unit. He was performing his duty in PAP Circle. However, he was relieved on 24.1.2004 from his duty at 06.00 PM by Traffic Inspector of PAP Circle with direction to report to Model Town Circle for Republic Day arrangements duty at Chhattarsal Stadium. While travelling from his duty place i.e. PAP Circle to his new duty place i.e. Model Town Circle, he met with a road accident at village Bawana-Kanjhawala 'T' Point in village Bawana (Delhi) at about 08.10 PM on 24.1.2004 and sustained multiple head injuries. He was admitted in ICU but succumbed to his injuries on 27.1.2004.
3. It is in these circumstances that applicant claims extra-ordinary family pension and an ex-gratia grant of Rs. 5 lakhs whereas she has been sanctioned only ordinary family pension. Being aggrieved she filed appeal but the same was rejected vide order dated 10.5.2006 without giving any reason. She had to file OA No.1687/2006, which was disposed of vide order dated 28.3.2007 setting aside the non-speaking order dated 10.5.2006 by directing the respondents to consider her case keeping in view Section 24 of Delhi Police Act and to pass a reasoned order within a period of two months (page-30).
Pursuant to aforesaid directions respondents passed a detailed order on 19.6.2007 by explaining that Section 24 caters to exigencies, which may require a police officer to perform his duties beyond fixed shifts or time spans relevant in the case of normal civil servants. A police officer cannot, for instance, walk off after performing 8 hours of duty and say my duty is over and I am off, if the exigencies of service demand his continued presence on duty. Similarly, this Section enables a police officer who may be off duty to intervene and take action as a police officer if say a crime is being committed or about to be committed in his presence or to his knowledge or it he perchance comes across a PO or a wanted criminal etc. etc. But this Section definitely does not envisage that if a police officer is not performing his duty and not even in the police station or a police office and may be playing a cricket match or seeing a movie or attending a marriage function or playing cards at home or attending to numerous possible private engagements etc. he should be treated as being on duty. Similarly, it was explained that the instructions issued by the Government of India vide OM dated 11.9.1998 provide that the families of the Central Government civilian employees, who die in harness in the performance of their bonafide official duties under various circumstances, shall be paid ex-gratia lump sum compensation of Rs. 5 / 7.5 lakhs but this death of the employee should have occurred in the actual performance of bonafide official duties. Similarly, case of grant of extra ordinary family pension is also covered under category-C whereas Constable Suresh Kumar expired on 27.1.2004 due to injuries sustained in an accident on 24.1.2004 after he was relieved from his official duties, therefore, he cannot be considered to be on duty. As such there is no justification to grant of ex-gratia payment or extra-ordinary family pension (page-16 of the OA). It is this order, which has been challenged by the applicant in present OA. Counsel for applicant has relied on following judgments:
G.D. Ishwar Chand v. Union of India and Ors. reported in 2004 (3) SLR 439;
Rajanna v. Union of India reported in 1995 Supp. (2) SCC 601;
Writ Petition (C) No.19839/2005 along with other Writ Petitions decided on 19.10.2006 by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi;
Madan Singh Shekhawat v. Union of India 7 Ors.
Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation and Anr. v. Francis De Costa and Anr. reported in 1993 Supp. (4) SCC 100;
Shakuntala Bai Pandey (Smt.) v. National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. reported in 1995 Supp (3) SCC 680;
Rakesh Kumar Mishra v. State of Bihar and Ors. ;
Promoters & Builders Assn. of Pune v. Pune Municipal Corporation and Ors. , while counsel for respondents has relied on judgment given by this Tribunal in OA No. 713/2005 decided on 21.5.2005 in the case of Mahesh Kumar and Anr. v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi and Ors.
4. Respondents have opposed this OA on the grounds as mentioned in the impugned order. In short their main contention is that applicant's husband met with an accident on his way while travelling from his duty place to his residence after duty was over, therefore, it cannot be stated that he died or sustained disability due to an accident while on duty. As far as judgments relied upon by counsel for applicant concerned counsel for respondents submitted all these cases were either of para-military forces or Army or SPG, who have different set of rules, which are not available in Delhi Police, therefore, all those cases are not relevant for the present case.
5. I have heard both the counsel and perused the pleadings as well.
6. It is not disputed by respondents that applicant met with an accident on 24.1.2004 after he was relieved from PAP Circle. Their contention is that since he had finished his duty and was going to his home, therefore, he is not entitled to extra ordinary pension or ex-gratia payment. Let us examine each of these judgments to see whether they are applicable or not. Perusal of judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court shows that a liberal view has been taken, not only by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi but even by Hon'ble Supreme Court. In G.D. Ishwar Chand (supra) decided by Hon'ble High Court of Dehli, petitioner, a constable in ITBP was on deputation with NSG. He was on sanctioned short leave and met with an accident while returning from leave. He sought 50% disability pension. It was contested by the respondents on the ground that petitioner was not on bonafide govt. duty when he met with the accident, therefore, his case is not covered under CCS (Extra Ordinary Pension) Rules. It is relevant to note that this case was also decided on the basis of CCS (Extra Ordinary Pension) Rules and not on the basis of some other rules meant for NSG or ITBP, therefore, according to me this would cover the case of applicant as well.
7. Reliance was placed only on Rule 4 (iv) of CCS (EOP) Rules, which for ready reference reads as under:
4.(a) (i) Injuries sustained when the man is 'on duty' will be deemed to have arisen in, or resulted from, Government service; but in cases of injuries due to serious negligence or misconduct, the question of reducing the disability pension will be considered.
(ii) In cases of self-inflicted injuries while on duty, attributability will not be conceded unless it is established that service factors were responsible for such action; in cases where attributability is conceded, the question of grant of disability pension at full or at a reduced rate will be considered.
(b) A person subject to the disciplinary code of the Central Armed Police Battalions, is 'on duty'
(i) When performing an official task or a task, failure to do which would constitute an offence, triable under the disciplinary code, applicable to him.
(ii) When moving from one place of duty to another place of duty irrespective of the method of movement.
(iii) During the period of participation in recreation, organized or permitted by service authorities, and during the period of travelling in a body or singly under organized arrangements.
(iv) When proceeding from his duty station to his leave station on returning to duty from his leave station at public expenses, that is, on Railway warrant, on cash TA (irrespective of whether Railway warrant/cash TA is admitted for the whole journey or for a portion only), in Government transport or when road mileage is paid for the journey.
(v) When journeying by a reasonable route from one's official residence to and back from the appointed place of duty irrespective of the mode of conveyance, whether private or provided by the Government.
8. It was on the basis of these rules it was held that petitioner therein was entitled to disability pension as he met with an accident while travelling from leave station to the duty as explained in Rule 4(b)(iv) of CCS (EOP) Rules. It was further held that it would make no difference whether he was travelling on public expense or his own expense because this principle has already been decided by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Madan Singh Shekhawat (supra) wherein the distinction between public expense and private expense was erased. Accordingly, Writ Petition was allowed by directing the respondents to consider his case for grant of disability pension.
9. Counsel for respondents submitted this case would not apply because ITBP has separate rules. This contention is not correct as it has been explained above that the case was decided only on the basis of CCS (EOP) Rules which are applicable to Delhi Police also as is evident from notification dated 17.12.1980 at serial No.17 enclosed in Delhi Police Act & Rules immediately before Delhi Police Appointment & Recruitment Rules, 1980 (page-119).
10. From this notification it is clear that CCS (EOP) Rules apply to the personnel of Delhi Police as well.
11. Rule 4(b) of CCS (EOP) Rules clearly states that a person subject to the disciplinary code of the Central Armed Police Battalion is on duty as explained in sub-rule (iv) or (v), so the question arises whether Delhi Police would be covered under this clause or not. For this purpose reference may be made to Section 3 of Delhi Police Act, which for ready reference reads as under:
3. One police force for the whole of Delhi - There shall be one police force for the whole of Delhi and all officer and subordinate ranks of the police force shall be liable for posting to any branch of the force including the Delhi Armed Police.
12. It is also not disputed that applicant was subject to disciplinary code. From above, it is clear that applicant was liable to be posted under Delhi Armed Police as well so he would be covered under rule 4(b) supra. If that be so the case of applicant would be fully covered by the above said judgments.
13. Applicant has categorically stated in pleadings that her husband was getting travelling allowance for counting from duty to house and vice versa. This averment has not been denied by the respondents, therefore whether he was travelling by public transport or private transport wouldn't make any difference. In any case this principle has been upheld by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Madan Singh Shekhawat (supra) as noted by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi also in the case of G.D. Ishwar Chand reported in 2004 (3) SLR 439.
14. It is also to be borne in mind that in the case of Madan Singh Shekhawat v. Union of India , Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:
13. It is the duty of the Court to interpret a provision, especially a beneficial provision, liberally so as to give it a wider meaning rather than a restrictive meaning which would negate the very object of the Rule.
15. Similarly in the case of Rajanna v. Union of India reported in 1995 Supp. 2 SCC 601, the petitioner therein was Security Assistant in SPG. He met with an accident while travelling in official car from his residence for going to the place of duty. He had claimed ex-gratia payment under Cabinet Secretariat circular dated 13.6.1986, which was rejected by the Tribunal on the ground that injuries had not been sustained while performing actual VIP security duty. Matter was carried to Hon'ble Supreme Court. Their Lordships while allowing the appeal observed as follows:
On the facts of the case, it cannot be doubted that there would be notional extension of the actual duty to include the journey of this kind in the official SPG vehicle between the staff quarters and the place of duty. The meaning of the expression 'actual VIP security duty' in the above circular must be the same as that of the words 'in the course of the employment' in the Workmen's Compensation Act; and, therefore, the test for determining the liability for payment under the circular should also be the same. The tribunal was in error in making an unduly strict and narrow construction of the expression used in the circular.
16. In the said case also contention raised by Union of India was that 'actual VIP security duty' means the actual period when the person is providing security to the VIP on commencement of the duty hours and it does not include the journey to and from the duty post. However, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that acceptance of the defence taken would frustrate the very object of the scheme in the circular.
17. Counsel for the respondents strenuously argued that this case was decided in view of the circular meant for SPG. However, it is noticed that in the circular of 13.6.1986 also ex-gratia payment was to be provided to those, who had sustained injuries or death while performing actual VIP security duty which was subsequently liberalized on 24.1.1990 by enhancing the rate and enlarging the application to those SPG personnel who performed duties other than actual VIP security duty therefore, the fact remains in that circular also ex-gratia payment was to be given when injury / death had occurred while on duty, therefore, the said circular wouldn't make any difference. The question, that was being considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether a person who meets with an accident while travelling from residence to the place of duty would be covered under the expression 'on duty' or not. It can, therefore, easily be concluded that the issue in question was same as raised in the present case, therefore, the said judgment is also relevant. In the said case also, it was held that since appellant was travelling in official car there would be notional extension of the actual duty to include the journey between staff quarters and South Block, his place of duty. It is relevant to note that this accident had taken place at 08.20 am while his actual duty was to start from 09.00 am.
18. If the facts of present case are seen in the backdrop of above judgment, we find that in the instant case also applicant met with an accident while he was travelling after his duty was over from the place of his duty to his residence. It is not disputed by the respondents that applicant was being given travelling allowance for this purpose and he was allowed to stay in his own house even though he is entitled to government accommodation (Para-F of the OA), therefore, the principle of notional extension as referred to above can be applied in the present set of facts as well. Even otherwise it is noticed while distributing the duties in note on page-19, it was mentioned that Constable Praveen Kumar and Constable Suresh, detailed for arrangement in Chhattarsal Stadium be relieved in the afternoon with direction to report for arrangement in MTC. It does not say whether he was required to report on the next date or the same day. The man is no more, therefore, it is not known whether he was going from one place of duty to other place of duty or was travelling to his residence. Of course respondents have stated that he was going to his residence because he had met with the accident near his village. Be that as it may, the fact remains that he was travelling on his own motor-cycle while going from his office place to residence, for which he was being given conveyance allowance. Since Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in more than one cases that liberal approach should be taken by the courts in such kind of cases and in a subsequent case of Shakuntala Bai Pandey (Smt.) v. National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. reported in 1995 Supp (3) SCC 680, also the same view was taken namely when a workman becomes permanently disabled or dies in an accident while proceeding to the place of his duty from home or returning from the place of his duty to home, he should be deemed to have died or become disabled while on duty, therefore, I am bound to follow the views expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
19. As far as the judgment in the case of Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation and Anr. v. Francis De Costa and Anr. reported in 1993 Supp. (4) SCC 100 is concerned, it will not be relevant because ultimately there was difference of opinion between the Division Bench and the matter was directed to be posted before the Bench of three Judges for deciding the matter.
20. I would be failing to my duties if I don't deal with the judgment relied upon by respondents in the case Mahesh Kumar and Anr. v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi and Ors. [OA No. 713/2005 decided on 21.5.2005]. Perusal of aforesaid judgment shows that it was given in a different context altogether. Counsel for respondents had specifically relied upon Para-17 of the said judgment. However, perusal of same shows that applicant in OA 592/2005 had suffered injury on his leg while going back to his home on a motor-cycle after finishing his duties. He claimed that he should be deemed to have suffered injuries while on duty as per Section 24 of Delhi Police Act and should be given the same benefit which such of the persons in Delhi Police are given who have suffered injuries while performing official duties and had become disabled to undergo the physical test. It was in those circumstances that Section 24 of Delhi Police Act was explained and it was observed that the provision is enacted to meet a totally different situation. It does not mean that a Police Officer shall be deemed to have been performing duties while he is on rest and has finished his assigned hours of duty and when he is not actually performing his official duties. The argument was accordingly rejected. As I have noted above this is absolutely in a different context. Even if I was asked to explain Section 24, I would have taken the same view as is taken by the Tribunal in above said case. However, in the present case before me, I am dealing absolutely with a different situation under CCS (Extra Ordinary Pension) Rules, which have been dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a number of judgments as already referred to above. Therefore, the case in hand is fully covered by the judgments as referred to above.
21. As far as grant of ex-gratia payment is concerned applicant has himself annexed Government of India's Scheme dated 11.9.1998 at page-24. Perusal of same shows that the compensation is intended to provide an additional insurance and security to employees, who are required to function under trying circumstances and are exposed to different kinds of risks in the performance of their duties (para-6). Under the conditions governing the payment of ex-gratia lumpsum compensation, guidelines should be observed. It is specifically mentioned that the main condition to be satisfied for the payment of ex-gratia lumpsum compensation in the specified circumstances is that the death of the employee concerned should have occurred in the actual performance of bonafide official duties. In para-2 it is reiterated that ministries would have to satisfy themselves that the death of the government servant had in fact occurred in the actual performance of bonafide official duties and to establish its causal connection and nexus with government service. It is thus clear that as far as grant of ex-gratia lumpsum compensation is concerned, a different yardstick has to be applied and it can be given only if a person dies during the actual performance of bonafide official duties. In the instant case since applicant was driving from his place of duty to his residence when he met with the accident, it cannot be stated that his death occurred due to actual performance of bonafide official duties, therefore, according to me applicant would not be entitled to lumpsum ex-gratia payment.
22. In view of above, OA deserves to be partly allowed. Respondents are directed to pass appropriate order for grant of extra ordinary family pension in terms of observations made above within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order under intimation to the applicant. No order as to costs.