Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
K. David Wilson vs Secretary To Government, Law ... on 21 August, 2001
Equivalent citations: 2001(5)ALD406, 2001(5)ALT65
ORDER S.R. Nayak, J.
1. This writ petition is filed by Sri David Wilson, who was at the relevant point of time serving as Sub-Judge in the Andhra Pradesh Judicial Service, assailing the disciplinary action taken by the respondents - Government of Andhra Pradesh and High Court of A.P. removing him from service.
2. The background facts leading to the filing of the writ petition be noted briefly as under: When the petitioner was serving as Subordinate Judge at Tadepalligudem, West Godavari District, he disposed of, by his judgment and decree dated 18-2-1992, a land acquisition OP No.22 of 1988 on his file awarding enhanced compensation of Rs. 85,000/- per acre and 30% statutory solatium, etc. Thereafterwards, 11 persons, one G. Satyanarayana Raju and 10 others claiming to be the residents of Tadepalligudem sent a petition to the learned District Judge, West Godavari District at Eluru, inter alia alleging that the petitioner is a corrupt officer and he awarded heavy compensation to the claimants in OP No.22 of 1988. They sent copies of the same complaint to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice as well as to the Hon'ble Judges of this Court. On the basis of that petition, the High Court directed the then District Judge, West Godavari District at Eluru, to conduct a preliminary enquiry. Accordingly, the learned District Judge, West Godavari District conducted enquiry and submitted his report dated 29-4-1992 to the High Court. On the basis of the preliminary enquiry report, the High Court ordered regular departmental enquiry against the petitioner and appointed the learned Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Srikakulam, as the Enquiry Officer to conduct the regular departmental enquiry. Two charges were framed against the petitioner. They read:
"Charge No. 1:--that you, the afore-described Sri K. David Wilson (the delinquent Officer), while working as the Subordinate Judge of Tadepalligudem of West Godavari District, mala fide picked up and selected a heavy Land acquisition OP No.22 of 1988, involving high stakes, in respect of a very large extent of, as much as, Ac. 29.33 cents and as many as 44 coconut trees, from out of only three OPs, in OP Nos. 5/88, 22/88, and 24/88, pending at that time, on the file of that Subordinate Judge's Court, because the stakes involved in the other two OP Nos.5 and 24 of 1988 are far less, as they pertain, respectively, only, to smaller extents of lands of Ac. 2.33 cents and Ac. 4.08 cents;
that, you took-up such mala fide enquiry into that selected OP No.22/88, in pursuance of a mala fide deal entered into between you and the claimants, through their advocates and the then Assistant Government Pleader;
that, in pursuance of such mala fide deal, referred to in the immediately preceding paragraph, you entered into, and completed the enquiry into, that OP No.22/88, within a short-time, by commencing the enquiry on 20-1-1992 and concluded on 27-1-1992 i.e., within 7 days, and heard arguments on 31-1-1992, and finally adjudicated thereupon, on 18-2-1992, on which date the said Assistant Government Pleader will lay down his office, within your knowledge and the knowledge of that Assistant Government Pleader and the claimants and their advocates, and, who (that Government Pleader) actually laid-down his office on that day;
that, in pursuance of such mala fide deal, enquiry and adjudication, you awarded a total compensation of more than Rs. 50,00,000/- (Rupees fifty lakhs only), including interest.
Charge No. 1 :--that, the draft judgment in that OP No.22/88, as contained in the short-hand note book of the then stenographer, by name, Sri K. Gangadhara Rao, and transcribed by him in the presence of the then District Judge, Sri B. Venkateswara Rao garu, of West Godavari District, on the one hand, does not, at all, tally with the actually typed draft judgment contained in that OP No. 22/88, as pronounced by you, on 18-2-1992, on the other hand, and that the language, and tenor and the discussion and the approach and the expression, etc., strikingly differ from each other;
that, without yourself dictating certain parts of the said judgment, contained in the stenographer's note book you directed the said Stenographer, to make certain additions and also to make, by himself (stenographer), discussion about the documents and the evidence of witnesses and, thereby, delegated your judicial authority, duty and responsibility, to the stenographer, whose duties are only of ministerial nature, inter alia, by way of transcribing, truly and correctly, what was dictated by the Judicial Officer;
that thereby, you took recourse to extra judicial considerations and dishonest means and corrupt practices, and, thereby adjudicated upon that OP mala fide, otherwise than according to law, by considering extra judicial considerations and having prepared some other judgment in the record of that case, otherwise than what is contained in the said stenographer's note book".
The charge-sheet and the questionnaire in Form No. 1 in duplicate prescribed under Rule 3 of Appendix VI of A.P. Civil Service Rules (CC&A) Rules, 1963, hereinafter referred to as CCA Rules, were served on the petitioner directing the petitioner to fill-in the said questionnaire and to resubmit the original thereof to the Enquiry Officer. After the service of the charge-sheet and the said questionnaire, the petitioner resubmitted the duly filled in questionnaire and his written statement in which he pleaded innocence of the two charges framed against him and also denied all the material allegations levelled against him. Not being satisfied with the written statement submitted by the petitioner and the answers given by him in the questionnaire in Form No. 1, a regular departmental enquiry was conducted. In the course of the enquiry, the petitioner was permitted to engage the services of two advocates to defend him. In the course of the enquiry on behalf of the disciplinary authority, Mr. K. Gangadhar Rao, Stenographer, was examined. None of the claimants or their advocates or the Assistant Government Pleader who appeared for the State Government in OP No. 22 of 1988 are examined on behalf of the disciplinary authority. The Enquiry Officer, after holding a detailed regular departmental enquiry and on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, came to the conclusion that both the charges are not proved. Accordingly, he submitted his report dated 3-5-1993 to the High Court.
3. The High Court after receipt of the enquiry report and on consideration of the same, disagreed with the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer on Charge No. 2. In that view of the matter, it issued show-cause notice [Order ROC No. 316/92 B.Spl. (SC)], dated 19-7-1993 calling upon the petitioner to show-cause within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the notice as to why the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer on Charge No. 2 should not be disagreed with and why the Charge No. 2 should not, for the reasons set out in the Annexure appended to that notice, be held proved.
4. The petitioner in response to the show-cause notice submitted his detailed reply dated 12-8-1993 pleading that he is totally innocent of the second charge. The High Court on consideration of the reply of the petitioner by its order dated 8-10-1993 rejected the explanation of the petitioner and held that Charge No. 2 was proved and called upon the petitioner to show-cause within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the notice as to why the punishment of "dismissal from service" should not be imposed upon him in view of the gravity of the Charge No. 2 held proved against him. The petitioner submitted his reply dated 8-11-1993 to the show-cause notice dated 8-10-1993. The High Court not being satisfied with the reply of the petitioner dated 8-11-1993 passed the final order ROC No. 316/92, B.Spl. (SC), dated 1-12-1993, removing the petitioner from service as a disciplinary measure. Against the said order, the petitioner preferred Writ Petition (Civil) No. 331 of 1994 before the Supreme Court of India under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court by its order dated 9-5-1996 set aside the order of removal passed by the High Court placing reliance on the judgments in B.S. Yadav and others v. State of Haryana and others, and Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and others v. L. V.A. Dixitulu and others, , and opining that since the petitioner held the substantive post of District Munsif at the time of issuance of order of removal from service by the High Court, the order of removal from service has to be made by the Governor only and not by the High Court itself, and directed that the removal order passed by the High Court be treated as recommendation only and it is for the Governor to pass appropriate order as per the recommendation of the High Court. In pursuance of the judgment of the Supreme Court, the High Court by its proceedings dated 15-7-1996, recommended to the Governor for removal of the petitioner from service as Sub-Judge. The Government of Andhra Pradesh on the basis of the recommendation made by the High Court issued G.O. Ms. No. 224, Law (LA&J-Courts.C) Department, dated 29-8-1997 removed the petitioner from service as a disciplinary measure. Hence, this writ petition by the petitioner assailing the validity of the Government Order G.O. Ms. No. 224, Law (LA&J-Courts.C) Department, dated 29-8-1997 and the proceedings of the High Court Rc.No. 316/92-Vigilance Cell, dated 15-7-1996.
5. We have heard Sri G. Vedantha Rao, learned senior Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader for Home for the State Government and Sri C.V. Nagarjuna Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the High Court.
6. Sri G. Vedantha Rao, learned senior Counsel would contend that both the charges framed against the petitioner are as vague as it could be lacking any material particulars and details. The learned Counsel would point out that the allegation that the petitioner took recourse to extra-judicial considerations and dishonest means and corrupt practices and thereby adjudicated upon the Original Petition No. 22 of 1988 with mala fide intention is totally unintelligible and it does not make any sense in the absence of particulars and on that count itself, the disciplinary action is liable to be set at naught. The learned Counsel would further contend that both the Enquiry Officer and the High Court found that the first charge framed against the petitioner was not proved. In that view of the matter, the respondents ought to have seen that the second charge levelled against the petitioner that he supplemented a judgment could not be sustained independently from that of the first charge because there was a direct nexus between the first charge and the second charge; the demolition of the first charge would lead to automatic extinction of the second charge. The learned Counsel would continue and contend that the second charge is only a corollary of and incidental to the first charge end since the first charge is held not proved, the second charge should fall to the ground and it should also be held not proved. The learned Counsel would alternatively contend that even assuming that the petitioner supplemented the judgment after dictation of the draft judgment to the Steno-Typist, that act without anything further can never be treated as a misconduct on the part of the petitioner warranting disciplinary action on that count. The learned senior Counsel would next contend that the respondents have utterly failed to notice that a judgment pronounced in open Court is the first judicial act after the hearing of the case and everything else, until then, is done out of Court and is not intended to be the operative act. The learned Counsel would contend that a Judge has the liberty to change his mind in the decision-making process after initial dictation of a judgment in a case out of the Court till he delivers the judgment in the open Court. The learned Counsel would take exception to the opinion of the High Court arrived at on the basis of the draft judgment transcribed by the stenographer in the presence of the District Judge, West Godavari District in the wake of the preliminary enquiry. The learned Counsel would submit that the opinion of the High Court that the petitioner delegated his judicial power to the stenographer is totally baseless and misconceived. The learned Counsel would alternatively contend that there is absolutely no legal evidence to substantiate charge No. 2. The learned Counsel would also point out that the departmental enquiry conducted by the respondents bristles with many procedural flaws and violation of principles of natural justice. The learned Counsel would point out that in the enquiry neither the complainants nor the Assistant Government Pleader who could have been material witnesses in the case were examined as witnesses to prove the charges. The learned Counsel would highlight that the statement of the steno-typist recorded in the preliminary enquiry was treated as substantive evidence in the regular departmental enquiry without examining the steno-typist and without making the statement given by him in the preliminary enquiry in the disciplinary proceedings and this procedure adopted by the Enquiry Officer is wholly violative of principles of natural justice and fair play in action.
7. The learned Government Pleader for Home appearing for the State Government and Sri C. V. Nagarjuna Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the High Court, on the other hand, would support the disciplinary action taken against the petitioner by the Government on the recommendation of the High Court. The learned Counsel for the respondents would contend that while reviewing the validity of disciplinary action taken by the government on the basis of the recommendation of the High Court on the administrative side, this Court on judicial side cannot act as an appellate authority and substitute its opinion in the place of the opinion reached by the disciplinary authority even assuming that from the same set of facts and evidence adduced in the departmental enquiry, two views are possible. The learned Counsel would highlight about the limitation and scope of judicial review of disciplinary actions.
8. It is true, as rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the respondents, that by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court and this Court and other High Courts, the scope of judicial review of disciplinary action has been circumscribed and limited. It is now well settled that while reviewing the disciplinary action taken by an employer against a delinquent employee, the Court cannot go into the question of adequacy or inadequacy or sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence on the basis of which findings are recorded by the Enquiring authority and/ or the disciplinary authority. If the findings are based on some legal evidence, the reviewing Courts are not entitled to interfere with the findings. The finding of fact recorded by the Enquiry Officer/Disciplinary authority cannot be reversed on re-appreciation of evidence on record. The judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merit. The High Court in the proceedings under Article 226 does not act as an appellate authority but exercises within the limits of judicial review to correct the error of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice as held by the Apex Court in Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Bhola Nath Singh, . The High Court cannot sit over the judgment of the disciplinary authority while exercising discretion under Article 226, but it has duty to see that conclusions reached by the disciplinary authority are based on some legal evidence and they do not suffer from any patent error. Though the High Court cannot sit over the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer/ Disciplinary authority, while exercising the writ jurisdiction, but, it has a legal duty to see that the findings/conclusions recorded by the Enquiry Officer/Disciplinary Authority are based on substantive legal evidence and they are not perverse and they do not suffer from any patent errors on the face of the record. The Court can interfere with disciplinary actions only (i) where it finds that departmental enquiry was conducted in utter violation of principles of natural justice resulting in miscarriage of justice; (ii) where the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and/or the disciplinary authority are not supported by any legal evidence and (iii) where the penalty imposed on the delinquent official is shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct proved against him, and not on any other ground. As often said and reiterated, the judicial review is not against the decision as such, but against the decision-making process. The Supreme Court in H.B. Gandhi v. Gopi Nath and others, (1992) Supp. (2) SCC 313, observed:
"Judicial review, it is trite, is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision making process. Judicial review cannot extend to the examination of the correctness or reasonableness of a decision as a matter of fact. The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the authority after according fair treatment reaches, on a matter which it is authorised by law to decide, a conclusion which correct in the eyes of the law. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It will be erroneous to think that the Court sits in judgment not only on the correctness of the decision making process but also on the correctness of the decision itself."
9. In the premise of the above parameters of judicial review of disciplinary action, let us proceed to consider the contentions of the learned Counsel. The first contention is that the charges framed against the petitioner are very vague, lacking in material particulars and details. Since the charge No. 1 is held not proved both by the Enquiry Officer and the High Court, there is no necessity to refer to the Charge No. 1 vis-a-vis, the contention of the learned senior Counsel that the charge is also as vague as it could be. In dealing with the contention of the learned senior Counsel, it is appropriate at the outset to note the requirements of a proper and valid charge-sheet. It is trite that charge-sheet is the charter of disciplinary action. The domestic/ departmental enquiry commences with the service of the charge-sheet. In other words, before proceeding with the departmental or domestic enquiry against a delinquent official, he must be informed clearly, precisely and accurately of the charges levelled against him. The charge-sheet should specifically set out all charges which the delinquent is called upon to show-cause against and should also state all relevant particulars and details without which he cannot defend himself. The object of this requirement is that the delinquent employee must know what he is charged with and have the adequate opportunity to meet the charge and to defend himself by giving a proper explanation, after knowing the nature of the offence or misconduct with which he is charged; otherwise it will amount to his being condemned unheard. Fair hearing pre-supposes a precise and definite catalogue of charges so that the person charged may understand and effectively meet it. If the charges are imprecise and indefinite or vague or unintelligible, the person charged could not be able to understand them and defend himself effectively and in those circumstances, the subsequent enquiry would not be a fair and just enquiry. The charged official ought to be informed of the charges levelled against him as also the grounds upon which they are based. Charge of misconduct should not be vague. The charge-sheet must be specific and must set out all the necessary particulars and details irrespective of the fact whether the delinquent knows it or not, he must be told about the charges and it was not his duty to connect the charge-sheet with his alleged understanding or knowledge of the charge. However, it is true that the charge need not be framed with the precision of a charge in criminal proceeding. But, at the same time, it must not be vague or so general as to make it impossible of being traversed. Therefore, the test is whether the charge conveys to the delinquent employee, the exact nature of the alleged misconduct in a way that would enable him to meet the charge effectively. It is well established that if a vague charge is given to a delinquent, it is a fatal defect, which vitiates the entire proceedings. It is also relevant to notice that the vagueness in the charge is not excused on the plea that the employee concerned should be deemed to have known the facts correctly. It should not be left to the delinquent official to find out or imagine what the charges against him are and if is for the employer to frame specific charges with full particulars.
10. In the instant case, two charges are framed against the petitioner and we have extracted the charges (1) and (2) framed against the petitioner above. The graveman of Charge No. 2 is that the petitioner delegated his judicial authority to the steno-typist whose duties are only ministerial in nature and the petitioner did so actuated and prompted by "dishonest means and corrupt practices and extra judicial considerations". The Charge No. 2 does not disclose the material particulars and details on the basis of which the disciplinary authority chose to attribute misconduct of delegating judicial authority to the steno-typist prompted by "dishonest means and corrupt practices and extra-judicial considerations". In other words, the disciplinary authority has not appraised the affected - the delinquent petitioner with details as to the alleged "dishonest means and corrupt practices and the details of extra-judicial considerations". These allegations levelled against the petitioner, we should state, are as vague as they could be and they are incapable of being understood intelligibly. Further, although the High Court on receipt of the report of the Enquiry Officer exonerating the petitioner on both the charges chose to differ with the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer on Charge No. 2 and to issue notice to the petitioner dated 19-7-1993 calling upon the petitioner to show-cause as to why the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer on Charge No. 2 should not be disagreed with and why the said Charge No. 2 should not, for the reasons recorded in the Annexure appended to the show-cause notice, be held proved, quite curiously, did not even state a word in the Annexure regarding the dishonest means and corrupt practices adopted by the petitioner-delinquent in deciding OP No. 22 of 1988 and the alleged extra-judicial consideration on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, as rightly contended by the learned senior Counsel for the petitioner, the Charge No. 2 framed against the petitioner is as vague as it could be, imprecise and unintelligible. In view of this finding, it is needless to state that the superstructure built upon this invalid charge-memo should also fall to the ground. In other words, the enquiry held by the Enquiry Officer/Disciplinary Authority and even the final order passed by the Government on the basis of the recommendations made by the High Court are liable to be declared as invalid and illegal only on that ground.
11. Two charges framed against the petitioner-delinquent, as pointed out supra, are not intelligible and they are framed in defective English language. Be that as it may, if one dissects these two charges, the crux of the allegations levelled against the petitioner was that he, as a Judge, picked up OP No. 22 of 1988 involving high stakes in respect of large extent of land admeasuring Ac. 29.33 cts of land and 44 coconut trees and tried that OP "in pursuance of a mala fide deal" entered into between the petitioner, the claimants and their advocates and the then Assistant Government Pleader, and in pursuance of such mala fide deal, the petitioner hastily completed the enquiry within a period of seven days and judgment was delivered on 18-2-1992, that is to say, within a period of 29 days from the commencement of the enquiry on 20-1-1992. That is the crux of Charge No. 1. The crux of Charge No. 2 is that the draft judgment in OP No. 22 of 1988 contained in the shorthand note book of the then steno-typist as transcribed by him in the course of preliminary enquiry conducted by the learned District Judge, West Godavari District, does not tally with the judgment pronounced by the petitioner in the open Court on 18-2-1992, and it so happened, because the petitioner had instructed the stenographer to make certain additions relating to documents and evidence of witnesses and thereby the petitioner was guilty of delegating his judicial authority, duty and responsibility to the stenographer whose duties are only of ministerial in nature. The second charge also accuses the petitioner that he delegated the judicial authority to the stenographer for "extra judicial considerations and dishonest means and corrupt practices". Let us stop for a while here. Although Charge Nos. 1 and 2 repeatedly refer to "mala fide deal" entered into between the petitioner, the claimants and their Counsel as well as the then Assistant Government Pleader for "extra judicial consideration and dishonest means and corrupt practices" on the part of the petitioner, not a word is said either in the charge memo or in the Annexure appended to the show-cause notice dated 19-7-1993 issued by the High Court as to what is the nature of the "deal" or what are the "extra-judicial considerations", and what are "dishonest means and corrupt practices" employed by the petitioner. The second charge should sink or stand with the first charge and it cannot have an independent existence. We say this, because, if we put the allegations contained in both the charges together, what transpires is that in order to favour the claimants, the petitioner took up the trial of OP No. 22 of 1988 out of turn and hastily tried it and judgment was pronounced and in that process, the steno-typist was used to summarise the documents and the oral evidence in the judgment and the whole thing was done by the petitioner for alleged but undisclosed "extraneous considerations". If the first charge that the petitioner picked up OP No. 22 of 1988 and tried the same for extraneous consideration fails, naturally, the same allegations contained in Charge No. 2 should also fail, because in both the charges the allegation against the petitioner was that he did the alleged acts for "extra judicial considerations" and employing "dishonest means and corrupt practices". The second charge levelled against the petitioner cannot stand or sustain itself independent of the first charge. The primordium of both the charges is the same and there is a direct nexus between the first and the second charge. It is trite to state that the second charge is therefore only an incidental to and corollary of the first charge. Therefore, when the first charge is held to be not proved, by logic and reason, the second charge too as regards extra judicial considerations and dishonest means and corrupt practices attributed to the petitioner should fail. If the first charge is held not proved and the second charge too as regards the allegation of extra-judicial considerations and dishonest means and corrupt practices attributed to the petitioners should be held not proved, what remains in the second charge is the alleged delegation of judicial authority to the steno-typist in the preparation of the judgment. It is not necessary for us to minutely dissect the judgment transcribed by the steno-typist in the course of preliminary enquiry before the learned District Judge, West Godavari District and the judgment pronounced by the petitioner in the open Court on 18-2-1992. Even assuming that as pointed out by the High Court in the Annexure to the show-cause notice dated 19-7-1993, there are certain differences between the final judgment delivered by the petitioner on 18-2-1992 and the draft judgment transcribed by the steno in the course of preliminary enquiry, that fact itself would never be a ground to conclude that the substance of the judgment was prepared by the steno-typist and not by the petitioner-judicial officer. At this juncture itself, it is relevant to notice that the Enquiry Officer in his report, on appreciation of the oral evidence of the stenographer, both in examination in chief and in cross-examination, has recorded the: finding:--
"I am of the opinion, that there is no substantial change, whatever, in the language employed in the operative part, i.e., relief para of both the judgments, either in the language, or wording used, as well as the figures, as to the enhanced compensation, etc., used in both the judgments. Likewise, also, in my opinion, there is no substantial difference, whatever, at all, in the language used, or employed, in the other paragraphs mentioned in para 44, supra, wherein the respective corresponding paragraphs, found to be tallying with each other, were mentioned. Throughout both the judgments, there is no change in the figures, by way of amounts of the compensation, solatium, etc., used".
12. The Enquiry Officer has also referred to the admission made by the steno in the cross-examination and opined that there is no change in the resultant paras of both the judgments and also in the figures occurring in both the judgments. It is true that as could be seen from the Annexure appended by the High Court to the show-cause notice dated 19-7-1993, there are certain variations, we should state, minor variations in the two draft judgments. Merely because one finds some differences in the draft judgments dictated by the judicial officer outside the Court and transcribed by the steno and the final judgment delivered in the open Court by the judicial officer, it is totally impermissible and unreasonable for anyone to infer that the variations came to be incorporated in the final judgment delivered in the open Court for some extraneous considerations, kind-wise or otherwise. One can take judicial notice of the fact that a Judge while he is in the process of decision-making reflects on the issue before him, may change his initial opinion; alter even the reliefs to be granted. The liberty as well as power of judicial officer to decide a lis independently and solely on the merits of the matter and in accordance with law and in terms of the dictates of the judicious conscience of the Judge and good faith, in our considered opinion, include the liberty and the power to correct, modify and change the draft judgments dictated to a stenographer or a steno-typist at any point of time before pronouncement of the judgment in the open Court. Of course, such a power would not be conceded to a judicial Officer if he chooses to dictate the final judgment or order in the open Court and grants some relief to the parties to the litigation, and, such relief cannot be subsequently altered by the Judge behind the back of the parties and without giving them notice before he signs the altered or modified judgment. That is not the situation of this case. However, the High Court finding some minor difference in the two judgments, the draft and the final judgments, as regards paras (1) to (10) and (14), has jumped to the conclusion that the petitioner delegated the judicial authority to the stenographer in the matter of preparation of the judgment, The High Court reached such opinion without reference to and consideration of the provisions of Section 2(9) read with Order XX, Rules 1, 3 and 4 of CPC.
13. In reaching that opinion the High Court has laid more stress on the transcribed judgment prepared by the Stenographer in the presence of the learned District Judge, West Godavari district on 27-4-1992 in the course of the preliminary enquiry and for the reason that the draft judgment differs in certain respects with the judgment ultimately pronounced by the petitioner in the open Court. From this circumstance, the High Court attributed undisclosed extra judicial considerations and corrupt practices against the petitioner. Therefore, the question that arises for consideration is whether the High Court acted legally in drawing such inference and justified in attributing mala fide deals and corrupt practices and extraneous considerations to the petitioner-judicial officer. In dealing with this question, it is appropriate for the Court to briefly refer to the term "judgment" defined in Section 2(9) and Order XX, Rules 1, 3 and 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 2(9) reads-
"2(9). "Judgment" means the statement given by the Judge on the grounds of a decree or order".
14. The Supreme Court in Vidyacharan v. Khubchand, , has opined that the essential element of a judgment is that there should be a statement of the grounds of the decision. A judgment stands on a different footing from an 'order' and a 'decree'. The words 'formal expression' are not used in the definition of 'judgment' which are used in the definition of 'decree' and 'order'. Therefore, no statement need be given by the Judge in a decree. Almost similar view was taken by the Rajasthan High Court in Boards and Boads v. Himachal Paper (Machinery), .
Order XX, Rules 1, 3 and 4 read-
"XX. (1). Judgment when pronounced-The Court, after the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment in open Court, either at once or, as soon thereafter as may be practicable, on some future day; and when the judgment is to be pronounced on some future day, the Court shall fix a day for that purpose, of which due notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders :
Provided that where the judgment is not pronounced at once, every endeavour shall be made by the Court to pronounce the judgment within fifteen days from the date on which the hearing of the case was concluded but, where it is not practicable so to do, the Court shall fix a future day for the pronouncement of the judgment, and such day shall not . ordinarily be a day beyond thirty days from the date on which the hearing of the case was concluded, and due notice of the day so fixed shall be given to the parties or their Pleaders;
Provided further that where a judgment is not pronounced within thirty days from the date on which the hearing of the case was concluded, the Court shall record the reasons for such delay and shall fix a future day on which the judgment will be pronounced and due notice of the day so fixed shall be given to the parties or their pleaders.
(2) xxx (3) Judgment to be signed--The judgment shall be dated and signed by the Judge in open Court at the time of pronouncing it, and when once signed, shall not afterwards be altered or added to, save as provided by section 152 or on review, (4) Judgments of Small Cause Courts-
(1) Judgments of a Court of Small Causes need not contain more than the points for determination and the decision thereon.
(2) Judgment of the other Courts--judgments of other Courts shall contain a concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision, thereon and the reasons for such decision".
15. What emerges from the provisions of Rules 1, 3 and 4 of Order XX CPC is that there shall be a judgment which shall contain the concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for such decision and such judgment shall be pronounced in the open Court after due notice to the parties or their pleaders and then dated and signed in open Court at the time of pronouncing it and once so dated and signed it shall not afterwards be altered or added to, save as otherwise provided by Section 152 of CPC or on review.
16. In Surendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, , the question whether a "judgment" could validly be delivered after the death of the two Judges who heard the Appeal, arose for decision before the Apex Court. In that case the appellants before the Supreme Court were the accused and they were prosecuted for the murder of one Babu Singh. Of these, Mr. Surendra Singh alone was convicted of the murder and was sentenced to death. The other two were convicted under Section 225 of the IPC and each was sentenced to 3 years rigorous imprisonment and to a fine of Rs. 200/-. All the three accused appealed to the High Court of Allahabad (Lucknow Bench) and the appeal was heard on 11-12-1952 by Kidwal and Bhargava, JJ. judgment was reserved. Before it could be delivered, Bhargava, J., was transferred to Allahabad. While there he dictated a "judgment" purporting to do so on behalf of himself and his brother Judge, that is to say, it purported to be a joint judgment, he used the pronoun "we" and not "1". He signed every page of the "judgment" as well as at the end but did not date it. He then sent this to Kidwal, J., at Lucknow. He died on 24-12-1952 before the "judgment" was delivered. After his dealh, on 5-1-1953 his brother Judge Kidwal, J., purported to deliver the "judgment" of the Court. He signed it and dated it. The date he placed on it was 5-1-1953, Bhargava, J's., signature was still there and anyone reading the judgment and not knowing the facts would conclude that Bhargava, J., was a party to the delivery on 5-1-1953. The appeal was dismissed and the sentence of death was confirmed. In the background of that fact situation and dealing with the question already noticed above, the Apex Court held-
"In our opinion, a judgment within the meaning of these sections is the final decision of the Court intimated to the parties and to the world at large by formal "pronouncement" or "delivery" in open Court. It is a judicial act which must be performed in a judicial way. Small irregularities in the manner of pronouncement or the mode of delivery do not matter but the substance of the thing must be there; that can neither be blurred nor left to inference and conjecture nor can it be vague. All the rest the manner in which it is to be recorded, the way in which it is to be authenticated, the signing and the reading, all the rules designed to secure certainty about the content and matter -can be cured; but not the hard core, namely the formal intimation of the decision and its contents formally declared in a judicial way in open Court. The exact way in which this is done does not matter. In some Courts the judgment is delivered orally or read out in some only the operative portion is pronounced, in some the judgment is merely signed after giving notice to the parties and laying the draft on the table for a given number of days for inspection.
An important point therefore arises. It is evident that the decision which is so pronounced or intimated must be a declaration of the mind of the Court as it is at the time of pronouncement. We lay no stress on the mode or manner of delivery, as that is not of the essence, except to say that it must be done in a judicial way in open Court. But however it is done it must be an expression of the mind of the Court at the time of delivery. We say this because that is the first judicial act touching the judgment which the Court performs after the hearing. Everything else up till then is done out of Court and is not intended to be the operative act which sets all the consequences which follow on the judgment in motion. Judges may, and often do, discuss the matter among themselves and reach a tentative conclusion. That is not their judgment. They may write and exchange drafts. Those are not the judgments either, however heavily and often they may have been signed. The final operative act is that which is formally declared in open Court with the intention of making it the operative decision of the Court. That is what constitutes the "judgment".
Now up to the moment the judgment is delivered Judges have the right to change their mind. There is a sort of 'locus paenitentiae' and indeed last minute alteration often do occur. Therefore, however much a draft judgment may have been signed beforehand, it is nothing but a draft till formally delivered as the judgment of the Court. Only then does it crystallise into a full fledged judgment and becomes operative....."
17. From the above judgment of the Apex Court, certain ground principles emerge. They can be summarized as follows:
(1) A judgment embodies the expression of the mind of the Court at the time of pronouncing it in the open Court. A draft prepared is not a judgment however heavily or often it may have been sized. It does not become a judgment, unless it is delivered in open Court with the intention of making it to the operative decision of the Court.
(2) Once pronounced, it becomes a judgment but until signed, the Judge may freely alter or amend it or even change it completely without any further formality except notice to the parties and a rehearing on the point of change, should that be necessary.
(3) But after it has been signed, it shall not be altered or added to save as provided by Section 152 of CPC or on review.
(4) Small irregularities in the manner of pronouncement or the mode of delivery, the manner in which it is to be recorded or the ways in which it is to be authenticated, the signing or the sealing, all the rules designed to secure certainty about its content and matter, do not matter. These can be cured. But what cannot be cured is the 'hard core' e.g., the formal intimation of the decision and its contents formally declared in a judicial way in open Court.
18. In Chowaran Bachan v. Thanuram, , a suit was instituted on 10-9-1954 for recovery of Rs. 16,000/-. The parties' evidence was closed on 1-12-1956. After arguments, the Court fixed the case for judgment on 11-12-1956. On that date it was adjourned to 14-12-1956 on the ground that judgment was not ready. The order sheet of 14-12-1956 read-
"Plaintiff by Shri Shukla and Pande and Dass, defendants 1 to 3 by Shri Patankar, defendant No. 4 by Shri Agarwal, judgment delivered".
Sri R.L. Gupta the Presiding Judge pf the Court died on 25-12-1956. On 26-12-1956 the judgment, which was on record and bore the date 11-12-1956 was found by the Second Civil Judge, Sri M.M. Dubey, in the office box of the deceased officer. The judgment was kept in a sealed envelope and it was opened on 3-1-1957 in the presence of the District Judge. That judgment did not bear the signature of the deceased Judge and only bore the typed date '11-12-1956' and concluded with paragraph- "In the result the suit fails and it is dismissed with parties costs on the plaintiff. Counsel fee Rs. 850/-". On 3-1-1957, Sri M.M. Dubey, the II Civil Judge, Durg, appended the following note to the judgrnent-
"I certify that this judgment was found in the office box of Sri K.L. Gupta, Additional District Judge (who expired on 25-12-1956) by me on 26-12-1956. I had sealed it and kept it with the Nazir. The envelope is opened today in the presence of the District Judge. The order sheet of the suit shows that the judgment was delivered on 14-12-1956 in the presence of the Counsel (Shri D.P. Agarwal, Shri C.W. Patankar and Shri Manohar Dass), who confirm this fact. The judgment was left unsigned by the Judge".
The Steno-typist of the Judge was examined in the Madhya Pradesh High Court on 31-12-1957. His evidence was that a part of the judgment was dictated on 11-12-1956 and the rest on 14-12-1956. After the first part of the judgment was over, it was typed on 11-12-1956. It was up to para 8. The second part of the dictation was typed by him on 14-12-1956. That portion was not typed in continuation of the paragraph 8, but was a rough draft. It was prepared at about 4.15 p.m., on 14-12-1956. It was given by him to the Judge along with the judgment which was then typed up to paragraph 8. The Judge gave him a corrected draft on 16-12-1956 for typing it fair. He further stated that the judgment was so typed on the same day, he having continued the fair typing after paragraph 8 and handed over the fair judgment and the draft with the corrections to the Judge who told him that he would peruse the judgment as typed by him and make corrections if necessary. He did not see the draft thereafter and the Judge passed away on 25-12-1956. At the top of the judgment, he had put the date 11-12-1956 thinking that it would be delivered on that date. At the end of the judgment he should have typed 14-12-1956 instead of 11-12-1956. He further stated that the Judge (Shri Gupta) at the time of delivery of the judgment in Civil Suit No. 12A of 1954, informed the Counsel that the judgment was being typed. He, however, announced in open Court in the presence of the Counsel for the parties that the suit was dismissed.
19. In the premise of the above facts it was contended for the plaintiff-applicant that there was no delivery of judgment in the eye of law and the unsigned judgment found in the office box on 26-12-1996, after his death, could not be said to be valid and legal judgment disposing of the suit. On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the defendants that a judgment dismissing the suit with costs was announced orally and consequently the non-signing of the judgment by the presiding Judge Sri R.L. Gupta, which in effect dismissed the suit with costs, was a mere irregularity which did not touch upon the merits of the case and the judgment so pronounced could not be rendered a nullity. The Madhya Pradesh High Court on consideration of the rival contentions held that declaration by a Judge of his intention of what his 'judgment' is going to be or declaration of his intention of what the final result is going to embody is not a judgment until he has crystallised his intention into a formal shape and pronounced it in open Court as the final expression of his mind.
20. It has been the consistent stand of the petitioner that he never looked into the shorthand notes taken by the Stenographer and, therefore, the disciplinary authority could not look at the shorthand notes as part of the judgment delivered by him in the open Court. In appreciating this plea of the petitioner, it is appropriate to refer to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Matheran Steam Light Tramway v. Lang, AIR 1927 Bom. 113. In that case a question as to whether unapproved and uncorrected notes dictated to the shorthand writer did or did not constitute a final decision of the Judge, and, therefore, not a judgment, arose for decision. Considering the facts and circumstances of that case, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that short-hand notes dictated by the Judge while preparing the judgment, which has never been approved by the Judge, cannot be said as part of his actual judgment. While holding so, the Division Bench observed :--
"Under the circumstances, we hold that the issue which we directed to be raised should be answered in the affirmative. The judgment in question will be that contained in the above letter of April 28, for we are unable to accept the shorthand notes which have never been approved by the learned Judge as being part of his actual judgment. They may be looked at as reasons which were at one time passing through his mind. But they cannot, in our opinion, be looked at as part of the technical judgment delivered by the learned Judge.....:
21. It is also pertinent to note that the Supreme Court in Surendra Singh's case (supra) laid down the principle that the judgment pronounced in open Court is the first judicial act after the hearing of the case and everything else until then is done out of Court and is not intended to be the operative act. The Court further held that mere signing of the draft does not indicate a closed mind and it would be against public policy to leave the door open for an investigation.
22. The High Court has opined that on a reading of the judgment transcribed by the stenographer in the course of the preliminary enquiry before the District Judge, West Godavari and the judgment actually delivered by the petitioner in the open Court, the only conclusion, which could be drawn, is that the authors of the two are totally different. The inference sought to be drawn by the High Court does not have the support of the evidence of the Stenographer. The stenographer in his evidence in the course of cross-examination in paragraphs 6 and 7 has stated that on 18-2-1992, the judgment in OP No. 22 of 1988 was dictated to him by the petitioner and that he took it in shorthand as dictated by the petitioner and transcribed the same into longhand. Be that as it may, as pointed out supra, the Judge's action in one-go or phases in the decision-making would fructify into a judgment within the meaning of Section 2(9) of CPC only when a judgment is delivered in the open Court and till then every act preceding that final act cannot be equated to a judgment within the meaning of that term as defined under Section 2(9) read with Rules 1, 3 and 4 of Order XX, of CPC. In other words, simply because one finds difference or discrepancy in the judgment transcribed by a Stenographer in pursuance of a dictation of the judgment by the Judge outside the Court and the final judgment that may be delivered by the Judge in the open Court, it will be totally unreasonable and unjust to infer that such difference is the outcome of a "mala fide deal, extra-judicial considerations and corrupt practices" on the part of the Judge. In the instant case, as already pointed out, both the Enquiry Officer and the High Court have held that Charge No. 1, which alleges that the petitioner hastily picked up LA OP No. 22/88 for enquiry and trial and delivered the judgment within a period of 29 days from the date of commencement of the enquiry in pursuance of a 'mala fide deal entered into between the petitioner, claimants and their advocates and also the then AGP and for extra-judicial considerations, is not proved. The second charge also attributes such "mala fide deal, extra-judicial considerations, dishonest means and corrupt practices" to the petitioner. If that part of the allegation made against the petitioner in charge Nos. 1 and 2 is held not proved, the mere fact that there is some discrepancy or difference in the judgment dictated to the Stenographer and the actual final judgment delivered by the petitioner in the open Court would not constitute any misconduct on the part of the petitioner, particularly, in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Surendra Singh 's case (supra) and the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Chowaram Banchan 's case (supra), with which we are in respectful agreement.
23. The finding recorded by the High Court in relation to charge No. 2 is based on the fact that paragraphs 1 to 10 and 14 of the judgment pronounced in the open Court are not found in the transcription made by the Stenographer in the course of the preliminary enquiry conducted by the learned District Judge, West Godavari District. It is relevant to notice that these paragraphs do not relate to the material part of the judgment, that is to say, the issues for decision, the discussion of the documentary and oral evidence, the arguments of the parties and the findings and conclusions recorded by the Judge and the relief granted by the Judge. These paragraphs exclusively relate to the pleadings/claims and counter-claims of the parties. It is also relevant to notice that possibility that in taking down the dictation outside Court, the Stenographer might have taken the dictation relating to the pleadings/claims-counter claims of the parties in some other dictation note book or some lose sheets cannot be ruled out. The second possibility is that the Judge without dictating the facts/claims and counter claims of the parties first would have proceed to dictate the material parts of the judgment thinking that he would later dictate the facts of the case before preparation of the final draft. The third possibility is that the petitioner Judge might have instructed the Stenographer to extract the pleadings of the parties as they are in order to save time of the Court. Even assuming that in the present case such instructions were issued by the petitioner-Judge to his Stenographer, from that circumstance itself, it cannot be said that the petitioner-Judge delegated his judicial power or authority of decision-making to the Stenographer. At the most, it can be considered to be taking assistance from the Stenographer in preparation of the judgment. The Courts have made distinction between taking assistance and delegation of power, and therefore, both of them cannot be treated as the same. The High Court has lost sight of the above noted probabilities. Be that as it may, even assuming that the petitioner-Judge subsequently added paras 1 to 10 and 14 to the draft judgment earlier dictated by him to the stenographer, that act itself would not constitute a misconduct. On the other hand, a Judge has liberty as well as power to modify, clarify, amend, add and delete any part of the draft judgment at any point of time and any number of times according to his judicial conviction and dictates of what he thinks just and right, before he actually pronounces the judgment in open Court. That power is an essential as well as inseparable component of the power of decision-making vested in any Judge and if that power is not allowed, we are afraid, Judges would not be able to deliver judgments to the dictates of their judicious conscience and good faith. Judicious conscience and good faith of a Judge cannot be imprisoned in a jacket of slavery by accepting the reasoning adopted by the High Court in this case.
24. It is very pertinent to notice that no oral or documentary evidence was led by the disciplinary authority to prove the crux of charge No. 2 that the petitioner delegated his judicial authority to the Stenographer in preparation of the judgment for "extra-judicial consideration" by resorting to "dishonest means and corrupt practices". The evidence of Mr. K. Gangadhar Rao., the Stenographer, is of no help to the disciplinary authority to prove the crux of the allegations contained in charge No. 2. Mr. Gangadhara Rao, in his cross-examination, in paragraphs 6, 7, 9, 10 and 11 states-
"6. On 18-2-1992, the judgment in OP No. 22 of 1988 was dictated to me by Sri Wilson, I took it in shorthand as dictated by him, and transcribed the same into long hand.
7. I stated before Sri Venkateswara Rao gam, District Judge, West Godavari, on 27-4-1992, inter alia, as that on 18-2-1992, the subordinate Judge, Tadepalligudem, dictated the order in OP No. 22 of 1988 to me, and I took down it in the shorthand from pages 9 to 15 and that, I transcribed the same and handed it over to the officer, for his signature and that, it was pronounced on 18-2-1992, in open Court.
9. It is true, that I have no capacity to prepare or draft for myself, any judgment in Land Acquisition OPs., by discussing for myself, the evidence and other material. I can add, as per the instructions of the Officer, certain portions like part of deposition, or gist of documents, placitum of rulings and the like. If the Officer wants me to type, I will type such matters.
10. It is true, that, neither in the draft dictated to me and typed before the District Judge, West Godavari, on 27-4-1992, nor in the actually pronounced judgment of Sri Wilson, there is no change in the result paras thereof and also in the figures in all of them.
11. As per the instructions of the Officer, while transcribing to meet the sequence, while transcribing, I will be correcting, on type, spelling mistakes, if any, and grammatical mistakes while typing draft, because, after corrections, it will go for fair judgment".
As could be seen from paragraph 10, the Stenographer clearly admits that there is no change in the draft judgment dictated to him by the petitioner which he transcribed before the District Judge, West Godavari and the judgment pronounced by the petitioner in the open Court, Should it be noticed, there is a serious flaw in the enquiry conducted by the disciplinary authority. The stenographer's note book in which he took the dictation was not at all produced or marked during the course of the enquiry. It is also not known whether the Stenographer had transcribed the entire draft judgment dictated by the petitioner or transcribed only part of it. Therefore, in view of the admission made by the Stenographer in the cross-examination and in the absence of Stenographer's note book being produced in the course of the enquiry, it cannot be said with certainty that what the Stenographer transcribed in the course of the preliminary enquiry conducted by the learned District Judge, West Godavari District correctly reflects the judgment actually dictated by the petitioner.
25. The enquiry conducted against the petitioner also suffers from another serious procedural flaw. The statement of the stenographer recorded by the learned District Judge, West Godavari District in the course of preliminary enquiry was treated as substantive evidence in the regular enquiry without examining the stenographer and marking the statement given by him in the preliminary enquiry and without giving any opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine the stenographer. This procedure adopted by the Enquiry Officer is clearly objectionable and in violation of principles of natural justice.
26. It is trite, the preliminary report was only to decide and assess whether it could be necessary to take disciplinary action against the petitioner-delinquent and it does not form any foundation for passing the order of removal against the petitioner-delinquent. This Court speaking through one of us. (S.R Nayak, J) in The Depot Manager v. Sri Mohd. Ismail and another, (DB), dealing with the nature of the preliminary enquiry and the evidentairy value of the materials and information collected in such enquiry held-
"Preliminary enquiry is neither a judicial nor a quasi-judicial act; it is purely an administrative action. The purpose of holding departmental enquiry is to decide whether the disciplinary action should or should not be taken against a delinquent employee. The said enquiry results in either punishment or exoneration of the employee concerned. On the other hand, the purpose of a preliminary enquiry is to find out whether there is sufficient justification for embarking on a full-fledged departmental enquiry against a particular employee. Such a preliminary enquiry does not result either in exoneration or punishment, but it merely guides the employer whether to proceed against a particular employee or not, and its purpose is to see whether a prima facie case is made out for issuing a charge-sheet calling for explanation. In other words, the purpose of preliminary enquiry is for the personal satisfaction of the Disciplinary Authority to enable him to come to a decision whether the matter should be dropped or any further action should be taken. It is also relevant to note that there is no obligation on the part of the Disciplinary Authority to disclose the materials and evidence collected in the course of the preliminary enquiry to the delinquent. There is no obligation cast on the Disciplinary Authority to disclose its findings in the preliminary enquiry. But, the satisfaction arrived at and the materials and the evidence collected in the preliminary enquiry may be a basis for initiating departmental enquiry and if the Disciplinary Authority wants to make use of the materials and evidence collected in the preliminary enquiry against the delinquent in the departmental enquiry, then, law requires that such materials and evidence should be disclosed to the delinquent and the delinquent should be given a reasonable opportunity to have his say regarding those materials".
27. It is well settled that the disciplinary authority cannot make use of any material or evidence collected by it in the course of preliminary enquiry against the delinquent official unless those materials and evidence are produced and proved in accordance with law in the regular departmental enquiry and the delinquent employee is given a fair opportunity to meet those adverse materials and evidence. In the instant case this well settled rule governing departmental enquiry is completely breached. On that count also, the departmental enquiry conducted against the petitioner is vitiated.
28. A departmental enquiry conducted for the purpose of disciplinary action against a public servant is not an empty formality. It is a serious proceeding intended to give the delinquent a chance to meet the charges and prove his innocence. The right of the delinquent officer to cross-examine witnesses who give evidence against him is a valuable right and in order to effectively exercise this right, it is necessary that the examination-in-chief of the witnesses should be recorded in the presence of the party against whom the deposition is made. An enquiry wherein examination-in-chief has been recorded in the absence of the person charged though he is allowed to cross-examine the witness, cannot be said to have been held in accordance with the rules of natural justice. This position is well settled by the judgments of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. T.R. Varma, , Jagdish Prasad Saxana v. State of Madhya Bharat, AIR 1961 SC 1070, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Chintaman Sadasiva, AIR 1961 SC 1623 and a catena of other decisions to follow. The Calcutta High Court in Choudhury v. Union of India and others, 1957-I LLJ 494 (Cal.), where the concerned employee was confronted with the evidence of the witnesses examined behind his back and where some of such witnesses were not tendered for cross-examination held that the enquiry was vitiated by violation of principles of natural justice and the dismissal order based on such enquiry must be held to be invalid.
29. The High Court in recording the finding against the petitioner has made use of the statement of the Stenographer recorded in the preliminary enquiry. In the first place, the statement given by the Stenographer in the course of the preliminary enquiry behind the back of the petitioner cannot be treated as a piece of legal evidence to record an adverse finding against the petitioner. Secondly, that statement of the Stenographer given in the preliminary enquiry has to be taken with a pinch of salt, particularly in the light of the evidence of the Stenographer in paras 6, 9, 10 and 11, which cumulatively would go to show that the judgment delivered by the petitioner in the open Court was prepared by the I petitioner himself and not by anyone else. The finding recorded by the High Court on charge No. 2, in our considered opinion, is based on conjectures and surmises and not on any permissible substantive legal evidence. The finding is, therefore, vitiated and consequently the disciplinary action taken by the High Court and the Government of Andhra Pradesh against the petitioner cannot be sustained.
30. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, we allow this writ petition and quash the impugned proceedings. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner into service forthwith. The petitioner is also entitled to all service benefits and advantages, pecuniary and otherwise, flowing from the quashing of the impugned disciplinary proceedings and action. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.