National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Vera Developers Pvt Ltd vs Rupinder Kaur on 22 December, 2025
IN THE NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
NEW DELHI
SECOND APPEAL NO. 843 OF 2025
(Against the order dated 31.10.2025 in Appeal no.139 of 2025 of the State Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission, U T Chandigarh )
with
IA nos.14947 to 14949 of 2025 (Setting aside of ex parte, exemption from filing the certified copy,
exemption from dim documents)
Vera Developers Pvt. Ltd., and Anr. Appellants
Versus
Rupinder Kaur Respondent
BEFORE:
HON'BLE DR. INDER JIT SINGH, PRESIDING MEMBER
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE SUDHIR KUMAR JAIN, MEMBER
For the Appellant Mr Pravin Bahadur, Advocate (VC)
Mr Ashish Choudhury, Advocate
Dated : 22.12.2025
ORDER
1. Heard the counsel for the appellant. This Second Appeal has been filed challenging the order of the State Commission dated 31.10.2025 vide which, the appeal (First Appeal) filed by the appellant herein was dismissed on account of limitation having been filed with a delay of 417 days as per the State Commissions calculations. The period of delay is not in dispute by the appellant herein. The order of the District Forum was dated 03.01.2024 and the first free certified copy of the same was despatched on the same day itself.
2. Section 51 (2) envisages second appeal to this Commission involves any substantial questions of law and section 51 (3) states that no substantial questions of law needs to be listed in the memorandum of SA/843/2025 Page 1 of 9 ,1 appeal. In the present case substantial question of law has been stated which are reproduced as under:
(a) Whether dismissal solely on the ground of delay is justified even if there is gross miscarriage ofjustice?
(b) Whether technical considerations ought to be allowed to prevail over substantial justice, more so when gross miscarriage thereof is ex-facie apparent from the face of record?
(c) Whether technical considerations be permitted to prejudice the case of a genuine litigant acting under the bona fide impression that the time for commencement of availing requisite legal remedies has not lapsed?
What constitutes the substantial question of law, and how it differs from mere the question of law has been elaborated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandrabhan (Deceased) through LRs and Ors., vs Saraswati and Ors. 2022 SCC Online SC 1273.
3. We have carefully considered the orders of the State Commission in the light of the condonation of delay application filed by them before the State Commission seeking condonation of delay and other facts and circumstances of the case, relevant document in the light of various judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Commission, including the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon by the appellant herein which have been filed along with the Second Appeal. The State Commission has considered the matter at length and the rival contentions of both the sides on the condonation of delay and considered the application in the light of the various judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cited in the said judgments and came to the findings that the SA/843/2025 Page 2 of 9 appellant have failed to explain such delay in filing the first appeal before the State Commission.
4. The Appellant has challenged the orders of the State Commission on following grounds:
a) Because the SCDRC erred in dismissing the first appeal solely on the grounds of delay/ limitation, without proper consideration of the application for condonation of delay and the reasons advanced therein, contrary to the settled law that substantial justice should prevail over technicalities.
b) Because the SCDRC considered the application seeking condonation of delay in a lackadaisical manner and has rejected genuine reasons for delay in filing the First Appeal.
c) Because SCDRC ought to have considered that the remedy of appeal is a valuable right statutorily conferred upon an aggrieved person and therefore, purely on technical grounds of delay in filing the appeal, the said rights/remedy ought not to have been defeated/extinguished.
d) Because the Hon'ble State Commission failed to appreciate that the delay of 417 days (or 390 days as per office report) in filing the First Appeal occurred on account of bona fide and unavoidable circumstances and was neither deliberate nor intentional.
e) Because the Ld. State Commission failed to consider that the counsel who appeared before the Ld. DCDRC never informed the Appellants about the order dated 03.01.2024 and subsequently formally disassociated himself from the matter vide email dated
05.03.2024, thereby causing the Appellants to remain unaware of the impugned order.
f) Because the Ld. State Commission failed to consider that the Appellants were unable to retrieve the case file despite repeated efforts, owing to the unfortunate accident of their earlier counsel on 22.03.2024, which rendered him unavailable and incapacitated for a long period.
g) Because the Appellants came to know about the DCDRC order only upon the filing of the execution application in July 2024, whereafter they participated in the execution proceedings and without prejudice offered refund along with interest, demonstrating their bona fides.
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h) Because the Appellants have at all times acted in good faith and have without prejudice to their rights and contentions and in order to bring a quiteus to litigation continuously shown willingness to comply with the directions of the Hon'ble Commission, however, there was no cancellation, which in itself constitutes a sufficient cause for condoning delay under settled law.
i) Because the Ld. State Commission failed to apply the settled principle that when refusal to condone delay defeats substantial justice and deprives a party of adjudication on merits, a liberal and justice-oriented approach must be adopted. Reliance is placed on:
j) Because the Ld. State Commission failed to appreciate the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hemlata Verma vs. ICICI Prudential Life Insurance Co. Ltd., (Civil Appeal No. 5131/2019) wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court Observed that: "We may consider it apposite to observe that the Commission while declining to condone the delay placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Ramlal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361. However, the later decision of this Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr, vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors.. (1987) 2 SCC 107 has held that in matter of condonation of delay, the Court should take liberal view. In our view, the Commission should have, therefore, taken note of subsequent decisions of this Court on the issue of condonation of delay"
k) Because the Ld. State Commission failed to appreciate the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case Inder Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (SLR (C) 6145/2024) wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court Observed that: "There can. be no quarrel on the settled principle of law that delay cannot be condoned without sufficient cause, but a major aspect which has to be kept in mind is that, if in a particular case, the merits have to be examined, it should not be scuttled merely on the basis of limitation".
I) Because the impugned order dismissing the appeal as time- barred reflects non-application of mind to the bona fide circumstances constituting sufficient cause" under law.
m) Because the Ld. Forum below failed to appreciate that the sum of Rs.2,50,000/- was merely application money paid by the Respondent's husband and not sale consideration towards any flat
n) Because neither an allotment letter nor an agreement to sell nor any builder-buyer agreement was ever executed between the parties, conclusively establishing that no concluded contract ever came into existence.
o) Because there is not a single correspondence between the parties from the date of alleged payment of sum of Rs. 2,60,000 towards application money till the filing of the consumer complaint. SA/843/2025 Page 4 of 9
p) Because it is highly improbable that a genuine allottee will remain silent for over three years (2019-2022) without a single inquiry, request, or follow-up regarding the alleged allotment, thereby showing that the Respondent was never an allottee of the Appellant.
q) Because there is not a single piece of document indicating the inter-se relationship between the Appellants and Respondent.
r) Because the Respondent allegedly applied through independent property dealers/brokers (Opp. Party Nos. 3 & 4) who made assurances in their personal capacity without the knowledge, authority, or involvement of the Appellants.
s) Because the Ld. DCDRC erroneously directed delivery of actual physical possession" even though no such flat exists with the II Appellants, and the entire inventory had been exhausted long ago. The direction is inherently unimplementable.
t) Because the direction to give possession upon payment of "balance sale consideration" is wholly unsustainable since there was no agreed consideration, no contract, and no concluded agreement between the parties.
u) Because the Ld. DCDRC ignored the material fact that all 3084 units were allotted strictly through the online draw system to applicants who completed all formalities, and the Respondent was never part of this process.
5. The main question for consideration is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the State Commission was justified in declining condonation of delay in filing the Appeal and dismiss it as barred by limitation. We have carefully gone through the orders of the State Commission, other relevant records and contentions of the Petitioner herein. We have also considered the reasons for delay as contained in the condonation of delay application filed by the petitioner herein before the State Commission in the light of observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Commission in various cases.
SA/843/2025 Page 5 of 9 'J
6. In Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through Legal Respresentative and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Anr. (2023) 10 SCC 531, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the lengths of delay being immaterial, each case for condonation of delay based on the existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts and that a court of appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the courts below. In Basawaraj and Another. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that when a case is filed beyond the limitation period, the applicant must demonstrate "sufficient cause," meaning an adequate and enough reason for not approaching the court within the prescribed time. If the party is found to be negligent, lacking bona fides, or not acting diligently, there is no justified ground for condoning the delay. Courts are not justified in condoning such delays by imposing any conditions and must adhere to the established parameters for condonation of delay. Condoning delay without sufficient cause and proper justification would violate statutory provisions and show disregard for legislative intent. In Esha Bhattcharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [(2013) 12 SCC 649], the Hon'ble Supreme Court expressed concern over the growing tendency to perceive delay as a trivial matter and to exhibit a lackadaisical attitude towards it, which needs to be addressed within the confines of legal SA/843/2025 Page 6 of 9 parameters. In Popat Bahiru Govardhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 10 SCC 765, the Supreme Court affirmed the principle that the law of limitation must be applied rigorously as prescribed by statute, even if it causes hardship to a particular party. The court cannot extend the limitation period on equitable grounds. In H. Dohil Constructions Co. (P) Ltd. v. Na ha r Exports Ltd., (2015) 1 SCC 680 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasized that the law of limitation is based on sound public policy, and therefore, applications for condonation of delay should be strictly construed in the absence of genuine reasons. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy v. LAO, 2024 SCC Online SC 513 observed that the law of limitation is rooted in the public policy of concluding litigation by forfeiting the remedy rather than the right itself, emphasizing that rights or remedies not exercised within a specified time should cease to exist. In State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654, the Supreme Court observed that the notion that merit in a case justifies disregarding a period of delay is preposterous. Regardless of a case's merit, the limitation period can bar its consideration, potentially excluding even strong cases. However, this does not negate the court's jurisdiction to condone delay in appropriate circumstances. In Bappanand Narshimman Annu Vs. Hirmanidevi G.S. Gupta & Ors., 2016 SCC Online NCDRC 2605, the National Commission observed that in accordance with the broad principles established by numerous decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the term 'sufficient cause' cannot be interpreted liberally when negligence, SA/843/2025 Page 7 of 9 inaction, or lack of bonafides are attributable to the party seeking such discretion. Emphasizing the importance of applying the statutory period of limitation rigorously, the Commission observed that unlimited leniency in time limits fosters uncertainty.
7. Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Manjunath Anandappa (Supra), stated that appellate courts generally should not intervene with the discretion exercised by lower courts. This principle is affirmed in U.P. Coop. Federation Ltd. v. Sunder Bros (AIR 1967 SC 249), where it is emphasized that appellate courts should be hesitant to interfere with the exercise of discretion by trial courts. The appellate court should not replace its own discretion for that of the trial judge unless the trial court has acted unreasonably, capriciously, or ignored relevant facts. Additionally, in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha (1980) 2 SCC 593, it is highlighted that appellate courts should intervene only when the lower court's order is clearly wrong, not just when it is not right.
8. The State Commission has passed a well-reasoned order and we don't see any reason to interfere with its findings. There is no illegality or material irregularity in the order of the State Commission. The case involves no substantial question of law. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is dismissed.
9. Registry of NCDRC is directed to send a copy of this order (free certified copy) to both sides, in particular the Respondent(s), on the SA/843/2025 Page 8 of 9 address given in the Memo of Parties, within a maximum period of one week from the date of this order.
10. Pending IAs, if any, also stand disposed off.
1 \ Sd/-
( DR. INDER JIT SINGH ) PRESIDING MEMBER Sd/-
( DR SUDHIR KUMAR JAIN, J.)
Satish - 5 ' MEMBER
SA/843/2025 .Page 9 of 9