Patna High Court
Dr. Taj Singh Lakshmana And Bihar ... vs State Of Bihar And Ors. on 25 January, 1995
Equivalent citations: [1996]85COMPCAS514(PATNA)
JUDGMENT Banwari Lal Yadav, J.
1. These three analogous writ petitions have been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as public interest litigation (for short "P.I.L.") and the points involved are similar in nature. Hence, it is convenient to dispose of them by this common judgment. These petitions would, however, be referred as first, second and third writ petitions.
2. In the first writ petition filed by Dr. Taj Singh Lakshmana (in person), chairman of the Bihar Sick Industries Association, the petitioner has stated that about 7000 entrepreneurs have obtained separate loans from the Bihar State Financial Corporation, Frazer Road, Patna (respondent No. 2), and separate agreements have been executed in respect of all the entrepreneurs. But those agreements have not been filed and only one of them was shown in the court. Nothing can be ascertained with certainty from the alleged prayer made in paragraph 10 of the first writ petition. However, the prayer in the first writ petition is that this court may treat this petition as a regular writ petition against the Bihar State Financial Corporation (for short "the B.S.F.C.") and to take necessary action against Shri A. K. Singh, managing director, B.S.F.C. (respondent No. 2), so that any allegation stated by the petitioner, if contested by the said respondent, shall be proved by him with concrete evidence and supporting documents. The further prayer is that the B.S.F.C. may be restrained from taking any action against those entrepreneurs to whom the B.S.F.C. had failed to disburse the full sanctioned loans. The next part of the relief appears to be that this court may write off the entire interest and other charges accumulated during the past many years against the aforesaid 7000 entrepreneurs, who have obtained loans from the B.S.F.C. and have not paid the amount as agreed upon and that only the principal amount may be left to be paid by the promoters after deducting the amount already paid by them.
3. The aforesaid 7000 entrepreneurs obtained different loans from the B.S.F.C. (respondent No. 2) and executed different agreements. It appears that part of the loan was disbursed to all the entrepreneurs, but the entire amount was not disbursed and when they went for further relief of the loan, they were exploited as the petitioner or the entrepreneurs refused to pay bribe (vide paragraph 2 of the first writ petition).
4. The petitioner, Dr. Taj Singh Lakshmana, chairman of the Bihar Sick Industries Association, has appeared in person. He strenuously contended that the respondent-BSFC is deliberately delaying to disburse the sanctioned loan for the last two years and thereafter the promoters are directed to apply for the second loan which they would sanction and would adjust against the overdues of the first loan. After failure of the entrepreneurs in these three writ petitions to make payment, proceedings under Sections 29 and 30 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (for short "the Act"), are initiated and the assets in the unit are sold to the collaborators at a price equal to the total amount due from the owner. Under the said Act, the B.S.F.C. was to act under the Regional Development Bank for assistance to the small and the medium scale industries of Bihar. The B.S.F.C. can ascertain whether the units obtaining loans have necessary working capital and can also have a watch on the working and performance of the unit. In paragraph 9 of the first writ petition it has been stated that the debased officers of the B.S.F.C. threw all the prescribed norms and objectives to the winds and started acting worse than the traditional village money-lenders. It was further urged that a committee be set up by the High Court to decide all the matters pertaining to these writ petitions and the committee may submit a report.
5. When the judgment was almost dictated a detailed written argument was also filed. We have perused the same. Nothing new was added. It was in the form of a rejoinder affidavit. It was emphasised that the approach of the respondents including the B.S.F.C. must be project-oriented rather than security-oriented. It was emphasised that a three-member committee headed by a retired High Court judge, the managing director and the petitioner himself, be constituted to solve the dispute. It was further submitted that the interest recoverable on different units may not be recovered.
6. In the second writ petition the prayer is to direct the B.S.F.C. (respondent No. 2) to follow strictly the guidelines laid down in Mahesh Chandra v. U. P. Financial Corporation, AIR 1993 SC 935 ; [1993] 78 Comp Cas 1 (SC) and to direct the State Government to set up a high level committee or Tribunal to consider all the cases of sick small scale industries and of incipient. In this second writ petition no counter-affidavit has been filed.
7. An averment has been made in the second writ petition that the sanctioned loan is disbursed only after the entrepreneurs have made substantial investment in the project from their own resources. The short points sharply focussed by Mr. C. M. Saxena, learned counsel for the second petitioner, are that the principles laid down in Mahesh Chandra's case, AIR 1993 SC 935 ; [1993] 78 Comp Cas 1 are not followed and that the total amount of sanctioned loan is never disbursed and without any notice proceedings are initiated under Section 29 of the Act. The points focussed by Mr. Saxena were echoed with some variant note by learned counsel appearing for the third writ petitioner. In the second and third writ petitions also, even though a number of entrepreneurs are involved who have executed different agreements but neither those agreements containing different conditions depending on the nature of loan and units have been filed nor complete facts have been stated. In these three writ petitions individual and separate disputes are involved, but the petitions as public interest litigation have been filed.
8. Mr. P.K. Shahi, appeared on behalf of the respondent-BSFC, Mr. N. Kumar and other counsel have appeared for other respondents and all of them were heard at great length. Mr. Verma urged that more than 7000 entrepreneurs have obtained separate loans and they have entered into different agreements containing different clauses depending upon the nature of the loan and the nature of the transactions and units. Public interest litigation in such different individual disputes has been filed just with a view to conceal the material facts and to obtain relief, directing the respondent-B.S.F.C. not to initiate proceedings for recovery of the loans, particularly in view of the procedure under Section 29 of the Act and not to initiate proceedings which are consistent with the agreements of the entrepreneurs. The specific and separate agreements executed by more than 7000 entrepreneurs have not been filed, nor have the material fa.cts been stated. As to at which stage the proceedings are pending has not been stated. In these writ petitions (as public interest litigation), the petitioners have not disclosed clear facts in respect of each entrepreneurs, so that the same may be replied through counter-affidavit and the correct facts may be brought before the court to appreciate the controversy. In the P.I.L. the petitioner must come with clean hands ; with clean mind and clean objective like the writ petitions filed by other petitioners. As there are individual disputes depending upon the facts with particular individual dispute, in that event there is no justification for P.I.L. nor can it be entertained. As the petitioners have concealed the material facts in these writ netitions and there are disputed questions of facts, hence no ground for interference has been made out.
9. Mr. P. K. Shahi emphatically urged that there is no quarrel and/or dispute with the dictum laid down and the direction given in Mahesh Chandra v. U. P, Financial Corporation, AIR i993 SC 935 ; [1993] 78 Comp Cas 1. But those dictums or directions or principles are based on the particular facts of that case. In these three writ petitions several thousand units and entrepreneurs are involved, having executed different agreements, but the petitioners have not come with clean hands. In the circumstances no relief can be granted to the petitioners in all the three writ petitions.
10. Having scrutinised the submissions of learned counsel for the parties, the questions for consideration are whether the P.I.L. In such a way where more than 7000 applicants (entrepreneurs) and several units with varying characteristics with different individual claims are involved the writ petitions as P.I.L. can be entertained, and whether in the circumstances of the case any relief can be granted to the petitioners of all the three writ petitions, particularly when they have not come with clean hands, clean mind and clean objective. Suffice it to say that their Lordships of the apex court have laid down a dictum in K.R. Srinivas v. R. M. Premchand [1994] 6 SCC 620 to the effect that it cannot be forgotten that a writ petitioner who comes to court for the relief in P.I.L., must come not only with clean hands like any other writ petitioner but also must further come with a clean heart, clean mind and clean objective. In these three writ petitions even after making all sincere efforts we could not ascertain the nature of the agreements executed by different entrepreneurs and units, nor were copies of the same furnished nor were details given nor necessary material facts were stated. In our considered opinion neither the petitioners in all the three writ petitions have come with clean hands, nor have they come with clean mind and nor with clean objective. Even the prayer of the relief sought by the petitioners is not clear as to what they actually want. Only this much can be ascertained that they want that no action need be taken against them to recover the loan obtained by them and no proceeding under Section 29 of the Act be initiated against them and the interest on the loans advanced may be written off.
11. In Dr. Nandjee Singh v. P. G. Medical Students Association, AIR 1993 SC 2264, their Lordships of the apex court have ruled that an independent dispute cannot be converted into P.I.L. This observation and direction were relied upon with profound respect by a Division Bench of this court in Arijit Dutta v. Union of India [1994] 2 BLJR 839. The necessary facts in respect of every agreement and every entrepreneur and unit have not been stated with accuracy in the present cases nor these petitioners have come with clean hands, nor with clean mind and nor with clean objective. We have profound regard for the dictum-laid down in Mahesh Chandra v. U. P. Financial Corporation, AIR 1993 SC 955 ; [1993] 78 Comp Cas 1, but in the present three writ petitions necessary'facts have not been indicated and nothing has been brought to our notice to indicate how we may grant any relief to the writ petitioners or to the different entrepreneurs or how we may direct the respondent-B.S.F.C. not to recover the unpaid amount from the petitioners, nor any case of P.I.L. has been made out for directing the respondent-B.S.F.C. not to initiate any proceeding under Section 29 of the Act
12. In our considered opinion- the petitioners in these three writ petitions have not come with clean hands, nor they have come with clean mind, nor with clean objective, as directed by their Lordships of the apex court in K. R. Srinivas v. R. M. Premchand [1994] 6 SCC 620. The disputes involved in these writ petitions are individual disputes, consequently the individual disputes cannot be converted into P.I.L. (See Dr. Nandjee Singh v. P. G. Medical Students Association, AIR 1993 SC 2264.
13. Half heartedly, on behalf of the petitioners, our attention was invited to the doctrine of promissory estoppel and on Article 21 of the Constitution and that the B.S.F.C. cannot take recourse to the remedy of Sections 29 and 30 of the Act. As regards Article 21, suffice it to say that life includes right to live with human dignity, but whatever action would be taken against different entrepreneurs in these three analogous writ petitions would be in accordance with the procedure established by law, particularly the relevant provisions of the said Act. Article 21 of the Constitution is, accordingly, not attracted.
14. In our opinion, the doctrine of promissory estoppel comes in operation where one party by his words or conduct to a transaction makes to the others an unambiguous promise or assurance, which is intended to affect the legal relations between them and the other party acts upon it, altering his position to his detriment, the party making the promise will not be permitted to act inconsistently with it. This is called the doctrine of promissory estoppel, quasi-estoppel or equitable estoppel. (See Wood-house A. C. Israel Cocoa Ltd. S. A. v. Nigerian Produce Marketing Co. Ltd. [1972] AC 741 at page 758 (HL) ; Braithwaite v. Winwood [I960] 1 WLR 1257 ; Durham Fancy Goods Ltd. v. Michael Jackson (Fancy Goods) Ltd. [1968] 2 QB 639, Snell's Principles of Equity (27th edition, page 562).
15. The factual foundation to attract the application of this doctrine was not laid in these petitions. Further, this doctrine is suspensive in nature and does not extinguish the promisee's obligations (i.e., obligations of entrepreneurs to pay the loan advanced by B.S.F.C.). As the petitioners have not disclosed correct facts nor they have come with clean hands and clean objectives, nor facts necessary to apply this doctrine have been stated with sufficient clarity, the petitioners cannot be held to be entitled to this doctrine. The facts of the cases Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. Dharmendra Trading Co., AIR 1988 SC 1247 ; [1988] 70 STC 59 and AIR 1980 SC 1245 (sic), are different, the dictum laid down by the apex court applies to the facts of those cases and the petitioners cannot claim the benefit, similarly.
16. In respect of other cases relied upon by the petitioners including Dr. Lakshmana, we are reminded what the Earl of Halsbury L. C. said long ago in Quinn v. Leathem [1901] AC 495, to the following effect :
" Now, before discussing Allah v. Flood [1889] AC 1, and what was decided therein there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are. to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it."
17. These observations were relied upon by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Good Year India Ltd. v. State of Haryana [1989] 4 JT 229, 246 ; [1991] 188 ITR 402 (SC).
18. In our considered opinion, the observations made in other cases relied upon by Dr. Lakshmana need not be referred to or discussed as every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved and that a case is only an authority for what it actually decided and not what may seem logically to follow from it.
19. To sum up, the dispute involved in respect of more than seven thousand entrepreneurs are individual disputes depending upon the nature of unit, hence in such a situation the public interest litigation is not maintainable. As the petitioners have not come to this court with clean mind and clean objectives and they have not stated material facts in respect of every dispute the provisions of Section 29 of the Act can be made applicable only when the necessary facts and circumstances exist. There is no justification to write off either interest or to constitute a committee headed by a retired judge of this court to go into the matter. The remedy under Article 226 being discretionary in nature no grounds for interference in these three writ petitions have been made out.
20. Resultantly, in view of the premises aforesaid we do not find any merit in any of these three writ petitions nor are they maintainable as P.I.L. Hence they are dismissed without any order as to costs. Let a copy of this judgment be kept in the other two analogous cases also.
Shashank Kumar Singh, J.
21. I agree.