Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
K.L. Khanna vs Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan on 11 February, 2014
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL BENCH O.A. No.1272/2012 Reserved On:27.01.2014 Pronounced on:11.02.2014 HONBLE MR. G. GEORGE PARACKEN, MEMBER (J) HONBLE MR. SHEKHAR AGARWAL, MEMBER (A) 1. K.L. Khanna S/o Late Shri Jagdish Chander Khanna R/o 109, Ashoka Enclave-I, Faridabad, Haryana-121003. 2. C.S. Pran S/o Shri Om Karnath Mishra R/o 1018, Neethikhand, Ist Indirauram, Ghaziabad (UP). 3. Sunil Malik S/o Late Shri A.D. Malik R/o G-12A, Block-III, Express Garden, Indirapuram, Ghaziabad (UP). 4. S.K. Thakur S/o Late Shri K.K. Thakur, R/o D-26, RBI Officers Colony, VV, New Delhi-110057. .Applicants (By Advocate: Mrs. Maninder Acharya) Versus 1. Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan Through its Director General, 2nd Floor, Core-4, Laxmi Nagar, Vikas Marg, Delhi-110092. 2. Union of India Through its Secretary, Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sport, Shastri Bhawan, C-Wing, New Delhi. Respondents (By Advocate: Shri Rana Ranjit Singh). ORDER
Honble Mr. G. George Paracken, Member (J) Applicants are aggrieved by the impugned order dated 05.01.2012 passed by the Respondet-Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan (NYKS for short) rejecting their request for grant of pensionary benefits as admissible to the Government of India employees and extended to their fellow employees.
2. The brief facts of the case are that Applicants are directly recruited employees of the NYKS against different posts, such as Regional Coordinator, System Analyst, Regional Director and Zonal Director etc. During their service, they were also given promotion to the posts of Zonal Director, Regional Director, Deputy Director etc. Applicant No.1 has since been retired from service of NYKS as Zonal Director on 31.12.2011, others are still working.
3. The NYKS was established as an Autonomous Body under the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports and it was registered as a Society under the Societies Registration Act on 17.12.1986. Initially it made appointments to the posts of Youth Coordinator, Regional Coordinator, Zonal Coordinator and other Group C and D posts on deputation basis from officers working in analogous post in the Central Government. Later on, it started making direct recruitments based on its own Recruitment Rules. While the officers on deputation were drawing their salary as per the fixed pay scales, the other directly recruited employees were paid the fixed emoluments as per the terms of their appointment letters. Some of the deputationists got absorbed in NYKS but with lesser emoluments than those were being drawn by them with the Sangathan. They approached this Tribunal with a prayer that their pay scales and service conditions should not be reduced/altered to their detriment and the NYKS should be directed to pay them their salaries in the pay scales at par with Central Government employees. The dispute reached up to the Apex Court and finally the Apex Court held that their service conditions including their pay scales have to be protected at par with the pay scales of the Central Government employees. Thereafter, the NYKS implemented the aforesaid directions and they were also given the pay scales as recommended by the 5th and 6th Pay Commissions as applicable to the Central Government employees.
4. Later on, the Direct Recruit Youth Coordinators of NYKS filed Writ Petition being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.24417/1997 before the High Court of Allahabad contending that there shall be no distinction with regard to payment of Pay and Allowances irrespective of their mode of recruitments as both the categories of Youth Coordinators were performing the same duties and functions. The High Court of Allahabad allowed the aforesaid Writ Petition vide judgment dated 29.11.1999 and directed the Respondents that all the benefits including pay scales, Dearness Allowance and retrial benefits which were enjoyed by the Youth Coordinators appointed through the mode of deputation should also be extended to the directly recruited Youth Coordinators. The NYKS challenged the aforesaid judgment before the Apex Court vide Civil Appeal No.7356/2000 but the same was dismissed vide order dated 12.07.2007. The Apex Court has also directed that both the categories of Youth Coordinators irrespective of their mode of recruitment should be treated alike and the same benefits including the pay scales, Dearness Allowance and retrial benefits like pension and gratuity shall be paid to them. The operative part of the said order reads as under:-
3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. At the time of admission of these appeals, this Court passed the following order on 1.5.2000. The order reads as follows:
"Issue notice confined to the question as to why the relief granted by the High Court may not be confined to the date of filing of the writ petition in the High Court."
Now, these appeals have come up for hearing. We find that the nature of duties being discharged by the Youth Coordinators who have come on deputation and have been absorbed as such and those who were directly recruited on fixed term are discharging the same duties. The only difference is their source of recruitment. Once the deputationists are discharging the same duties and are being paid salary and other allowances then there is no reason to deny the same benefits who are discharging the same duties and functions. Those deputationists now absorbed obtained the order from this Court but the direct recruits did not approach this Court, they were treated as a class apart because of their source of recruitment. Once these persons are already working for more than two decades discharging the same functions and duties then we see no reason why the same benefit should not be given to the respondents. Looking to the nature and duties of these respondents we are of opinion that there is no reason to treat them differently. However, at the time of admission this Court on 1.5.2000 confined the relief from the date of filing of the writ petition before the High Court. In fact, these directly recruited Youth Coordinators approached the Court in earlier point of time but they were advised to approach the Government and they did approach the Government but the Government denied them the same relief as was given to the deputationists. Therefore, there is no reason not to grant them the same scale pay and as such this Court at the time of admission has confined the relief that why it should not be granted from the date of the filing of the writ petition in the High Court. Accordingly, we dispose of these civil appeals with a direction that the same benefits as were being given to the Youth Coordinators who were initially on deputation and were absorbed, should be given to the respondents from the date of filing of the writ petition in the High Court of Allahabad. Hence, the order of the High Court of Allahabad is affirmed with minor modification as indicated above. There would be no order as to costs.
5. Thereafter, the NYKS got an amount of Rs.10,74,36,263/- (Rupees Ten Crore Seventy Four Lakh Thirty Six Thousand Two Hundred and Sixty Three Only) sanctioned from the Government of India for the implementation of the aforesaid judgment. It has also duly complied with the aforesaid judgment of the Apex court and issued necessary orders vide its letter No.F.10-08/2007-YS.I dated 28.01.2009. On their retirement, they were also paid all the retirement benefits at par with Central Government employees. Three of such employees, namely, Mr. Jawahar Kathuria, Mr. Alwan Mesih and Mr. R.P. Bhardwaj have since been retired from the post of Zonal Director/Joint Director.
6. However, in the case of the Applicants who are holding the posts of Joint Director/Zonal Director, Deputy Director/Regional Coordinator are still being denied the benefit of pension and other retrial benefits merely on the ground that they were not parties in the aforesaid proceedings before the Court. According to the Applicants, a bare perusal of the judgment passed by the High Court of Allahabad as well as by the Apex Court would clearly reveal that they were judgments in rem and not in personam. The Apex Court has clearly held that the nature of duties being discharged by the Youth Coordinators who had come on deputation and those who were directly recruited on fixed terms was the same and the only difference was in their source of recruitment. The Apex Court was further pleased to hold that once the deputationists were discharging the same duties as directly recruited Youth Coordinators, there was no reason to treat them differently. The Applicants have, therefore, submitted that treating the aforesaid judgments in personam by the Respondents and thereby denying the benefits to the directly recruited employees is illegal and, therefore, not justifiable. They have also submitted that by denying the benefits of the aforesaid judgment, the NYKS has created two separate classes among the Zonal Directors/Joint Directors/Directors themselves first being those who filed the Writ Petition before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and the second being those who are not parties to the said Writ Petition.
7. They have also submitted that the Chandigarh Bench of this Tribunal, vide its order dated 04.02.2011 in OA No.675/PB/2009 and other connected cases Parshotam Lal and Others Vs. U.O.I. & Others have also followed the same principle laid down by the Honble High Court of Allahabad in the aforesaid Writ Petition. The Tribunal has, therefore, allowed the six Original Applications preferred by directly recruited as Accounts Clerk-cum-Typist or Peon-cum-Chokidar. The relevant part of the said order of the Chandigarh Bench dated 04.02.2011 is reproduced as under:-
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and considered the documents on record.
The applicants in this case are seeking the benefit of the order dated 22nd July 2009 (Annexure A-6), whereby 13 persons have all be granted all service benefits including retirement benefits as applicable to Group D employees working under Government of India, purportedly in compliance with the judgment of High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam. The said order further stipulates that these Group D employees are governed by Rules and Regulations as applicable to Group D employees of Govt. of India, as admissible from time to time. It is not denied that the so called 13 employees have been working under the Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan, whereunder the applicants No.1 to 12 are also working as Group D employees. Once the respondents have decided to extend service and other pensionary benefits to similarly situated employees working in the same organization, applicants No.1 to 12 cannot be denied the same relief. In Union of India & another etc. etc. vs. Lalita S. Rao and others AIR (2001) SC 1792, the Apex Court has rules that the orders issued by the Court in earlier cases should be applied and enforced irrespective of the fact whether some are parties to the proceeding or not.
In E.S.P. Rajaram and others vs. Union of India & Others, AIR 2001 SC page581, the controversy related to the scale of pay admissible for Traffic apprentices in the Railway appointed prior to the cut off date. It was observed that the controversy in its very nature is one which applies to all such employees of the Railways; it is not a controversy which is confined to some individual employees or a section of the employees. If the judgment of the Tribunal which had taken a view contrary to the ratio laid down by Supreme Court judgment 1996 (4) SCC 416 was allowed to stand, then the resultant position would have been that some Traffic Apprentices who were parties in those cases would have gained an unfair and undeserved advantage over other employees who are holding the same post. Such enviable position would not only have been per se discriminatory but could have resulted in a situation which is undesirable for a cadre of large number of employees in a big establishment like that of the Indian Railways. To avoid such a situation the direction impugned was passed. It was absolutely necessary for the same of maintaining quality and fair-play with the other similarly placed employees.
A DB of Punjab and Haryana High Court had the occasion to consider the similar controversy in the case of Satyapal Singh and others vs. The State of Haryana and another, 1999 (2) RSJ 377. The relevant observations made in para 5 may be extracted as below:
5. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the judgment of the learned Single Judge was really not a judgment in personam but was judgment in rem inasmuch as law had been laid down and the petitioners in that case were held entitled to the relief claimed by them. Really speaking, the State Government should have itself granted the same relief to other similarly situated persons though they may not have come to the Court. The State government should under such circumstances apply the law itself to the similarly situated persons instead of forcing any individual or a Union to resort to unnecessary litigation as law is already settled and only the same has to be applied to the facts of a particular case. The petitioners in the present case had, through their Union, filed a representation in August, 1992 after the judgment of the learned single Judge. If the respondents failed to comply with the judgment because of the pendency of the Letters Patent Appeal and then the appeal before the Apex court, the petitioners cannot be denied the same benefit as was granted to the petitioners in the aforesaid writ petitioner. The respondents as a Welfare State should rather see to it that the litigation in the courts is minimized. After this Court or the Apex Court lays down the law, it should see to it that similarly situated persons automatically get the same relief without resorting to litigation. In another case of Satbir Singh vs. State of Haryana, 2002 (2) SCT page 354, the Honble High Court has held that when a judgment attains finality, the State is bound to grant relief to its employees who are similarly situated even though they are not party to the litigation. A final decision of the Court must not only be respected but should also be enforced and implemented evenly and without discrimination in respect of all the employees who are entitled to the benefit which has been allowed to the employees who have obtained orders from the Court. The matter is one of principle and should not depend upon who comes to the court and who does not.
In Dr (Mrs) Santosh Kumari vs.Union of India & others, 1994 (7) SC 565, Honble Supreme Court lamented that a more deserving candidate may not have the means to approach the court, should he be denied the benefit which has been granted to those who dared the department with court orders.
Since the respondents have granted relief to some of the employees, pursuant to an order of the Kerala High Court, which has attained finality, havingbeen implemented and not challenged before the superior court, the action of the respondents to deny the same relief to the similarly situated persons is per se illegal, arbitrary and in defiance of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The same cannot, therefore, be sustained in the eyes of law. Further, the judgment/order in that case cannot also be said to be in personam, as claimed by the respondents, but the same has to be treated in rem and must be complied with in respect of all similarly situated persons.
Since respondents No.13 and 14 are also working in the same department, where such benefits have been granted to other category of employees, they cannot certainly be treated differently nor deprived of service and other retrial benefits, which have been extended to similarly situated other Group D employees.
In view of the above, OA No.675/PB/2009 is allowed and the applicants are held entitled to the benefit of the order dated 22.7.2009 as at Annexure A-6 as per rules and the same be extended to them by passing a speaking order within a period of 3 months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Further, this order applies mutatis mutandis to the rest of the 5 other cases also.
All the 6 OAs stand disposed of in the above terms. No costs.
8. The aforesaid order of the Chandigarh Bench was challenged before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and vide Civil Writ Petition No.23846 of 2011 (O&M) and other connected matters but the same was dismissed vide its order dated 08.02.2012. The relevant part of the said order reads as under:-
During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioners tried to make distinction between two categories of employees and submitted that the employees, who were recruited after 1.4.1987, the date on which the petitioner Sangathan was made autonomous body, are not entitled to the said benefit, but when it was specifically asked whether this point was raised by the petitioner Sangathan in the reply before the Tribunal, it has been conceded that no such plea was ever taken before the Tribunal. It has also been admitted that by the aforesaid two orders i.e. 26.2.2009 and 22.7.2009 passed in compliance of the aforesaid two judgments, the pension and other retrial benefits have been extended not only to the pre-Sangathan employees but also to the post-Sangathan employees. In view of the said admitted position no difference can be made between two categories of employees. Therefore, in our view the Tribunal has rightly granted the benefit to all the employees, whether employed prior to 1.4.1987 or thereafter, as in the matter of pension no classification can be made as suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioners.
In view of the aforesaid, we do not find any ground to interfere in the impugned orders. Hence, all the petitions are dismissed.
9. Again, the Ernakulam Bench of this Tribunal considered the same issue vide OA No.172/2010 Thulasi B. and Others Vs. U.O.I. & Others and following the judgment of the Apex Court dated 12.07.2011 allowed the said OA vide order dated 18.01.2012 and its relevant part is reproduced as under:-
10. Arguments were heard and documents perused. M.A filed by the applicants is purely to take on record the copy of the judgment of the Chandigarh Bench of the Tribunal. For taking on record the judgment no M.A is required. As such, it is not felt necessary to give any opportunity to the other side to respond to the M.A. In fact, the said M.A has been closed in a docket order of the Tribunal stating "the judgment annexed with the M.A has been taken on record."
11. As regards merit of the matter, it is seen from Annexure A-3 and Annexure A-4 judgments as well as Chandigarh Bench judgment that the employees of the Nehru Yuva Kendra are treated at par with other Central Government employees. The two judgments have been fully complied with by issue of orders vide Annexure A-5 and Annexure A-6. It is a settled law that the decision of the Coordinate Bench unless defers, has to be respected and adopted. In this regard the decision by the Apex Court in the case of Sub-Inspector Rooplal v. Lt. Governor, (2000) 1 SCC 644, is relevant to be cited wherein the Apex Court has held as under :-
"12. At the outset, we must express our serious dissatisfaction in regard to the manner in which a Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal has overruled, in effect, an earlier judgment of another Coordinate Bench of the same Tribunal. This is opposed to all principles of judicial discipline. If at all, the subsequent Bench of the Tribunal was of the opinion that the earlier view taken by the Coordinate Bench of the same Tribunal was incorrect, it ought to have referred the matter to a larger Bench so that the difference of opinion between the two Coordinate Benches on the same point could have been avoided. It is not as if the latter Bench was unaware of the judgment of the earlier Bench but knowingly it proceeded to disagree with the said judgment against all known rules of precedents. Precedents which enunciate rules of law form the foundation of administration of justice under our system. This is a fundamental principle which every presiding officer of a judicial forum ought to know, for consistency in interpretation of law alone can lead to public confidence in our judicial system. This Court has laid down time and again that precedent law must be followed by all concerned; deviation from the same should be only on a procedure known to law. A subordinate court is bound by the enunciation of law made by the superior courts. A Coordinate Bench of a Court cannot pronounce judgment contrary to declaration of law made by another Bench. It can only refer it to a larger Bench if it disagrees with the earlier pronouncement. This Court in the case of Tribhovandas Purshottamdas Thakkar v. Ratilal Motilal Patel while dealing with a case in which a Judge of the High Court had failed to follow the earlier judgment of a larger Bench of the same Court observed thus :
The judgment of the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court was binding upon Raju, J. If the learned Judge was of the view that the decision of Bhagwati, J., in Pinjare Karimbhai case and of Macleod, C.J., in Haridas case did not lay down the correct law or rule of practice, it was open to him to recommend to the Chief Justice that the question be considered by a larger Bench. Judicial decorum, propriety and discipline required that he should not ignore it. Our system of administration of justice aims at certainty in the law and that can be achieved only if Judges do not ignore decisions by courts of coordinate authority or of superior authority. Gajendragadkar, C.J., observed in Bhagwan v. Ram Chand :
'It is hardly necessary to emphasise that considerations of judicial propriety and decorum require that if a learned Single Judge hearing a matter is inclined to take the view that the earlier decisions of the High Court, whether of a Division Bench or of a Single Judge, need to be reconsidered, he should not embark upon that inquiry sitting as a Single Judge, but should refer the matter to a Division Bench, or, in a proper case, place the relevant papers before the Chief Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question. That is the proper and traditional way to deal with such matters and it is founded on healthy principles of judicial decorum and propriety'."
12. The judgments which have been implemented cannot be considered to be a judgment in personam as identical employees cannot be treated differently. If the department means that for deriving the benefits as available to the applicant in other O.A, other individuals should move the Court, such a view is not supported by any authority. Rather, the Apex Court as early as in 1975 in the case of Amrit Lal Berry v. CCE, (1975) 4 SCC 714, held as under :-
" We may, however, observe that when a citizen aggrieved by the action of a government department has approached the Court and obtained a declaration of law in his favour, others, in like circumstances, should be able to rely on the sense of responsibility of the department concerned and to expect that they will be given the benefit of this declaration without the need to take their grievances to court."
13. The V Central Pay Commission in its recommendation, in regard to extension of benefit of court judgment to similarly situated, held as under :-
"126.5 Extending judicial decisions in matters of a general nature to all similarly placed employees. We have observed that frequently, in cases of service litigation involving many similarly placed employees, the benefit of judgment is only extended to those employees who had agitated the matter before the Tribunal/Court. This generates a lot of needless litigation. It also runs contrary to the judgment given by the Full Bench of Central Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore in the case of C.S. Elias Ahmed and others v. UOI & others (O.A. Nos. 451 and 541 of 1991), wherein it was held that the entire class of employees who are similarly situated are required to be given the benefit of the decision whether or not they were parties to the original writ. Incidentally, this principle has been upheld by the Supreme Court in this case as well as in numerous other judgments like G.C. Ghosh v. UOI, [ (1992) 19 ATC 94 (SC) ], dated 20-7-1998; K.I. Shepherd v. UOI [(JT 1987 (3) SC 600)]; Abid Hussain v. UOI [(JT 1987 (1) SC 147], etc. Accordingly, we recommend that decisions taken in one specific case either by the judiciary or the Government should be applied to all other identical cases without forcing the other employees to approach the court of law for an identical remedy or relief. We clarify that this decision will apply only in cases where a principle or common issue of general nature applicable to a group or category of Government employees is concerned and not to matters relating to a specific grievance or anomaly of an individual employee."
14. In a latter case of Uttaranchal Forest Rangers' Assn. (Direct Recruit) v. State of U.P.,(2006) 10 SCC 346, the Apex Court has referred to the decision in the case of State of Karnataka vs C Lalitha (2006) 2 SCC 747 as under :-
"29. Service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all persons similarly situated should be treated similarly. Only because one person has approached the court that would not mean that persons similarly situated should be treated differently."
15. Taking into account of the above facts it can be safely said that the applicants are entitled to all the service benefits as available to the counter parts in the Central Government Departments. As a matter of fact it has to be held that this judgment should be treated as judgment in rem so that the benefits as available to the applicants in this O.A are extended to identically situated other employees of the respondents without any need for them to knock at the doors of the Court for claiming such benefits.
16. Counsel for the respondents, at the time of hearing, made a submission that in so far as pensionary benefits are concerned as there is a change inasmuch as with effect from 1.1.2004 those who are recruited to the service are entitled to contributory pension scheme only and not for any pensionary benefits under CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, the applicants may be considered for such benefits available to post 1.1.2004 recruits. The contentions of the counsel for the respondents cannot hold good as the regularization of the applicants had taken place much earlier to 1.1.2004 as could be seen from Annexure A-1order of regularization. As such, as regards pensionary benefits all the applicants and similarly situated individuals are entitled to pensionary benefits under CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. We reiterate here that this order is passed keeping in view the provisions of Rule 24 of the C.A.T (Procedure) Rules which include that power to make such orders (to secure ends of justice) treating this judgment as judgment in rem in consonance with para 126.5 of the 5th Pay Commission extracted above.
10. The same issue was also considered by this Bench in OA No.976/2013 Devenker Kumar (Youth Coordinator) & Others. Vs. Union of India and Others decided on 20.03.2013. The reliefs sought by them were to grant them retrial and other pensionary benefits as has been passed by this Tribunal in OA No.564/2011 Chander Mani Atwal and Others Vs. U.O.I. & Others disposed of vide order dated 16.02.2012 wherein it has been held that the decision of the Writ Petition before High Court of Chandigarh will hold the field. The aforesaid OA was allowed by this Tribunal vide order dated 20.03.2013. The relevant part of the said order reads as under:-
2. It is noticed that some of the applicants and also the Adhoc Committee for Pension Rights made representations to the various authorities, including the Director General, NYKS requesting for issuance of appropriate order in continuation of Office Order dated 26.2.2009 issued by the Director General in compliance of the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos.7356/2000 and 7357/2000 decided on 12.7.2007. The said representations placed on record as Annexure A-18 collectively are yet to be decided by the respondents.
3. In terms of Section 20 (1) of Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, this Tribunal should not ordinarily admit an application unless it is satisfied that the applicants had availed of all the remedies available to them under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances. Thus, when it is obligatory for an employee covered under Rule 14 of aforesaid Act and notifications issued thereunder to comply with Section 20 (1) of the Act before approaching this Tribunal, it is also incumbent upon the authority competent to take decision in the representations made to it to decide the representations of such employees expeditiously.
4. Learned counsel for applicants has relied upon the decision of the Full Bench of this Tribunal in Thulasi B & others v. Union of India & others (O.A.No.172/2010) decided on 18.1.2012 wherein it has been viewed as under:-
11. As regards merit of the matter, it is seen from Annexure A-3 and Annexure A-4 judgments as well as Chandigarh Bench judgment that the employees of the Nehru Yuva Kendra are treated at par with other Central Government employees. The two judgments have been fully complied with by issue of orders vide Annexure A-5 and Annexure A-6. It is a settled law that the decision of the Coordinate Bench unless defers, has to be respected and adopted. In this regard the decision by the Apex Court in the case of Sub-Inspector Rooplal v. Lt. Governor, (2000) 1 SCC 644, is relevant to be cited wherein the Apex Court has held as under :-
"12. At the outset, we must express our serious dissatisfaction in regard to the manner in which a Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal has overruled, in effect, an earlier judgment of another Coordinate Bench of the same Tribunal. This is opposed to all principles of judicial discipline. If at all, the subsequent Bench of the Tribunal was of the opinion that the earlier view taken by the Coordinate Bench of the same Tribunal was incorrect, it ought to have referred the matter to a larger Bench so that the difference of opinion between the two Coordinate Benches on the same point could have been avoided. It is not as if the latter Bench was unaware of the judgment of the earlier Bench but knowingly it proceeded to disagree with the said judgment against all known rules of precedents. Precedents which enunciate rules of law form the foundation of administration of justice under our system. This is a fundamental principle which every presiding officer of a judicial forum ought to know, for consistency in interpretation of law alone can lead to public confidence in our judicial system. This Court has laid down time and again that precedent law must be followed by all concerned; deviation from the same should be only on a procedure known to law. A subordinate court is bound by the enunciation of law made by the superior courts. A Coordinate Bench of a Court cannot pronounce judgment contrary to declaration of law made by another Bench. It can only refer it to a larger Bench if it disagrees with the earlier pronouncement. This Court in the case of Tribhovandas Purshottamdas Thakkar v. Ratilal Motilal Patel while dealing with a case in which a Judge of the High Court had failed to follow the earlier judgment of a larger Bench of the same Court observed thus :
The judgment of the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court was binding upon Raju, J. If the learned Judge was of the view that the decision of Bhagwati, J., in Pinjare Karimbhai case and of Macleod, C.J., in Haridas case did not lay down the correct law or rule of practice, it was open to him to recommend to the Chief Justice that the question be considered by a larger Bench. Judicial decorum, propriety and discipline required that he should not ignore it. Our system of administration of justice aims at certainty in the law and that can be achieved only if Judges do not ignore decisions by courts of coordinate authority or of superior authority. Gajendragadkar, C.J., observed in Bhagwan v. Ram Chand :
'It is hardly necessary to emphasise that considerations of judicial propriety and decorum require that if a learned Single Judge hearing a matter is inclined to take the view that the earlier decisions of the High Court, whether of a Division Bench or of a Single Judge, need to be reconsidered, he should not embark upon that inquiry sitting as a Single Judge, but should refer the matter to a Division Bench, or, in a proper case, place the relevant papers before the Chief Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question. That is the proper and traditional way to deal with such matters and it is founded on healthy principles of judicial decorum and propriety'."
12. The judgments which have been implemented cannot be considered to be a judgment in personam as identical employees cannot be treated differently. If the department means that for deriving the benefits as available to the applicant in other O.A, other individuals should move the Court, such a view is not supported by any authority. Rather, the The Apex Court as early as in 1975 in the case of Amrit Lal Berry v. CCE, (1975) 4 SCC 714, held as under : -
"We may, however, observe that when a citizen aggrieved by the action of a government department has approached the Court and obtained a declaration of law in his favour, others, in like circumstances, should be able to rely on the sense of responsibility of the department concerned and to expect that they will be given the benefit of this declaration without the need to take their grievances to court."
13. The V Central Pay Commission in its recommendation, in regard to extension of benefit of court judgment to similarly situated, held as under :-
"126.5 Extending judicial decisions in matters of a general nature to all similarly placed employees. We have observed that frequently, in cases of service litigation involving many similarly placed employees, the benefit of judgment is only extended to those employees who had agitated the matter before the Tribunal/Court. This generates a lot of needless litigation. It also runs contrary to the judgment given by the Full Bench of Central Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore in the case of C.S. Elias Ahmed and others v. UOI & others (O.A. Nos. 451 and 541 of 1991), wherein it was held that the entire class of employees who are similarly situated are required to be given the benefit of the decision whether or not they were parties to the original writ. Incidentally, this principle has been upheld by the Supreme Court in this case as well as in numerous other judgments like G.C. Ghosh v. UOI, [ (1992) 19 ATC 94 (SC) ], dated 20-7-1998; K.I. Shepherd v. UOI [(JT 1987 (3) SC 600)]; Abid Hussain v. UOI [(JT 1987 (1) SC 147], etc. Accordingly, we recommend that decisions taken in one specific case either by the judiciary or the Government should be applied to all other identical cases without forcing the other employees to approach the court of law for an identical remedy or relief. We clarify that this decision will apply only in cases where a principle or common issue of general nature applicable to a group or category of Government employees is concerned and not to matters relating to a specific grievance or anomaly of an individual employee."
14. In a latter case of Uttaranchal Forest Rangers' Assn. (Direct Recruit) v. State of U.P.,(2006) 10 SCC 346, the Apex Court has referred to the decision in the case of State of Karnataka vs C Lalitha (2006) 2 SCC 747 as under :-
"29. Service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all persons similarly situated should be treated similarly. Only because one person has approached the court that would not mean that persons similarly situated should be treated differently."
15. Taking into account of the above facts it can be safely said that the applicants are entitled to all the service benefits as available to the counter parts in the Central Government Departments. As a matter of fact it has to be held that this judgment should be treated as judgment in rem so that the benefits as available to the applicants in this O.A are extended to identically situated other employees of the respondents without any need for them to knock at the doors of the Court for claiming such benefits.
16. Counsel for the respondents, at the time of hearing, made a submission that in so far as pensionary benefits are concerned as there is a change inasmuch as with effect from 1.1.2004 those who are recruited to the service are entitled to contributory pension scheme only and not for any pensionary benefits under CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, the applicants may be considered for such benefits available to post 1.1.2004 recruits. The contentions of the counsel for the respondents cannot hold good as the regularization of the applicants had taken place much earlier to 1.1.2004 as could be seen from Annexure A-1order of regularization. As such, as regards pensionary benefits all the applicants and similarly situated individuals are entitled to pensionary benefits under CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. We reiterate here that this order is passed keeping in view the provisions of Rule 24 of the C.A.T (Procedure) Rules which include that power to make such orders (to secure ends of justice) treating this judgment as judgment in rem in consonance with para 126.5 of the 5th Pay Commission extracted above.
5. He has also made reference to the order passed by the Chandigarh Bench of this Tribunal in Parshotam Lal & others v. Union of India & others (OA-675/PB/2009 with connected cases) decided on 4.2.2011 wherein it has been held thus:
In another case of Satbir Singh vs. State of Haryana, 2002 (2) SCT page 354, the Honble High Court has held that when a judgment attains finality, the State is bound to grant relief to its employees who are similarly situated even though they are not party to the litigation. A final decision of the Court must not only be respected but should also be enforced and implemented evenly and without discrimination in respect of all the employees who are entitled to the benefit which has been allowed to the employees who have obtained orders from the Court. The matter is one of principle and should not depend upon who comes to the court and who does not.
In Dr. (Mrs.) Santosh Kumari vs. Union of India & others- 1994 (7) SC 565, Honble Supreme Court lamented that a more deserving candidate may not have the means to approach the Court, should he be denied the benefit which has been granted to those who dared the department with court orders.
Since the respondents have granted relief to some of the employees, pursuant to an order of the Kerala High Court, which has attained finality, having been implemented and not challenged before the superior court, the action of the respondents to deny the same relief to the similarly situated persons is per se illegal, arbitrary and in defiance of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The same cannot, therefore, be sustained in the eyes of law. Further, the judgment/order in that case cannot also be said to be in personam, as claimed by the respondents, but the same has to be treated in rein and must be complied with in respect of all similarly situated persons.
Since respondents No. 13 & 14 are also working in the same department, where such benefits have been granted to other category of employees, they cannot certainly be treated differently not deprived of services and other retiral benefits, which have been extended to similarly situated other Group D employees.
In view of the above, OA No.675/PB/2009 is allowed and the applicants are held entitled to the benefit of the order dated 22.7.2009 as at Annexure A-6 as per rules and the same be extended to them by passing a speaking order within a period of 3 months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Further, this order applies mutatis mutandis to the rest of the 5 other cases also.
11. The Respondents have filed their reply stating that the contention of the Applicants are unfounded and without any basis. They have also stated that the (i) Apex Court has held in a series of judgments that the courts have no role in deciding the pay scales and other benefits of the employees and this role can be discharged only by expert bodies like Pay Commission, (ii) the extant Rules and Regulations of NYKS of whom the Applicants are employees do not subscribe to any provision for pension for its employees on Government of India pattern, (iii) the Government has not approved the introduction of Pension Scheme for the employees of Autonomous Bodies under various Ministries/Departments on Government of India pattern and (iv) in accordance with the OM dated 25.06.2010 issued by the Ministry of Finance, Department of Expenditure and the OM No.1(2)/EV/2007 dated 30.06.2009 has issued instructions for allowing the Autonomous Bodies to shift to New Pension Scheme even for those employees recruited prior to 01.01.2004.
12. However, they have submitted that after formation of Sangathan because of financial constraints, the salary and other benefits of the employees have been reduced but the Apex Court while deciding Writ Petition (Civil) No.1188/1989 B.R. Dutta and Others Vs. U.O.I. & Others decided on 15.11.1994 and SLP (Civil) No.2421-2422 and 14717 of 1995 decided on 22.03.1996 Joginder Nath Sharma and Others Vs. U.O.I. & Others and directed that the salary and other benefits being drawn by the District Youth Coordinators and similarly situated employees shall not be reduced to their detriment merely on the ground that they have been absorbed in the Sangathan. They have further submitted that the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court has been complied with.
13. Further according to them, the post-Sangathan employees, specially the Youth Coordinators approached the High Court of Allahabad for similar service benefits. The controversy was ultimately settled by the Apex Court in Appeal (Civil) No.7356/2000 Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan Vs. Rajesh Mohan Shukla (supra) holding that since nature of duties being discharged by Youth Coordinators appointed on deputation and those appointed by direct recruitment are the same, they are to be treated at par and they are not to be treated differently with pre-Sangathan Youth Coordinators. The said judgment has also been complied with by them.
14. Again, some of the Group D employees approached the Kerala High Court by filing Writ Petition ( Civil) No.20986 of 2006 claiming the said relief and in compliance with the order therein dated 05.09.2008, the Sangathan (Respondent No.1) granted service benefits including the retrial benefits only to those 13 persons who were petitioners before the High Court in the said Writ Petition. Therefore, the Applicants herein cannot claim similar benefits.
15. We have heard the learned counsel for the Applicants Mrs. Maninder Acharaya and the learned counsel for the Respondents Shri Rana Ranjit Singh. In our considered view the issue involved has been settled by a series of judgments by the Allahabad High, Punjab Haryana High Court, Kerala High Court, Benches of the Tribunal at Chandigarh, Ernakulam and New Delhi as pointed by both the parties in this OA. The Apex Court in its judgment in Civil Appeal No.7356/2000 Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan Vs. Rajesh Mohan Shukla and Others decided on 12.07.2007 (supra) has very clearly held that the nature of duties being discharged by the Youth Coordinators who initially came on deputation got absorbed in NYKS and those who were directly recruited being the same, there cannot be any differentiation in their pay and other benefits. The Chandigarh Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Parshotam Lal and Others (supra) has also held in clear terms that the Pre-Sangathan Employees and the Post-Sangathan employees cannot be treated separately. Accordingly, the Tribunal held that all service benefits including retirement benefits as applicable to Group D employees working under Government of India shall be paid to the Applicants therein also. The aforesaid order has been upheld by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh vide its order dated 08.02.2012. Again the Ernakulam Bench of this Tribunal has also held in the case of Thulasi B. and Others (supra) that as regards pensionary benefits are concerned, all the similarly placed employees are entitled for the pensionary benefits under the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. Finally, the Principal Bench of this Tribunal also in the case of Devender Kumar (Youth Coordinators) & Others (supra) has held that the judgment of the Chandigarh Bench in the case of Parshotam Lal and Others (supra) cannot be considered as a judgment in personam but has to be considered as a judgment in rem and benefits have to be extended to all the employees.
16. In view of the above position, we allow this OA and quash and set aside the impugned order dated 05.01.2012. Consequently, we also direct the Respondents to grant the pensionary benefits to the Applicants also as is being enjoyed by other employees of NYKS including Youth Coordinators, Regional Coordinators, Accountant-cum-Typists, Group D employees at par with Central Government employees on their retirement. The Applicants who have already retired from service of NYKS shall be paid the retirement benefits within a period of 2 months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
17. There shall be no order as to costs.
(SHEKHAR AGARWAL) (G. GEROGE PARACKEN) MEMBER (A) MEMBER (J) Rakesh