Kerala High Court
Sasi @ Kuruttu Sasi vs State Of Kerala on 26 August, 2013
Author: P.Bhavadasan
Bench: P.Bhavadasan
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.BHAVADASAN
MONDAY, THE 26TH DAY OF AUGUST 2013/4TH BHADRA, 1935
CRL.A.No. 461 of 2009 ( )
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SC.NO. 1175/2003 OF ASST. SESSIONS COURT, ATTINGAL
CP.NO. 3/2002 OF JUDICIAL FIRST CLASS MAGISTRATE COURT, VARKALA
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APPELLANT(S)/A1 TO A3 AND A5:
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1. SASI @ KURUTTU SASI, (A1),
S/O. KALIYAN, BHASKAR COLONY,MP.VII NO.231,
PERUMKULAM DESOM, MANAMBOOR VILLAGE.
2. BIJU, (A2), S/O. RAMAN,
KANNANKARA, MP.VIII/249, PERUMKULAM DESOM,
MANAMBOOR VILLAGE.
3. SUDEVAN, (A3), S/O. RAMANKUTTY,
CHARUVILA PUTHEN VEEDU, PERUMKULAM KANNANKARA,
MANAMBOOR DESOM, MANAMBOOR VILLAGE.
4. SURESH, (A5), S/O. SUKUMARAN,
PULIYAKKACHIRA VEEDU, KODITHOOKKIYAKUNNU,
KAVALAYOOR DESOM, MANAMBOOR VILLAGE.
BY ADVS.SRI.C.S.MANU
SRI.S.K.PREMRAJ
SRI.ANOOP JOSEPH
SRI.ABHILASH AKBAR
SRI.T.B.SIVAPRASAD
RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:
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STATE OF KERALA,
REPRESENTED BY CIRCLE-INSPECTOR OF POLICE,
KADAKKAVOOR POLICE STATION.
BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SRI. ROY THOMAS
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD
ON 26-08-2013, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
sts
P.BHAVADASAN, J.
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Crl.A. No. 461 of 2009
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Dated this the 26th day of August, 2013
J U D G M E N T
Of the five accused persons prosecuted for the offences punishable under Sections 450, 376(2)(g) and 506(ii) read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, the fourth accused was acquitted of all charges and others were convicted for all the offences. Accused Nos. 1 to 3 and 5 were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of 10,000/- each with a default clause of six months for the offence under Section 376(2)(g), five years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of 5,000/- each with a default clause of six months for the offence under Section 450 of IPC and rigorous imprisonment for three years for the offence under Section 506(ii) of IPC. Substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently and set off as per law was allowed. It is also directed that if fine amounts were realized, the same shall be paid to PW2, the victim as Crl.A. No. 461 of 2009 -2- compensation.
2. PW2, an unwed mother is the victim in this case. The incident is said to have taken place on 28.05.2000 in the night. As per the allegations, the son of PW2 who was 13 years of age at the relevant time, had gone to her house and the victim was all alone in the house. As usual, the victim went to sleep after supper. A short while thereafter, she heard a sound from outside. She asked who it was. The reply given was that it was Thulasi and at once PW2 claims to have realized that it was not Thulasi, it was somebody else. She made it clear to the person that it was not Thulasi. Then it is stated that the second accused replied that it was him. She was asked to open the door which she refused. The allegation is that then the third accused stealthily entered the house through the roof and then opened the door to let others in. It is alleged that the second accused took out a chopper and threatened the victim with dire consequences if she dared to resist. Overcome with fear, Crl.A. No. 461 of 2009 -3- she remained passive. It is further alleged that thereafter, the first accused pinned her down to the ground and committed forced sexual assault followed by the others. PW2 was exhausted that due to the pain and other after effects of the gang rape, she could not get up and she remained in the house for the next five days. On the fifth day, PW3 is alleged to have come to the house of PW2 and finding that PW2 was lying in the house, she asked for the reason. PW2 narrated the incident to her. PW3 offered to take her to the Police Station and then to the hospital. PW2 went along with PW3 and laid Ext.P2 First Information Statement. PW8, the Sub Inspector of Police recorded Ext.P2, First Information Statement furnished by PW2 and on that basis, he registered crime as per Ext.P10, FIR. He also had the body note prepared as Ext.P2(a). PW9 took over investigation. He prepared Ext.P1 scene mahazar and recovered MOs 1 to 7. He filed a report showing the offences committed by the accused as per Ext.P11 report. Crl.A. No. 461 of 2009 -4- After having the accused arrested, he had them sent for potency test. He also had PW2 examined by PW4 and obtained Ext.P3 certificate. He recorded statement of witnesses, completed investigation and laid charge before the court.
3. The court before which the final report was laid, took cognizance of the offences. Finding that the offences are exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions, the said court committed the case to Sessions Court, Trivandrum under Section 209 of Cr.P.C. The said court made over the case to Assistant Sessions Court, Attingal for trial and disposal.
4. The latter court, on receipt of records and on appearance of the accused before the said court, framed charges for the offences punishable under Sections 450, 376 (2)(g) and 506(ii) read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
5. To the charge, the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The prosecution therefore had PWs 1 to Crl.A. No. 461 of 2009 -5- 9 examined and had Exts. P1 to P13 marked. MOs 1 to 7 were got identified and marked.
6. After the close of the prosecution evidence the accused were questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C. They denied all the incriminating circumstances brought out in evidence against them and maintained that they were innocent. Finding that the accused could not be acquitted under Section 232 Cr.P.C., they were asked to enter on their defence. They chose to adduce no evidence.
7. On an appreciation of the evidence mainly relying on the evidence furnished by PWs 2 and 3, the court below came to the conclusion that there were no evidence as against the fourth accused and acquitted him of all charges. The court below found that the evidence of PWs 2 and 3 is sufficient enough to come to a conclusion that the other accused were guilty of the offences alleged against them. Conviction and sentence as already mentioned followed. The said conviction and sentence are assailed in this appeal. Crl.A. No. 461 of 2009 -6-
8. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant pointed out that even going by the prosecution case, PW2 was threatened with dire consequences using a chopper if she dared to raise her voice. But that weapon has not been recovered. There is nothing to show that any weapon has been used as alleged. It was also pointed out that there is five days delay in lodging the FIS which is not properly explained and the explanation offered by PW2 cannot be accepted for more reasons than one. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that even going by the evidence of PW2, she was bleeding as a result of the sexual assault committed on her and this aspect is belied by the medical evidence wherein the doctor has noticed that there was no bleeding. He had not noticed any bleeding. It is also contended that the medical evidence does not support the claim made by PW2. The doctor examined as PW4 does not positively say that there are signs of sexual assault on PW2. It is also contended that if one is to believe PW2, the acts Crl.A. No. 461 of 2009 -7- committed were of such brutal nature that it is rather inconceivable that it would have left no external injuries on the victim. In fact, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, PW2 would say that there were visible injuries on her body which she belied by Ext.P3, the medical certificate.
9. The learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that the court below has relied on the res gestea principle to draw inspiration from the evidence of PW3 to find corroboration for the evidence of PW2. It is contended by the learned counsel that by no stretch of imagination, it could be said that hearsay evidence spoken to by PW3 would fall within the ambit of res gestea evidence as contained in Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act. For the above proposition, the learned counsel relied on the decisions reported in Sukhar v. State of U.P. [2000 (2) KLT SN 10], Bhaskaran v. State of Kerala [1985 KLT 122] and Polachan v. State of Kerala [1993 (2) KLT 472]. Crl.A. No. 461 of 2009 -8-
10. For the proposition that the delay is fatal in cases by the present nature, the learned counsel relied on the decision reported in Devinder Singh and others v. State of Himachal Pradesh [AIR 2003 SC 3365]. The reliance was placed on the same decision for the proposition that as the medical evidence belies the prosecution case, the court below was unjustified in holding the accused guilty.
11. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant had no quarrel with the proposition that if the evidence of the prosecutrix is found to be cogent, convincing and credit worthy, the conviction can be certainly based on the same. But one has to carefully scrutinize the evidence of the prosecutrix and the court should be convinced that it inspires confidence in the mind of court. If there are inherent improbabilities in the version given by PW2 or by the prosecutrix or the other items of evidence belied the version given by the prosecutrix, then the court may do well to look for corroborative items of evidence. In the case on Crl.A. No. 461 of 2009 -9- hand, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, it is virtually impossible to say that the evidence of PW2 is so inspiring so that one can safely base a conviction on that evidence. The medical evidence belies her testimony. So also it is contended that according to PW2, she had flashed the incident to all her neighbours and it is surprisingly to note according to the learned counsel that the Investigating Officer did not feel it even necessary to question the neighbours, let alone being examined in court. It is also contended that going by the evidence of PW2, she had profuse bleeding after the incident and as per the scene mahazar, which is Ext.P1, the Investigating Officer recovered two clothes stained with blood. But surprisingly enough, the chemical analysis report of those two cloth materials have not been produced by the prosecution. The learned counsel went on to point out that the inherent improbabilities in the case betray the prosecution and it is not safe to base a conviction on the solitary evidence of PW2. Accordingly, it is Crl.A. No. 461 of 2009 -10- contended that the conviction and sentence cannot stand.
12. The learned Public Prosecutor on the other hand contended that on the very face of it, the contentions cannot stand. There is no suggestion to PW2 as to why she should falsely implicate the accused persons. Ext.P1, scene mahazar, according to the learned Public Prosecutor, clearly shows that entry was gained to the house through the roof. At least, to that extent, there is clear evidence. It is not necessary, according to the learned Public Prosecutor, that in all cases of rape, there could be external injuries. It depends upon the facts of each case. In the case on hand, the learned Public Prosecutor went on to point out that five persons had forced themselves into the house of the victim and threatened her with a chopper thereby, making her passive and the threat instilled in her mind made her unresponsive to the acts committed by the accused persons. The learned Public Prosecutor went on to contend that as rightly noticed by the lower court, the evidence of PW2, to a Crl.A. No. 461 of 2009 -11- certain extent, gets corroboration at the hands of PW3. That also strengthens the prosecution case. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, there are no reasons as to why PW2 should be disbelieved and there are no infirmities pointed out in her evidence which would show that she had an oblique motive to falsely implicate the accused persons. It was also contended by the learned Public Prosecutor that the version of PW2 gets corroboration with the contents of Ext.P2, the First Information Statement and there are no serious contradictions or infirmities pointed out in the evidence of PW2 in the narration of the incident which appears in Ext.P2, First Information Statement. These facts have been taken note of by the court below. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, the court below which had the opportunity to watch the demeanour of witnesses has chosen to believe the version given by PWs 2 and 3 and there is no justifiable reason established before this Court to take a different view. At any rate, according to the learned Crl.A. No. 461 of 2009 -12- Public Prosecutor, there is evidence to show that forced entry was gained into the house of PW2 and to that extent, Section 450 of IPC is attracted.
13. As is the usual case, here too, the court is left with the evidence of PW2 to assess the credibility of the version given regarding the incident said to have been committed by the accused persons. PW2 is the mother of a child who was aged 13 years at the relevant time. The evidence is to the effect that son of PW2 had gone to her house prior to the date of incident. The victim was all alone in her house on 28.05.2000. The evidence of PW2 is to the effect that on the date of incident, as usual, after dinner, she went to sleep. A short while thereafter, she heard a sound from outside. When she enquired, a person replied that it was Thulasi. PW2 was definite that it was not Thulasi because she was familiar with his sound and she said so. Then she was asked to open the door which, PW2 says that, she refused. According to PW2, to her surprise and dismay, she found Crl.A. No. 461 of 2009 -13- that the third accused had gained entry into the house through the roof and had unbolted the door letting the others in. According to her, the second accused had a chopper with him and he threatened her with dire consequences, if she raised any alarm. She says that she should remain submissive and passive. PW2 then goes on to say that all others went out of the house except A1 who pinned her down on the ground and committed the forced sexual assault. She would then say about the acts committed by others. According to the testimony of PW2, she was profusely bleeding as a result of the incident and she could not get up to do anything after the incident. Therefore, she remained inside the house. According to PW2, after five days when PW3 came home and finding PW2 lying in the house, asked for the reason. PW2 narrated the incident to PW3. With the help of PW3, PW2 says that she went to the Police Station and gave First Information Statement and then went to the hospital.
Crl.A. No. 461 of 2009 -14-
14. It may be noticed that PW3 has closely related to PW2. PW3 says that she had gone to the house of PW2 to borrow some money. When she reached there, she found PW2 lying in a exhausted state and unable to move about. She enquired and told about the incident by PW2.
15. The court below has treated the hearsay evidence of PW3 as falling within the ambit of res gestea as contained in Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, it is difficult to accept that view. In the decision reported in Sukhar v. State of U.P. [2000 (2) KLT SN 10], it was held as follows:
"S. 6 of the Evidence act is an exception to the general rule whereunder the hearsay evidence becomes admissible. But for bringing such hearsay evidence within the provisions of S.6 what is required to be established is that it must be almost contemporaneous with the acts and there should not be an interval which would allow fabrication. The statements sought to be admitted, therefore, as forming part of res gestae must have been made Crl.A. No. 461 of 2009 -15- contemporaneously with the acts of immediately thereafter. The court has no hesitation to come to the conclusion that PW2's statement indicating that the injured told him that his nephew has fired at him would become admissible under S.6 of the Act."
16. In the decision reported in Bhaskaran v. State of Kerala [1985 KLT 122], it was held as follows:
"S. 6 of the Evidence Act read with illustration
(a) thereto shows that spontaneous statements in the course of the transaction are admissible as being res gestae. The statement is relevant only if it is that of a person who has seen the actual occurrence and who uttered it simultaneously with the incident or so soon thereafter as to make it reasonably certain that the speaker is still under the stress of the excitement caused by his having seen the incident. The statement uttered or the act done must be a spontaneous reaction of the person witnessing the crime and forming part of the transaction. The bystander's declaration must relate only to that which came under their observation. The declaration must be Crl.A. No. 461 of 2009 -16- substantially contemporaneous with the fact and not merely the narration of a prior event.
A bystander is a person present at the time of the incident. Remarks made by persons other than the eye witnesses are only hearsay. In order to make the statement of a bystander admissible, it must have been made, as contemplated by S.6 of the Evidence Act and illustration (a) to it, at the time the transaction was taking place, or so shortly before or after it as to form part of the transaction. If the transaction has terminated and then the statement is made, the statement is irrelevant. The admissibility is dependent on continuity. Tested in the light of these principles, we find that the statement purported to have been made by PW1 to PW2, on her arrival after the assailant had left the place is only hearsay and cannot form part of res gestae. "
17. In the decision reported in Polachan v. State of Kerala [1993 (2) KLT 472], it was held as follows:
"What PW2 told PWs 1 and 4 as soon as they reached the scene is admissible under S.6 of the Evidence Act as Res Gestae because, the said statement of PW2 being immediately after Crl.A. No. 461 of 2009 -17- the occurrence should be treated as part of the transaction. The statements of even by- standers witnessing a transaction are relevant if they are made while the transaction is in progress or so shortly before or after it as to form part of the same transaction. The statement to be admissible as Res Gestae should have been made contemporaneously with the act. In other words it should have been made either during or immediately before or after the occurrence. It should not have been after such an interval from the act as to afford occasion for fabrication."
18. The application of res gestae depends upon proximity of time of conveyance of the information. It should be so proximate that the information conveyed is, in fact, form part of a same transaction. The real test is the proximity of time. It is the principle behind res gestae evidence is that the information is conveyed before there is any lapse of time so as to develop or cook up a story. The logic behind the principle is that the act constituting res gestae is so close and proximate i.e., treated to form part of Crl.A. No. 461 of 2009 -18- same transaction. The proximity rule is applied to rule out any discrepancies and deliberate falsehood.
19. If that be the test, surely, the case on hand should fail to meet the test. PW3 goes to the place of occurrence after five days of the incident. It is significant to notice that in Ext.P2, PW2 has no case that PW3 had come to her house for borrowing money. What one could gather from a reading of Ext.P2 is that PW2 had gone to PW3 and conveyed the information to her. Whatever that be, the evidence furnished by PW3 cannot be treated as res gestae evidence and it cannot be taken as corroboratory items of evidence.
20. What next arises for consideration is the medical evidence furnished by PW4 and the certificate issued by him namely Ext.P3. PW4 would say that he had occasion to examine the victim on 03.06.2000. As per his observation, the patient was conscious and well oriented. He could not notice any external injuries on the body of PW2. His findings are available in Ext.P3 certificate. The definite opinion given Crl.A. No. 461 of 2009 -19- by PW4 is that he could not conclusively say that there was sexual intercourse as alleged by PW2. He has given his reason for arriving at such a conclusion. Of course, he would say that PW2 complained of difficulty in passing urine but he could not notice any external injuries.
21. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, if the act as alleged by PW2 was committed on her, it is rather inconceivable that the medical evidence would have been as stated above. It was a brutal act committed by five persons and going by the evidence of PW2, as a result of the acts committed by the accused persons, she had profuse bleeding. PW4 says that he had not noticed any signs of bleeding nor did the patient complain to him of bleeding. Surely, if what PW2 claimed was true, that would not have been omitted to be noticed by PW4. The medical evidence given by PW4 and his certificate, Ext.P3, it does not support the prosecution case at all.
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22. It is also significant to notice that though in Ext.P1, scene mahazar, it is stated that two clothes containing blood stains were recovered from the place of occurrence, there is nothing to show that they were sent for chemical examination and reports have been exhibited as evidence in the case. So there is no forensic evidence in this case at all.
23. That leaves us with the evidence of PW2 alone. It is well settled by now that the victim of rape is not an accomplice but she is in the position of an injured witnesses and her evidence is entitled to considerable weight. One should also remember that an offence of rape is never done in public or on invitation. The offence by very nature is done in secrecy and it is imprudent on the part of the court to insist for corroboration. This is the reason why it is said that if the evidence of the prosecutrix is found to be convincing enough, the court can base a conviction on her evidence. But her evidence should be beyond reasonable doubt and should establish the acts committed by the accused persons. Crl.A. No. 461 of 2009 -21- If there are inherent improbabilities in the case or her evidence is belied by other items of evidence, then the court may do well to look for corroboration. If the above test is applied to the evidence of PW2, it is difficult to say that her evidence is of a sterling character though that is a relative term.
24. The evidence of PW2 is to the effect that she had flashed the incident to her neighbours assumes importance. None of the neighbours have been examined and nor is there anything to show that they have ever been questioned by the Investigating Officer. It is difficult to accept the version given by PW2 that none of them came forward to help her because they were frightened of the accused persons. At any rate, there is no reason as to why they should not have been questioned by the Investigating Officer.
25. PW2 in her evidence has stated that people visit her for certain kinds of sorceress remedies and people used Crl.A. No. 461 of 2009 -22- to come to her almost all days. It is difficult to believe that none will have come to meet her on all those five days. Moreover, if the evidence of PW1 is to be believed, her physical state would have been deplorable.
26. The above infirmities in the evidence of PW2 makes it extremely hazardous to venture a finding solely based on her evidence. If the acts were committed as narrated by her, surely and certainly, there would have been indication which PW4 could have easily noticed and made mention of in his report. The absence of any injuries visible so as to support the case of rape in the evidence of PW4 and in his certificate, certainly casts suspicion on the narration of the incident as given by PW2.
27. The learned counsel for the appellant has fully justified in his submission that based on the evidence of PW2 alone, it will not be safe to come to the conclusion that the offence of rape has been committed. Therefore, the commission of offence under Section 376 of IPC cannot be Crl.A. No. 461 of 2009 -23- sustained.
28. What now remains to be considered is the offences under Sections 450 and 506(ii) of IPC. As the offence under Section 376 has failed, consequently the offence under Section 506(ii) has also to fail. These two are so interlinked that one cannot remain in the absence of the other. So the conviction under Section 506(ii) also has to fail.
29. However, the position may be different with respect to the offence under Section 450 of IPC. There is an evidence to show that the entry was gained through the roof by one of the accused persons and he had unbolted the door letting in others. The entry in the dead of night cannot be for any good reasons. That has to be for some illegal activities. To that extent, the lower court may be justified in came to the conclusion that the offence under Section 450 is made out. The conviction under Section 450 of IPC has only to stand.
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30. What then remains to be considered is the sentence imposed for the offence under Section 450 IPC. The court below has awarded a sentence of five years and a fine of 5,000/- on each of the accused persons who were found guilty of the offence. In the light of the weak evidence furnished by PW2 though supported by Ext.P1, the sentence seems to be on the harsh side.
Thus, while allowing the appeal in part and setting aside the conviction and sentence for the offences punishable under Section 376(2)(g) and 506(ii) of IPC, the conviction for the offence under Section 450 of IPC is sustained and the sentence imposed is set aside and instead each of the accused is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine of 15,000/- each, in default of payment of which each of them shall suffer simple imprisonment for a further period of six months. Set off as per law is allowed. If the fine amount is Crl.A. No. 461 of 2009 -25- realized, it will be paid to PW2, the victim as compensation.
The appeal is disposed of as above.
Sd/-
P.BHAVADASAN JUDGE ds //True Copy// P.A. To Judge