Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
S. Anjaneyulu vs Regional Manager, Apsrtc, Vijayawada on 22 July, 1999
Equivalent citations: 1999(5)ALD55, 1999(4)ALT585, AIR 1999 ANDHRA PRADESH 403, (1999) 5 ANDHLD 55 (1999) 4 ANDH LT 585, (1999) 4 ANDH LT 585
ORDER
1. Rule nisi. Sri C. V. Ramulu, learned Standing Counsel for the APSRTC, took notice for the respondent. The writ petition was heard finally with the consent of both the learned Counsel for the parties.
2. In the year 1993, the respondent issued tender notification calling for tenders to grant licence for allotment of the stall at Machilipatnam Bus-Station to sell soda and cool-drinks. In response to the tender notification, the petitioner applied and the stall was allotted to the petitioner as licensee initially for a period of three years from 15-8-1993 to 14-8-1996. At the request of the petitioner, the licence period was subsequently extended for a further period of three years from 15-8-1996 to 14-8-1999. As on today, the extended period of licence is in currency. When the matter stood thus, it appears that the respondent has issued the tender notification dated 13-7-1999 calling for applications from the eligible persons to allot the same stall for selling soda and cool-drinks for the period beyond 14-8-1999. At that stage, this writ petition is filed praying for "a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to renew the licence of the petitioner in respect of soda and cool drinks stall in Machilipatnam Bus Station for another two terms of three years each with effect from 15-8-1999 on enhancement of licence fee as per terms and conditions the contract entered into between the petitioner and the respondent, by declaring that the action of the respondent in calling for fresh tenders in respect of soda and cool drinks stall in Machilipatnam Bus Station by his Tender Notification No.01/437(34)/99-RM(V), dated 13-7-1999 and also the proceedings of the respondent bearing No.01/ M1/90(35)/93-RM, dated 8-7-1999 refusing to extend the licence of the petitioner as highly arbitrary, without jurisdiction, contrary to the terms and conditions of contract, illegal, unsustainable and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and for a consequential direction to the respondent to renew the licence in favour of the petitioner."
3. Sri C. Ramachandra Raju, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that when he participated in the tenders in the year 1993 in pursuance of the Tender Notification, he was supplied with a copy of the General Terms and Conditions for Licensing Stalls/Canteens, a copy of which is annexed to the writ petition at pages 8 and 9 of the material papers and on the basis of those terms and conditions, he offered his bid with the understanding that the respondent would renew the licence for three terms of three years each on compound enhancement on the existing monthly licence fee @ 20%, 30% and 30% in the 4th, 7th and 10th year of licence respectively, subject to due performance of the contract by the petitioner, and in that view of the matter, it should be held that the General Terms and Conditions for Licensing Stalls/Canteens furnished to the petitioner alongwith the tender schedule form the part of the essential terms of the contract, and if those General Terms and Conditions for Licensing Stalls/Canteens are considered to be the essential tenns of the contract existing between the petitioner and the respondent, it goes without saying that the respondent is bound to renew the licence for three terms of three years each. The learned Counsel would maintain that the refusal of the respondent to renew the licence and the action of the respondent in calling for the applications from the eligible persons to allot the premise to run the soda and cool drinks stall beyond 14-8-1999 is ex facie illegal and arbitrary and contrary to the terms of the agreement.
4. I do not find any merit in the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. In the first place, it is relevant to note that the so called 'General Terms and Conditions for Licensing Stalls/Canteens' annexed to the writ petition at pages 8 and 9 of the material papers, strictly speaking, in legal parlance, are only administrative instructions and they are not the law. There is no need for me to dilate this aspect further because, the Division Bench of this Court in S. Sudhakara Gupta and others v. APSRTC, (DB), dealing with the rule making power of the Corporation under Section 45 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 and considering certain Circulars similar to the 'General Terms and Conditions for Licensing Stalls/Canteens' that fell for consideration before the Division Bench, opined in para 26 as under:
"26. Legal rights are created either by law or contract. When we use the expression 'law' by some form of law like legislation or subordinate legislation, known to the constitutional system which is capable of being enforced. We do not see how the administrative decisions of a Corporation like the present respondent are different from the administrative decisions of any other private Corporation functioning in the similar circumstances. The various Circulars issued by the respondent-Corporation referred to earlier cannot even be called as regulations made in exercise of the power under Section 45 of the Act, because such regulations can be made only with the previous sanction of the State Government. No material was placed before the Court to show that these Circulars can be brought within the ambit of Section 45. Therefore, in our opinion, the various Circulars do not create any enforceable legal rights in favour of the appellants/writ petitioners, being purely administrative instructions issued by the respondent-Corporation to its subordinates."
Therefore the 'General Terms and Conditions for Licensing Stalls/Canteens' cannot be treated to be a law, and these terms and conditions do not create any right in anybody including the petitioner. Alternatively, it should be noted that any valid contract, apart from other requirements, is essentially grounded on the jurisprudential and statutory requirement of satisfying the 'Doctrine of consensus ad idem'. It is not that an oral contract exists between the petitioner and the respondent and, therefore, the Court should find out the agreed terms and conditions of the contract with external aids. The petitioner and the respondent have entered into a written agreement. The written agreement should reflect the 'meeting of the minds' of the contracting parties on the agreed terms and conditions of the contract. The agreement does not reflect that the contracting parties have agreed and adopted the 'General Terms and Conditions for Licensing Stalls/Canteens' as binding terms and condition of the contract. The written agreement does not even refer to the 'General Terms and Conditions for Licensing Stalls/ Canteens'. The agreement is not one line agreement. The agreement contains several convenants governing the relations of the contracting parties. Therefore, the parties are bound by the terms of the written agreement and work out their mutual rights and obligations within the framework of the agreement. Since the terms of the agreement do not vest any right in the petitioner-contracting party to seek extension of the licence as a matter of right or of course on his agreeing to pay the compound enhanced licence fee on the existing monthly licence fee, the petitioner cannot seek a writ of mandamus from this Court to the respondent to renew the licence for a further period of two terms of three years each on his agreeing to pay the compound enhanced licence fee on the existing monthly licence fee. However, Sri C. Ramachandra Raju's argument is that the very fact that in the year 1996, the respondent renewed the licence for a further period of three years which is going to expire on 14-8-1999 indicates that the respondent acted upon the 'General Terms and Conditions for Licensing Stalls/Canteens' thinking that he was bound by those terms and conditions, and therefore, it is not legally permissible for the respondent now to retract and refuse to extend the licence for the remaining two terms of three years each on the ground that the Corporation has taken a policy decision not to renew the licence after the expiry of the term of the existing licence. This contention of the learned Counsel is again not well founded. It is nobody's case that the respondent lacks power and competence to renew the licence in favour of the petitioner, if he so chooses. That is beyond the point. What is pertinent for the Court to consider in the instant writ petition is whether the petitioner has any established subsisting right to claim renewal of the licence beyond 14-8-1999. As pointed out supra, the agreement entered between the parties does not vest such right in the petitioner-contracting party. If agreement is of no help to the petitioner, Mr. Raju, is not in a position to trace the obligation of the respondent to renew the licence beyond 14-8-1999 with reference to any other document or Statute except the so called General Terms and Conditions of licence to which reference is already made.
5. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.