Delhi High Court
Kanti Parshad vs The State on 9 February, 1971
Equivalent citations: 1971CRILJ1241
ORDER Pritam Singh Safeer, J.
1. Kanti Parshad was convicted Under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for nine months and also to the payment of fine of Rs. 500/- in default whereof he was to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months. His sentence was reduced by the Additional Sessions Judge to that of rigorous imprisonment for six months. The sentence of fine was not maintained.
2. The case against the petitioner was that on the 29th of June, 1968, at about 6 p. m. while driving a D. T. U. bus No. DLP-828 near the traffic point of Shakti Nagar Chowk, Delhi, he caused such injuries to the deceased, who was standing with a bicycle at the traffic point, which resulted into his instantaneous death.
3. The prosecution has examined apart from P. Ws. 6 and 7, P. Ws. 3 and 9 as eye-witnesses of the occurrence. have gone through the evidence of P.W. 9 several times. That was for the reason that he happened to be the solitary witness, who had stated that the vehicle passed over the deceased. In his cross-examination he was unable to state as to which part of the body of the deceased was crushed. A close examination of his statement discloses that it would not be safe to rely upon hi-s testimony so far as the passing of the bus over the body of the deceased is concerned. He is a witness, who like P, W. 3 not only belongs to the same caste as the deceased, but had also known him earlier. According to P.W. 9 the house in which he lives is about 50 houses away from the residential house wherein Om Parkash deceased lived. The prosecution evidence is to the effect that the bus did not stop for 30/35 paces after the fatal impact. Surinder Kumar P.W. 6 was accompanying the deceased. According to him. it was his cycle which the deceased was holding. P.W. 7 Kewal Kishan is another eye-witness, whose testimony cannot be ignored.
4. It is unacceptable that the occurrence did not involve the present petitioner. The defense adopted while making the statement Under Section 342 of the Indian Penal Code was to the effect that the present petitioner had not caused the accident and had been erroneously involved.
5. A dishonest defense does not relieve the prosecution of its obligation to bring the guilt home to the accused. It stands proved in terms of the evidence of P. Ws. 6 and 7 that the petitioner was driving the bus. mentioned in the opening part of this judgment, and that the accident resulted from an impact which the bus caused. Accord-ins to the said witnesses the bumper of the bus struck Om Parkash deceased, who fell down, suffered the injuries. and died.
6. The prosecution in this case has been negligent in not satisfactorily proving the injuries caused on the person of Om Parkash. P.W. 10. who has been produced to prove Exhibit P, W. 12/A, the alleged injury report resulting from the examination of the deceased carried out by Dr. M. A. Babu, was a mere dresser in the Police Hospital. The explanation offered through his evidence that Dr. M. A. Babu was not available is not founded on evidence. He stated that Dr. Kaushal had told him that Dr. Babu had gone to England. That statement is hit by Section 60 of the Evidence Act. Why could not Dr. Kaushal be produced to depose to that effect? No witness has been produced on the basis of whose testimony it could be held that Dr. Babu had gone to England. Hearsay evidence is no evidence.
7. It is no doubt true that ribs on the body of the deceased Om Parkash were fractured both on the right as well as on the left side. As recorded in Exhibit P.W. 12/A some intestines were coming out. There were certain aspects which must be borne in mind. There is no evidence showing that any blood came out of the deceased at the place of occurrence or that the tyres of the vehicle got any blood marks at the spot. The investigating officer ' has not stated that he found the tyre marks on the road in such a situation that one of the marks was on one side of the body and the other across it. There is no deposition of any witness barring P.W. 9. which is not worthy of credit, to the effect that any part of the vehicle crossed over the body of the deceased Om Parkash. The injuries could have spoken for themselves if Dr. Babu had been produced and if he had deposed that the injuries could have been caused by a wheel of the vehicle crossing over the body of the deceased. The said doctor if produced, could have been cross-examined as to whether he had found any marks on the body which could be described as left over by the wheel of the vehicle. It cannot be safely held on the face of the evidence adduced in this case that any part of the vehicle passed over the body of the deceased. .
8. After taking me through the evidence Mr. K. L. Sharma has rendered me eminent assistance by pointing out that the provisions of Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code occur in a peculiar setting. He has drawn my attention to Section 116 of the Indian Motor Vehicles Act. In the course of his arguments I have perused Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code as well.
9. The learned Counsel at the outset cited in Re: M. Ganesan. . There Section 116 of the Motor Vehicles Act came in for consideration. It was noticed that the said provision was practically a reproduction of Section 11 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, which Act prevailed in England. After reproducing both the provisions in paragraph 5 of the judgment the learned Judge noticed that Section 11 of the English Act was followed by Section 12. It would be pertinent to notice the distinction which becomes - significant if the phraseology employed by the Legislature in the various provisions is kept in view. Section 116 of the Motor Vehicles Act is:
Whoever drives a motor vehicle at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the nature, condition and use of the place where the vehicle is driven and the amount of traffic which actually is at the time or which might reasonably be expected to be in the place, shall be punishable Section 11 of the English Act to which reference was made is:
If any person drives a motor vehicle on a road recklessly, or at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the public having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the nature, condition, and use of the road, and the amount of traffic which is actually at the time, or which might reasonably be expected to be. on the road, he shall be liable.
The said section is followed by Section 12 of the English Act. which is:
(1) If any person drives a motor vehicle on a road without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road, he shall be guilty of an offence.
It is clear that even careless driving is deciphered as an offence in terms of Section 12 of the English Act. Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code is:
Whoever drives any vehicle, of rides, on any public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person, shall1 be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both, It is this provision which is concerned with driving. Section 304-A under which the petitioner was convicted is: "Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
It is visible that the provision as such is not limited to rash or negligent driving. Any rash or negligent act where by death of any person is caused becomes punishable provided it is covered by Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code The two elements in Section 304-A, either of which or both of which may be proved to establish the guilt of an accused person are rashness/negligence. A very significant discussion of the aforesaid ingredients is contained in Bhalchandra Waman Pathe v. The State of Maharashtra, 1968 Ace CJ 38 (Bom) which is the next case cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The Supreme Court was dealing with the judgment of the High Court of Bombay. There was a Regulation framed by the Commissioner of Police under the Bombay Police Act defining the duties of pedestrians and the drivers. The accused in the Bombay case while driving his car caused injuries to two sisters. who were crossing the road where there were marks on it indicating that the pedestrians could cross at that place. One of the sisters expired. It is true that in Delhi there is no Regulation which on parity with the Regulations in vogue in Bombay may be defining the duties of pedestrians or drivers. That controversy, however, does not touch anywhere on the horizon of the circumstances of the case in my hand. There was no pedestrian crossing the road in this case. The deceased was standing near a traffic point.
10. In paragraph 11 of the Supreme Court judgment. referred to above, the following observations have been made:
An offence Under Section 304-A, Indian Penal Code may be committed either by doing a rash act or a negligent act. There is a distinction between a rash act and a negligent act. In the case of a rash act as observed by Straight, J, in Idu Beg's case 2nd 3 All 776 the criminality lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular. which having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted. Negligence is an omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Again as explained in Nidamarti Nagabhushanam's case (1872) 7 Mad HCR 119. a culpable rashness is acting with the consciousness that the mischievous and illegal consequences may follow, but with the hope that they will not, and often with the belief that the actor has taken sufficient precautions to prevent their happening. The immutability arises from acting despite the consciousness. Culpable negligence is acting without the consciousness that the illegal and mischievous effect will follow, but in circumstances which show that the actor has not exercised the caution incumbent upon him and if he had he would have had the consciousness. The imputability arises from the neglect of the civic duty of circumspection.
The distinction between negligence and rashness has achieved a highly merited exposition not only in the paragraph quoted above but also in paragraph 12 of the judgment. If the various provisions reproduced in a former part of this judgment are kept in view then it becomes clear that while Section 116 of the Motor Vehicles Act and Sections 11 and 12 of the English Act as well as Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code deal with cases of driving which may be dangerous, careless or reckless or the one which may bring a person inside the purview of Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code, the provisions of Section 304-A of the Code stand apart. If it is proved in a case that the negligence/rashness on the part of a person has resulted into a death that would suffice for the purpose of Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. A person may cause death by a rash or negligent act which may have nothing to do with driving at all. The act made punishable Under Section 304-A is distinguishable from other penal acts inasmuch as it may be free from intention but then culpable rashness and negligence have been made punishable as such.
11. It has been strenously argued before me that if at all the petitioner acted with an error of judgment. He was neither rash nor negligent. It has also been pleaded on the basis of the observations contained in the Supreme Court case, noticed above, that the death caused should not in any way prejudice the mind of a court of law. I may say that the more heinous the method employed in committing a crime may be the greater would be the caution on the judicial mind to be thoroughly impartial while arriving at any conclusion in such a case.
12. It is nobody's case that the deceased did not instantaneously expire at the spot. No suggestion has been made in the cross-examination of any of the prosecution witnesses that the deceased Om Parkash uttered a single word after the fatal impact. Rashness would be there if departing from rules of commonsense and prudence a decision is made to take the hazard in a particular manner and the action so hazardously performed would ultimately establish the element of rashness. Negligence, as apart from rashness, is to neglect to do what a reasonable person would have done, abstain from doing that which may have prevented the ultimate incriminating result. Negligence and rashness to be punishable in terms of Section 304-A must be attributable to a state of mind wherein the criminality arises because of no error in judgment but of a deliberation in the mind risking the crime as well as the life of. the person who may lose his life as a result of the crime. Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code is such a provision which discloses that criminality may be there apart from any means rea. There may be no motive or intention. Still a person may venture to practise such j rashness "or negligence which may cause the death of another. The death so caused is not the determining factor. The circumstances of the case, however may establish rashness or negligence. In this case what stands established is that Om Parkash, the deceased, was standing near the traffic point at a time when there was enough of visibility and in a situation where it was expected of a prudent man exercising commonsense that while driving the vehicle it should not be so driven as to involve Om Parkash, into .any impact whatsoever. On evidence it can be safely concluded that the petitioner could see where the traffic point was; he could see where the deceased was. If he was not to incur the noose of culpable negligence around his neck, he was to completely avoid the deceased. An ordinary prudent man was expected to avoid a person standing with a cycle at a crucial place like the traffic point. A driver cannot detract his attention from the traffic point. It is urged on behalf of the State that there was an element of rashness present in the mind of the petitioner since he was driving at such a speed that he could control the vehicle only 30/35 paces beyond the place of the impact. No evidence has been produced regarding the measurement of the tyre marks giving any expert opinion regarding the speed. It is in evidence that there was a bus stop before the traffic point. It is not clear that the bus in question had been stopped by the petitioner at that point, or not. The element of negligence, however, is present. The counsel for the State has cited before me In re, Parthasarathy and has invited my attention to paragraphs 15 and 16 of that judgment. Rama-swami. J.. while dealing with that case laid down certain tests for determining reasonable speed,. He also observed that the driver is required to keep a reasonably careful lookout for other road-users, including, of course, pedestrians. In paragraph 18 of the judgment it was said:
The driver is under a duty of using whatever means are at hand to avoid a threatened collision.
It is regrettable that the defense set up in the statement Under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is either false or ill-advised. It could have been usefully pleaded by the petitioner that he had applied his brakes and that only the outer side of the bumper struck the deceased. Here no effort has been made to explain the accident.
13. As I have said in an earner part of the judgment, I am not at all prejudiced by the kind of explanation offered while making the statement Under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the petitioner. It however, stands established on the record that the accident resulted from culpable negligence punishable within the meaning of Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code.
14. The petitioner is not a previous convict. It may be that he will be losing his service. The impugned judgment was made on the 11th of January. 1971. For several days before moving the Sessions Court, it is submitted by Mr. K. L. Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner, that the petitioner was held in custody and that for over a month the petitioner has suffered detention of imprisonment. While maintaining his conviction Under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, the sentence is reduced to that already undergone. With that modification the petition is dismissed.