Central Administrative Tribunal - Chandigarh
Savita Rani And Ors. vs Union Territory And Ors. on 8 October, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2003(2)SLJ124(CAT)
ORDER
O.P. Garg, Vice Chairman
1. The applicants in the aforesaid two OAs are the members of the regular cadre of the Education Deptt., U.T. Chandigarh. They joined as Nursery Teachers/J.B.T. Teachers in the year 1976 on regular basis. They are claiming the benefit of higher pay scale for having acquired the higher qualification prior to 19th February, 1979 with all consequential benefits as has been allowed to other Teachers pursuant to the decision of this Court dated 8th January, 1998 in OA No. 649/CH/97 - R.D. Kaushal and 20 Ors. v. Union of India and 3 Ors., and the earlier decision dated 18.6.90 in OA No. 172/CH/1990.
2. It is asserted that all the applicants are similarly placed as the applicants in the aforesaid OAs and, therefore, on ground of parity, they are also entitled to the benefit of higher pay scale for having acquired higher qualification prior to 19.2.1979.
3. The respondents, particularly the Director Public Instructions (School), Chandigarh Administration, has taken the plea that the present OAs are barred by limitation as the applicants have come forward to claim higher pay scale after a lapse of a period of about 25 years. It is also asserted that since the applicants were not party to OA No. 649/CH/97 or OA No. 172/CH/90, they cannot be allowed the benefit of the decision in the said OAs.
4. We have heard Mr. R.K. Sharma, learned Counsel for the applicants as well as Mr. N.K. Bhardwaj, appearing on behalf of the respondents.
5. The controversy lies in a very narrow campass. With a view to give an incentive to the Nursery and J.B.T. Teachers, the Punjab Govt. had granted higher scale of pay to those Teachers who have acquired higher educational qualifications. The letter dated 19.2.1979 issued by Punjab Govt. and addressed to the Secretary, Govt. of Punjab, Education Deptt. was adopted for giving benefit of higher pay scale to the Teachers working under the U.T. Chandigarh. The Chandigarh Administration accordingly issued order on 20.9.1982. One Jai Singh filed OA No. 172/CH/90 before this Bench. This OA was allowed on 18.6.1990. Subsequently, OA No. 649/CH/97 was filed on behalf of 21 Teachers employed in different Schools claiming the same benefit. This OA was allowed by a DB of this Tribunal on 8.1.1998. All the 21 applicants of the said OA have been granted the higher pay scale of Rs. 1640-2925 w.e.f. 18.6.1990 by the order of the Chandigarh Administration dated 21.9.98 (Annexure A/8).
6. It is an indubitable fact that the decisions aforesaid squarely apply to the applicants in the present OAs. Each one of them has acquired higher qualification prior to 19th February, 1979. Since their case is at par on all counts with the applicants in the earlier OAs, the applicants are entitled to the higher pay scale.
7. Now the question is whether for the reason of delay in approaching this Tribunal and on the ground that the applicants were not a party to the earlier OAs, should they be deprived of the benefit of higher pay scale as is admissible under the Govt. Orders and pursuant to the decision of this Tribunal in the case of similarly circumstances Teachers. On the above two grounds only, the respondents have denied the benefit of higher pay scale to the applicants. We proceed to discuss these two contentions which go to the root of the matter.
8. Mr. N.K. Bhardwaj appearing on behalf of the respondents placed emphatic reliance on the provisions of Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Chand Sharma etc. v. Udham Singh Kamal and Ors., 1999(2) SC SLJ 294, to fortify his submission that the present two OAs are barred by time. It is stated by Mr. Bhardwaj that the claim of the applicants relates to the period prior to 19th February, 1979 which cannot be entertained after a lapse of two decades. This submission of the learned Counsel for the respondents was repelled by Mr. R.K. Sharma appearing on behalf of the applicants. He urged that where the benefit of a particular judgment which has become final is claimed, the question of period of limitation pales into insignificance. He further urged that an employee has a recurring cause of action in the matter of pay fixation. In support of his contention he placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of M.R. Gupta v. Union of India and Ors., 1995(2) SC SLJ page 337. In that case, it was held that where fixation of pay was not in accordance with rules, it is a continuing wrong against the concerned employee giving rise to recurring cause of action each time he was paid salary. Under the circumstances, fresh cause of action arises every month and, therefore, the question of limitation would not arise as the claim for correct fixation of pay is not 'one time action.' There are a spate of decisions of the various Benches of Central Administrative Tribunal on the point. In a recent decision dated 11.7.2001 in MA 2646 of 2000, Tej Ram and 2 Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. The Principal Bench has taken the view that the matters relating to pay have a continuous cause of action and, therefore, the contention that the OA is barred by limitation has to be rejected. There is yet another view in regard to the applicability of period of limitation in the cases where benefit of the earlier judgment is claimed. In Y.G. Sharma v. Union of India and Ors., 1991 (2) ATJ page 123, the Calcutta Bench relying upon the three decisions, namely (i) R.L. Sundara Raman v. Union of India and Ors., ATR 1990(1) CAT 136; (ii) Nripendra Chandra Dey and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., 1990(13) ATC 344; and (iii) R. Sambandam and Ors. v. Comptroller and Auditor General of India, New Delhi and Ors., 1990(1) ATJ 466, took the view that an application claiming the benefit of higher pay scale on the basis of a judgment of the Tribunal is preferred by an applicant similarly placed, the question of applicability of bar of limitation does not arise. In the case of R.D. Gupta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., 1990(1) ATJ page 212=1991(3) SLJ 575 (CAT), the Principal Bench took the view that where applicants are seeking the benefits of similar judgments in another case, the bar of limitation does not apply. Therefore, for the twin reasons, firstly, that the claim of correct fixation of pay or higher scale of pay is a recurring cause of action and secondly, where the benefit of the earlier judgment is prayed for by similarly placed persons, the bar of limitation would not be attracted. The Apex Court in the case of K.C. Sharma and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., 1997(3) RSJ 606=1998(1) SLJ 54 (SC) had taken the view that where the applicant sought benefits of the decision of the Full Bench of the Tribunal by filing the OA, the application should not have been dismissed by the Tribunal as barred by limitation. This decision by implication is an authority on the point that where benefit of the earlier decision is sought, the consideration of delay would not apply. The plea of limitation raised by the respondents to deny the benefit of the higher scale of pay to the applicants has to be totally discarded as being untenable.
9. The other point reflects the litigative zeal on the part of the administration. Should each and every employee be driven to file their case to take the same relief which has already been granted and allowed to other employees who are similarly circumstanced. The contention raised on behalf of the respondents that since the applicants were not a party to the earlier decisions, the benefit thereof cannot be extended to them is abhoring to law and has to be rejected outright in view of the series of the decisions of the Apex Court and the High Court as well as this Tribunal. In Union of India and Anr. etc. etc. v. Lalita S. Rao and Ors., AIR 2001 SC 1792=2001 (3) SLJ 58, the Apex Court approached the problem with this angle and ruled that the orders issued by the Court in earlier cases should be applied and enforced irrespective of the fact whether some are parties to the proceeding or not. In E.S.P. Rajaram and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 2001 SC 581=2001 (2) SLJ 299 (SC), the matter was further clarified by the Apex Court. In that case the controversy related to the scale of pay admissible for Traffic apprentices in the Railways appointed prior to the cut off date. It was observed that the controversy in its very nature is one which applies to all such employees of the Railways; it is not a controversy which is confined to some individual employees or a section of the employees. If the judgment of the Tribunal which had taken a view contrary to the ratio laid down by Supreme Court judgment 1996(4) SCC 416 was allowed to stand then the resultant position would have been that some Traffic Apprentices who were parties in those cases would have gained an unfair and undeserved advantage over other employees who are holding the same post. Such enviable position would not only have been per se discriminatory but could have resulted in a situation which is undesirable for a cadre of large number of employees in a big establishment like that of the Indian Railways. To avoid such a situation the direction impugned was passed. It was absolutely necessary for the sake of maintaining equality and fair-play with the other similarly placed employees.
10. A DB of Punjab and Haryana High Court had the occasion to consider the similar controversy in the case of Satyapal Singh and Ors. v. The State of Haryana and Anr., 1999 (2) RSJ 377. The relevant observations made in Para 5 may be extracted as below:
"5. After hearing learned Counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the judgment of the learned Single Judge was really not a judgment in personam but was a judgment in rem inasmuch as law had been laid down and the petitioners in that case were held entitled to the relief claimed by them. Really speaking, the State Government should have itself granted the same relief to other similarly situated persons though they may not have come to the Court. The State Government should under such circumstances apply the law itself to the similarly situated persons instead of forcing any individual or a Union to resort to unnecessary litigation as law is already settled and only the same has to be applied to the facts of a particular case. The petitioners in the present case had, through their Union, filed a representation in August, 1992 after the judgment of the learned Single Judge. If the respondents failed to comply with the judgment because of the pendency of the Letters Patent Appeal and then the appeal before the Apex Court, the petitioners cannot be denied the same benefit as was granted to the petitioners in the aforesaid writ petition. The respondents as a welfare State should rather see to it that the litigation in the Courts is minimised. After this Court or the Apex Court lays down the law, it should see to it that similarly situated persons automatically get the same relief without resorting to litigation."
There is yet another recent decision of DB of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana, 2002 (2) SCT page 354 in which the earlier decision in Satyapal Singh's case (supra), Lalita S. Rao (supra) and E.S.P. Rajaram (supra) were relied upon to take the view that when a judgment attains finality, the State is bound to grant relief to its employees who are similarly situated even though they are not party to the litigation. A final decision of the Court must not only be respected but should also be enforced and implemented evenly and without discrimination in respect of all the employees who are entitled to the benefit which has been allowed to the employees who have obtained orders from the Court. The matter is one of principle and should not depend upon who comes to the Court and who does not. In Dr. (Mrs.) Santosh Kumari v. Union of India and Ors., JT 1994 (7) SC 565, Hon'ble Supreme Court lamented that a more deserving candidate may not have the means to approach the Court, should he be denied the benefit which has been granted to those persons who dared the department with Court orders.
11. There is also a decision of the Principal Bench of this Tribunal in the case of A. K. Khanna and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., 1988(2) ATR page 518. The applicants in that OA were not parties to the Civil Writ Petition which was allowed by the Tribunal (TA 335/85 - B.S. Saini and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors.) originally filed before Delhi High Court. They claimed benefit of the said decision. The Principal Bench held that there is no reason not to extend the benefit of that judgment to the applicants, particularly, when they are similarly placed as the petitioners in the aforesaid writ petition. Not extending the similar benefit would amount to a discrimination violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
12. The position which emerges from the survey of the above decisions is that to deny the benefit of the earlier judgment which has attained finality, to the similarly situated employees, is nothing but a blatant discrimination. Such an action speaks of arbitrariness and high-handedness on the part of the employer. To drive each one of the similarly placed person to obtain orders of the Court, would amount to exploitation of the employees having limited resources, time and energy. The Courts would also be burdened with un-necessary litigation. Justice delivery system is under tremendous strain. Cases are filing up in Courts of law soaring astronomically year after year. As a matter of fact, it is also the duty of the State to take remedial measures to curtail the litigation and to wipe off or minimise the already over crowded dockets of the Courts. How to eliminate the arrears and curtail the delays are the questions which are vexing every mind. The State instead of extending its cooperation to bring down the litigation should not encourage its employees to take recourse to multiple legal proceedings on the same point which stands already decided finally. There is also an element of wastage of public money as the State has to defend the cases by employing its legal agency resulting in payment of the substantial amount in the shape of fees. The State should avoid the fruitless exercise and wasteful expenditure. Unnecessary litigation further breeds strained relations between the members of the staff and the State as a employer which has to be avoided at all costs. The State has pervasive obligation to discharge in relation to maintaining its accepted standards of employer-employee relationship. One of the obligations of the State is to be reasonable and fair in granting service benefits to its employees in accordance with the Service Rules and the principles enunciated in the decisions of the Courts. When the decisions to which the State is party become final, a duty is cast upon the State to grant relief to its employees who are similarly situated and on identical facts. In our view it is not necessary for the State to require each one of its employees to approach the Courts of law for grant of reliefs which State ought to grant to the employees in the normal course of its administration.
13. In the present case, the respondents instead of extending the benefit to the applicants of the decisions which have become final, have un-necessarily failed to do complete justice. The denial is evasive and in a sense amounts to circumventing the orders of this Court. The representations made by the applicants failed to evoke any response. The respondents further failed to see to reason and instead of conceding the legitimate and well-meritted claim put forward by the applicants thought of contesting their claim on flimsy grounds. As a matter of fact, it was a fit case where, we would have saddled the erring officer personally with costs but since he appears to have not been properly advised, we propose to leave the matter as it is in the expectation that in future the concerned officer will take note of the general instructions issued by the administration contained in letter dated 13.5.2002 issued on the strength of the observations made by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in CWP No. 16317 of 2001--Varinder Kumar and Ors. v. State of Haryana etc. and CWP No. 4382 of 2002--Satbir Singh and Anr. v. State of Haryana etc. It is emphasised that the benefit of a decision which has become final has to be extended in respect of the similarly situated employees regardless of the fact that they were or were not parties to the litigation.
14. In the light of the above discussion, we allow both the OAs and direct that the benefit of the higher pay scale, as a result of the acquisition of higher qualification prior to 19th February, 1979, shall be extended to the applicants in the light of the earlier decisions of this Tribunal in the case of R.D. Kaushal and 20 Ors. v. Union of India and 3 Ors., decided on 8th January, 1998 (OA No. 649/CH/97). The respondents shall release the amount of the arrears for the period as restricted in the decision aforesaid, within a period of 3 months from the date of production of a copy of this order before the Director Public Instructions (Schools), U.T. Chandigarh (Respondent No. 3).
15. This Registrar of this Tribunal shall send copy of this judgment to the Adviser to the Administrator, U.T. Chandigarh for taking note of the observations made above and to issue the necessary guidelines to the subordinate officers of the various departments for compliance.
No order as to costs.