Gauhati High Court
Raghvendra Awasthi, Ips vs The State Of Assam on 20 May, 2016
Author: Rumi Kumari Phukan
Bench: Rumi Kumari Phukan
IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh)
Transfer petition(crl) 42/2015
Criminal petition 239/2016.
Shri Raghvendra Awasthi, IPS, Director
General, Civil Defence and Home Guards,
Meghalaya.
Petitioner.
-vs-
State of Assam.
Respondent.
PRESENT HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE RUMI KUMARI PHUKAN For the petitioner Mr. J Roy and Ms M Dev Advocate.
For the State Mr. K Munir, Addl.PP.
Date of hearing 6.5.2016 and 9.5.2016
Date of judgment 20.5.16.
JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV)
Both transfer petition(criminal) 42/2015 and criminal petition 239/2016 were filed by the petitioner against the respondent with almost on same ground, as such they are taken up together and being disposed of by this common order.
2(2) The petitioner is an accused in Sessions Case no.7/1999 under Section 147/302/209/201/120B/343/325/365/34 of the IPC pending before the learned Sessions Judge, Golaghat. Raising certain grievances that the learned Sessions Judge conducted the proceeding in violation of the prescribed procedure, petitioner has prayed transfer of the case to any other court for adjudication, apprehending that he would not get fair trial from the said court.
(3) In criminal petition 239/2016 petitioner prayed quashing of the criminal proceeding in sessions case 7/1999 which is pending before the learned Sessions Judge, Golaghat.
(4) The aforesaid sessions case arose out of the FIR dated 2.5.1997 and charge sheet was filed on 10.10.1998. The petitioner, who was the Superintendent of Police, Golaghat at the relevant time, faced trial with twelve persons who were also police officials including two other civilians. Hearing of the said case is completed and now at argument stage and at this juncture the petitioner comes up for transfer of these petitions as well as for quashing of the proceedings. The transfer petition was filed on 14.12.2015 and the criminal petition 239/2015 was filed on 1.4.2016.
3(5) The contentions raised in both the petitions are almost similar and which can be summarised as below.
(6) The aforesaid FIR was filed by one Inspector(CID), Sri Bharat Ch Gogoi, against the present petitioner and four police personnel and after completion of the investigation charge sheet was filed against the thirteen persons mentioned above.
(7) The brief facts of the prosecution is that on 9.10.1995 two surrendered ULFA members ~ Pranjal Gogoi and Lachit Gogoi picked up one Jyoti Lohar from the house of one Mantu Gogoi as directed by the then SP Raghvendar Awasthi(petitioner) in a car and brought him to the official residence of petitioner. Thereafter those persons were wrongfully confined by the petitioner in HP Baruah Building popularly known as "bhut bungalow". As a result of torture and assault made by the present petitioner they got serious injuries on their persons and the said Jyoti Lohar succumbed to his injuries in the said building and his dead body was disposed off by the accused persons to cause disappearance of material evidence. During the course of investigation it had been found that accused R. Awasthi with the assistance of the co-accused had also wrongfully confined ones Zakir Hussain, Dilip Gogoi and Mantu Gogoi alias Manas Pratim Gogoi(business partners of the said deceased Lohar) and tortured all of them. Subsequently the said victims were released by one of the co-accused(police officer) but 4 Jyoti Lohar was tortured till death and his dead body was disposed off with a view to saving themselves from the crime.
(8) With the above findings the charge sheet was filed against the accused petitioner and his associates. It is stated in the charge sheet that the above crime was committed at different stages by the accused persons in their private capacity and there is nothing to show that the deceased was picked up and detained in connection with any legal proceeding. The case was committed to the court of Sessions and the prosecution in the meantime examined all the witnesses. Statements of the accused persons were also recorded and the case is now at the argument stage. The prosecution has submitted its written argument. (9) In support of the transfer petition and the quashing proceeding the learned counsel Mr. J. Roy and Ms M. Dev vehemently submitted that the transfer of the trial of the accused petitioner is necessitated due to the attitude and conduct of the trial court ~ conducted the trial in a biased manner ~ causing prejudice to the accused petitioner and creating more than a reasonable apprehension in his mind that he would not get proper justice from the said court. That apart due to the irregularities committed by the court while conducting the trial, great injustice was caused to the petitioner and the continuation of the proceeding would be nothing but abuse of the process of law for which the proceeding as a whole should be quashed and set aside. 5 (10) Among the glaring examples of biasness and prejudice pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner can be summarized as below.
(i) The charges were framed against the accused petitioner without supplying him the essential documents that were required to be supplied to him under Section 207 of the CrPC, whereas the petitioner has the right to have police papers relied upon by the prosecution.
(ii) Despite the fact that the FIR was lodged on the basis of an inquiry report petitioner was not served the said report and the learned court did not even show any intention to furnish it despite giving repeated directions by this Court in criminal revision petition 194/1999 and WP(C) 2305/2015.
(iii) It is also contended that the learned court below proceeded with the case without prosecution sanction as provided under Section 197 of the CrPC, whereas the petitioner is an IPS Officer, he was entitled to get proper protection under Section 197 of the CrPC and as per the govt. notification also. Though the petitioner approached the trial court on 18.8.2015 raising the point of having no 6 sanction of prosecution in terms of the directions given by this Court in WP(C) 2305/2015 learned Sessions Judge took up the petition for hearing and proceeded to further re-examine prosecution witnesses after summoning them on the very date fixed for hearing of the petitioner under Section 107 of the CrPC. The above affair of the learned Sessions Judge is stated to be a biased conduct and the defiance towards fair play and impartiality in conducting the trial.
(iv) The above conduct of the trial court was challenged by the petitioner in criminal petition no: 713/2015, which was disposed of by this Court on 7.9.2015 with direction to the trial court to follow the order of the Division Bench in WP(C) 2035/2015. But on submission of the said order to the trial court the learned Sessions Judge by his order dated 13.11.2015 incorrectly made an observation that the copy(of enquiry report) prayed by the petitioner was already made available to him but it was not received by him by suppressing the order dated 16.10.2014.
(v) The learned trial court fixed 15.8.2015 for recording statement of the accused under Section 313 of the CrPC despite the fact that prosecution had already submitted 7 its written argument and the statement under section 313 was also complied with, which shows arbitrariness and mala fide in continuing the criminal proceeding without any process of law.
(vi) It is contended that the manner in which the learned trial court conducted the case without giving any opportunity to the petitioner to defend his case in accordance with law petitioner apprehends that he would not get proper justice due to lack of opportunity of fair trial.
(vii) That after the conclusion of the prosecution argument the learned court recalled of its own a number of witnesses who had given statement under section 164 of the CrPC without a prayer from the prosecution, referring to an old order of 2008 of the learned court below which had been already lying before the court when prosecution argument was allowed to be concluded. It is apprehended that such one-sided conduct of the court will deny a fair trial to the petitioner.
(viii) In Civil Rule 4564/1995 petitioner was respondent 3 which was filed by some of the victims to the said 8 incident, the learned Single Judge opined that there is no sufficient material to establish guilt of the petitioner and on the basis of the aforesaid observations all the departmental proceedings initiated against the petitioner were dropped by the government of Assam and he was promoted to the rank of DIG with retrospective effect and as such the name of the petitioner required to be deleted from the FIR and the charge sheet in terms of the observations indicated above. But the trial court did not consider the above aspect and proceeded with the trial even in the face of above irregularities cropped up during the course of trial.
(ix) It is assailed that the learned trial court was sitting over the order dated 8.6.2006 and is now taking recourse to day-to-day hearing which had been directed long ago. The learned court is intentionally denying fair trial to the petitioner while giving all opportunities to the prosecution ~ taking evidence and adding charge against the another accused at the last stage of the trial. Another contention raised is about rejection of the prayer of the petitioner for dispensing with his personal appearance.
9
(x) On the basis of the above contentions it was urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is serious apprehension in the mind of the accused petitioner that he would not get free and fair trial before the said court as guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution.
(xi) In support of the contention that non-compliance of the documents under Section 207 of the CrPC has caused prejudice to the petitioner the learned counsel has relied upon the decision in BK Sashikala v. State represented by the Superintendent of Police, 2012 (9) SCC 771, wherein it is held that "the right of the accused to ask for all documents that he may be entitled is one of facets of just and fair and transparent investigation. The documents whether relied upon or not by the prosecution but filed in the court and which would help in determining the truth should be disclosed to the accused. Denial of access to documents in custody of the court though not relied upon by the prosecution, even at the advanced stage of trial(Section 313 of the CrPC stage in this case) may cause prejudice to the accused in properly defending the case and thus result in denial of a fair trial. The 10 cause of speedy trial should not cause justice to be denied".
(xii) Justifying such transfer of criminal proceeding to different courts the learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the decision in Satish Jagi v. State of Chattishgarh and others, 2007 (3) SCC 62, where it is held as below. A judicial officer in whatever capacity he may be functioning has to act with the belief that he is not to be guided by any factor other than to ensure that he shall render a free and fair decision which according to his conscience is right one on the basis of the material placed before him. There can be no exceptions to this imperative but at the same time there should not be any scope given to any person to go away to the feeling that the judge was biased, however unfounded the impression may be. It is sure that the present Sessions Judge would have acted in true sense of a judicial officer but nevertheless to ensure that justice is not only done but also seen to be done and in view of the peculiar facts of the case it would be appropriate if the High Court transfers the case to some other Sessions court. However, such transfer shall not be construed as casting any aspersion on the learned Sessions Judge.
(11) It is to be mentioned that at the time of initiating the hearing by this court the petitioner himself had filed an additional affidavit with a submission that this court while working as SDJM(S), Golaghat, passed several orders against the petitioner and also committed the case to the sessions court for trial on 4.1.1999 without furnishing the 11 entire copy of documents under section 207 and 208 of the CrPC for which the petitioner is aggrieved and hence this court may not take up the case but this court however proceeded for hearing for which the petitioner apprehends that he would not get proper justice from this court. So it is a prayer for recusal. The same aspect will be discussed later.
(12) As against the prayer of such transfer the learned Addl. PP Mr. Munir has submitted that while deciding such prayer the court has to be convinced as to whether the accused petitioner has any real apprehension or bias against the trial judge in the given facts and circumstances alleged by the petitioner. So far as the apprehension is concerned it is to be one which would establish that the justice will not be done and being fairly persuaded by such criteria the transfer of the case can be made otherwise such transfer petition at the fag end of trial cannot be entertained. It is also fairly conceded by the learned Mr Munir that save and except the fact that the copy of the inquiry report is not yet furnished to the accused petitioner there is no other perversity in the trial to reveal biasness against the petitioner. (13) Considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and the documents annexed. At the outset I would like to deal with the additional affidavit filed by the petitioner which is nothing but a prayer for recusal from conducting the proceeding. The only 12 reason for making such prayer for recusal is that since this court while attending the case prior to committal as SDJM in the year 1998 has refused bail to the petitioner on several occasions and committed the case without providing necessary copies, petitioner still felt aggrieved to this court. In this regard the opinion of this Court is that such a remote aspect of decades ago cannot be a ground of apprehension or biasness. As we all do our duty as per the law and procedure and came across thousands of such cases during such a span of 18 years(1998 to 2016) one cannot have personal interest in any of such cases, so I prefer not to show any unnecessary sensitivity to such prayer made by the petitioner and I do hereby reject the prayer for recusal which I had already made it clear to the petitioner on the very date of hearing and accordingly the matter was heard by this Court as per law.
(14) In support of the contention that the sanction is required prior to launching criminal prosecution, the petitioner being a police officer, learned counsel for the petitioner has referred the case law in General Officer Commanding, Rashtriya Rifles v. Central Bureau of Investigation and another, (2013) 6 SCC 228, where it is held that if the offence is alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to acting in discharge of his official duty, ground for prior sanction becomes imperative. Further it is held that protection given 13 under Section 197 of the CrPC is to protect responsible public servant against the institution of possibly vexatious criminal proceedings for the offences alleged to have been committed by them while they are acting or purporting to acting as a public servant. The question to examine as to whether sanction is required or not under a statute has to be considered at the time of taking cognizance of the offence and not during inquiry or investigation. On the same point the petitioner has referred to the decision reported in 1987 (1) SCC 276, Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana; (1993) 3 SCC 339, State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Budhikota Subba Rao; (1996) 1 SCC 478, R. Balakrishna Pillai v. State of Karala and others; and 2000 CLJ 4031, Gaurishankar Prasad v. State of Bihar.
(15) Relying upon the above decisions it has been submitted that cognizance of offence taken by the trial court against the accused petitioner is bad in law as he was discharging his official duty as Superintend of Police, Golaghat, at the relevant time. I have given due consideration to the submissions made to this court. It is to be noted that the petitioner had raised the same issue before this court on earlier occasion also when this court directed the petitioner to raise such issue before the trial court in due manner. Accordingly, after disposal of WP(C) 2035/2015 the petitioner had raised the said issue before the trial court which was disposed of after hearing of both 14 parties by its order dated 13.11.2015, which is impugned in this case also.
(16) In this context it may be mentioned that as the concerned case record i.e. sessions case 7/1999 called for in connection with this case was placed before this court which I have accordingly gone through. What transpired from the case record is that such question of sanction was raised before the court at the very initial stage of taking cognizance i.e. at the time of framing of charge and the learned Sessions Judge after hearing the matter at length by an elaborate order dated 20.4.2005 has rejected such prayer with the observation that no such sanction was required in view of the fact that the purported act of confining and killing of a person in the police custody was not in discharge of his official duty. Surprisingly, the petitioner did not challenge the aforesaid order and the charge was framed accordingly and after a long run of prosecution the petitioner had again raised the same plea by filing different petition before this court by suppressing the aforesaid aspect. Such conduct of petitioner cannot at all be appreciated and it is an abuse of the process of law. In the decision relied by the petitioner reported in (2012) 6 SCC it is categorically held that such a question of sanction has to be considered at the time of taking cognizance of the offence and not 15 during inquiry and investigation(vide para 43). Such a challenge at the fag end of the trial again and again is not maintainable. (17) The learned Sessions Judge could have disposed such petition for want of sanction by referring to the order dated 20.4.2005 instead of hearing the matter afresh. However, it can be construed that in terms of the order and direction passed by the Division Bench in WP(C) 2305/2015 the petitioner has availed the chance of raising the same issue and obviously this court was also not made aware of such order passed on 20.4.2005. In view of such matter on record and the falsity of plea of the petitioner that the court has never acted upon the subject of sanction this court is not obliged to appreciate the order dated 13.11.2015 passed by the learned Sessions Judge on the point of sanction which is in tune with the order passed on 20.4.2005 and the said order dated 20.4.2005 has already attained finality. (18) It is to be noted that while pressing such matter for sanction the petitioner has nowhere offered any explanation as to under what reference or discharge of legal duty the said deceased person was kept in his official residence and then in another private building without a case being registered against the said person. This aspect is perhaps enough to negate the claim of the petitioner that he acted (by keeping such person in confinement) while discharging his official duty. 16 (19) The petitioner further lays stress on the decision rendered in Civil Rule 4564/1995 where the court opined that the petitioner is not liable for the allegation of torture on the deceased, J. Lohar. And on the basis of the aforesaid decision the petitioner has claimed that his name should be deleted from the FIR as well as the charge sheet. (20) This court on perusal of the aforesaid decision (annexed to the record) found that the aforesaid case was filed by two petitioners praying an impartial investigation in respect of the death of the said Jyoti Lohar in the police custody and the illegal detention to petitioner
2. While disposing the case the court in para 8 observed as follows.
"It appears to me that there is no sufficient material on record for establishing it as against respondent 3"(petitioner was respondent
3) in the aforesaid case. However, in the last para of the judgment reads as follows.
"It is also made clear that any order, orders and observation made by this court in this case including the report of the District and Sessions Judge, Golaghat shall not either influence the investigation or trial and it shall not cause any prejudice to the respondent 3 in related matters".
(21) It is quite visible that the aforesaid aspect was a simple observation by the court and it cannot be held that it is enough to 17 exonerate the petitioner from all the charges and the criminal prosecution that has been made out subsequently during the course of investigation.
(22) Regarding the challenge of the petitioner that the CID has conducted the investigation without any authority of law is also found to be unnecessary allegation. In the order dated 6.3.1997 passed in Civil Rule 4564/95 the court directed the govt. of Assam for initiation of action against the delinquent officer for prosecution as well as disciplinary proceeding on the basis of findings given in the inquiry report dated 30.6.1996 conducted by the learned Sessions Judge. It is to be noted that only after the said direction the inquiry was conducted by the CID and thereafter on 2.5.1997(that is after passing of the said direction on 6.3.1997 the Inspect of Police, CID filed the impugned FIR, no illegality is crept in as has been alleged by the petitioner Let us appreciate the legal criterion that has to be fulfilled prior to consideration of transfer of a criminal proceeding from one court to another.
(23) In this context we may profitably refer to a passage from a three-judge decision in Gurucharan v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1996 SC 1418 where it has been held as below.
18
The law with regard to the transfer of cases is well settled. A case is transferred if there is a reasonable apprehension on the mind of the person to a case that justice would not be done. The petitioner is not required to demonstrate that the justice inevitably failed. He is entitled to such a transfer if he shows circumstances from which it can be inferred that he entertains an apprehension and it is reasonable in the circumstances alleged. It is one of the principles of administration of justice that justice would not only be done but it should be seen to be done. However, a mere allegation that there is apprehension that justice will not be done in a given case does not suffice. The court has further to see whether the apprehension is reasonable or not to judge the reasonableness of the apprehension, the state of mind of the person who entertains the apprehension is no doubt relevant but that is not all. The apprehension must not only be entertained but must appear to the court to be a reasonable apprehension".
(24) In Abdul Mazar Madani v. State of T.N. (2000) 6 SCC 204 the Hon'ble Supreme Court ruled that the apprehension of not getting a fair trial and impartial inquiry or trial is required to be reasonable and not imaginary, based on conjecture and surmises. 19 (25) The said decision was reiterated by the subsequent decision rendered in Cap. Amrinder Singh v. Prakash Singh Badal and others, (2009) 6 SCC 260, where it is also held that it is required on the part of the court to see whether the apprehension alleged is reasonable or not. In the context it is also held that assurance of fair trial is a first imperative of dispensation of justice. The purpose of criminal trial is to dispense fair and impartial justice uninfluenced by extraneous consideration. When it is shown that the public confidence in the fairness of the trial would be seriously undermined the aggrieved party may seek the transfer of the case.
(26) The said principle was followed in Lalu Prasad Yadav v. State of Jharkhand (2013) 8 SCC 593 where it is categorically held that "seeking transfer at the drop of a hat is unconscionable. An order of transfer is not to be passed in a matter of routine or merely because an interested party has expressed such apprehension about the proper conduct of the trial. The power has to be exercised cautiously and in exceptional circumstances where it is necessary to do so to provide credibility to the trial. There has to be real apprehension that there would be miscarriage of justice"(also referred Nahor Singh Yadav and another v. Union of India, (2011) 1 SCC 307). In a recent case law reported in AIR 2016 20 SC 336, Usmangani Adambhai Vahorav. State of Gujarat and others, decided on 8.1.2016, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has endorsed all the above views expressed earlier.
(27) Adverting to the grounds given by the petitioner it would be found that basically the petitioner tried to challenge the case on merit which is not permissible under the transfer petition. Non- consideration of the question of sanction as regards the petitioner cannot be ground for transfer as it is a judicial order of a court which is amenable to the alternative remedy like revisions etc and the said exercise has already been done by the petitioner. It is also to be noted that apart from the petitioner there are other ten police officers facing the trial but none of them have challenge the conduct of trial at any stage except the petitioner.
(28) I have also gone through the orders passed by the learned trial court that was referred above that is the order dated 12.5.2004, 16.10.2014, 13.11.2015, 18.8.2015, 8.9.2015, 16.11.2015, 5.12.2015 etc. What is discernable from the material on record is that the aforesaid sessions case was conducted by as many as six presiding officers and different orders were passed by different presiding officers. There was an order dated 5.7.2008 where on the prayer of prosecution to examine all the witnesses who have given statement under section 164 of the CrPC the learned court allowed to summon 21 to those witnesses and though some of the witnesses were examined by one presiding officer but some of them were left to be examined may be because of transfer of presiding officers and in the meantime the subsequent presiding officer as per the material on record acted only to regularize the same without being anything persuaded by his own notion. All this happens because of long pendency of the case and at some times the court also lost its track while pursuing day to day hearing order passed long years back by his predecessors. (29) On scrutiny of the records it reflects that the court framed charge against one of the accused viz. C. Gogoi under Section 201/149 of the IPC) at the later stage of hearing and on the prayer made by the said accused recalled two of the witnesses for reexamination by the said witness. Such affairs of the court has also been challenged by the petitioner that the court cannot reopen the matter for hearing while the case at the stage of argument and such a submission has no substance at all. The reexamination of the witnesses under the provisions of Section 311 of the CrPC cannot be designed as biasness against the defence or favouritism to prosecution. Nothing is discernable that the trial court was in any way influenced by extraneous consideration and that he did not act in reasonable manner so as to raise a doubt about the credibility of the trial.
22(30) In the instant case this court is persuaded to think that the apprehension that has been stated is absolutely mercurial and cannot be remotely stated to be reasonable. The contention of the petitioner that his prayer for discharge has not been considered by the trial court in absence of sanction and that he has been exonerated by the observation of the court so rendered in Civil Rule 4564/1995, which was not considered by the trial court, and that necessary copies of the inquiry report were not furnished to him while framing charge and subsequent thereto, that the court has distantly adhered day to day course of hearing, that the court has decided to examine some left over witnesses under section 311 of the CrPC even at the stage of argument etc etc that has been mentioned above cannot be a ground for transfer as he failed to create apprehension in the mind of the court that it would be reasonable to create apprehension to deny justice to petitioner or biasness on the part of the court. A court of law is within its ambit if it explores and adjusts all matters on record and any challenge of such effort to discredit his judicial act cannot be permissible, which is again made by a litigant who is none other than the accused himself in such proceeding.
(31) In our criminal justice delivery system the balance tilts in favour of the accused in case of any doubt in regard to the trial. The subject that was challenged by the petitioner can be raised in course of his 23 argument raising such grievances if there is any inherent defect in the prosecution resulting prejudice to his defence and in the process the court is obliged to appreciate all such grievances. (32) From what has been discussed above it is found that the ground for seeking transfer of the above case does not deserve consideration at all. It is found that petitioner has not been able to make out a case of biasness and prejudice on the part of the State or the prosecuting authorities to raise a very real and plausible ground for transferring the trial pending before the learned Sessions Judge, Golaghat.
Let us now discuss the other facets of the quashing proceeding as regards the session case that is pending before the trial court.
(33) The law relating to invoking the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on the High Court is well settled. In the landmark judgment the Supreme Court in the State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 (Suppl) (1) SC 335 the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down certain parameters by which the High Court can exercise powers conferred on the High Court. The above guidelines is reproduced below.
(i) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report(FIR), or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and 24 accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(ii) Where the allegations in the First Information Report(FIR) and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers u/s 156(1) of the Code except under order of the Magistrate within the purview of Sec. 155(2) of the Code.
(iii) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the First Information Report(FIR) or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(iv) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute a non-cognizable offence and no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order from a Magistrate as contemplated under sec. 1559(2) of the Code.
(v) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can reach such a conclusion is just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for offence.
25
(vi) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act to the institution and continuance of the proceeding at or where there is specific provision the Code or Act providing efficacious redress or the grievances for the aggrieved party.
(vii) Where the criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive or wreaking vengeance on the accused with a view to spite him due to private and person grudge.
(34) In Minu Kumari and another v. State of Bihar and others, 2006 (4) SCC 359, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the power of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC though very wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution by the test specifically laid down in Section 482 of the Code but it should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution High Courts should refrain from giving a prima facie decision.
(35) In Umesh Kumar v. Andhra Pradesh report in 2013 (10) SCC 591 the Supreme Court dealt with the scope of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the following words:
The scope of section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is well defined and the inherent power could be exercised to prevent abuse of process of court and to otherwise, 26 to secure the ends of justice. However, in exercise of such power it is not permissible to appreciate the evidence as it can only evaluate material documents on record to the extent of prima facie satisfaction of existence of sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused and the court cannot look into the materials, the acceptability of which will essentially be a matter of trial. Any document filed along with the petition levelled as evidence without being tested and proved cannot be examined.
(36) The Supreme Court in in Narinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab and another, (2014) 6 SCC 466(para 29.7) held as bellow.
"When the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not".
(37) Analyzed thus it is found that there is no illegality in the proceeding before the trial court as has been alleged by the petitioner to invoke the provisions of Section 482 of the CrPC so as to quash the criminal proceeding at the fag end of the trial. It appears that the petitioner is moving around the same issues by filing one after 27 another petition before this court by suppressing certain material aspects as has been discussed above.
(38) Moreover the petitioner has raised the issue of non-furnishing of copies of documents relied by the prosecution but except the specific document regarding inquiry report conducted by the learned Sessions Judge he has not mentioned any other documents which was not furnished to him. Of course there is a mention in the FIR about such inquiry report but it appears from the record that the prosecution except referring seizure of the said documents has not exhibited/ relied on the said documents, nor the said officer has been examined as witness. However the petitioner is legally entitled to get the copy and there was earlier direction also to furnish the said copy to the petitioner. Accordingly the learned Sessions Judge, Golaghat is hereby directed to ensure personally that the copy of the said inquiry report is furnished to the petitioner on the very day of his appearance before the court without fail by taking the signature of the accused petitioner on record.
(39) In view of the findings and discussions above both the petitions stand dismissed. The learned Sessions Judge, Golaghat, is hereby directed to conclude the trial without further delay but not beyond one month from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 28 (40) Return the LCR forthwith along with a copy of this order. Registry will do the needful.
JUDGE na/ 29