Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Bandi Ramesh Chowdary, vs District Legal Services Authority, on 8 September, 2025
Author: R.Raghunandan Rao
Bench: R Raghunandan Rao
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APHC010332672025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3529]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
MONDAY,THE EIGHTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE R RAGHUNANDAN RAO
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T.C.D.SEKHAR
WRIT PETITION NO: 17056/2025
Between:
1. BANDI RAMESH CHOWDARY,, S/O.GOPAIAH CHOWDARY, AGED
ABOUT 50 YEARS, OCC- BUSINESS, R/O.B.R.RESIDENCY,
RAJIVNAGAR, ONGOLE CITY, PRAKASAM DISTRICT
...PETITIONER
AND
1. DISTRICT LEGAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, REP.BY ITS
SECRETARY, PRAKASAM DISTRICT AT ONGOLE.
2. MARELLA KOTI LINGAM, (DIED)
3. MARELLA MARUTHI PRASADA RAO, S/O.LATE KOTI LINGAM,
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS, R/O.VASUNDARA APARTMENTS,
MANGAMURU ROAD, ONGOLE CITY, PRAKASAM DISTRICT.
4. GURIJALA SRI LAKSHMI, , W/O.SRIDHAR NAIDU, AGED ABOUT 69
YEARS, OCC- HOUSEWIFE, R/O.INDUKURPETA VILLAGE AND
MANDAL, SPSR NELLORE DISTRICT.
5. BATHINA RADHA DEVI, W/O.RAMESH BABU, AGED ABOUT 62
YEARS, OCC HOUSEHOLD, R/O.LAKSHMIPURAM, GUNTUR CITY,
GUNTUR DISTRICT.
6. NAGANDIA MADHAVI LATHA, W/O.GOPICHAND, AGED ABOUT 60
YEARS, R/O.ARANDALPETA, GUNTUR CITY, GUNTUR DISTRICT.
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...RESPONDENT(S):
Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased tomay be pleased to issue a writ, order or direction more particularly one in the nature of WRIT OF CERTIORARI calling for entire records connected to award dated 02.01.2017 passed in PLC No.270 of 2016 passed by 1st the respondent, examine the same and set it aside after declaring the same, as illegal, irregular, irrational, without Jurisdiction and violative of provisions of Andhra Pradesh Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 and offends Articles 14 and 21 of constitution of India consequently to set aside the award dated 02.01.2017 passed in PLC No.270 of 2016 passed by the 1st respondent and pass IA NO: 1 OF 2025 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased may be pleased to grant stay of all further proceedings in award dated 02.01.2017 passed in PLC No.270 of 2016 passed by the l^t respondent including arrest of the writ petitioner in E.P.No.390 of 2021 in PLC No.270 of 2016 on the file of the court of Learned Principal District Judge, Ongole, Prakasam District, pending disposal of main writ petition and pass Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. NAGA PRAVEEN VANKAYALAPATI Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. S. LAKSHMINARAYANA REDDY (SC FOR APSLSA)
2. N SRIRAM MURTHY The Court made the following Order:
(per Hon‟ble Sri Justice R. Raghunandan Rao) Heard Sri Naga Praveen Vankayalapati, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Sri S. Lakshmi Narayana Reddy and Sri N. Sriram Murthy, learned counsel appearing for the respondents.3
2. Respondents 3 to 6 had approached the Lok-Adalat, District Legal Services Authority, Ongole, Prakasam District, for recovery of money from the petitioner, on the basis of a promissory note, dated 02.01.2015, said to have been executed in favour of their mother late Smt. Venkata Subbamma. This request of the respondents was referred to the Lok-Adalat as P.L.C.No.270 of 2016. The petitioner participated in the proceedings before the Lok-Adalat and an Award, signed by the petitioner, as well as the respondents through their Power of Attorney was recorded and passed by the Lok-Adalat held on 02.01.2017, by the District Legal Services Authority, Ongole. The terms of this compromise, reduced to an Award were that the petitioner, would pay an amount of Rs.10 lakhs as full and final settlement of the amounts due to the mother of the respondents 3 to 6. The Award further recorded that the said amounts were to be paid on or before 30.08.2017, failing which, the respondents 3 to 6 would be free to recover a sum of Rs.11,43,115/- with subsequent interest @ 24% from 30.08.2017 till realization.
3. Respondents 3 to 6 filed E.P.No.390 of 2021, for recovery of money, after the period of three years, set out in the Award, dated 02.01.2017.
The respondents 3 to 6 also prayed for placing the petitioner in jail under the provisions of Order XXI of C.P.C.
4. At that stage, the petitioner has approached this Court, by way of the present Writ Petition.
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5. Sri V. Naga Praveen, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that the Award, dated 02.01.2017, is invalid on various grounds. It is contended that PLC.No.270 of 2016 is beyond limitation; respondents 3 to 6 are not entitled to any decree from the Lok-Adalat in view of Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act, and that respondents 3 to 6 are not the sole legal heirs as another daughter of late Smt. Venkata Subbamma and her L.Rs were not made parties to the Award.
6. The above contentions raised by the petitioner do not contain any allegation of fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence on the petitioner. The petitioner does not plead or dispute that he had not agreed to the terms of the Award or that the said Award had been passed behind his back. The issues raised before this Court are purely issues relating to the legality of the Award. It is settled law that an Award passed by a Lok-Adalat can be challenged on the restricted grounds of undue influence, fraud or coercion. The aforesaid issues raised by the petitioner do not fall in any of these categories and as such, the said challenge would have to fail. We are fortified in this view by the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Yalamarthi Narasimha Rao vs. The District Legal Services Authoirity (Lok Adalath) at Vijaywada and Ors.1
7. Though this petition can be disposed of on the aforesaid short ground, we also deem it appropriate to consider the issues raised by the petitioner.
1 2022 (1) ALD 547 5
8. It is the contention of the petitioner that the entire exercise is barred by limitation. The promissory note, which is the basis for the claim of respondents 3 to 6, is dated 02.01.2014. They approached the Legal Services Authority in the year 2016 and the Award was passed on 02.01.2017. Viewed from any angle, it does not appear that the Award was passed beyond limitation or that the claim of the respondents 3 to 6 was beyond limitation. Apart from this, Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act clearly stipulates that the debtor can always agree to pay money which is otherwise barred by limitation. This assurance is to be given in the form of a written agreement. By virtue of the fact that the petitioner has signed the Award, the requirement of Section 25 of the Contract Act is fulfilled.
9. Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act stipulates that no suit for recovery of money can be filed before the Court, by the legal heirs of a creditor, unless the said legal heirs have obtained a certificate of succession or document specified under Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act. In the present case, no such documents appear to have been produced in evidence. However, the language of Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act stipulates such a requirement when a claim is sought to be made in a Court. In the present case, the Award has been passed by the Lok-Adalat. The Lok-Adalat has been created by virtue of the provisions of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. Section 19 of the Legal Services Authorities Act provides for the organization of the Lok-Adalat at different levels. This provision does not in any manner indicate that Lok-Adalat would be a civil Court. Section 21 of the 6 Legal Services Authorities Act creates a legal fiction that every Award of a Lok-Adalat would be deemed to be a decree of a civil Court. The very fact that a deeming provision has been placed in Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act makes it clear that a Lok-Adalat is not a civil Court and there was a necessity of elevating an Award of the Lok-Adalat to that of a decree of a civil Court.
10. Section 22 of the Legal Services Act sets out the powers of the Lok-Adalat. In this provision, certain powers which are vested in a civil Court under C.P.C are vested with the Lok-Adalat. The fact that such a provision for vesting the powers of a civil Court had been inserted in Legal Services Authorities Act is again a pointer to the fact that the Lok-Adalat is not a „Court‟. The petitioner would also rely upon Section 22(3) of the Legal Services Authorities Act which states that the proceedings before a Lok-Adalat would be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193, 219 and 228 of I.P.C and every Lok-Adalat would be deemed to be a civil Court for the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter 26 of Cr.P.C. The legislature, by specifying the provisions of law for which a Lok-Adalat shall be deemed to a civil Court, has impliedly stipulated that the Lok-Adalat would not be a „Court‟ for any other purpose. Consequently, the Lok-Adalat cannot be treated as „a Court‟ under Section 214 of the Succession Act.
11. Learned Counsel for the petitioner had also relied upon a judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in New Okhla Industrial 7 Development Authority (Noida) v. Yunus and Ors2. In our opinion, the said judgment does not assist the petitioner. In fact, the said judgment would fortify the view taken by us.
12. In the case before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, an Award was obtained from the Lok-Adalat, in relation to compensation payable under the Land Acquisition Act. Certain persons who were affected by an acquisition had entered into a compromise with the authorities and obtained certain compensation under an Award passed by the Lok-Adalat. Other persons, who were similarly situated, sought payment of the same compensation under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act. The issue, whether such compensation can be claimed, came up before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court. After going into the nature of the Award passed by a Lok-Adalat, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court had held that an application under Section 28A cannot be made on the basis of an Award passed under Section 20 of the Legal Services Authorities Act. This conclusion was drawn on the ground that an application under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act can be made only when there is an award passed by a Court.
13. The relevant observations of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in this regard are at paragraph 38 and paragraph 50 which are extracted herein below:
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(2022) 9 SCC 516 8
38. The scheme of Section 28A of the Act is unmistakably clear from its very opening words. What section28A CA No. 901/2022 (@ SLP (C) No.9927/2020 etc.) contemplates is a redetermination of compensation under an award passed under Part III. Part III takes in Section
23. Section 23 deals with the matters to be taken into consideration. Various aspects including the market value on the date of the notification under Section 4(1) are indicated. What we wish to emphasise is that elements of Section 23 are not in consonance as such with the guiding principles set out in Section 19(4) of the „1987 Act‟ which are to guide a Lok Adalat. When the Court deals with the matter under Section 18, in other words, it is bound to look into the evidence and arrive at findings based on the evidence applying the legal principles which have been enunciated and arrive at the compensation. While it may be true that there is reference to „other legal principles‟ in Section 19(4) of the 1987 Act, the Lok Adalat also can seek light from the principles of justice, equity, and fair play. The Lok Adalat by virtue of the express provisions is only a facilitator of settlement and compromise in regard to matters which are referred to it. It has no adjudicatory role (See State of Punjab &Anr. v. Jalour Singh &Ors.
50. In this regard, we notice the judgment of this Court in State of Karnataka v. State of T.N (2017) 3 SCC 362: (SCC pp. 406-407, paras 75-76)
75. In this context, we may usefully refer to the Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 14th Edn. by G.P. Singh. The learned author has expressed thus:
"In interpreting a provision creating a legal fiction, the court is to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created [State of Travancore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashewnut Factory, AIR 1953 SC 333; State of Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak, AIR 1953 SC 244 : 1953 Cri LJ 1094] , and after ascertaining this, the Court is to assume all those facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to the giving effect to the fiction. [East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council, 1952 AC 109 : (1951) 2 All ER 587 (HL); CIT v. S. Teja Singh, AIR 1959 SC 352] But in so construing the fiction it is not to be extended beyond the purpose for which it is created [Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v.
State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661; CIT v. Amarchand N. Shroff, AIR 1963 SC 1448] , or beyond the language of the section by which it is created. [CIT v. Shakuntala, AIR 1966 SC 719; MancheriPuthusseri Ahmed v. Kuthiravattam Estate Receiver, (1996) 6 SCC 185 : AIR 1997 SC 208] It cannot also 9 be extended by importing another fiction. [CIT v. Moon Mills Ltd., AIR 1966 SC 870] The principles stated above are „well- settled‟. [State of W.B. v. Sadan K. Bormal, (2004) 6 SCC 59 :
2004 SCC (Cri) 1739 : AIR 2004 SC 3666] A legal fiction may also be interpreted narrowly to make the statute workable. [Nandkishore Ganesh Joshi v. Commr., Municipal Corpn. of Kalyan and Dombivali, (2004) 11 SCC 417 : AIR 2005 SC 34] "
76. In AneetaHada v. Godfather Travels and Tours [AneetaHada v. Godfather Travels and Tours, (2012) 5 SCC 661 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 350 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 241] , a three-Judge Bench has ruled thus :(SCC p. 681, paras 37-
38) "37. In State of T.N. v. Arooran Sugars Ltd. [State of T.N. v. Arooran Sugars Ltd., (1997) 1 SCC 326] the Constitution Bench, while dealing with the deeming provision in a statute, ruled (2017) 3 SCC 362 CA No. 901/2022 (@ SLP (C) No.9927/2020 etc.) that the role of a provision in a statute creating legal fiction is well settled. Reference was made to Chief Inspector of Mines v. Karam Chand Thapar [Chief Inspector of Mines v. Karam Chand Thapar, AIR 1961 SC 838 : (1961) 2 Cri LJ 1] , J.K. Cotton Spg. and Wvg. Mills Ltd. v.Union of India [J.K. Cotton Spg. and Wvg. Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, 1987 Supp SCC 350 : 1988 SCC (Tax) 26] , M. Venugopal v. LIC [M. Venugopal v. LIC, (1994) 2 SCC 323 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 664] and Harish Tandon v. ADM, Allahabad [Harish Tandon v. ADM, Allahabad, (1995) 1 SCC 537] and eventually, it was held that when a statute creates a legal fiction saying that something shall be deemed to have been done which in fact and truth has not been done, the Court has to examine and ascertain as to for what purpose and between which persons such a statutory fiction is to be resorted to and thereafter, the courts have to give full effect to such a statutory fiction and it has to be carried to its logical conclusion.
38. From the aforesaid pronouncements, the principle that can be culled out is that it is the bounden duty of the court to ascertain for what purpose the legal fiction has been created. It is also the duty of the court to imagine the fiction with all real consequences and instances unless prohibited from doing so. That apart, the use of the term "deemed" has to be read in its context and further, the fullest logical purpose and import are to be understood. It is because in modern legislation, the term "deemed" has been used for manifold 10 purposes. The object of the legislature has to be kept in mind."
14. Before parting with the present case, it would also appropriate to observe that the Award was passed as a compromise between the parties and on the basis of an understanding arrived at between the parties. In such circumstances, the allegation that one of the daughters of late Smt. Venkata Subbamma is not a party to the Award, would not be a ground on which the petitioner can challenge the award. At best, that is a ground which can be raised by the daughter who is said to have been left out in the Award proceedings.
15. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, pending if any, shall stand closed.
_______________________ R.RAGHUNANDAN RAO,J _______________ T.C.D.SEKHAR,J RJS 11 HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE T.C.D.SEKHAR WRIT PETITION NO: 17056/2025 (per Hon‟ble Sri Justice R. Raghunandan Rao) Dt: 08.09.2025 RJS