Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Abdul Khuddus And Ors. vs State Of A.P. And Anr. on 13 October, 1998
Equivalent citations: 1998(6)ALD246, 1998(5)ALT710, 1999 A I H C 332, (1998) 2 LS 440, (1998) 6 ANDHLD 246, (1998) 5 ANDH LT 710, (1998) 3 APLJ 374, (1999) 1 ANDHWR 303
Author: Y.V. Narayana
Bench: Y.V. Narayana
ORDER
MOTILAL B. NAIK, J
1. Petitioners seek for issuance of a Writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ or direction calling for the records relating to LGC No. 15 of 1992 on the file of the Special Court under Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, Hyderabad, and quash the order dated 9-6-1994 passed thereon.
2. Petitioners 1 to 3 herein are respondents 1, 3 and 4 respectively, in LGC No-15 of 1992 on the Special Court under AP Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, Hyderabad for short ('the Special Court'), The said LGC No.15 of 1992 was filed by the first respondent herein, viz., State of Andhra Pradcsh, represented by the Sub-Collector, Vijayawada, Krishna District, against the first petitioner herein Abdul Khuddus and one Smt. Jeenathunnissa Begum who died during the pendency of the said LGC and in her place sons were brought on record as respondents 3 and 4 respectively, who are petitioners 2 and 3 herein.
3. Brief facts in the said LGC No. 15 of 1992 are hereunder:
The first respondent herein, viz., State of Andhra Pradesh, represented by the Sub-Collector, Vijayawada, who filed the said LGC complained that the first petitioner herein is in occupation of a total extent of 470 square yards of land in Ward No.5 Block No. 1 of Vijayawada town, out of which 250 sq yards of land is a patta site covered under Ex.A8 purchased by the first petitioner in the year 1976 for a valid consideration. It is alleged that the first petitioner herein encroached upon an extent of 220 sq. yards of land by grabbing it illegally which in NTS No.26 correlated to old NTS No. 17/1-A/1-A of Vijayawada town. Likewise, the petitioners 2 and 3 herein are in occupation of 540 sq. yards out of which 350 sq. yards of land is a patta land which is said to have been purchased by their late mother Jeenathunisa Begum under Ex.A11 in the year 1944. The remaining extent of 190 sq. yards has been grabbed by them which is situated in NTS No.26 correlated to old NTS No. 17/1-A/1-A of Vijayawada town. The first respondent herein, therefore, sought a direction from the Special Court to declare the Government as owner of the schedule lands and a further declaration that the petitioners herein are the land grabbers within the meaning of the AP Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act.
4. Petitioners herein who were respondents 1, 3 and 4 respectively in the said LGC No.15 of 1992 have filed their counters before the Special Court.
5. The first petitioner herein in this Counter filed before the Special Court has pleaded that the entire Gandhi Hill of which the petition-schedule site is a part, vests in the Gandhi Hill Committee and as such the Government of Andhra Pradesh has no right to claim the petition-schedule land. The boundaries of the site occupied by the first petitioner herein were also not clearly given. He further contended that the extracts of Adangal Register attached to the LGC appeared to liave been prepared only for the purpose of this Case, so also the sketch annexed thereto. He further stated in his counter that he purchased an extent of 250 sq. yards under a registered sale deed dated 29-12-1976 from one Mohd.Omer (marked as Ex.A8) The site lying to the East of the extent purchased by this first petitioner was also in occupation of the prcdcccssors-in-title of the vendor Mohd. Omer since a long time and the said occupation was never treated as objectionable. The first petitioner in this counter further pleaded that even if the site of 220 square yards situated to the cast of patta lands purchased by him is treated as part of Hill poramboke belonging to the Government, his predecessors-in-title have perfected their title over it by adverse possession and the title of the Government over the said land stands extinguished and as such he is not a land grabber and he cannot be evicted from the petition-schedule land.
6. Petitioners 2 and 3 herein who are respondents 3 and 4 in the said LGC have filed their counters contending that their mother late Jeenathunnissa Begum purchased an extent of 350 sq yards under a registered sale deed dated 28-7-1944(Ex.All) from one Mohd. Abdul Allam. The site of 180 square yards adjoining that 350 sq yards purchased by their mother, on the eastern side, which is said to have been grabbed by them, was also in occupation of the prcdcccssors-in-title of their mother for more than the statutory period and as such even if it is treated as Hill poramboke land belonging to the Government, the title of the Government shall stand extinguished and that they have perfected their title by adverse possession. Petitioners 2 and 3 have also pleaded that they have constructed a two-storeyed building in the entire land and are in possession, for which the Government did not raise any objection.
Petitioners 2 and 3 herein, therefore, pleaded before the Special Court that they are not land grabbers and the Government is not the owner of the petition-schedule land.
7. On the above pleadings, the Special Court framed the following issues:
(1) Whether the petitioner is the owner of the petition schedule land?
(2) Whether the rival title set up by the respondents is true and valid?
(3) Whether the respondents are land grabbers within the meaning of the Act?
(4) To what relief ?
On 17-8-1993, the Special Court framed the following additional issue:
"Whether respondents 1, 3 and 4 have perfected their title over the extents claimed by the Government in the petition-schedule land by adverse possession?"
On 6-9-1993, the Special Court has also framed the following additional issue:
"Whether the petition-schedule land is required for any public purpose? If not, what is the present market value of the petition-schedule land?"
8. Before the Special Court, on behalf of the first respondent-Government PWs 1 to 4 were examined. P.S. Raheemuddin, Deputy Tahsildar, incharge of the cases filed under the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, working at Vijayawada is examined as PW1, B. Pulliah, Revenue Inspector working in the office of MRO, Vijayawada Urban is examined as PW2, K.V. Sivarama Sharma, Town Surveyor, working in Municipal Corporation of Vijayawada is examined as PW 3 and V. V.S. Subba Rao, Special Revenue Inspector in the MRO's Office, Vijayawada Urban is examined as PW4. Exs.Al to A15 were also marked on behalf of the Government. On behalf of the petitioners herein, RWs. 1 to 3 were examined.
9. The Special Court on a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence and in the light of the issues framed, held on issue No. 1 that the Government is the owner of the Schedule-land, on issue No.2, the rival title set up by the petitioners herein was rejected, and on additional issue framed on 17-8-1993, the claim of adverse possession set up by the petitioners herein has been rejected and; on issue No.3, the petitioners herein are declared as land grabbers within the meaning of Section 2(d) and (e) of the Act. As far as the additional issue framed on 6-9-1993, the Special Court held that in view of the constructions made by the petitioners herein on the schedule-lands, the market value of the lands grabbed by them has to be recovered, and directed the first petitioner herein to pay an amount of Rs.4,40,000/- and second and third petitioners to pay an amount of Rs.3,80,000/- within 12 monthly instalments to the Government while fixing the market value at Rs.2,000/- per sq yard. By holding so, the Special Court allowed the LGC No.15 of 1992 by an order dated 9-6-1994. This is the decision of the Special Court which is assailed before us.
10. Sri T. Veerabhadrayya, learned Counsel for the petitioners primarily contended that the impugned order dated 9-6-1994 passed by the Special Court suffers from various infirmities. Learned Counsel submitted that the Special Court failed to appreciate the oral and documentary evidence in the proper perspective and came to erroneous conclusion by holding that the petitioners herein are land grabbers. Learned Counsel contended that by virtue of their long standing possession over the schcdulcd-land, petitioners and their predecessors-in-title have perfected their title by adverse possession and the Special Ccurt failed to appreciate this vital aspect and has erroneously rejected the claim of adverse possession set up by the petitioner herein. He further contended that the official witnesses PWs.l to 3 examined on behalf of the Government have foiled to identify that the land which is in occupation of these petitioners is a Government land. Learned Counsel submits that as per the stand of the Government, the lands in occupation of these petitioners fall in new NTS No.26 correlated to old TS No.17/1-A/1-A. But, however, PW 1 deposed that Ex A1 does not disclose that NTS No.26 correlates old TS N0.17/1-A/1-A. Counsel further contends that even in Ex.A13 extract of Town Survey Register, the extent of land grabbed by these petitioners has not been mentioned. It is further contended that the Government has not been able to conclusively prove that the lands in question are Government lands and the Special Court has totally misdirected itself in coming to the conclusion that the land in question is a Government land- According to the learned Counsel Exs.Al to A5 A12 and A13 relied upon by the Government, failed to disclose the identity of the lands in occupation of these petitioners and the Special Court failed to appreciate this vital aspect.
11. Counsel farther contends that as provided under Section 10 of the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, the initial burden is on the complainant to prove mat the land belongs to him/it. In mis case, the Government being the complainant has failed to proveprima Jade that the lands in question belong to it. On the contrary, the petitioners liave proved that they have been in possession of the lands in question since a long time and their prcdecessors-in-titlc were also in possession of the said lands and therefore, they cannot be described as land grabbers. Counsel pleads that the Special Court relying on the documents Exs.Al to A5 and A12 and A13 even though they did not establish the title of the Government over the lands in question, lias erroneously passed the impugned order declaring the petitioners herein as land grabbers and sought for setting aside tlte impugned order dated 9-6-1994 as it is passed without any evidence.
12. Learned Government Pleader for Revenue (Assignment) appearing on behalf of the first respondent has justified the impugned order passed by the Special Court. He contended that when once the LGC is filed before the Special Court, the Special Court would scrutinise the case and on such scrutiny if it finds that the allegations levelled in the said case against the respondents arc, primafacie, true, then it takes the case on its file and proceeds to make further enquiry. Learned Government Pleader contends that registering the LGC case itself is sufficient to prove that the complainant Government has prima facie discharged its burden as required under Section 10 of the Act. This apart, learned Government Pleader submits that the Special Court after carefully scrutinising Exs.Al to A5 and A12 and A13 coupled with the evidence official witnesses PWs.l to 3 has come to the unassailable conclusion that the petitioners herein are landgrabbers and therefore, the well-considered decision of the Special-Court does not call for interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
13. In the wake of these submissions, the question that arises for consideration is whether this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, could interfere with the impugned order dated 9-6-1994 passed by the Special Court?
14. In State of West Bengal v. Atul Krishna Shaw, , the Supreme Court has held thus:
"It is indisputcdly true that in a quasi-judicial proceeding if the appellate authority had appreciated the evidence on record and recorded the findings of the fact, those findings arc binding on this Court or the High Court. By process of judicial review, we cannot appreciate the evidence and record our own findings of tact. If the findings are based on no evidence or based on conjectures or surmises and no reasonable man would, on given facts and circumstances, come to the conclusion reached by the appellate authority on the basis of the evidence on record, certainly this Court would oversee whether the findings recorded by the appellate authority is based on no evidence or beset with surmises or conjuctures."
15. What follows from the above decision of the Supreme Court is if the findings of the quasi-judicial authorities arc based on no evidence or based on conjectures or surmises and the conclusion reached by it is perverse, then the Supreme court or the High Courts are certainly to interfere with the findings of such authorities to undo the wrong done by it. Keeping the above proposition in view, we now proceed to deal with the contentions of the learned Counsel for the petitioners.
16. Learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the Special Court erroneously relied upon Ex.A1 and held that the petitioners have grabbed the land of the Government. We have examined Ex.A1 which is an extract of Town Survey Register of Vijayawada Town relating to Revenue Ward No.5 and Block No.1 with respect to Old Survey No.17/1-A/ 1-A. Ex.A1 shows the nature of land as 'hill' and the entire extent is shown as Ac.12.10825 sq ft. Under column No.7, the land is described as 'Poramboke'. Significantly, in column No.6 under the heading whether the land is Government Mitta, Zamindar or Inam, nothing is mentioned to indicate that the land covered by old survey No.17/1-A/1-A is Government land. The Deputy Tahsildar of Vijayawada who was examined as PW 1 has admitted that Ex.Al does not disclose that New Town Survey No.26 of Vijayawada town correlated to old NTS N0.17/1-A/1-A. Though the learned Government Pleader contended that the new Town Survey No.26 correlates to Old TSNo-17/l-A/l-A, the evidence ofPWl goes contrary to the said contention. Learned Government Pleader contended that the Government has filed Exs.A4 and A5 rough sketches of Survey No.17/1-A/1-A showing that the land encroached by these petitioners. It shall be remembered that Exs.A4 and A5 are rough sketches prepared by the Government and filed into Court. In order to defend its case, the Government has pressed into service these documents. The claim of the Government is that the 220 square yards occupied by the first petitioner and 190 square yards occupied by the petitioners 2 and 3 over and above the extent covered under Exs.A8 and All respectively are situated in NTS No.26 correlated to old S.N0.17/1-A/1-A. Though it is submitted by the learned Government Pleader that revised town survey was held in the year 1965 and Ex.Al is the extract of revised Town Survey Register to accept this submission. Nothing is mentioned in Ex.Al to indicate that NTS No.26 correlates to old TS No-17/1-A/1-A. Even in Ex.A13 which has been pressed into service on behalf of the Government, which is said to be an extract of 1965 Town Survey Register, the extent of lands in question alleged to have been occupied by these petitioners, has not been clearly mentioned except markings with red colour indicating the encroached area. Neither the names of these petitioners are mentioned nor the extent and the survey numbers indicated. Ex.A13 is not at all clearly legible to reach to such conclusion that the petitioners have encroached the lands in question.
17. The Special Court has relied on the oral evidence of PWs 1 to 3 who have deposed that the lands in question which are in occupation of the petitioners over and above the extents covered under Exs.A8 and A11 are the Government lands and are situated in NTS No.26 correlated to old TS No. 17/1-A/ 1-A. Government has also pressed into service Exs.A1 to A5 and A12 to A15 in support of its claim. As discussed above, Ex.A1 does not show that the lands in question are Government lands. Moreover, the evidence of PW1 goes contrary to the version of the Government who deposed that Ex.Al does not disclose that NTS No.26 correlates to old Survey No.17/1-A/1-A.
18. In our considered view, on a careful scrutiny of the documents pressed into service by the Government, the Government has not been able to clearly establish that the lands in question which are in occupation of these petitioners, are located in NTS No.26. Though the Government claimed that the lands in question are located in old Survey No. 17/1-A/ 1-A correlated to NTS No.26, the Town Survey Register has not been placed before the Court to ascertain that Town survey was conducted in the year 1965 and the old Survey No.17/1-A/1-A correlates to NTS No.26. Even on a perusal of Ex.A13 which is said to be the extract of 1965 Survey Plan, we are unable to trace any symptoms of the names of these petitioners except a marked portion with red colour and nothing is visible in Ex,A13. This, in our considered view, is not sufficient to hold that the Government has discharged its initial burden of proving that it is the owner of the lands in question. Exs.A2 and A3 which are pehanees relate to Faslis 1399 and 1400 they arc of recent origin and they cannot reflect the true origin of the lands. Exs.A6 and A7 and A9 are the notices. Ex.A14 is the letter addressed by the Special Registrar to the MRO, Vijayawada about the value of the land in the Basic Value Register and Ex.A15 is the certificate issued by the MRO on the value of the lands. These documents in our view, fail to prove the title of the Government over the lands in question.
19. On the other hand, the petitioners who were examined as RWs. 1 to 3 have stated that the lands in question which are in their occupation by them were also in occupation of their prcdcccssors-in-title since the times immemorial. When they purchased the lands under Exs.A8 and All respectively, the extents over and above the area covered under Exs.AS and All, are the lands whose possession was in the hands of their predecessors-in-title and they have constructed structures also. They further deposed that nobody objected for their possession over the lands in question. It is only a few days prior to the filing of the LGC, the Government officials issued notices to them and the documents were created by the Government only with a view to dislodge them from their possession.
20. Though these petitioners failed to prove their claim of adverse possession over, the lands in dispute by adducing documentary evidence, mat itself cannot be a ground for the Special Court to come to the conclusion that the petitioners are land grabbers. From a reading of the impugned order, it is clear that the Special Court has erroneously cast the burden exclusively on these petitioners to prove their title but has not taken care to examine whether the complainant-Government of Andhra Pradesh has been able to prove that the lands in question are Government lands.
21. Learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the first respondent contended that registering the LGC itself is sufficient to prove that the complainant-Government has prima facie discharged its burden as required under Section 10 of the AP Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 and that the respondents are rightly held as land grabbers. We are not inclined to accept this contention. In this regard, Section 10 of the said Act is extracted hereunder:
"Section 10: Burden of Proof:--"Where in any proceedings under this Act, a land is alleged to have been grabbed, and such land is prima facie proved to be the land owned by the Government or by a private person, the Special Court or as the case may be, the Special Tribunal sliall presume tliat the person who is alleged to have grabbed the land is a land-grabber and the burden in proving that the land has not been grabbed by him shall be on such person."
22. On a plain reading of the above section, it is abundantly clear that the initial burden is on the complainant whether it is Government or a private person, to prima facie prove tliat the land grabbed belonged to it/ him. If such burden is discharged satisfactorily, men what follows is the presumption tliat the land is grabbed and that the alleged land-grabber shall prove mat the land in question has not been grabbed by him. As discussed above, the documentary evidence adduced on behalf of the Government to prove that the lands in question are Government lands, does not in any way, even prima facie, establish that the lands in dispute belong to the Government. When the complainant-Government itself has not been able to prove that the lands in question, prima facie, belongs to the Government in terms of Section 10 of the Act, it cannot be said that the Government has discharged its initial burden of prima facie satisfaction before the Special Court. On a reading of the impugned judgment of the Special Court, we have no hesitation to hold that the Special Court has totally misdirected itself by erroneously placing the initial burden on the petitioners herein to prove that they are not the land grabbers. Section 10 of the Act clearly envisages that initial burden always rests on the complainant, be it the Government or a private person, to prove that the land in question, prima facie belongs to it/him. We are, having regard to the above discussion, inclined to hold that the findings of the Special Court are not based on any evidence at all and the Special Court proceeded only on surmises and conjuctures to hold that the petitioners are land-grabbers. When the Government, being tlte complainant before the Special Court foiled to prima facie prove that the lands to the extent of 220 square yards and 190 square yards held by petitioner 1 and 2 and 3 over and above the extents covered under Exs.A8 and A11 respectively, are located in NTS No.26 correlating to old Survey No.17/1-A/1-A are Government lands, these petitioners cannot be held to be land-grabbers within the meaning of Section 2(d) and (e) of the Act and the Government is not entitled to claim possession or value of these lands from the petitioners herein.
23. As held by the Supreme Court in the decision, (cited supra) when an order passed by the quasi-judicial authority or Tribunal is based only on surmises and conjucturcs and the finding is based on no reasonable evidence, this Court is entitled for judicial review of such decision and correct the wrong done to a party. In our view, this is a fit case warranting interference from this Court. Accordingly, we set aside the order impugned dated 9-6-1994 passed by the Special Court in LGC No. 15 of 1992.
24. In the result, the writ petition is allowed, but in the circumstances without costs.