Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
K. Venkataramana Reddy vs A. Radha And Ors. on 26 April, 1990
Equivalent citations: 1991CRILJ498
ORDER 1. The petitioner is the complainant in C.C. No. 99/83 on the file of the 2nd Addl. Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Nellore. He filed this revision against an order of the Sessions Judge, Nellore, reversing the order of the 2nd Addl. Judicial Magistrate of First Class in C.C. 99/83. 2. The facts of the case in brief are : The petitioner complainant worked as a Sub-Inspector of Police at Kaluvoya of Nellore District. During that time, on 21-6-81, R-1 and R-2 the Sub-Inspector and Head-Constable of Nellore Town came to him in a jeep and took him to the Central Crime Police Station, Nellore, by making a false representation that he was wanted by the Addl. Superintendent of Police, Nellore. On finding that he was brought to the Central Crime Station instead of to the Addl. S.P., the petitioner questioned them as to why he was misrepresented. Thereupon R-1 and R-2 got enraged and abused him in vulgar language. When the petitioner requested them to behave in a decent manner, they beat him with their hands on the neck and back and dragged him out of the jeep and took him forcibly into the Crime Police Station. Inside the police station R-13 the Asst. Superintendent of Police and R-14 the Circle Inspector, Nellore, were present. The complainant was thrown before them. On seeing the petitioner R-13 and R-14 abused him and directed the complainant to remove his clothes. Accordingly the petitioner removed his clothes and requested them to inform the accusation, if any, against him. Then they informed him, that he was concerned in a crime of the Town Police-Station, Nellore, for offences under sections 354 and 447 IPC. This incident was witnessed by one Rameshwer Rao and another Yanadi Reddy. Thereafter at 9-30 p.m. the petitioner was taken to the I - Town Police-Station, Nellore, by R-1 and R-2. In that police-station R-13 and R-14 were present. They opened the lock-up room and directed the petitioner to go in. The petitioner requested them to release him on bail on the ground that the offences were bailable and that he was ready to furnish necessary sureties. Thereupon R-13 and R-14 grew wild and abused him in vulgar language. Then A-14 (R-14) caught hold of the neck of the petitioner and A-13 slapped him on the back and both of them pushed him forcibly into the lock-up room. Thereafter A-13 and A-1 left the police station. At about 11-00 p.m., the petitioner was taken out of the lock-up room by orders of R-3 and he was asked to sign in the Prisoner's Search Register. Then the complainant questioned as to why he was asked to sign at 11-00 p.m. whereas he was actually kept in the lock-up room at 9-30 p.m. However, the petitioner signed in the register with a comment that he was refused bail though he was entitled to since the offences were under sections 354 and 447 IPC. On this R-3, R-4, R-6, R-7 and R-8, who were present there, got wild and beat the complainant with their hands indiscriminately and pushed him into the lock-up room. During that night he was in the lock-up room without food and water. Next day morning at about 8-00 a.m., he was taken out to answer calls of nature. After answering calls of nature he contacted his advocate at Nellore over telephone and informed him to contact his brother for purposes of getting sureties for his bail. While the petitioner was still on conversation with the advocate, R-3 and R-6 snatched away the phone depriving the petitioner from completing his talk. The petitioner asserted his right to contact his advocate. Thereupon, R-3 and R-6 called R-4, R-5 and R-8 to R-12 who were present in the police-station. Then R-3 to R-13 formed themselves into an unlawful assembly with the common object of assaulting the petitioner. R-6 to R-8 and R-10 were armed with lathies and they beat the complainant with the said lathies. A-3 to A-5, A-9, A-11 and A-12 gave fist-blows on the complainant and told him that he had no business to contact his advocate. Due to the blows the petitioner fell down. Then he was physically removed and put in the lock-up room. One Mahaboob Saheb, who was in the lock-up, witnessed the entire incident. One Duvvuri Chandrasekhara Reddy and another Doraswami Reddy requested for release of the petitioner on bail offering themselves to be sureties. But R-14 refused to release him without assigning any reasons. Thereafter at 3-00 p.m., the petitioner was produced before the Magistrate with a remand report. At the last minute of the remand, A-14 added another offence under Section 450 I.P.C., to get over the legal hurdle in refusing bail to the petitioner for the offences originally noted under sections 354 and 447 IPC, which are bailable. The petitioner also filed the arrest-card which discloses that he was arrested for offences under sections 354 and 447 IPC. While releasing him on bail, the Court also observed that adding of the offence under section 145 IPC is not at all attracted to the factual position of the case. The Court also recorded the statement of the petitioner regarding the injuries received by him as a result of the beating at the police-station while he was in wrongful confinement by refusing bail to him for offences which were bailable. After release on bail, the petitioner immediately presented himself before the Medical Officer, Government Hospital (Casualty) Nellore at 7-30 p.m., on 22-6-81 and the wound Certificate issued by the Doctor is filed along with the complaint. 3. Therefore, it is stated in the complaint, R-1 and R-2 are liable for offences under sections 342, 323 and 506 IPC and R-3 to R-12 under sections 147, 324 and 345 IPC. Originally R-13 and R-14, were not shown as accused in the complaint, but later they were added. The complaint was taken on file by the First Class Magistrate. 4. At that stage, the respondents filed Crl.M.P. 42/88 stating therein that there is no sanction under section 197 Cr.P.C. and under O. 191 of the A.P. Police Manual. Further the complaint is barred by limitation under Section 53 of the A.P. District Police Act. Therefore the complaint has to be dismissed. 5. The trial Court (the Judicial Magistrate of First Class) elaborately considered the miscellaneous petition and dismissed it holding that no sanction is required u/S. 197 Cr.P.C. or under 0.191 of the A.P. Police Manual and that the complaint was not barred by limitation. Thereafter the respondents again filed another petition, Crl.M.P. 1014/88, and the same was dismissed stating that the earlier petition on similar grounds was dismissed. Against that order the respondents filed Crl. Revn. Petition 104/88 before the Sessions Judge, Nellore. The learned Sessions Judge reversed the order of the Magistrate's Court holding that there was no sanction for prosecution, which was necessary, and consequently dismissed the complaint. Hence this revision case. 6. Mr. Padmanabha Reddy, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that sanction under S. 197 Cr.P.C., is called for only if the acts complained of are of official in character or have nexus to the official duties and in the absence of either the said sanction is wholly unwarranted to prosecute the respondents. According to him the acts referred to in the complaint are neither of the two supra and therefore the Sessions Court is incorrect in dismissing the complaint on the ground that there is no sanction as contemplated by S. 197 Cr.P.C. Mr. Bali Reddy, the learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that even if the acts stated in the complaint are held to be not official in their character still since they have nexus or relevance in discharge of the official duties, the sanction envisaged by S. 197 Cr.P.C., is mandatory for purposes of entertaining the complaint. In view of these rival contentions, it is necessary to have look at S. 197 Cr.P.C., which reads : "197. (1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office gave by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction - (a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government ......" 7. In Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu the Supreme Court had to consider the scope and object of S. 197 Cr.P.C. After delving into this aspect at length and after referring to the facts of that case the Supreme Court held that it is not every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under S. 197(1) Cr.P.C., nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office then sanction would be necessary; and that would be so irrespective of whether it was, in fact, a proper discharge of his duties because that would really be a matter of defence of the merits, which would have to be investigated at the trial, and could not arise at the stage of the grant of sanction, which must precede the institution of the prosecution. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court further observed that if the acts complained of are so integrally connected with the duties attaching to the office as to be in-separable from them, then sanction under S. 197(1) would be necessary, but if there was no necessary connection between them and the performance of those duties, the official status furnishing only the occasion or opportunity for the acts, then no sanction would be required. 8. In Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhar . His Lordship, Chandrasekhara Iyer, J., laid down the test in the following manner to find out whether or not the sanction is necessary. According to His Lordship there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. Even if the act exceeds than is strictly necessary for the discharge of the official duty, still it matters little since that question would arise only at a later stage when the trial proceeds on merits. What needs to be found out is whether the act and the official duty are so inter-related that one can postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of the official duty, though possibly in excess of the needs and requirements of the situation. There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty. 9. In Amrik Singh's case, , as noted, what is stated to be necessary for insistence upon sanction under section 197, Cr.P.C., is that the act complained of must be integrally concerned with the official duties. According to Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J., as noted in Matajog Dobey's case there must be reasonable connection between the act complained of and the official duty. Varadachariar, J., in Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor, 1940 Cri LJ 468 : (AIR 1939 Federal Court 43) held that there must be something in the nature of the act complained of that attaches it to official character of the person doing it for purposes of finding that sanction under section 197, Cr.P.C., is necessary. Again according to Lord Simond as held in Gill v. King, 1949 Cri LJ 503 : (AIR 1948 PC 128) a public servant can only be said to act or purport to act in the discharge of his official duty, if his act is such as to lie within the scope of his official duty. 10. Summing up different decisions on this aspect, His Lordship Chinnappa Reddy, J., in Syed Jaferullah Jeferi v. Abdul Aziz (1969 (2) APLJ 206) furnished a few illustrations with a view to help understanding the position clearly thus : "The delivery of an alleged dishonest judgment by a Judge, the making of alleged false entries in accounts by an accountant are instances of the first category of cases (Where the act complained of is the very act which he is expected or authorised to do under the statute or the law but which becomes reprehensible because it is alleged to be done fraudulently or dishonestly) because the writing of a judgment is itself the official duty of a Judge and the writing of accounts is the official duty of an accountant. The use of reasonable force by a police officer effecting an arrest, the removal of an obstruction to a lawful search etc., are illustrations of the second category of acts (where the act complained of though not itself sanctioned by statute or enjoined by his official duty is, however, so intimately and integrally connected with his official or statutory duty that it can be said to have been done in furtherance of the duty prescribed by for statute or achieving the object enjoined by his duty) because the use of reasonable force, is reasonably connected with the effecting of an arrest and the removal of an obstruction with a lawful search." 11. The above two illustrations are thus cases where sanction under Section 197, Cr.P.C., is necessary since they fall under one or the other of the two categories noted above in the brackets. However, following are the exceptions to the above requirement since they do not fall under either of the two categories : The receipt of a bribe by a Judge for delivering a dishonest judgment does not come within either of the categories because, while writing a judgment is his official duty, receipt of a bribe is not; nor is there any reasonable connection between the receipt of the bribe and the writing of the judgment. His position as a Judge and his official duty to write a judgment merely provide him with the opportunity to commit the offence of receiving a bribe. Again a police officer causing injuries to an accused person with a view to extort a confession from him does not come within either of the categories. While it is the duty of a police officer to investigate into an offence it is not part of his duty to extort a confession; nor can it be said that the extortion of a confession is reasonably connected with the duty of a police officer to investigate. This is how the demarcating line is drawn by His Lordship Chinnappa Reddy, J.
12. Incidentally it needs to be noted that the Supreme Court in Virupaxippa v. State of Mysore while considering See. 161 of the Bombay Police Act was to construe the words 'colour of office' and while so doing their Lordships observed that the expression "under colour of something" or "under colour of duty" or "under colour of office" is not infrequently used in law as well as in common parlance. Their Lordships proceeded to furnish examples of the said expression thus at page 851 :
"........ When a person is entrusted with the duty of collecting funds for, say, some charity and he uses that opportunity to get money for himself, we say of him that he is collecting money for himself under colour of making collections for a charity. Whether or not when the act bears the true colour of the office or duty or right, the act may be said to be done under colour of that right, office or duty it is clear that when the colour is assumed as a cover or a cloak for something which cannot properly be done in performance of the duty or in exercise of the right or office, the act is said to be done under colour of the office or duty or right."
13. The next important decision on this aspect of the Supreme Court is in State of A.P. v. Venugopal wherein it is observed at page 37 :
"It is easy to see that if the act complained of is wholly justified by law, it would not amount to an offence at all in view of the provisions of S. 79 of the Indian Penal Code. Many cases may however arise where in acting under the provisions of the Police Act or other law conferring powers on the police, the police officer or some other persons may go beyond what is strictly justified in law. Though Section 79 of the Indian Penal Code will have no application to such cases. Section 53 of the Police Act, will apply. But Section 53 applies to only a limited class of persons. So, it becomes the task of the Court whenever any question whether this section applies or not arises to bestow particular care on its decision. In doing that it has to ascertain first what act is complained of and then to examine if there is any provision of the Police Act or other law conferring powers on the police under which it may be said to have been done or intended to be done. The Court has to remember in this connection that an act is not "under a provision of law merely because the point of time at which it is done coincides with the point of time when some act is done in the exercise of the powers granted by the provision or in performance of the duty imposed by it. To be able to say that an act is done "under" a provision of law, one must discover the existence of a reasonable relationship between the provisions and the act. In the absence of such a relation the act cannot be said to be done "under the particular provision of law."
14. In State of Maharashtra v. Narhar Rao, it is categorically laid down that the test to determine as to whether a particular act complained of was done under colour of the office or in excess of the duty is to see that reasonable connection between the act complained of and the powers and duties of the office exists. The act cannot be said to have been done under colour of office because the point of time at which it is done coincides with the point of time the accused officer is invested with the powers or duty of his office. To the same effect is the decision in State of Maharashtra v. Atma Ram, 1966 Cri LJ 1498 : (AIR 1966 SC 1786).
15. It is in S. B. Saha v. M. S. Kochar, the Supreme Court after having referred to several earlier decisions observed thus at pages 1844-1846 :
"The question of sanction under section 197 can be raised and considered at any stage of the proceedings. In considering the question whether or not sanction for prosecution was required, it is not necessary for the Court to confine itself to the allegations in the complaint. It can take into account all the materials on the record at the time when the question is raised and falls for consideration. The sine qua non for the applicability of S. 197 is that the offence charged, be it one of commission or omission, must be one which has been committed by the public servant either in his official capacity or under colour of the office held by him."
16. In Balbir Singh v. D. N. Kadian, the act complained of was tampering of search memo while the same was in custody of Court by the Sub-Inspector and Constable of Delhi Police Force. Dealing with those facts, the Supreme Court held that the act cannot be deemed to be an act purported to have been done by the Police in discharge of their official duties and accordingly there was no necessity to obtain sanction under section 197, Cr.P.C.
17. In Bakshish Singh v. Gurmej Kaur, while observing that it is necessary to protect the public servants from being harassed in criminal proceedings the Supreme Court observed that it is equally important to emphasize that rights of the citizens should be protected and no excesses should be permitted. It is further observed that in the facts and circumstances of each case protection of public officers and public servants functioning in discharge of official duties and protection of private citizens have to be balanced by finding out as to what extent and how far is a public servant working in discharge of his duties and whether the public servant has exceeded his limit.
18. Mr. Bali Reddy, no doubt, took me through Pritam Singh v. Delhi Admn. (1987 Cri LJ 872) (Delhi). There the act complained of was found to be one done during the course of discharge of official duties and therefore sanction under section 197, Cr.P.C., was held to be necessary. That was a case where the traffic police stopped an advocate since he was proceeding on a scooter without a helmet on his head contravening the Motor Vehicle Rules. The advocate was also abused, pushed and detained. Hence a complaint was filed against the police. In that background of facts, the Delhi High Court found that the accused therein were discharging their official duties and in that they had made certain excesses, but there was still reasonable nexus between the act complained of and the discharge of official duties warranting sanction for prosecution under section 197, Cr.P.C. The facts therein are thus distinguishable from those on hand.
19. The other decision referred to is in Ravindra v. V. K. Panwar (1989 Cri LJ 191) (MP) of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. That was a complaint filed under section 323, IPC alleging that the police official slapped the petitioner while the latter came on a prohibited route on his motor cycle. On facts it was found therein that the act Complained of could by no means be characterised as foreign to discharge of official duty and therefore sanction for prosecution under section 197, Cr.P.C., was necessary. While arriving at that finding it was observed that the use of some force by police in the management of a fair which attracts large number of people cannot be entirely ruled out, but on the material available the police officer could be said to have exceeded the powers in the management of the fair, and, however, the nature of the act complained of clearly attaches to his official conduct. The facts therein are thus different and therefore to decide the need or otherwise of the sanction under See. 197, Cr.P.C., in the instant case that decision is of no help.
20. From the above discussion of the decisions it can safely be deduced that there can be two categories of cases that fall under the protection of S. 197, Cr.P.C. They are (i) the act complained of is one authorised by a statute or law but became questionable on account of the fact that it was done with fraudulent or dishonest intention and (ii) the act complained of, though not authorised by statute or law, is intimately and integrally connected with his official or statutory duty and has thus a reasonable nexus to the discharge of duty. In finding whether or not a complaint falls under either or neither of the above two categories, the facts and circumstances of the case have to be appreciated so to arrive at a balance between the protection available under section 197, Cr.P.C. and he protection of the private citizen from the on slaughts under the colour of office. It is only when the act on such appreciation does not fall under either of the above two categories and amounts to an offence that no sanction under section 197. Cr.P.C., is necessary for purposes of prosecution of the accused. In case they fall under either of the two categories supra, the sanction contemplated by Section 197, Cr.P.C., is necessary.
21. Before so appreciating the facts mentioned in the complaint; it is apposite to notice that Section 46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure dealing with arrest makes a specific reference to the amount of force that can be used in effecting such an arrest. Section 46 reads : "Arrest how made.
46. (1) In making an arrest the police officer or other person making the same shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested, unless there be a submission to the custody by word or action.
(2) If such person forcibly resists the endeavour to arrest him, or attempts to evade the arrest, such police officer or other person may use all means necessary to effect the arrest ......"
From the above provision, it is apparent that the amount of force necessary to be used varies from the resistance the person to be arrested exhibits and therefore it is the degree of force in making the resistance that forms basis nudging the excessiveness or otherwise of the force used in arresting the person. Section 49 of the Code mandates that no person shall be subjected to more restraint than is necessary to prevent his escape.
22. In the light of the above provisions and the principles deduced, I shall now proceed to examine the facts alleged in the complaint so as to find out whether or not the protection contemplated by Section 197, Cr.P.C., is available to the respondents. It is stated in the complaint that R-1 and R-2 came to Kaluvoya Police Station, took the petitioner in a zeep stating that he was required by the Addl. Superintendent of Police. Instead of taking him to the Addl. Superintendent of Police, they took him to the Central Crime Police Station, Nellore, and asked him to get down from the zeep. When the petitioner questioned them as to why they brought him to the Central Crime Police Station having told that he was required by the Addl. Superintendent of Police, they became angry and abused him in filthy language. Then the petitioner requested them to behave in a decent manner. Thereupon, R-1 and R-2 beat the petitioner with hands on his neck and back, dragged him out of the zeep and took him forcibly into the Crime Police Station. There is thus the allegation of abusing, beating and dragging against the 1st and 2nd respondents. The question whether the said acts of beating, abusing and dragging were warranted in the discharge of their official duties or not and whether they have any nexus with their official duties can be decided only after the evidence is let in and not earlier to that.
23. In so far as A-3 to A-12 are concerned the allegation is that A-3, A-4, A-6, A-7 and A-8 beat the petitioner on the same night when the petitioner endorsed in the Prisoners' Search Register that bail was refused to him though the offences registered against him were bailable. On the next day, when the accused was talking over the telephone to his advocate in the police station and when he asserted that he had a right to speak to his advocate, A-3 to A-12, who were present in the police station, beat him with hands and lathies. In regard to this allegation also it cannot at this stage be decided as to whether or not there was any excess force used against the complainant. There can be a definite finding only on the evidence to be let in.
24. Prima facie, the acts alleged against R-1 to R-12 appear to be in excess than required and therefore at this stage it is not proper to insist upon the permission to prosecute under S. 197, Cr.P.C. Thus, in so far as R-1 to R-12 are concerned whether or not sanction under section 197, Cr.P.C., is necessary can be decided only after the evidence is let in and if only it transpires from the evidence so adduced that the acts complained of were the resultants of some reasonable nexus with their official duty, it can be insisted that for continuance of further proceedings sanction under the said provision is necessary.
25. Turning to the allegations against R-13 and R-14, it is to be seen that they abused the petitioner when he was taken into the Crime Police Station and asked him to remove his dress. They again abused the petitioner when he sought for grant of bail. At that time A-14 caught hold of the neck and A-13 slaped the petitioner on the back and that both of them together pushed him into the lock-up room. Firstly refusal of bail, even if the offences are bailable in nature, is one having nexus to the official duty. So far as pushing by slapping on the back into the lock-up room is concerned it cannot be said to be excessive since that much force is warranted to get a person into the lock-up room. Therefore, in the circumstances, as submitted by Mrs. Bali Reddy, R-13 and R-14 are entitled to the protection under section 197, Cr.P.C. and accordingly in the absence of a sanction thereunder the complaint filed against them is not maintainable.
26. Adverting to the sanction under Order 191 of the A.P. Police Manual, the contention of Mr. Padmanabha Reddy is that there is no such necessity to obtain the sanction inasmuch as the said order is only an administrative instruction and has no statutory force and that the said order cannot override the right available to the petitioner under the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is further submitted that the complaint filed by the petitioner is one in individual capacity and not as the Sub-Inspector of Police complaining the acts done by the respondents in excess of their powers. Order 191 of the Police Manual reads :
"Sanction to prosecute police officers :
191. No criminal prosecution of a police officer for an offence committed by him shall be instituted by another police officer in his official capacity without the sanction of an officer not inferior in rank to the Superintendent of Police in respect of a district police force, the commandant ...... This does not affect the magistracy or private individuals to initiate such proceedings."
From the above order, it is manifest that the officer making the complaint and the one against whom it is made must both the police officers and the proceedings must be in the official capacity of the complainant. In the instant case the complaint is filed by K. Venkata Ramana Reddy in his individual capacity. May be that he happened to be the Sub-Inspector of Police, but the proceedings are not instituted in his official capacity. Further the complaint against R-1 to R-14 is not against the acts done by them in their official capacity but for having been done in excess thereof. Thus neither the complaint lodged is in the official capacity of the petitioner nor the respondents are sought to be tried for the offences alleged in their official capacity. Further the very approval accorded by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the Police Manual as per G.O. Ms. No. 308 Home (Police-D) Department dated 9-2-1960 is subject to the condition that the manual does not supersede any statutory rule, service rules or other orders issued by the Government from time to time, and if there is any conflict, the latter will prevail. Thus, the statutory right available to the petitioner under the Code of Criminal Procedure to prosecute the respondents in his individual capacity for the acts done by them in excess of their official capacity remains unaffected and accordingly no permission under Order 191 is necessary in this case.
27. It is lastly contended by Mr. Padmanabha Reddy that the complaint is not barred by Section 53 of the A.P. (Andhra Area)District Police Act of 1859. Section 53 reads as under :
"All actions and prosecutions against any person, which may be lawfully brought for (anything done or intended to be done, under the provisions of this Act, or under the provisions of any other law for the time being in force, conferring powers on the police) shall be commenced within three months after the act complained of shall have been committed and not otherwise. ........"
The period of limitation, as seen, is three months from the date of the alleged offence. In this case the date of offence as alleged in the complaint is 21-6-81. The complaint against A-1 to A-12 was filed on 28-7-81, clearly within three months, and therefore it is clearly within the period of limitation, even assuming that Section 53 applies to A-1 to A-12. However, in so far as A-13 and A-14 are concerned they were made accused by way of amendment some time during March, '83. Therefore, it is beyond three months. In so far as A-1 to A-12 are concerned, the acts complained of were as held above in excess of their official duties and therefore not official. On this ground also Further Section 53 is not applicable to A-1 to A-12. But in so far as A-13 and A-14 are concerned, it was held above that the acts complained of were not in excess and therefore sanction under section 197, Cr.P.C., is necessary. Consequently, Section 53 is attracted and in view of the fact that the complaint against them was filed some time long after the period of three months prescribed by Section 53, the same is barred by limitation also. I am also fortified in this view by a decision of the Supreme Court in State of A.P. v. Venugopal wherein it is held that unless the act complained of appears to have been done or intended to be done under the provisions of the Police Act or of the other laws conferring powers on the police, the protection of S. 53 will not be available. Accordingly, it is to be held that the complaint against A-13 and A-14 is barred by Section 53 of the A.P. (Andhra Area) District Police Act, 1859 while the complaint against A-1 to A-12 is maintainable against them since it is not so barred.
28. Mr. Bali Reddy submitted that there is long delay in prosecuting the respondents and that this delay is a factor favourable to the respondents since any prosecution at this stage would prejudice the trial. It is to be borne in mind that the complaint was taken on file in 1983 though it was filed in 1981 since it was referred to the police and so on. The trial Court itself held in Cri.M.P. No. 1014 of '88 that the accused did not appear for five long years for their examination under See. 251 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The delay, thus, is on account of the non-appearance of the accused themselves and they cannot be permitted to make a ground of their own laches. I accordingly see no sub-stance in this contention.
29. Before parting with this matter, it needs to be pointed out that all the respondents accused in this case are not public servants removable by or with the sanction of the Government so as to attract Section 197, Cr.P.C., as such. However, by virtue of the powers conferred by sub-section (3) of Section 197, Cr.P.C., the Government of Andhra Pradesh has through G.O. Ms. No. 406 Home (Courts-B) dated 30-4-1974 extended the application of Section 197 to all the police officers including Sub-Inspectors, Head Constables and Constables. In view of this G.O., applicability of Section 197, Cr.P.C., is beyond the realm of controversy, of course subject to the condition that the acts complained of satisfy the requirement or otherwise.
30. In the result, the revision in so far as A-13 and A-14 (respondents Nos. 13 and 14) are concerned is dismissed by hold that the complaint is barred by limitation under section 53 of the Police Act besides being hit by Section 197, Cr.P.C., for want of necessary sanction. The revision to the extent it relates to A-1 to A-12 is allowed by setting aside the order of the Sessions Court, Nellore. The trial Court shall, however, dispose of the case within six months from the date of receipt of this order since it is a very old one.
31. Order accordingly.