Income Tax Officer vs Bir Engg. Works [Alongwith Misc. Appln. ... on 14 February, 2005

[Cites 80, Cited by 32]

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Amritsar

Income Tax Officer vs Bir Engg. Works [Alongwith Misc. Appln. ... on 14 February, 2005

Equivalent citations: [2005]94ITD164(ASR), [2005]275ITR55(ASR), (2005)93TTJ(ASR)257

ORDER

Joginder Pall, A.M.

1. In exercise of the powers vested under Section 255(3) of the IT Act, 1961 (hereinafter, referred as the Act), the President of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (in short ITAT) has constituted this Special Bench to decide the following question :

"Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Tribunal committed a mistake under Section 254(2) of the IT Act in dismissing the appeal of the Revenue in the light of circulars of the Board ?"

Before proceeding to answer this question, the background and events leading to present reference need to be mentioned.

2. The Central Board of Direct Taxes (in short CBDT) is the supreme body of IT Department responsible for formulation and implementation of Government policy and administration of Direct Taxes Laws. As per provisions of Section 119 of the Act, the CBDT is vested with the powers of issuing directions/instructions to the field officers. With a view to reducing the pendency of appeals in the Tribunal, High Court and Supreme Court and also to redress the difficulties of small assessees in meeting the cost of litigation, the Board has been issuing instructions to the field officers of the IT Department prescribing the monetary limit for filing appeals before the various appellate forums including the Tribunal. In the year 1980, the CBDT issued Instruction No. 1328, wherein it was stated that in so far as the wealth-tax appeals are concerned, appeals to Tribunal should not be filed if the tax effect was less than Rs. 2000. For appeals arising from income-tax, such monetary limit was fixed at Rs. 5,000. The main objective was to reduce the litigation and also the costs involved therein. On 6th April, 1985 Instruction No. 1612 was issued wherein the monetary limit (tax effect) was fixed at Rs. 5,000 in respect of appeals to be filed under other Direct Taxes and Rs. 10,000 for income-tax appeals. On 3rd July, 1984, the CBDT vide F. No. 319/25/84-WT issued a specific circular (dt. 3rd July, 1984) with regard to the appeals concerning the applicability of Rule 11IB of Wealth-tax Rules where the Departmental officers were directed not to file appeals before the Tribunal unless tax effect in each appeal was Rs. 20,000 or more. Subsequently, Board issued instruction No. 1777 dt. 4th Nov., 1987, same monetary limit of Rs. 10,000 was provided in respect of all appeals arising under the income-tax, wealth-tax, gift-tax, estate duty, etc. Subsequently the Board issued another Instruction No. 1903 dt. 28th Oct., 1992 as per which monetary limit of tax effect for filing appeals before Tribunal, High Court and Supreme Court was enhanced to Rs. 25,000, Rs. 50,000 and Rs. 1,50,000 respectively. Thereafter. Instruction No. 1979 dated 27th March, 2000 was issued whereby the Departmental officers of the IT Department were directed not to file appeal before the Tribunal in a case where the tax effect involved is less than Rs. 1,00,000 for appeal under Section 260A/reference under Section 256(2) before the High Court, monetary limit of tax effect is fixed at Rs. 2,00,000 and for appeal before the Supreme Court, monetary limit of tax effect is fixed at Rs. 5,00,000. These instructions have been issued in supersession of all earlier instructions. Some exceptions have been provided where appeals could be filed even if the tax effect is less than the prescribed monetary limit.

3. In spite of these clear instructions of the Board, field officers of the Department have been filing appeals even in cases where the tax effect is less than the abovementioned monetary limit of tax effect, contrary to the aforesaid instructions of the Board. Such matter came to be considered by Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench in the case of ITO v. Dharamvir (2002) 253 ITR 1 (Chd)(AT), where the matter was discussed in detail. Relying on the judgments of Bombay High Court in the case of Unit Trust of India and Anr. v. P.K. Unny and Ors. (2001) 249 ITR 612 (Bom) and CWT v. Executors of Late D.T. Udeshi, (1991) 189 ITR 319 (Bom) and the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CST v. India Industries 122 STC 100 (SC), it was held that instructions issued by the Board were binding on the field officers of the IT Department It was also held that these instructions were benevolent in nature as these seek to redress the difficulties of small tax payers and also reflect the policy of the Government for reducing unnecessary litigation in comparatively small cases. It was, therefore, the duty of field officers of the IT Department to comply with these instructions, which were binding. Since the appeal in the case was filed against the instructions of the Board, the same was dismissed on this ground.

4. Thereafter, Tribunal, Amritsar Bench by relying on the order of Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench in the case of ITO v. Dharmvir (supra) and the judgment of Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Cameo Colour Co. (2002) 254 ITR 565 (Bom) dismissed the appeal in the case of ITO v. Shri Ravinder Kumar in ITA No. 404 & 405/Asr/1994 for the asst. yrs. 1992-93 and 1993-94 and other cases vide consolidated order dt. 1st Aug., 2002. On identical facts and for the same reasons, Tribunal, Amritsar Bench also dismissed appeals in the case of ITO v. Bir Engg. Works, G.T. Road, Jalandhar, in ITA No. 377, 378 & 379 Asr/2002 for the asst. yrs. 1983-84 to 1985-86 and others vide consolidated order dt. 20th Jan, 2003. Thereafter, the Revenue filed miscellaneous applications in the case of the ITO v. Bir Engg. Works, requesting for recall of the order and Tribunal, Amritsar Bench vide its order dt. 21 July, 2003 in Misc. Appln. Nos. 21, 26 and 27 rejected such miscellaneous applications. The Revenue has again now moved miscellaneous applications against the order of Tribunal dismissing the earlier miscellaneous applications in this case. Similarly, Revenue has filed miscellaneous application in the case of ITO v. Shri Ravinder Kumar. Hence, this reference to the Special Bench.

5. Sh. Ashwani Kumar, the learned Departmental Representative for the Revenue, filed written submissions vide his letter dt. 7th Dec., 2004. He submitted that Instruction Nos. 1903 and 1978 were only the instructions of the Board meant for the officers of the IT Department. These are only administrative instructions issued under Section 119(1) of the Act. These laid down the monetary limit for filing the appeals before the Tribunal, High Court and Supreme Court so as to regulate the process of litigation. He submitted that these did not confer any vested rights for public at large. He submitted that only circulars of the Board issued under Sub-section (2) of Section 119 are meant for the public. He drew our attention to Rule 11 IB of the IT Rules, 1962 which provide for publication and circulation of Board's order. He submitted that circulars issued under Sub-section (2) of Section 119 are required to be published in the Official Gazette as these alone are meant for the public use. But instructions issued under Sub-section (1) of Section 119 are only administrative instructions and in case field officers failed to comply with these directions and filed appeals in cases where the tax effect is below the monetary limit prescribed by the Board, such officers could be liable for administrative actions like disciplinary proceedings, etc. But taxpayers cannot claim benefit by relying on such instructions issued by the Board. He further submitted that while circulars issued under Sub-section (2) of Section 119 of the IT Act, are binding on the IT authorities, instructions issued under Sub-section (1) of Section 119 are not binding on the IT authorities. The fact that circulars are binding on the authorities is clear from the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Hero Cycles (P) Ltd. and Ors., (1997) 228 ITR 463 (SC). He submitted that intended purpose of Instruction is materially different from that of circular. While instructions are issued for the purpose of proper administration of the Act, these are guidelines for the Departmental officers and these do not have any statutory force. Thus, Instruction Nos. 1903 and 1979 prescribed only the monetary limit of tax effect for filing the appeals before the various appellate forums with a view to minimize pendency of litigation. But there are certain exceptions provided therein where an appeal can be filed even though the tax effect involved is less than the prescribed monetary limit. He submitted that in case the Departmental authority decides to file appeals on the ground that case is covered by any of the exceptions, the authority is not duty-bound to specify such exceptions in the grounds of appeal because there is no requirement under the law to do so. He further argued that the Instructions couldn't substitute any provisions of law. The power for filing an appeal is conferred on the IT authorities by the statute. He submitted that the IT authorities file an appeal as per powers conferred under the Act. The Board cannot take away such statutory power by way of issue of administrative instructions because these instructions are only administrative in nature.

5.1. The learned Departmental Representative further relied on the judgment of Hon'ble jurisdictional Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Rani Paliwal v. CIT (2004) 268 ITR 220 (P&H), where this issue was considered by the Hon'ble High Court. The Hon'ble High Court held that the Board's circular is only an instruction issued to the IT authorities not to file appeals where tax effect is less than Rs. 1,00,000. The Tribunal is not bound by any such instruction and once the Department files an appeal, the Tribunal was bound to decide the same on merits. Accordingly, the High Court held that this question, in their opinion, was not a question of law. He submitted that this judgment is binding on all authorities including Tribunal functioning in the jurisdiction of Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court. He further submitted that this view is also upheld by the Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court in the case of CIT v. Rajasthan Patrika Ltd. (2002) 258 ITR 300 (Raj). Referring to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Anr. (2004) 267 ITR 272 (SC), the learned Departmental Representative submitted that this judgment refers only to the circulars of the Board, which were binding in nature. He further submitted it is a settled position that the judgment of jurisdictional High Court is binding on the authorities falling in its jurisdiction. The Tribunal and subordinate authorities cannot afford to ignore the law enunciated by the jurisdictional High Court or Supreme Court. For this preposition, he relied on the following judgments :

(i) State of Andhra Pradesh v. CTO and Anr. (1988) 169 ITR 564 (AP).

(ii) Air Conditioning Specialists (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors. (1996) 221 ITR 739 (Guj).

(iii) K. Subramanian, ITO and Anr. v. Siemens India Ltd. and Anr. (1985) 156 ITR 11 (Bom)

(iv) Shri Mahabir Industries v. CIT (1996) 220 ITR 459 (Gau).

(v) Siemens India Ltd. and Anr. v. K. Subramanian, ITO and Anr. (1983) 143 ITR 120 (Bom) 5.2. He further relied on the judgment of Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court (Full Bench) in the case of CIT v. Smt. Aruna Luthra, (2001) 252 ITR 76 (P&H)(FB), where the Hon'ble High Court has held that once the jurisdictional High Court' or Supreme Court decides a particular issue, the judgment of jurisdictional High Court/Supreme Court would relate back to the date when particular section was inserted in the Act. This, according to him, would be a mistake of law apparent from record which could be rectified under Section 154/254(2). Thus, referring to the judgment of Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Rani Paliwal v. CIT (supra), the learned Departmental Representative submitted that the Hon'ble High Court has held that even if appeal filed by the Revenue is below a particular limit, the Tribunal is bound to decide the same on merits, He submitted that, in view of the judgment of jurisdictional High Court, the miscellaneous applications filed by the Revenue in the aforesaid cases deserve to be allowed. He further submitted that, relying on the judgment of the Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Rani Paliwal v. CIT (supra), the Tribunal Amritsar Bench, has allowed the miscellaneous applications filed by the Revenue in several cases. He particularly referred to the Misc. Appln. Nos. 128, 95, 98, 96, 101, 91, 92, 97, 93 and 127/Asr/2004. He, therefore, submitted that present miscellaneous applications also deserve to by allowed.

5.3. Shri R.K. Raina, learned Departmental Representative has also filed written submissions vide his letter dt. 12th Aug., 2004, reiterating the submissions made by Sh. Ashwani Mahajan already discussed in the preceding paragraphs. He also relied on the judgment of the apex Court in the case of J.R. Raghupathy, etc. v. State of AP and Ors. AIR 1988 SC 1681, where the notification issued by the Andhra Pradesh Government in breach of the guidelines was struck down by the Hon'ble High Court and on appeal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the guidelines were merely in the nature of instructions issued by the State Government to the Collectors regulating the manner in which they should formulate their proposals for formulation of a Revenue Mandal or for location of its headquarters keeping in view broad guidelines. These guidelines had no statutory force and they had also not been published in the Official Gazette. The ultimate decision as to the formation of the Revenue Mandal or location of its headquarters rested with the Government These Instructions do not have any statutory force and do not give rise to any legal right in favour of the assessee. Thus, he submitted that similar is the position of the instructions issued by the Board and these do not have any binding force. He has also contended that the Tribunal was not justified in dismissing the appeal merely on the ground that the tax effect involved therein was below the monetary limit laid down under instructions of the Board. Thus, ' he also pleaded that the miscellaneous applications filed by the Revenue should be allowed.

6. Shri K.R. Jain, the learned counsel for the assessee in Misc. Appln. No. 73/Asr/2004 submitted that the Tribunal, Amritsar Bench, had not committed any mistake while dismissing the appeal of the Revenue in limine which was filed against the instructions of the Board prescribing monetary limit of tax effect for the purpose of filing appeals before the Tribunal. He relied on the decision of the Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, in the case of ITO v. Dharmvir (supra) where the Tribunal has discussed this issue in greater detail and has held that Instruction No. 3979 issued by the Board prescribing the monetary limit for filing the appeal before the Tribunal was binding on the IT authorities and any appeal filed contrary to the instructions of the Board was liable to be dismissed. He submitted that the Revenue has not placed any evidence on record to show that this decision of the Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, was contested in appeal before the Hon'ble High Court. He submitted that this decision of the Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, has been followed by various Benches of the Tribunal including Tribunal, Amritsar Bench, in several such cases. He particularly referred to the decision of Tribunal, Amritsar Bench, in the case of ITO, Ward-3 v. Partap Builders, Bhatinda, in ITA No. 33/Asr/2001. He submitted that in addition to the decision of the Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, in the case of ITO v. Dharmvir (supra), the Tribunal Amritsar Bench has also followed the judgment of Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the cases of CWT v. Executors of Late DT. Udeshi (supra), CIT v. Cameo Colour Co. (supra). He further submitted that the decisions of the Tribunal, Amritsar Bench, have been accepted by the Department.

6.1. Proceeding further, the learned counsel submitted that Instructions issued by the CBDT are binding on the IT authorities. He relied on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of UCO Bank v. CIT (1999) 237 ITR 889 (SC), the Judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT v. Smt. Nayana P. Dedhia (2004) 270 ITR 572 (AP), the judgment of Hon'ble Allahabad Court in the case of CIT v. Smt. Parkashwati (1994) 189 ITR 567 (All) (sic) and the judgment of Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of CWT v. S. Annamalai (2002) 258 ITR 675 (Mad), where by referring to CBDT's Instruction No. 1979, dt. 27th March, 2000, and by relying on the judgment of Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Cameo Colour Co. (supra), the Hon'ble Madras High Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the same had been filed contrary to the circular issued by the Board prescribing monetary limit of tax effect. Further drawing our attention to the judgment of Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Rani Paliwal v. CIT (supra), Sh. Jain submitted that in this case, the Hon'ble High Court dismissed the appeal of the assessee on the ground that there was no question of law involved much less substantial question of law. He submitted that the observations made by the High Court that once the appeal is filed, the Tribunal is bound to decide the same on merits, was only a passing remark. This cannot be said to be a part of ratio decidendi and, therefore, it is not binding in nature.

6.2. Alternatively, the learned counsel for the assessee submitted that as per provisions of Section 254(2), the Tribunal has powers to rectify the mistake of law or facts, which are apparent from record. All those issues, which involve prolonged discussions and arguments and where two views are possible fall outside the purview of Sub-section (2) of Section 254 of the IT Act. He relied on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of T.S. Balaram, ITO v. Volkart Brors. and Ors. (1971) 82 ITR 50 (SC) and the judgment of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Hotze Hotels (P) Ltd v. CIT (2001) 248 ITR 647 (Del).

7. Sh. Y.K. Sud, CA, appearing for the intervener also adopted the arguments of Sh. K.R. Jain. He submitted that Instructions issued by the Board are binding on all the IT authorities. He also relied on the recent judgment of Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Jaswant Singh Bambha v. CBDT, and Ors. in CWP 19040 of 2003 where the Hon'ble High Court by referring to several judgments of the High Court has taken the view that Instructions issued by the Board are binding on the IT authorities. He also placed a copy of the judgment on our file. He submitted that if instructions issued by the Board are not followed by the IT authorities, this would open floodgates of arbitrariness as some authority might accept the claim of the assessee by relying on such instructions and the same authority or some other authority might decide such matters against the assessee by ignoring such instructions. He submitted that this approach would be contrary to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Kaumudini Narayan Dalai and Anr. (2001) 249 ITR 219 (SC). He also submitted that the judgment of Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Rani Paliwal v. CIT (supra) was rendered in altogether different context. He submitted that the Hon'ble High Court dismissed the appeal of the assessee on the ground that such plea was not taken before the authorities below. But it does not mean that the Hon'ble High Court has decided the issue on merits. Therefore, this judgment is not binding in nature.

8. Sh. S.K. Bansal, Advocate, appearing for the intervener adopted the same arguments and submitted that the instructions issued by the CBDT were binding on the IT authorities. He relied on 9 judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and 21 judgments of the various High Courts mentioned in Annexure-A of this order, in support of the proposition that the instructions issued by the CBDT were binding on the IT authorities. He further submitted that the observations made by the Hobble Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Rani Paliwal v. CIT (supra) that once the Department files an appeal, the Tribunal was bound to decide the same on merits was casual observation and, therefore, circular will not be considered by the Courts. Referring to the contrary decision of the Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court in the case of CIT v. Rajasthan Patrika Ltd. (supra), he submitted that the authors have expressed the view that the same is incorrect.

9. Shri J.K. Gupta, Advocate, appearing for the intervener relied on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court by referring to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution have observed that these articles strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness of equality of treatment. These require that State action must be based on valid relevant principles applicable alike to ail similarly situate and it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations because that would amount to denial of equality. Any action of the State, which is discriminatory, would amount to mala fide exercise of authority by the State. Thus, he contended that instructions issued by the Board which aim at imparting similar treatment in the cases where tax effect is less than the prescribed monetary limit is required to be followed by the IT authorities.

10. Shri Ashwani Kalia, CA, appearing for the intervener, also adopted the same arguments, which were argued by the earlier counsel and submitted that instructions of the Board were binding on the IT authorities

11. We have heard both the sides at length and given our careful consideration to the submissions made by the parties and referred to the various judgments relied upon by both the parties. We feel that this Bench is required to address to the following questions :

(i) Whether, instructions issued by the Board are binding on the IT authorities or not ?

(ii) Whether the observations made by Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Rani Paliwal v. CIT (supra) form part of ratio decidendi and are, therefore, binding on all the authorities working in its jurisdiction or these are only in the nature of passing remarks which are not binding ?

(iii) Whether the mistakes pointed out by the Revenue in the miscellaneous applications could be rectified by the Tribunal under Section 254(2) of the IT Act or not?

11.1. Before proceeding to decide these questions it would he relevant to reproduce hereunder the provisions of Section 119 which empower the CBDT to issue directions to the field officers of the IT Department This section reads as under:

"119(1). The Board may, from time to time, issue such orders, instructions and directions to other IT authorities as it may deem fit for the proper administration of this Act and such authorities and all other persons employed in the execution of this Act shall observe and follow such orders, instructions and directions of the Board :

Provided that no such orders, instructions or directions shall be issued-

(a) so as to require any IT authorities to make a particular assessment or to dispose of a particular case in a particular manner; or

(b) so as to interfere with the discretion of the CIT(A) in exercise of his appellate functions (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power,-

(a) the Board may, if it considers it necessary or expedient so to do, for the purpose of proper and efficient management of the work of assessment and collection of revenue, issue, from time to time (whether by way of relaxation of any of the provisions of Sections 139, 143, 144, 147, 148, 154, 155, Sub-section (IA) of Section 201, Sections 210, 211, 234A, 234B, 234C) 271 and 273 or otherwise), general or special orders in respect of any class of incomes or class of cases, setting forth directions or instructions (not being prejudicial to assessees) as to the guidelines, principles or procedures to be followed by other IT authorities in the work relating to assessment or collection of revenue or the initiation of proceedings for the imposition of penalties and any such order may, if the Board is of opinion that it is necessary in the public interest so to do, be published and circulated in the prescribed manner for genera! information;

(b) the Board may, if it considers it desirable or expedient so to do for avoiding genuine hardship in any case or class of cases, by general or special order, authorize any IT authorities, not being a CIT(A) to admit an application or claim for any exemption, deduction, refund or any other relief under this Act after the expiry of the period specified by or under this Act for making such application or claim and deal with the same on merits in accordance with law;

(c) the Board may, if it considers it desirable or expedient so to do for avoiding genuine hardship in any case or class of cases, by general or special order for reasons to be specified therein, relax any requirement contained in any of the provisions of Chapter IV or Chapter VI-A, where the assessee has failed to comply with any requirement specified m such provision for claiming deduction thereunder, subject to the following conditions, namely:

(i) the default in complying with such requirement was due to circumstances beyond the control of the assessee; and

(ii) the assessee has complied with such requirement before the completion of assessment in relation to the previous year in which such deduction is claimed:

Provided that the Central Government shall cause every order issued under this clause to be laid before each House of Parliament."

(Emphasis, italicised in print, supplied is ours) From a plain reading of section reproduced above, it is clear that Sub-section (1) of Section 119 refers to orders, instructions and directions to the IT authorities by the Board. The section itself provides that all such authorities and all other persons employed in the execution of this Act, shall observe and follow such orders, instructions and directions of the Board. Only exceptions provided under the proviso are that such instructions cannot interfere with the discretion of the CIT(A) in exercise of appellate functions and also cannot direct any IT authorities to make a particular assessment or to dispose of a particular case in a particular manner, Otherwise, Sub-section (1) of Section 119 itself mandates that such instructions shall be binding on the IT authorities. Sub-section (2) of Section 119 refers to specific orders with reference to any class of income or class of cases either by way of relaxation of any of the provisions: of section mentioned therein or with reference to class of income or class of cases. These instructions could be in the form of guidelines, principles or procedure to be followed by the IT authorities in the work relating to assessment, collection of revenue or the initiation of proceedings for the imposition of penalties. The only restriction imposed on the powers of the Board is that those should not be prejudicial to assessee. Here also the Board may, if of the opinion that it is necessary in the public interest to do so, publish and circulate such instructions. Therefore, it is not in all cases that instructions/circulars issued by the Board under Section 119(2) are published by the Board. Thus, only the difference between Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (2) of Section 119 is that, while Sub-section (1) deals with the general instructions and directions, Sub-section (2) is more specific with reference to particular class of income or class of cases. But we are not inclined to agree with the view canvassed by the learned Departmental Representative that instructions issued under Sub-section (1) of Section 119 are more in the nature of administrative instructions, and, therefore, are not binding on the authorities because section itself mandates that such instructions shall be followed by the field authorities. Therefore, these are binding in nature. Nowhere Section 119 provides any exception to IT authorities not to follow such instructions except in a case where such instructions interfere with the discretion of CIT(A) or with the jurisdiction and power of particular IT authorities in a particular case. Admittedly, instructions issued by the CBDT prescribing monetary limit for filing the appeals before the Tribunal, High Court or Supreme Court are not in nature which could interfere with the discretion of CIT(A) or interfere with the power and jurisdiction of IT authorities to complete the assessment order to dispose of a particular matter in a particular case in a particular manner. Therefore, these instructions are binding on IT authorities.

11.2. In this regard, we would now like to refer to the various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and High Courts on the issue of binding nature of instructions issued by the CBDT This issue came to be considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Navnit Lal C. Javeri v. K.K. Sen, AAC (1965) 56 ITR 198 (SC), where it was held that the circulars issued by the Central Board of Revenue, would be binding on all officers and persons employed in the execution of the IT Act. This issue was also considered by the Hon'ble apex Court in the case of UCO Bank v. CIT (supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the CBDT under Section 119 of the IT Act, 1961, has power, inter alia, to tone down the rigour of the law and ensure a fair enforcement of its powers, by issuing circulars in exercise of its statutory powers under Section 119 of the Act which are binding on the authorities in the administration of the Act. However, under Section 119(2)(a), the circulars as contemplated therein cannot be adverse to the assessee. The power is given for the purpose of just, proper and efficient management of the work of assessment and in public interest. Such power is beneficial power given to the Board for proper administration of Direct Tax Laws so that undue hardship may not be caused to the assessee and such laws are correctly applied. Such circulars are binding on the tax authorities. In the case of Collector of Central Excise v. Dhiren Chemical Industries (2002) 254 ITR 555 (SC) : (2002) 10 SCC 64, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has gone to the extent of saying that regardless of the interpretation that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has placed on the phrase, if there were circulars which have been issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs which place a different interpretation upon the said phrase, that interpretation will be binding upon the Revenue. In simple words, it means that even if the Board has issued instructions which are contrary to the interpretation of the Supreme Court, the instructions of the Board placing a different interpretation would be binding on the Revenue authorities. In the case of Union of India and Anr. v. Azadi Bachao Andolan and Anr. (2003) 263 ITR 706 (SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that a notification issued by the Central Government under Section 90 for implementation of the terms of DTAA, the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 90 comes into operation and an assessee who is covered by the provisions of the DTAA is entitled to seek benefits thereunder, even if the provisions of the DTAA are inconsistent with those of the Act. The apex Court has referred to their several earlier judgments and has held that instructions issued by the Board under Section 119 of the IT Act, 1961, are binding on the IT authorities.

11.3. The same issue came to be considered before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in greater detail in the case of Commr. of Customs v. Indian Oil Corporation (supra), The Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to their several earlier judgments in the case of Collector of Central Excise v. Dhiren Chemical Industries (supra), and Simplex Castings Limited v. Commr. of Customs (2003) 5 SCC 528. After referring to the above referred judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed on p. 277 that the principles laid down by the above-referred decisions are as under:

"(1) Although a circular is not binding on a Court or an assessee, it is not open to the Revenue to raise a contention that is contrary to a binding circular by the Board. When a circular remains in operation, the Revenue is bound by it and cannot be allowed to plead that it is not valid nor that it is contrary to the terms of the statute.

(2) Despite the decision of this Court, the Department cannot be permitted to take a stand contrary to the instructions issued by the Board.

(3) A show-cause notice and demand contrary to existing circulars of the Board are ab initio bad.

(4) It is not open to Revenue to advance an argument or file an appeal contrary to the circulars.

As we have noted, the provisions of Section 151A are in pari materia with the provisions of Section 119 of the FT Act, 1961, and Section 37B of the Central Excise Act. Parliament introduced section 151A by an amendment to the Customs Act, 1962, in 1985 but w.e.f. 27th Dec, 1985 (Act 80 of 1985), when this Court had already construed identical language in the manner indicated.) It may be assumed that Parliament had legislatively approved the construction by using the exact words so construed again in the Customs Act. There is, therefore, no reason why the principles enunciated by this Court under the two earlier Acts should not also be determinative of the construction put on the latter in respect of a materially similar statutory provision. This was also not argued by the appellant."

(Emphasis, italicised in print, supplied is ours) From the above, it is clear that Hon'ble apex Court has not only referred to the binding nature of the circulars of the Board, but even the instructions issued by the Board. The Hon'ble apex Court has also referred to the provisions of Section 151A of the Customs Act, Section 37V of the Central Excise Act and equated these provisions with Section 119 of the IT Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has emphatically held that it is not open to the Revenue to advance an argument or file an appeal contrary to the circulars of the Board. Thus, it does not leave any doubt in our mind that both instructions issued under Section 119(1) and circular issued by the Board under Section 119(2) have equal force and are binding on all the IT authorities. Various High Courts including the Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT v. Smt. Nayana P. Dedhia (supra) has expressed the same view.

In the preceding paragraph, we have referred to the provisions of Section 119 of the IT Act and the various judgments where it has held that the instructions/circulars issued by the CBDT are binding on the IT authorities It may further be mentioned that even instructions issued by the CBDT prescribing monetary limit for filing the appeals have been considered by the various High Courts. It would be relevant to refer to some of the judgments of the various High Courts on this matter. These are as under:

(1) CWT v. Executors of Late D.T. Udeshi (supra) In this case, the Revenue had filed an appeal in a case where tax effect was less than Rs. 30,000 and the same was against the Board's circulars dt. 12th July, 1984 and 14th July, 1987 prescribing the said monetary limit of tax effect of Rs. 30,000. The Hon'ble Bombay High Court dismissed the reference on the ground that the tax effect being less than prescribed monetary limit, appeal could not be filed contrary to the directions of the CBDT.

(2) CIT v. Cameo Colour Co. (supra) In this case also the Revenue had filed an appeal contrary to the Board's Instruction No. 1979, dt. 27 March, 2000 where the tax effect was below the prescribed monetary limit. The Hon'ble Bombay High Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the same was contrary to Board's instructions which were binding on the IT authorities.

(3) CWT v. S. Annamalai (supra) In this case also, the appeal filed by the Department under Section 27A of the WT Act, 1957, was dismissed on the ground that tax effect was below the prescribed monetary limit fixed by the CBDT and the case was not covered under any of the exceptions mentioned therein.

(4) CIT v. Smt. Usha Mathur. (2001) 252 ITR 179 (P&H) Here also an appeal under Section 260A was dismissed on account of smallness of tax effect (5) CIT v. Bhagwan Cloth Store (2002) 170 Taxation 503 (MP) In this case also, the Hon'ble Madhya Pradesh High Court has dismissed the reference by referring to Board's instruction No. 1903 prescribing monetary limit on the ground that the tax effect was below the monetary limit prescribed by the Board. While dismissing the appeal, the Hon'ble Madhya Pradesh High Court also took into account the fact that on identical facts reference application was dismissed by the High Court vide its order dt. 24th Feb., 1999 in IT Ref. 69 and 70 of 1998 and the S.L.P. filed against the above order before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was also dismissed.

(7) CIT v. Smt. Aruna Luthra (supra) In this case, the Hon'ble High Court held that once the jurisdictional High Court or Supreme Court enunciates a law, the same relate back to the date when provisions were introduced in the Act. This would be a mistake of law apparent from record, which could be rectified under Section 154. However, the Hon'ble High Court referred to the instructions issued by the Board prescribing the monetary limit of filing an appeal before the High Court which provided that an appeal should not be normally filed. Taking into account these facts, the High Court declined to interfere with the order of the Tribunal though on merits, the matter was held to be in favour of the Revenue.

11.4. Contrary view has been taken by the Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court in the case of CIT v. Rajasthan Patrika Ltd. (supra), where it was held that once the appeal is filed against the instructions of the Board, the High Court ought not to dismiss the appeal or reject the reference. These were only administrative instructions, which were not binding on the Court.

11.5. Apart from the various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the High Courts, various Benches of the Tribunal have also dismissed the appeals filed against the instructions of the CBDT prescribing monetary limit of tax effect on the ground that instructions issued by the Board were binding on the IT authorities. Some of the decisions in this regard are as under :

(1) The decision of Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, in the case of ITO v. Dharamvir (supra) and Ors.

(2) The decision of Tribunal, Lucknow Bench, in the case of Jt. CIT v. Sh. Dev Raj Aggarwal, Kanpur, ITA Nos. 812, 813 & 814/Luck/2002.

(3) The decision of Tribunal, Amritsar Bench, in the case of ITO v. Partap Builders in ITA No. 33/Asr/2001 for the asst. yr. 1997-98 and others.

(4) The decision of Tribunal Hyderabad Bench in the case of Dy. CWT v. Nb. Syed Jaffar Ali Khan, WTA Nos. 75 & 76/2002 for the asst. yrs. 1993-94 and 94-95.

Thus, from the above, it is clear that instructions issued by the Board including those prescribing the monetary limit of tax effect for filing the appeals before the Tribunal, High Courts and Supreme Court are binding on the IT authorities. This view also finds the support from the commentary of Law and Practice by Kanga, Palkhivala and Vyas where the authors have expressed the view that the instructions of Board prescribing the monetary limit for filing the appeals are binding on the IT authorities. We also feel that if such instructions are not followed by the IT authorities, it would open floodgates of arbitrariness where the Departmental officers may follow the policy of pick and choose as they like. This would give rise to high-handedness and discrimination and violate the principles of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Further, these instructions are issued by the Board after due deliberations after taking into account the various aspects of the matter including the likely revenue impact. These also reflect the policy of the Government Therefore, it is the duty of every officer working in the Department to follow the same, more so when these have the statutory backing/force. The judgment of apex Court in the case of J.R. Raghupathy v. State of Andhra Pardesh (supra) relied upon by the learned Departmental Representative has no application to the facts of the present case because, Section 119 of the Act is in the statute itself. Therefore, instructions issued by the Board have statutory force.

11.6. Thus, in the light of detailed discussions in the preceding paragraphs and legal position discussed above, we are of the considered opinion that instructions of the Board including those prescribing monetary limit for filing the appeal before the various forum are binding on the IT authorities. The law does not draw any distinction between instructions/circulars issued under Section 119(1) and 119(2) of the IT Act.

Both are binding on the Departmental Officers. We hold accordingly. Therefore, this question is decided accordingly.

12. The next aspect of the case that requires to be considered by this Bench is about the nature of observations made by the Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Rani Paliwal v. CIT (supra). Whether the observations made therein forms part of ratio decidendi and are, therefore, binding in nature as convassed by the learned Departmental Representative or the same are only passing remarks which are not binding in nature. We are in full agreement with the learned Departmental Representative that the ratio of the decision of the jurisdictional High Court is binding on all the authorities falling in its territorial jurisdiction including the Tribunal. However, it would depend upon the fact whether such observations are in the nature of ratio decidendi or mere passing remarks. We have carefully and respectfully gone through the judgment of Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in the aforesaid cases. In order to appreciate the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court, it would be appropriate to reproduce hereunder the findings recorded by the High Court:

"Having heard learned counsel for the appellant, we are of the, view that none of the questions raised is a question of law much less a substantial question of law, and, therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.

As regards question No. (i), it is urged that in view of the Board's Circular No. F. 279/126/98/ITJ, dt. 27th March, 2000, the appeals filed by the Department were not maintainable because the tax effect did not exceed Rs. 1,00,000 in each assessment year and, therefore, according to the circular, the Department could not prefer an appeal. From the perusal of +he order of the Tribunal, it is clear that no such plea was raised before the Tribunal, and, therefore, we are not allowing the assessee to raise this plea for the first time before us. In any case, the Board's circular is only an instruction issued to the IT authorities not to file appeals where the tax effect is less than Rs. 1,00,000. The Tribunal is not bound by any such instruction and once the Department files an appeal, the Tribunal was bound to decide the same on the merits. This question, in our opinion, is not a question of law."

(Emphasis, italicised in print, supplied is ours) If we closely analyse the observations of the Hon'ble High Court, the following position emerges :

(i) As per provisions of Section 260A, an appeal against the order of the Tribunal lies only if there is a substantial question of law. Now in the present case, the Hon'ble High Court has observed with the opening sentence itself that none of the questions raised is a question of law much less a substantial question of law and, therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.

(ii) As regards the plea of the learned counsel that tax effect in the present case being less than Rs. 1,00,000 the Hon'ble High Court observed that the assessee cannot be allowed to raise this plea for the first time because no such plea was taken before the Tribunal.

(iii) As regards Board's circular, the Hon'ble Court has observed that these were only instructions issued to the IT authorities not to file appeals where the tax effect was less than Rs. 1,00,0000 and the Tribunal is not bound by my such instruction.

(iv) Once the Department files an appeal, the Tribunal was bound to decide the same on the merits. This question, in their opinion was not a question of law.

12.1. From the above, it is clear that the Hon'ble High Court dismissed the appeal of the assessee on the ground that the issue raised did not involve any question of law much less substantial question of law. As stated earlier, an appeal against the order of the Tribunal lies to the High Court only if there is substantial question of law. Further, the Hon'ble High Court has also observed that the assessee could not be allowed to raise such plea because no such plea was taken before the Tribunal. Thus, the findings of the Tribunal are based on these reasons. As regards the observations made by the Hon'ble High Court that the instructions of the Board arc not binding on the Tribunal, there is no quarrel with such proposition. As it is settled position under the law that the instructions of the Board are not binding on the Courts including the Tribunal. However, the Courts including the Tribunal can certainly refer to these instructions and decide the matters in favour of the parties, if these instructions favour them. This has been done in a number of cases where the Hon'ble Supreme Court, High Courts and the various Benches of the Tribunal have decided the matters in favour of the assessee by relying on such instructions of the Board. However, the observations made by the Hon'ble High Court that once the appeal is filed before the Tribunal, the Tribunal is bound to decide the same on merits appear to be passing, remarks and is not part of the ratio decidendi because in our view, the appeal has been dismissed by the High Court for the reasons that the questions raised in the case did not involve any question of law much less of substantial law and also that no plea was taken before the Tribunal. Their Lordships did not allow the assessee to raise this plea for the first time before the High Court. The observations of the Court become part of ratio decidendi, if the parties have been heard and their arguments have been considered. We have referred to the book on Jurisprudence by Salmond at p. 148 (12th Edn.) which enumerates circumstance under which a precedent loses the binding force. One such circumstance mentioned therein is that if it is a precedent sub silentio or not fully argued. Now in the present case also, the assessee was not allowed to argue the case on this issue. Therefore, when the assessee was not permitted to raise the plea, it cannot be said that such observations were made after hearing the parties at length or after considering all relevant aspects including the nature of instructions issued by the Board in the light of various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and High Courts on these issues. Thus, we are of the opinion that such observations of the Hon'ble High Court are in the nature of passing remarks only.

12.2. In this regard, it would be appropriate to refer to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S. Shanmugavel Nadar v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. (2003) 263 ITR 658 (SC). The facts of the case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court were that the constitutional validity of an Amendment Act of 1960 amending the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, 1921 was upheld by the Madras High Court in Varadaraja Pillai's case (1972) 85 Mad LW 760. Appeals by special leave were dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the technical ground that the State of Madras, a necessary party, had not been impleaded. When the constitutional validity of an Amendment Act, 1996, amending the 1921 Act, was challenged a Division Bench of the High Court entertained some doubt about the correctness of the earlier decision in Varadaraja Pillai's case (supra) and the matter was referred to a Full Bench for reconsidering that decision. The Full Bench held that, appeals from the decision in Varadaraja Pillai's case (supra) having been dismissed, though on a technical ground, that decision stood merged in the decision of the Supreme Court, and according to the doctrine of merger it was not open to the Full Bench to reconsider that decision. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Hon'ble apex Court reversed the decision of the Full Bench of the High Court and held that the Supreme Court had dismissed the appeals from the decision of the Madras High Court in Varadaraja Pillai's case (supra), only on a technical ground without any law being laid down by the Supreme Court. Neither the merits of the judgment in Varadaraja Pillai's case (supra) nor the reasons recorded therein were gone into by the Supreme Court. The Full Bench of the Madras High Court was fully entitled to go into the merits and decide all controversies and was not to feel inhibited by the fact that the appeals against the decision in Varadaraja Pillai's case (supra) were dismissed by the Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that a summary dismissal by the Supreme Court, without laying down any law, is not a declaration of law envisaged by Article 141. When the reasons are given, the decision of the Supreme Court would be binding on all Courts within the territory of India : when no reasons are given, dismissal simpliciter is not a declaration of law by the Supreme Court. It would be appropriate to reproduce hereunder the findings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as recorded on p. 659 :

"Article 141 of the Constitution of India speaks of declaration of law by the Supreme Court; for a declaration of law there should be a speech, i.e. a speaking order. A decision, which is not express and is not founded on reasons nor on consideration of the issues, cannot be deemed to be a law declared, to have binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141. A summary dismissal by the Supreme Court, without laying down any law, is not a declaration of law envisaged by Article 141. When reasons are given, the decision of the Supreme Court would be binding on all Courts within the territory of India; when no reasons are given, dismissal simpliciter is not a declaration of law by the Supreme Court."

In the present case, as discussed above, the appeals were dismissed on the ground that no substantial question of law was involved and" the plea regarding tax effect was not taken before the Tribunal and the plea was not allowed to be raised. Therefore, observations were made by the Hon'ble High Court without hearing the parties and without considering the various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the issue of binding nature of the instructions. These were only passing remarks, not binding in nature.

12.3. Without prejudice and independent of the view that the observations made by the Hon'ble High Court were only passing remarks, we wish to mention that even if it is considered that these observations are binding, still the issue which requires to be decided is whether the same constitutes any mistake of law or facts apparent from the record, which could be rectified under Section 254(2) of the IT Act. The issue involved in the present cases are miscellaneous applications filed under Section 254(2) of the IT Act and the appeals in these cases already stand dismissed by the Tribunal. It is settled .position under the law that under Section 254(2) of the Act, the Tribunal has limited powers. The issue whether the same falls within the powers of Tribunal or not is dealt within the succeeding paragraphs.

13. As per provisions of Section 254(2) of the IT Act, the Tribunal is vested with the powers to rectify the mistakes of law or facts, which are obvious, patent and glaring from the records. All those issues, which involve prolonged discussions, arguments, debatable and where two conceivable views are possible, fall outside the purview of the provisions of Section 254(2) of the IT Act. The Tribunal does not have power to review its own decision. The powers conferred under Section 254(2) are analogues to powers conferred on the IT authorities under Section 154 of the IT Act. In the case of T.S. Balaram, ITO v. Volkart Bros. and Anr. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the issue as to what constitutes a mistake apparent from record. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that a mistake apparent on the record must be obvious and patent mistake and not something which can be established by a long .drawn process of reasoning on points on which there may be conceivably two opinions. A decision on a debatable point of law is not a mistake apparent from the record. The ratio of this judgment would equally apply to the powers of the Tribunal under Section 254(2) of the Act.

13.1. Their lordships of Delhi High Court also considered this issue in the case of Hotze Hotels (P) Ltd. v. CIT (supra) and the Hon'ble High Court has held that the computation of relief under Section 80M involving question of interpretation of Section 71(2) is a debatable question, and, therefore, it was not mistake apparent from the record which could be rectified under Section 154 of the IT Act. The issue regarding scope of powers of Tribunal under Section 254(2) was also considered by the Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Popular Engineering Co. v. ITAT and Anr. (2001) 248 ITR 577 (P&H) where the High Court has held that the Tribunal has powers to rectify only such mistakes which are apparent from the record. It does not have any powers to review its own order. The Court further observed that the absence of adequate reasons in an order passed under Section 254(1) cannot per se be regarded as mistake apparent within the meaning of Section 254(2) of the IT Act. Likewise, the possibility of forming a different opinion than one expressed in the order passed under Section 254(1) cannot be a ground for entertaining an application under Section 254(2).

13.2. This issue also came to be considered by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Smt. Baljeet Jolly v. CIT (2001) 250 ITR 117 (Del), where the Hon'ble High Court held that powers of the Tribunal to rectify an errors are limited only to rectify mistakes, which were apparent from record. Mistakes discovered by a complicated process of investigation, argument and proof did not fall within the purview of Section 254(2) of the IT Act. Further, the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT v. Anamika Builders (P) Ltd. (2001) 251 ITR 585 (Cal), has held that once a possible view had been taken by the Tribunal, it cannot be changed in a miscellaneous petition filed by the assessee.

13.3. In the case of CIT v. Ideal Engineers (2001) 251 ITR 743 (AP), the Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that order under Section 254(2) recalling its earlier order on the ground that same was erroneous amounts to review of its original order. The same is not permitted under Section 254(2) of the Act. In the case of Karan & Co. v. ITAT (2002) 253 ITR 131 (Del), the Hon'ble Delhi High Court has held that Tribunal has no powers to recall its original order under Section 254(2) of the IT Act.

13.4. Now when we examine the present case in the light of above legal position, we find that the Tribunal, Amritsar Bench, has taken a possible view by relying on the Board's Instruction No. 1979, dt. 27 March, 2000. This view is also' supported by three judgments of Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the cases referred to above, judgment of Hon'ble Madhya Pradesh High Court and Hon'ble Madras High Court in the cases referred to above and there is only one contrary view taken by the Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court. Besides, the view that instructions issued by the Board from time to time are binding on the IT authorities is supported by several judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the High Courts. Thus, the view taken by the Tribunal, Amritsar Bench, was- possible view, which could oat be substituted by way of miscellaneous petitions. Besides, the issue whether the instructions of the Board are binding or not and whether the appeals could be dismissed by relying on Board's Instruction No. 1979, dt. 27th March, 2000 due to smallness of tax effect or not and also whether the judgment of the Hon'ble jurisdictional Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Rani Paliwal v. CIT (supra) was only a observation in the nature of passing remarks or was binding in nature are highly debatable, contentious and which could be established only through long drawn process of reasoning, arguments and debate. Therefore, the issue would fall outside the purview of powers of the Tribunal vested under Section 254(2) of the IT Act, 1961. Exercise of powers by the Tribunal under Section 254(2) in allowing such applications would amount to review of the orders which is not permitted under the law. Therefore, these applications deserve to be rejected on this count.

13.5. Thus, in the light of these detailed discussions and legal position discussed above, we are of the considered opinion that the Tribunal did not commit any error in dismissing the appeals by relying on Instruction No. 1979, dt. 27th March, 2000 of the CBDT and such issues fall outside the scope of rectification mentioned under Section 254(2) of the IT Act, 1961.

14. These miscellaneous applications filed by the Revenue will now go to the regular Bench for final disposal for a limited purpose whether the tax effect in these cases exceeds the prescribed monetary limit fixed by the Board.

Annexure-A List of cases of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and High Courts cited by Shri S.K. Bansal, Advocate, as Intervener Sr. Supreme Court Cases No.

1. CIT v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala and Ors. (2001) 252 ITR 1 (SC)

2. UCO Bank v. CIT (1999) 237 ITR 889 (SC)

3. Collector of Central Excise v. Dhiren Chemicals Inds. (2002) 254 ITR 554 (SC)

4. Union of India and Anr. v. Azadi Bachao Andolan and Anr. (2003) 263 ITR 706 (SC)

5. CST v. Indra Ind. (2001) 248 ITR 338 (SC)

6. Berger Paints India Ltd v. CIT (2004) 266 ITR 99 (SC)

7. Goodyear v. State of Haryana (1991) 188 ITR 402 (SC)

8. CIT v. Sun Engg. Works (P) Ltd. (1992) 198 ITR 297 (SC)

9. Commr. of Customs v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Anr. (2004) 267 ITR 272 (SC) High Courts Cases

10. Unit Trust of India and Anr. v. P.K. Unny and Ors. (2001) 249 ITR 612 (Bom)

11. Smt. Pati Devi v. ITO and Anr. (1999) 240 ITR 727 (Kar)