Dr.Nawal Kishore Prasad vs State Of Jharkhand & Ors. on 10 May, 2013

[Cites 46, Cited by 4]

Jharkhand High Court

Dr.Nawal Kishore Prasad vs State Of Jharkhand & Ors. on 10 May, 2013

Bench: Shree Chandrashekhar

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                                         W. P. (S) No. 1594 of 2003
             In the matter of an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India 
                                                          
                   1. Shyam Kishore
                   2. Hiralal Singh
                   3. Arun Kumar
                   4. Maheshwar Ram
                   5. Balram Singh
                   6. Krishna Ram                                  ...   ...   ...     Petitioners
                                                          Versus
                   1. The State of Jharkhand
                   2. The Health Commissioner (Cell)cumSecretary, 
                       Health Department, Govt. of Jharkhand, Ranchi
                   3. The Deputy Secretary, Health Department, Govt. of 
                       Jharkhand, Ranchi
                   4. The Civil Surgeon, Palamu Daltonganj, 
                       State of Jharkhand
                   5. The Deputy Director Tuberclosis (T.B.) Health                                  
                       Services, Bihar, Patna                      ...     ...     ...     Respondents
                                                          With
                                               W.P.(S) No. 5329 of 2007
                   Dr. Nawal Kishore Prasad                        ...   ...   ...     Petitioner
                                                          Versus
                   1. The State of Jharkhand through Secretarycum
                       Commissioner, Dept. of Health, Govt. of Jharkhand, Ranchi
                   2. Principal, Rajendra Medical College, now Rajendra 
                       Institute of Medical Sciences,  Bariatu, Ranchi
                   3. DirectorinChief, Health Services, Jharkhand, Ranchi
                   4. District Provident Fund Officer, Ranchi
                   5. Treasury Officer, Ranchi
                   6. State of Bihar through CommissionercumSecretary, 
                       Department of Health, Government of Bihar, Patna
                   7. DirectorinChief, Health Services, Government of
                       Bihar, Department  of Health,  Patna ...                  ...     Respondents
                                                          
                   For the Petitioners                    : M/s Saurav Arun, Prabhash Kumar
                   For the State of Jharkhand : Mr. Sunil Singh, J.C. to S.C. II
                   For the State of Bihar                 : Mr. S.P. Roy, G.A., Bihar
                                                          
                                                      P R E S E N T
                          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR
                                                           
          C.A.V. On: 12/04/2013                                        Delivered on: 10/05/2013
                                                          
 Shree Chandrashekhar,J:   Both  the writ   petitions were  listed for  hearing and  a 
                    common question of law, whether the High Court of Jharkhand has 
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jurisdiction  to  entertain  the  writ  petition,  has arisen  in  both the 
cases   therefore,   with  the   consent   of  the   parties,     both   the   cases 
were   taken   up  for   hearing  together   and  I   propose   to  dispose   of 
both the writ petitions by a common order. 


Facts :
                     W.P. (S) No. 1594 of 2003


2.            This writ petition has been filed by one Shyam Kishore 
and five other persons seeking quashing of Executive Order No.81 
dated   30.05.1992  passed   by   the   Health   Commissioner   and 
Secretary, Health Department, Government of Bihar, whereby the 
services   of   the   petitioners   were   terminated.   A   further   prayer 
seeking quashing of Executive order dated 30.03.2002 passed by 
the   Respondent   No.   2,   the   Health   Commissioner   (Cell)cum
Secretary, Health Department, Government of Jharkhand, has been 
made by the petitioner. In the writ petition, Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 
are the authorities of the State of Jharkhand and Respondent No. 5 
is the Deputy Director Tuberculosis (T.B.), Health services, Bihar, 
Patna.  
3.            The brief facts as disclosed in the writ petition are that, 
in   view   of   memo   dated   25.03.1983,   Government   of   Bihar 
constituted a Selection Committee to fill up the vacant sanctioned 
post   in   the   Health   Department   and   local   advertisements   were 
posted in front of the office notice board in different offices. The 
petitioners made applications and they appeared before Selection 
Committee.   The   petitioners   were   selected   vide   memo   dated 
23.01.1990

and they were appointed/adjusted against the sanctioned vacant post of male Family Planning Workers on temporary basis and they gave their joining at Primary Health Centre (P.H.C), Panki, Palamua. The services of the petitioners were confirmed however, when their salary was withheld on the 3 ground that their initial appointment was illegal, they moved the Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. Nos. 1956/1990(R), 2024/1990(R), 1394/1990(R) and 2506/1990(R). The writ petitions were disposed of by order dated 05.09.1991 with a direction to the Secretary, Health Department, Government of Bihar to decide whether the appointment of the petitioners was legal or illegal, regular or irregular and a direction was also given for payment of their salary for the period they had actually worked. A showcause notice dated 26.02.1992 was issued to the petitioners and by order dated 30.05.1992, the petitioners were terminated from service. The petitioners submitted their representations to the Health Directorate, Government of Bihar and several other representations to different authorities however, by Executive order dated 30.03.2002, a decision was taken not to review the decision taken by the Government of Bihar on 30.05.1992.

W.P. (S) No. 5329 of 2007

4. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition seeking quashing of letter dated 24.03.2005 issued by UnderSecretary, Department of Health, Government of Bihar and memo dated 16.01.2006 issued by the Secretary, Department of Health, Government of Bihar. A further prayer for a direction upon the respondents for fixing the pay of the petitioner in the revised payscale with effect from 01.01.1996 till the date of superannuation of the petitioner i.e., 31.07.1999, has also been made.

5. The brief facts of the case are that, the petitioner joined the Bihar Health Services and was appointed on a ClassII post in the Bihar Health Service under the Government of Bihar with effect from 28.09.1966. He superannuated from service with effect from 31.07.1999 from the post of Medical Officer, Field Demonstration 4 Centre, P.S.M. Department, Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi. He made a representation before the SecretarycumCommissioner, Department of Health, Bihar on 05.08.1999, for fixation of his pay in the payscale of Rs. 14,300 - 18,300/ with effect from 01.01.1996 and for arrears of salary. On 15.10.1999, a payslip was issued from the office of the Accountant General, Bihar in which his basic pay was shown at Rs. 10,700/ whereas the petitioner was entitled for the payscale of Rs.14,300 18300/ with effect from 01.01.1996. The petitioner again made representations before different authorities however, by order dated 22.03.2005, the UnderSecretary, Department of Health, Government of Bihar rejected the representation of the petitioner. Being aggrieved by order dated 22.03.2005 communicated through memo dated 24.03.2005, the petitioner submitted a review petition on 08.04.2005 to the Commissioner and Secretary, Department of Health and Family Welfare, Government of Bihar, Patna, which was rejected on 16.01.2006. The petitioner moved the High Court in W.P.(S) No. 5339 of 2004 which was disposed of by order dated 01.10.2004 directing the respondents to consider the grievance of the petitioner and pass an order within six weeks. The main contention of the petitioner is summarized in para 52 of the writ petition which is extracted below. : "That the main contention of the petitioner of W.P. (S) No. 5339 of 2004 is to grant promotion and fixation of pay as per his seniority in Bihar Health Services by identifying the Need Based posts as he superannuated on 31.07.1999, his pay and allowances were fixed in the basic scale of Rs. 6500 10500/ of Medical Officer."

The Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000

6. On 15.11.2000, the existing State of Bihar was bifurcated and a new State namely, the State of Jharkhand was 5 created under the Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act of 2000'). Section 3 of the Act of 2000 declares that the State of Jharkhand shall be formed comprising 18 districts of the existing State of Bihar and from the appointed day, the said territories shall cease to form part of the existing State of Bihar. Accordingly, Section 4 declares that on and from the appointed day, the State of Bihar shall comprise the territories of the existing State of Bihar other than those specified in Section 3. Section 2(e) defines "existing State of Bihar" to mean the State of Bihar as existing immediately before the appointed day. And, Section 2(j) defines "successor State" in relation to the existing State of Bihar, means the State of Bihar or the State of Jharkhand.

7. Section 25 of the Act of 2000 declares that on and from the appointed day, there shall be a separate High Court for the State of Jharkhand which would be referred to as the "High Court of Jharkhand" and the High Court of Patna shall become the High Court for the State of Bihar. Section 27 of the Act of 2000 declares the jurisdiction of the High Court which is extracted below,

27. Jurisdiction of High Court. The High Court of Jharkhand shall have, in respect of any part of the territories included in the State of Jharkhand, shall such jurisdiction, powers and authorities as, under the law in force immediately before the appointed day, are exercisable in respect of that part of the said territories by the High Court at Patna.

8. Section 30 deals with the custody of seal of High Court and declares that the law in force immediately before the appointed day with respect to the custody of the seal of the High Court at Patna shall with the necessary modifications, apply with respect to the custody of the seal of the High Court of Jharkhand. Section 31 of the Act of 2000 which deals "form of writs and other processes" declares that the law immediately before the appointed day with respect to the form of writs and special processes used, 6 issued or awarded by the High Court at Patna shall, with the necessary modifications, apply with respect to the form of writs and other processes used, issued or awarded by the High Court of Jharkhand.

Cause of Action

9. Article 226 of the Constitution of India as was originally enacted, had twofold limitations with regard to the territorial jurisdiction of the High Courts namely, the writs issued by the Court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction and, the person or authority to whom writ may be issued must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories.

10. In "Election Commission, India Vs. Saka Venkata Rao", reported in AIR 1953 SC 210, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held :

8. ".....The rule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory enactment and cannot apply to writs issuable under Article 226 which makes no reference to any cause of action or where it arises but insists on the presence of the person or authority 'within the territories' in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction."

11. Again, in "Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh Vs. Union of India & Anr.", reported in AIR 1961 SC 532, a Constitution Bench of seven judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the correctness or otherwise of the judgment rendered by the Court in "Saka Venkata Rao" (supra), and the Hon'ble Supreme Court held,

13. "..... It seems to us therefore that it is not permissible to read in Article 226 the residence or location of the person affected by the order passed in order to determine the jurisdiction of the High Court. That jurisdiction depends on the person or authority passing the order being 7 within those territories and the residence or location of the person affected can have no relevance on the question of the High Court's jurisdiction."

12. The effect of the above decisions was that no High Court other than the High Court of Punjab had jurisdiction at that time to issue any direction, order or writ to the Union of India. As noticed above, an attempt to import the concept of 'cause of action' conferring jurisdiction on the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, was repelled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and therefore, in the circumstances, Article 226 was amended by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963 and a new Clause (1A) was inserted. By the Constitution (Fortysecond Amendment) Act, 1976 Clause (1A) was renumbered as Clause (2). The reason was stated thus :

"This clause would enable the High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The Committee feels that the High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises in part only should also be vested with such jurisdiction."

13. However, the expression 'cause of action' has neither been defined in the Constitution nor in the Code of Civil procedure, 1908. It may however, be described as a bundle of essential facts necessary for the plaintiff to prove before he can succeed. Failure to prove such facts would give the defendant a right to judgment in his favour. Cause of action thus gives occasion for and forms the foundation of the suit.

14. In Halsbury's Law of England (4th Edn.), the expression 'cause of action' has been described as under, 8

15. " 'Cause of action' has been defined as meaning simply a factual situation, the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person. The phrase has been held from earliest time to include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and every fact which a defendant would have a right to traverse. 'Cause of action' has also been taken to mean that a particular act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the subjectmatter of grievance founding the action, not merely the technical cause of action."

15. In "Words and Phrases (4th Edn.)" the meaning attributed to the phrase 'cause of action' in common legal parlance is existence of those facts, which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf.

16. The expression 'cause of action' means bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, which traversed to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. The classic definition of the expression cause of action is found in "Cooke Vs. Gill", reported in (1873) 8 CP 107 wherein Lord Brett observed, "'Cause of Action' means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court."

17. In "Read Vs. Brown", reported in (1888) 22 QBD 128, Lord Esher M.R. adopted the definition for the phrase 'cause of action' which signifies, "every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to sup port his right to the judgment of the court. It does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to be proved.

18. In "Chand Kour Vs. Partab Singh", reported in ILR(1889) 16 Cal 98, 102, Lord Watson observed, ".....the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the ground set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour."

19. In "Gurdit Singh & Ors. Vs. Munsha Singh & Ors.", reported in (1977) 1 SCC 791, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held,

41. "The expression "cause of action" has sometimes been employed to convey the restricted idea of facts or circumstances which constitute either the infringement or the basis of a right and no more. In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has been used to denote the whole bundle of material facts which a plaintiff must prove in order to succeed. These are all those essential facts without the proof of which the plaintiff must fail in his suit. Now, whether we use the expression in the narrower or in the wider sense, in the case before us, the death of Kishan Singh was certainly an essential part of the cause of action. It had to be proved to enable the plaintiffs to put forward their claims to succeed at all. But, proof of the date of death was not essential or indispensable for that purpose. It could only become material in deciding whether the right which had accrued had been extinguished by the law of limitation. Both the narrower and the wider sense of the term "cause of action" would certainly include all those facts and circumstances on the strength of which the plaintiffs urged that they were entitled to the benefit of the obligatory presumption of law contained in Section 108 of the Evidence Act. As these were not available to the plaintiffs before the expiry of seven years from August 5, 1945, it does not seem to be possible to urge that this cause of action had 10 arisen more than three years before the filing of the suits now before us. Applying the tests stated above, the causes of action in the earlier and later litigations would, in my opinion, be materially different. We could only hold that no cause of action had arisen at all if we assume that Kishan Singh had not died at all. And, how could we assume that without disregarding Section 108, of the Evidence Act? If we cannot do that, the cause of action could only accrue when we could presume that he is dead. And, the date of its accrual could not possibly lie a day earlier than 7 years after August 15, 1945, when Kishan Singh was last heard of."

20. For the purpose of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India, the expression 'cause of action', for all intent and purposes must be assigned the same meaning as envisaged under Section 20(c), C.P.C. It is pertinent to note that in view of Section 141 of Code of Civil Procedure, although the provisions of the Code would not apply to writ proceedings, since the provisions under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure and Clause (c) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India are pari materia, the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered on interpretation of Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply to the writ proceedings also.

21. In "Union of India & Ors. Vs. Oswal Woollen Mills Ltd. & Ors.", reported in (1984) 2 SCC 646, when it was found that the registered office of the company was situated at Ludhiana, but a petition was filed in the High Court of Calcutta on the ground that the Company had its branch office there, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the High Court of Calcutta could not have entertained the writ petition.

22. In "State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. M/s Swaika Properties & Anr.", reported in (1985) 3 SCC 217, the company whose registered office was at Calcutta filed a petition in the High Court 11 of Calcutta challenging the notice issued by the Special Town Planning Officer, Jaipur for acquisition of immovable property situated in Jaipur, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the entire cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench and therefore, the High Court of Calcutta had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.

23. In "Oil and Natural Gas Commission" Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu & Ors.", reported in (1994) 4 SCC 711, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, when the Head Office of the ONGC was not located at Calcutta, nor the contract was to be carried out in West Bengal, territorial jurisdiction cannot be conferred on the High Court of Calcutta on the ground that an advertisement had appeared in a daily newspaper, published from Calcutta, or because the petitioner had submitted his bid from Calcutta, or because subsequent representations were made from Calcutta or because the final decision taken by ONGC was received at Calcutta inasmuch as none of these would constitute an 'integral part' of the 'cause of action' so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the High Court of Calcutta under Article 226 (2) of the Constitution.

24. In "C.B.I. AntiCorruption Branch, Mumbai Vs. Narayan Diwakar", reported in (1999) 4 SCC 656, a petition was filed before the High Court at Guwahati for quashing the F.I.R. filed by the C.B.I. at Bombay, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has upheld the objection that the High Court of Guwahati had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.

25. In "Union of India & Ors. Vs. Adani Exports Ltd. & Anr.", reported in (2002) 1 SCC 567, a petition was filed in the High Court at Gujarat claiming benefit of the Passport Scheme under the EXIM policy and the petition was allowed. Taking note of the 12 judgment in "Oil and Natural Gas Commission Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu Ors." (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under,

16. "It is clear from the above constitutional provision that a High Court can exercise the jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. This provision in the Constitution has come up for consideration in a number of cases before this Court. In this regard, it would suffice for us to refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu & Ors., (1994) 4 SCC 711 wherein it was held:

"Under Article 226 a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. The expression 'cause of action' means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the court. Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. Thus the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition, the truth or otherwise of the averments made in the petition being immaterial."

17. It is seen from the above that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition or a special civil application as in this case, the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in support of the cause 13 of action that those facts do constitute a cause so as to empower the court to decide a dispute which has, at least in part, arisen within its jurisdiction. It is clear from the above judgment that each and every fact pleaded by the respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the court's territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the court concerned. If we apply this principle then we see that none of the facts pleaded in para 16 of the petition, in our opinion, falls into the category of bundle of facts which would constitute a cause of action giving rise to a dispute which could confer territorial jurisdiction on the courts at Ahmedabad.

18. As we have noticed earlier, the fact that the respondents are carrying on the business of export and import or that they are receiving the export and import orders at Ahmedabad or that their documents and payments for exports and imports are sent/made at Ahmedabad, has no connection whatsoever with the dispute that is involved in the applications. Similarly, the fact that the credit of duty claimed in respect of exports that were made from Chennai were handled by the respondents from Ahmedabad have also no connection whatsoever with the actions of the appellants impugned in the application. The nongranting and denial of credit in the passbook having an ultimate effect, if any, on the business of the respondents at Ahmedabad would not also, in our opinion, give rise to any such cause of action to a court at Ahmedabad to adjudicate on the actions complained against the appellants."

26. In "National Textile Corporation Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Haribox Swalram & Ors.", reported in (2004) 9 SCC 786, the Hon'ble 14 Supreme Court decided the issue of jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court to entertain the writ petition in the following facts:

12. "In the present case, the textile mills are situate in Bombay and the supply of cloth was to be made by them exfactory at Bombay.

According to the writ petitioners, the money was paid to the mills at Bombay. The learned Single Judge after a detailed discussion of the matter held that the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. The Division Bench has reversed this finding on the ground that concluded contract had come into existence which could be cancelled only after giving an opportunity of hearing and consequently, the question of revocation of the contract at its Calcutta address would constitute a cause of action. In our opinion, the view taken by the Division Bench is wholly erroneous in law. It was nowhere pleaded in the writ petition that the appellant herein had initiated any action under Section 11 of the Act by issuing any notice to the writ petitioner for cancellation of the contract. In fact, it is stated in para 18 of the petition that the Central Government did not follow the procedure prescribed in Section 11 for cancellation of contract. Regarding the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court, the relevant statement was made in para 73 of the writ petition wherein it was stated as under:

73. "Your petitioner carries on business and maintains all accounts at the aforesaid place of business within the jurisdiction. Your petitioner states that by reason of the aforesaid, your petitioners have suffered loss and damage at its said place of business within the jurisdiction. All notices and correspondences referred to hereinabove addressed to your petitioner has been received by your petitioner at your petitioner's place of business within the jurisdiction. In the circumstances, this Hon'ble Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the present application."

27. The Hon'ble Supreme Court finally decided the issue in the "National Textile Corporation Limited & Ors." (supra) in these words,

12.1. "As discussed earlier, the mere fact that the writ petitioner carries on business at Calcutta or that the reply to the correspondence made by it was received at Calcutta is not an integral part of the cause of action and, therefore, the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and the view to the contrary taken by the Division Bench cannot be sustained. In view of the above finding, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed....."

28. In "Alchemist Ltd. & Anr. Vs. State Bank of Sikkim & Ors.", reported in (2007) 11 SCC 335, the Hon'ble Supreme Court took note of the submissions of the parties in paragraph Nos. 8, 9 and 10 which are as under,

8. "The appellant Company contended that a part of cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The appellant Company, for such submission, relied on the following facts:

(i) the appellant Company has its registered and corporate office at Chandigarh;

(ii) the appellant Company carries on business at Chandigarh;

(iii) the offer of the appellant Company was accepted on 2022004 and the acceptance was communicated to it at Chandigarh;

(iv) partperformance of the contract took place at Chandigarh inasmuch as Rs 4.50 crores had been deposited by the appellant Company in a fixed deposit at Chandigarh as per the request of the first respondent;

(v) the Chairman and Managing Director of the first respondent visited Chandigarh to ascertain the bona fides of the appellant Company;

(vi) negotiations were held between the parties in the third week of March, 2005 at Chandigarh;

(vii) letter of revocation dated 2322006 was received by the appellant Company at Chandigarh. Consequences of the revocation ensued at Chandigarh by which the appellant Company is aggrieved.

It was, therefore, submitted that at least a part of cause of action had certainly arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and hence it had jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It was, therefore, submitted that the impugned order passed by the High Court deserves to be set aside by directing the Court to decide the writ petition on merits.

9. The respondents, on the other hand, submitted that neither of the above facts nor circumstances can be said to be a part of cause of action investing jurisdiction in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. According to the respondents, all substantial, material and integral facts constituting a cause of action were within the territory of the State of Sikkim and, hence, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana was fully justified in holding that it had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain, deal with and decide the lis between the parties.

10. The respondents, in this connection, relied upon the following facts:

(i) registered and corporate office of the first respondent Bank is at Gangtok i.e. Sikkim;

(ii) secretariat of the second respondent State is situated at Gangtok i.e. Sikkim;

(iii) offers were called for from various parties at Gangtok;

(iv) all offers were scrutinised and a decision to accept offer of the appellant Company was taken by the first respondent Bank at Gangtok;

(v) the State Government's decision not to approve the proposal of the appellant Bank was taken at Gangtok;

(vi) the meeting of the Board of Directors of the first respondent Bank was convened at Gangtok and a resolution was passed to withdraw the letter dated 2022004 at Gangtok;

(vii) a communication was dispatched by the first respondent Bank to the appellant Company on 2322004 from Gangtok.

29. In the aforesaid circumstance, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under,

37. "From the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view the ratio laid down in a catena of decisions by this Court, it is clear that for the purpose of deciding whether facts averred by the appellantpetitioner would or would not constitute a part of cause of action, one has to consider whether such fact constitutes a material, essential, or integral part of the cause of action. It is no doubt true that even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the court, the court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit/petition. Nevertheless it must be a "part of cause of action", nothing less than that.

38. In the present case, the facts which have been pleaded by the appellant Company, in our judgment, cannot be said to be essential, integral or material facts so as to constitute a part of "cause of action" within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution. The High Court, in our opinion, therefore, was not wrong in dismissing the petition."

30. In "South East Asia Shipping Co. Ltd. Vs. Nav Bharat Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.", reported in (1996) 3 SCC 443, a contract was executed in Bombay and performance of the contract was also to be done under the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court however, merely because bank guarantee was executed at Delhi and transmitted for performance to Bombay, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it would not constitute a 'cause of action' 18 to give rise to lay a suit on the original side of the Delhi High Court. The plea that since the bank guarantee was executed and liability was enforced from the bank at Delhi and therefore, the Delhi High Court has jurisdiction, was rejected. It has been further observed that, the 'cause of action' has been explained as a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a right to claim relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act, no cause of action would possibly be accrued or would arise.

31. In "Subodh Kumar Gupta Vs. Shrikant Gupta & Ors.", reported in (1993) 4 SCC 1, the branch of the firm was at Chandigarh, the head office of which was situated in Bombay however, a suit was instituted in the Court of Civil Judge, Chandigarh, for dissolution of the firm, it was held that no part of the cause of action can be said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Chandigarh Court.

32. In "State of Uttarakhand & Anr. Vs. Umakant Joshi", reported in (2012) 11 SCC 164, when a direction was issued by the newly created High Court of Uttarakhand to grant promotion with effect from a date prior to formation of the new State, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held,

27. "Therefore, the High Court of Uttarakhand, which too came into existence with effect from 09.11.2000 did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition filed by Respondent 1 for issue of a mandamus to the State Government to promote him to Class I post with effect from 16.11.1989, more so because the issues raised in the writ petition involved examination of the legality of the decision taken by the government of Uttar Pradesh to promote Shri R.K. Khare with effect from 16.11.1989 and other officers, who were promoted to Class I 19 post vide Order dated 22.01.2001 with retrospective effect.

28. It appears to us that the counsel, who appeared on behalf of the State of Uttarakhand and the Director of Industries did not draw the attention of the High Court that it was not competent to issue direction for promotion of Respondent 1 with effect from a date prior to formation of the new State, and that too, without hearing the State of Uttar Pradesh and this is the reason why the High Court did not examine the issue of its jurisdiction to entertain the prayer made by Respondent 1.

29. In view of the above, we hold that the writ petition filed by Respondent 1 in 2008 in the Uttarkhand High Court claiming retrospective promotion to Class I post with effect from 16.11.1989 was misconceived and the High Court committed jurisdictional error by issuing direction for his promotion to the post of General Manager with effect from 16.11.1989 and for consideration of his case for promotion to the higher posts with effect from the date of promotion of his socalled juniors."

Discussion :

33. Relying on the provisions contained in Sections 2(e), 2(j), 27 and 89 of the Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000 and Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India, the learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.

34. Mr. Saurav Arun, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in W. P. (S) No. 1594 of 2003, has further contended that in view of the High Court at Patna (Establishment of a Permanent Bench at Ranchi) Act, 1976 (Act of 1976), whereby the Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court was established specifying territorial jurisdiction of the Ranchi Bench in matters arising out of four districts within the then State of Bihar (now falling under the 20 territory of State of Jharkhand), the present writ petition can be maintained before the Jharkhand High Court. He has relied on the decisions reported in (2001) 9 SCC 432, (2001) 2 SCC 294, (2004) 6 SCC 254, 2002 (3) JCR 195, Prushottam Pharmaceuticals Vs. State of Bihar, 2002 (1) JLJR 491, 2006 (2) JCR 419 and "State of Bihar Vs. Arvind Bijay Bilung & Anr.", reported in 2001 (3) JCR 155 (Jhr).

35. Mr. Prabhash Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P.(S) No. 5329 of 2007 has adopted the argument of Mr. Saurav Arun, Advocate and supplemented his arguments by placing reliance on orders passed in W.P.(S) No. 2903 of 2009, W.P.(S) No. 5076 of 2003 and the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in C.A. No. 5338 of 2006.

36. Adverting to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that in view of Section 27 of the Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000, read with the High Court at Patna (Establishment of a Permanent Bench at Ranchi) Act, 1976, since the petitioners were appointed and posted in the offices which now form part of the territory of the State of Jharkhand, the Hon'ble Jharkhand High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition preferred by the petitioners, I find that the Act of 1976 by which a Permanent Bench of High Court at Patna was established at Ranchi would no longer operate in view of the enactment of the Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000.

37. As noticed earlier, Section 25 of the Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000 declares that on and from the appointed day, there shall be a separate High Court for the State of Jharkhand. Section 30 deals with the custody of seal of High Court and Section 31 deals with form of writs and other processes. Section 32 declares that the law in force immediately before the appointed day relating to the powers of the Chief Justice, Single 21 and Division Courts of the High Court at Patna with respect to all matters ancillary to the exercise of those powers shall, with the necessary modification, apply in relation to the High Court of Jharkhand. An important expression "with the necessary modification" has occurred in Sections 30, 31 and 32. A conjoint reading of Section 25 and Section 27 would make it clear that the jurisdiction of the High Court of Jharkhand would flow from the provisions of the Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000 and it would be confined to the territory of the State of Jharkhand. This has been made clear by the expression "with the necessary modification"

occurring in Sections 30, 31 and 32 of the Act of 2000. It has been further made clear in Section 34 that the High Court at Patna shall, as from the appointed day have no jurisdiction in respect of the transferred territory, except in cases provided in the Act. Thus, the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that in view of Act of 1976, the High Court of Jharkhand would have jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition on the ground that the offices where the petitioners were posted fall under the territory of the State of Jharkhand, even though, the impugned order was passed by the State of Bihar prior to creation of the State of Jharkhand, is untenable.

38. In "Kusum Ignots & Alloys Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Anr.", reported in (2004) 6 SCC 254, the appellantcompany which had its Head Office at Mumbai and which had obtained a loan from Bhopal Branch of State Bank of India, filed a writ petition in the High Court of Delhi, which was dismissed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The Hon'ble Supreme Court ruled that passing of a legislation by itself does not confer any right to file a writ petition in any court unless a cause of action arises therefor. I find that this decision does not help the case of the petitioners. It was held that the fact which is neither material nor essential nor 22 integral part of the 'cause of action' would not constitute a part of 'cause of action' within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed,

18. "The facts pleaded in the writ petition must have a nexus on the basis whereof a prayer can be granted. Those facts which have nothing to do with the prayer made therein cannot be said to give rise to a cause of action which would confer jurisdiction on the Court."

39. In "Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Association Vs. Union of India & Ors.", reported in (2001) 2 SCC 294, the order of the then Acting Chief Justice of the High Court of Rajasthan carving out jurisdiction between the cases to be heard at Jodhpur Principal Seat and Jaipur Bench Seat and a declaration with respect to 'cause of action' fell for examination before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and it was held that, "whether the case arises from one of the specified districts or not so as to determine the jurisdictional competence to hear by reference to territory bifurcated Principal Seat and the Bench Seat, shall be an issue to be decided in an individual case by the Judge or judges hearing the matter, if a question may arise in that record. This decision is also not helpful to the petitioners.

40. In "Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Ranchi & Anr. Vs. Swarn Rekha Cokes and Coals (P) Ltd. & Ors.", reported in (2004) 6 SCC 689, the nature and scope of Sections 84 and 85 of the Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000 fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and it was held that the provisions as contained in Sections 84 and 85 provide that laws which were applicable to the undivided State of Bihar would continue to apply to the new states created by the Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000, unless such law is repealed or amended.

41. In "CBI, AHD, Patna Vs. Braj Bhushan Prasad & Ors.", reported in (2001) 9 SCC 432, when a question arose as to the place of enquiry/investigation into the cases relating to Fodder Scam, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that since the main offence is under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and as in all the cases treasuries were situated within the territory of State of Jharkhand, all the 33 cases involved in the appeals before the Supreme Court stood transferred to the courts situated within the territories of State of Jharkhand.

42. In "Shyam Chandra Chaudhary Vs. State of Bihar", reported in 2002 (3) JCR 195(Pat), it was held that even though the convict was lodged in Bhagalpur Jail in the State of Bihar, since the conviction of the accused was ordered by a court falling under the jurisdiction of the Jharkhand High Court, the appeal challenging the order of conviction would lie before the Jharkhand High Court.

43. In "Ram Badan Singh Vs. State of Jharkhand", reported in 2003 (3) JCR 8 (Jha), the effect of Section 2(f), Sections 84 and 85 of the Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000 was considered and it was held that the Bihar Public Health Engineering Service Class II Rules would bind both the successor states unless suitable provision is made by the competent legislature.

44. In "State of Bihar Vs. Arvind Bijay Bilung & Anr.", reported in 2001 (3) JCR 155 (Jhr), Section 72 (1) and (2) of the Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000 was considered and it was held that the State of Bihar would have no jurisdiction to suspend the persons holding posts and offices in the State of Jharkhand. This is also not relevant in the facts of the present case.

45. In "Akhileshwar Prasad Vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board", reported in 2006 (2) JCR 418 (Jha), in view of the agreement reached between the Jharkhand State Electricity Board 24 and the Bihar State Electricity Board and subject to final accounting/adjustment of their liabilities, the Jharkhand State Electricity Board was directed to make payment of retiral benefits to the employees who had retired from the offices now falling within the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Jharkhand. This decision is also not an authority on the point that if the employee has retired prior to the appointed day from an office now falling under the territory of the State of Jharkhand, the writ petition would be maintainable before the Jharkhand High Court.

46. In "Rajendra Pratap Sinha Vs. State of Jharkhand", reported in 2009 (2) JLJR 750, Sections 72 and 73 of the Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000 were considered and it was held that in view of Section 73 of the Act, the service conditions of the employee cannot be altered to his disadvantage by any of the successor States.

47. In "Singhbhum Homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital & Anr. Vs. State of Bihar", reported in 2002 (2) PLJR 80, again, the scope of Section 2(f) and Section 84 of the Bihar reorganisation Act, 2000, was considered and it was held that notwithstanding the change in the territories, the statutory notifications and other laws would continue to bind the new State.

48. In "Bharati Prasad Thakur Vs. Sidhu Kanhu University, Dumka", reported in 2002 (1) JLJR 491, leaving the matter open in so far as the liability of the State of Bihar and the State of Jharkhand was concerned, since the Godda college which falls under the Sidhu Kanhu University and which now falls under the territory of State of Jharkhand, a direction was given to the State of Jharkhand and Sidhu Kanhu University to make payment of pension to the writ petitioner.

49. I find that none of the decisions relied on by the petitioners advances their case. The judgments relied upon by the 25 learned counsel appearing for the petitioners are not at all lending any support to the case of the petitioners. These decisions are not authorities for the proposition that the order of termination passed by the State of Bihar prior to creation of new State of Jharkhand would give rise to 'cause of action' to prefer a writ petition before the Jharkhand High Court or that the Jharkhand High Court would have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition merely because the offices where the petitioners were posted now fall within the territory of the State of Jharkhand.

50. Coming back to the facts of the case, I find that in W.P.(S) No. 1594 of 2003 the impugned order dated 30.05.1992 was passed by the Health Commissioner and Secretary, Government of Bihar, however, he has not been made a party. Even, the State of Bihar has not made a partyRespondent. Further, the executive order dated 30.03.2002 which has been impugned by the petitioners, is a decision taken by the Secretary, Department of Health, in the files, declining to reconsider the order dated 30.05.1992 of the Government of Bihar. I further find that in the writ petition, there are references of Respondent No. 2 to whom a direction was given vide order dated 21.04.1992, which is factually incorrect. Neither a direction was given to the Respondent No. 2 nor order dated 30.05.1992 was passed by Respondent No. 2, as alleged in the writ petition. Respondent No. 2 is the Health Commissioner (Cell)cumSecretary, Health Department, Government of Jharkhand. There are references of certain official correspondence by Respondent Nos. 2 and 4. It would be useful to take note of statements made in paragraph Nos. 25, 26, 27 and 28 in W.P.(S) No. 1594 of 2003.

25. "That it is submitted that the termination letter 30.05.1992 and executive order dated 30.03.2002 (contained in Annexure 10 and

18) are against law and are without jurisdiction 26 for violation of this Hon'ble Court's judgment and order and hence are fit to be quashed.

26. That due to filing from time to time representations to the concerned authorities and getting their reply through executive orders, the petitioners were awaiting in hope and anticipation that their services could be regularised/reinstated by the respondent in facts and circumstances of their grievance and order and direction from time to time passed by this Hon'ble Court could not move this Hon'ble Court earlier.

27. That petitioners after passing of executive order dated 30.03.2002 (Annexure 18) upholding the previous order contained in Annexure 10 have lost their hope to get service, have any how, collected some amount and hence the instant petition is being filed with a prayer to consider the grievance of the petitioners in light of order and direction dated 21.04.1992 (Annexure 9) passed by the Hon'ble High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 2950/91 (R) which has not been obeyed by the Respondent No. 2.

28. That petitioners have no any alternative and efficacious remedy than to move this Hon'ble High Court."

51. The order by which the services of the petitioners were terminated, is the order dated 30.05.1992 passed by the Health Commissioner and Secretary, Government of Bihar. Merely because when the order dated 30.05.1992 was passed, the petitioners were serving in the offices which now form part of the territory of the State of Jharkhand or because certain correspondences took place between the officials of the Department of Health, Government of Jharkhand or because some decision was taken in the internal official file by the Health Secretary of the Government of Jharkhand not to reexamine or review the order of termination dated 30.05.1992, would not give rise to 'cause of action' to the petitioners to move the Jharkhand High Court. It cannot be said that the aforesaid facts as pleaded in the writ petition, are material 27 facts or integral facts or essential facts which would constitute the 'cause of action' and therefore, it cannot be said that even a part of 'cause of action' has arisen in the territory of the State of Jharkhand and therefore, a writ can be maintained before the Jharkhand High Court.

52. Similarly, in W.P.(S) No. 5329 of 2007, the impugned orders were issued by the authorities of the Government of Bihar. The representations were made to the authorities of the Government of Bihar and a direction has been sought on the authorities of the Government of Bihar and therefore, merely because in earlier proceeding a direction was issued by the Court to the State of Jharkhand also, this would not give rise to any 'cause of action' so as to maintain the writ petition before this Court. In the entire writ petition no grievance has been raised against the State of Jharkhand and therefore, the fact that the State of Jharkhand was made a party in proceeding in W.P.(S) No. 5339 of 2004 and a direction was issued to the State of Jharkhand, are not the facts which can be said to be constituting the integral part of the 'cause of action' so as to infer that a part of the 'cause of action' has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Jharkhand and therefore, the writ petition would be maintainable in this Court. The impugned order has been passed by an authority of the Government of Bihar.

53. In "State of Haryana & Anr. Vs. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association", reported in (2002) 6 SCC 72, it has been held that merely because averment in the writ petition has not been specifically rebutted, relief cannot be granted and the High Court is bound to consider the averment on its true merits before granting relief to the writ petitioner.

54. I further find that there is no averment in both the writ petitions that this Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain this 28 writ petition. This is also not averred in both the writ petitions that either 'cause of action' or a part of 'cause of action' has arisen within the jurisdiction of the High Court of Jharkhand and therefore, High Court of Jharkhand has jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.

55. In "Oil and Natural Gas Commission" Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu & Ors." (supra), when a writ petition was entertained by the High Court, the Hon'ble Supreme Court expressed its displeasure in these words,

12.".....Notwithstanding the strong observations made by this Court in the aforesaid decision and in the earlier decisions referred to therein, we are distressed that the High Court of Calcutta persists in exercising jurisdiction even in cases where no part of the cause of action arose within its territorial jurisdiction. It is indeed a great pity that one of the premier High Courts of the country should appear to have developed a tendency to assume jurisdiction on the sole ground that the petitioner before it resides in or carries on business from a registered office in the State of West Bengal. We feel all the more pained that notwithstanding the observations of this Court made time and again, some of the learned judges continue to betray that tendency......"

Conclusion:

56. In the result, I hold that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition preferred by the petitioners in both the writ petitions. I also hold that neither the 'cause of action' nor any part of the 'cause of action' has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Jharkhand and therefore, W.P.(S) No. 1594 of 2003 and W.P.(S) No. 5329 of 2007 are not maintainable in this Court and accordingly, both the writ petitions are dismissed.

Direction :

57. The Registrar General of this Court is directed to place the record of these cases before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the Jharkhand High Court for necessary directions for amendment in the High Court of Jharkhand Rules, 2001, so as to make it mandatory for a person/persons to clearly aver in the writ petition the jurisdiction of the High Court of Jharkhand.

(Shree Chandrashekhar, J.) Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi Dated: 10/05/2013 Manish/A.F.R.

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