Punjab-Haryana High Court
Jagdeep Singh Alias Jasdeep Singh vs State Of Punjab on 9 March, 2026
CRM-14494-2025 in/and CRM-M-22-2025 -1
107/2 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRM-14494-2025 in/and
CRM-M-22-2025
Date of Decision: 09.03.2026
Jagdeep Singh alias Jasdeep ...Petitioner
Singh
vs.
State of Punjab ...Respondent
Coram : Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.S.Shekhawat
Present : Mr. Armaan Gagneja, Advocate
for the applicant/complainant.
Mr. Charanpreet Singh, AAG, Punjab.
Mr. Shivender Pal Singh, Advocate
for the non-applicant/petitioner.
***
N.S.Shekhawat J. (Oral)
CRM-14494-2025
1. The applicant/complainant has moved the present application under Section 528 of BNSS with a prayer for revival of main petition i.e. CRM-M-22- 2025 in view of non-compliance of the order dated 17.02.2025 and to withdraw the relief of anticipatory bail granted to the petitioner/non-applicant in the abovesaid case, due to petitioner's deliberate non-compliance, non-adherance to the terms of settlement forming the basis of relief of anticipatory bail.
2. The brief facts of the present case are that the petitioner/non- applicant had filed the main petition i.e. CRM-M-22-2025 before this Court with a prayer to grant him concession of anticipatory bail in a case FIR No. 206, 1 of 10 ::: Downloaded on - 21-03-2026 05:40:07 ::: CRM-14494-2025 in/and CRM-M-22-2025 -2 dated 09.11.2024 registered under Sections 420, 406, 34 of IPC, at Police Station Sadar, Sri Muktsar Sahib, District Sri Muktsar Sahib.
3. During the course of hearing, the case was taken up 08.01.2025 and the relevant extract of the said order has been reproduced below:-
"Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the transactions in the present case had taken place in June 2020, whereas the FIR has been got registered on 09.11.2024 after long and unexplained delay. He further contends that without prejudice to his rights and just to show his bona fide, the petitioner is willing to return an amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- to the complainant of the present case within a period of 3 weeks from today and he is ready to amicably settle the dispute with the complainant.
On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant has no serious objection to the prayer made by learned counsel for the petitioner.
Consequently, with the consent of the parties, the matter is referred to the Mediation & Conciliation Centre of this Court and the parties are directed to appear in Meditation & Conciliation Centre of this Court on 16.01.2025. The petitioner shall hand over a draft of Rs.10,00,000/- to the complainant within a period of 3 weeks from today, against receipt.
In the meantime, the petitioner is directed to join the investigation. In the event of arrest, he shall be released on interim bail to the satisfaction of Arresting/Investigating Officer subject to the conditions provided under Section 482(2) of B.N.S.S. It is clarified that in case the amount of Rs.10,00,000/- is not paid by the petitioner within a period of 3 weeks from today, the present petition shall be deemed to be dismissed.
Adjourned to 05.02.2025."
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4. On the adjourned date i.e. 05.02.2025, the following order was passed by this Court:-
"Learned counsel for the parties submit that the matter has been amicably resolved between the parties and the accused collectively agreed to pay a sum of Rs.14 lacs to the complainant in the present case. Learned counsel for the parties jointly submit that for finalising the terms of the settlement deed, the matter may be referred to Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this Court.
The parties are directed to appear before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this Court on 10.02.2025.
Adjourned to 17.02.2025.
Interim order to continue."
5. On 17.02.2025, again, the case was finally taken up and was disposed of by passing the following order:-
"Vide order dated 05.02.2025, this case was referred to Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this Court.
Today, learned counsel for the parties submit that they have amicably resolved all the disputes and a settlement deed dated 10.02.2025 has been signed by both the parties. Learned counsel for the parties further submit that the parties shall remain bound by the terms of the compromise/settlement.
In view of the above statement made by learned counsel for the parties, the interim order dated 08.01.2025 is made absolute. The petitioner shall continue to join the investigation, as and when called by the Investigating Officer. The petitioner shall also abide by the conditions as specified under Section 482 (2) of B.N.S.S."
6. Learned counsel for the applicant-complainant submits that after the grant of concession of anticipatory bail, the petitioner/non-applicant failed 3 of 10 ::: Downloaded on - 21-03-2026 05:40:08 ::: CRM-14494-2025 in/and CRM-M-22-2025 -4 to abide by the terms of the settlement deed dated 10.02.2025 and has not made any payment to him. Since the concession of anticipatory bail was granted to the petitioner/non-applicant on the basis of the settlement deed dated 10.02.2025 and he had made a statement that he would remain bound by the terms of the compromise, but since he has not adhered the terms of compromise, the order dated 17.02.2025 may be recalled.
7. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner/non-applicant submits that he was granted one opportunity to make the payment, as per the statement made by him at the time of disposal of the bail application on 17.02.2025. However, learned counsel for the petitioner/non- applicant further submits that the petitioner is not in a position to make the payment to the applicant-complainant.
8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record carefully.
9. In the present case, it is apparent from the order dated 17.02.2025, that learned counsel appearing for the parties had submitted that they had resolved all the disputes amicably and a settlement deed dated 10.02.2025 had been signed by both the parties and the parties would remain bound by the terms of the compromise/settlement. However, the petitioner has not paid any amount deliberately to the applicant-complainant and has played a fraud not only on the complainant, but this Court as well.
10. The question of recalling of an order by a Criminal Court has been considered by the High Court of Orissa, in the matter of "Siba Bisoi vs. State 4 of 10 ::: Downloaded on - 21-03-2026 05:40:08 ::: CRM-14494-2025 in/and CRM-M-22-2025 -5 of Odisha, 2022, SCC Online Ori 948," wherein the following observations were made:-
"12. The question whether the bar under Section 362 would impinge upon the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was considered by the apex Court in the case of R. Rajeshwari v. H.N. Jagdish reported in (2008) 4 SCC 82, wherein it was held that although a specific bar has been created in regard to exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court to review its own order and ordinarily, exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be unwarranted but in some rare cases, the High Court may do so where a judgment has been obtained from it by practising fraud on it.
13. Even otherwise, Section 362 of the Code places a bar on the Court to 'alter' or 'review' its order or judgment. Once the judgment is pronounced and signed the Court becomes functus of icio and therefore, no further alteration or review of the same is permissible save and except to correct clerical or arithmetical errors. However, what is sought by the State in the instant IA is not alteration or review but 'recall' of the entire order on grounds as have been noted hereinbefore. In other words, if the IA were to be allowed, it would mean complete abrogation of the order and restoring the parties to the position they were prior to passing of the order.
14. There is thus, an inherent distinction between alteration or review and recall of an order. In the case of Habu v. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 1987 Rajasthan 83 : 1986 SCC Online Raj 54, a full bench of the Rajasthan High Court held that power to recall is dif erent from power of altering or reviewing the judgment.
15. In Pushpangathan v. State of Kerala reported in (2015) 3 KLT 105, the Kerala High Court held that, Section 362 Cr.P.C. does not
5 of 10 ::: Downloaded on - 21-03-2026 05:40:08 ::: CRM-14494-2025 in/and CRM-M-22-2025 -6 af ect the power of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to recall a judgment or order, if legal grounds are properly established by the party complaining.
16. The position that emerges from a reference to the case laws noted above is that the bar under Section 362 of Cr.P.C. is not absolute and in any case, does not apply in case of recall of the order. There is no dispute that the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can be exercised if any of the three conditions exist, namely, to give effect to any order under the Code, to prevent abuse of the process of Court or to secure the ends of justice. In case any of the three conditions exist, the High Court would be justified in exercising its jurisdiction. Therefore, the objection raised by Mr. Panda with regard to maintainability of the I.A. is not tenable. However, whether such course of action is justified in facts and circumstances of the instant case, shall be discussed later."
11. Still further, the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court, in the matter of "Bimal Kumar and others Vs. State of U.P." also discussed similar principles of law and held as follows:-
"18. So far as legal position is concerned, law is well settled on the point that Section 362 Cr.P.C., 1973 puts embargo upon retrial of Section 362 Cr.P.C., 1973 reads as under:
"section 362 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
362. Court not to after judgement. Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error."
19. But at the same time, it is to be seen that if the fraud is played upon the court whether the hands of the court are tight? Whether court cannot take any action? Whether it remains silent spectator in a matter where an 6 of 10 ::: Downloaded on - 21-03-2026 05:40:08 ::: CRM-14494-2025 in/and CRM-M-22-2025 -7 order was obtained by playing a patent fraud upon the court? A person impersonate himself and dare to appear before the court with a false identity whether he can be left open? All these questions have to be looked into by the Court in a revision.
20. Firstly, I have to look into the meaning of fraud. In De Grey, C.J. in Rex. v. Duchess of Kingston 2 Smith LC 687 that Fraud' is an extrinsic, collateral act, which vitiates the most solemn proceedings of courts of justice. Lord Coke says it avoids all judicial acts ecclesiastical and temporal."
22. It is also clear as indicated in Kinch v. Walcott [1929 APPEAL CASES 482] that it would be in the power of a party to a decree vitiated by fraud to apply directly to the Court which pronounced it to vacate it. According to Kerr:
"In order to sustain an action to impeach a judgment, actual fraud must be shown; mere constructive fraud is not, at all events after long delay, sufficient... but such a judgment will not be set aside upon mere proof that the judgment was obtained by perjury". (See the Seventh Edition, Pages 416-
417)
23. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 49, paragraph 265, it is acknowledged that, "Courts of record or of general jurisdiction have inherent power to vacate or set aside their own judgments". In para 269, it is further stated:
"Fraud or collusion in obtaining judgment is a sufficient ground for opening or vacating it, even after the term at which it was rendered, provided the fraud was extrinsic and collateral to the matter tried and not a matter actually or potentially in issue in the action".
It is also stated:
"Fraud practiced on the court is always ground for vacating the judgment, as where the court is deceived or misled as to 7 of 10 ::: Downloaded on - 21-03-2026 05:40:08 ::: CRM-14494-2025 in/and CRM-M-22-2025 -8 material circumstances, or its process is abused, resulting in the rendition of a judgment which would not have been given if the whole conduct of the case had been fair."
24. In American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edition, Volume 46, para 825, it is stated:
"Indeed, the connection of fraud with a judgment constitutes one of the chief causes for interference by a court of equity with the operation of a judgment. The power of courts of equity in granting such relief is inherent, and frequent applications for equitable relief against judgments on this ground were made in equity before the practice of awarding new trials was introduced into the courts of common law. Where fraud is involved, it has been held, in some cases, that a remedy at law by appeal, error, or certiorari does not preclude relief in equity from the judgment. Nor, it has been said, is there any reason why a judgment obtained by fraud cannot be the subject of a direct attack by an action in equity even though the judgment has been satisfied."
25. The law in India is not different. Section 44 of the Evidence Act enables a party otherwise bound by a previous adjudication to show that it was not final or binding because it is vitiated by fraud. The provision therefore gives jurisdiction and authority to a court to consider and decide the question whether a prior adjudication is vitiated by fraud. In Paranjpe v. Kanade [ILR 6 (1882) BOMBAY 148], it was held that:
"it is always competent to any Court to vacate any judgment or order, if it be proved that such judgment or order was obtained by manifest fraud".
26. In Lakshmi Charan Saha v. Nur Ali [ ILR (1911)38 Calcutta 936], it was held that:
"The jurisdiction of the Court in trying a suit [questioning the earlier decision as being vitiated by fraud,] was not limited to an investigation merely as to whether the plaintiff 8 of 10 ::: Downloaded on - 21-03-2026 05:40:08 ::: CRM-14494-2025 in/and CRM-M-22-2025 -9 was prevented from placing his case properly at the prior trial by the fraud of the defendant. The Court could and must rip up the whole matter for determining whether there had been fraud in the procurement of the decree.
27. In Manindra Nath Mittra v. Hari Mondal [(1919) 24 Calcutta Weekly Notes 133], the Court explained the elements to be proved before a plea of a prior decision being vitiated by fraud could be upheld. The Court said:
"with respect to the question as to what constitutes fraud for which a decree can be set aside, two propositions appear to be well established. The first is that although it is not permitted to show that the Court (in the former suit) was mistaken, it may be shown that it was misled, in other words where the Court has been intentionally misled by the fraud of a party, and a fraud has been committed upon the Court with the intention to procure its judgment, it will vitiate its judgment. The second is that a decree cannot be set aside merely on the ground that it has been procured by perjured evidence".
12. From the above referred principles of law, it is apparent that this Court has limited powers under Section 362 Cr.P.C., but when a litigant plays a fraud upon the Court, the Court cannot remain a silent spectator. In the present case, the concession of anticipatory bail was allowed to the petitioner/non- applicant on the ground that he would make the payments to the complainant and the parties had signed a settlement deed dated 10.02.2025 in this regard.
13. Even, during the course of hearing, learned counsel for the parties had submitted that they shall remain bound by the terms of the compromise. However, the petitioner/non-applicant chose not to comply with the terms of the 9 of 10 ::: Downloaded on - 21-03-2026 05:40:08 ::: CRM-14494-2025 in/and CRM-M-22-2025 -10 settlement deed dated 10.02.2025 and the order dated 17.02.2025 passed by this Court is liable to be recalled.
14. In view of the above discussion, the present application is allowed. Consequently, the order dated 17.02.2025 passed by this Court is ordered to be recalled and the main case is taken on Board today itself. CRM-M-22-2025
1. In view of the order passed in above-said application i.e. CRM- 14494-2025, the main case is ordered to be dismissed.
(N.S.SHEKHAWAT)
JUDGE
09.03.2026
hemlata
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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