Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Ex Asi (Exe) Puran Prasad vs Govt. Of Nct Delhi on 4 February, 2010
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL BENCH OA No.2282/2009 MA No.1521/2009 New Delhi, this the 4th day of February, 2010 HONBLE MR. L.K.JOSHI, VICE CHAIRMAN (A) HONBLE DR. DHARAM PAUL SHARMA, MEMBER (J) Ex ASI (Exe) Puran Prasad, S/o late Shri Jai Mangal, R/o House No. 15, Gali No. 11-B, Kaushik Enclave, Burari, Delhi-84 Applicant (By Advocate: Sh. Ravi Kant Jain) Versus 1. Govt. of NCT Delhi, Through Commissioner of Police, Police Head Quarters, IP Estate, New Delhi 2. The Joint Commissioner of Police, Operation Police Head Quarters, New Delhi 3. The Deputy Commissioner of Police, Police Control Room, Model Town, New Delhi Respondents (By Advocate: Sh. Rishi Prakash) ORDER
Mr. L.K. Joshi, Vice Chairman(A) Former Assistant Sub Inspector in Delhi Police, Shri Puran Prasad was dismissed from service by order dated 20.01.2006 of the disciplinary authority, the appeal against which was also dismissed by the appellate authority by order dated 23.05.2006. The Applicant had earlier approached this Tribunal through OA No.1456/2009. The following directions were given in the aforesaid OA:
2. When confronted with the position that present Original Application is barred by time and no application seeking condonation of delay is accompanied with it, counsel for the applicant seeks permission to withdraw this Original Application with liberty to file fresh Application for the same cause of action wherein application seeking condonation of delay shall also be filed. The OA in hand has been filed with an application for condonation of delay.
2. Before going into the merits of the case, we have to first consider whether the OA is maintainable under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which deals with limitation. The aforesaid Section is reproduced below:
21. Limitation - (1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application,-
(a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made;
(b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where -
(a) the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates; and
(b) no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court, the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in clause (a), or, as the case may be, clause (b), of sub-section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.
3. In the application for condonation of delay, it has been mentioned that (a) the Applicants daughter had undergone orthopedic surgery in May, 2006 in which he had to spend substantial amount and was not in a position to approach this Tribunal; (b) thereafter the brother of the Applicant fell ill and he had to go to his village again and again to take care of his brother who ultimately expired in July, 2007; and (c) the Applicant did not have sufficient means to approach this Tribunal. This is hardly a satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay. The appeal of the Applicant had been dismissed on 23.05.2006. He should have come before this Tribunal by 22.05.2007. Applicants brother, as averred by him, died in July, 2007. The period of limitation was over before the demise of the Applicants brother. Moreover, the surgery of the Applicants daughter could also not be such a factor as to prevent him from approaching this Tribunal for almost one year. From the discharge slip given by the hospital, it is seen that the Applicants daughter was admitted to the hospital on 17.05.2006 and was discharged on 20.05.2006. She was then taken to the hospital on 11.07.2006 for removal of the cast. After that, as per the medical certificates submitted by the Applicant, she was taken to the hospital for check up on 27.07.2006, 19.10.2006, 8.02.2007, 27.09.2007and 15.07.2008. It would be seen that this is not a course of treatment because of which the Applicant would not get any time for filing the OA before this Tribunal.
4. In P.K. Ramachandran V. State of Kerala, (2005) 11 SCC 486, the Honourable Supreme Court has held that the Court must record its satisfaction that the explanation for delay was reasonable and satisfactory.
5. In State of Karnataka and others V. S.M. Kotrayya and others, (1996) 6 SCC 267 also, the Honourable Supreme Court had held that the Tribunal was wholly unjustified in condoning the delay without considering the explanation offered for the delay.
6. The learned counsel for the Applicant would contend that the Applicant has a very good case on merit and that similarly situated employees of Delhi Police have been given relief by the Honourable Delhi High Court recently.
7. It is no doubt true that a Full Bench of this Tribunal had given relief to similarly situated employees of Delhi Police, which order was upheld by the Honourable Delhi High Court also. However, while the others were alert for their rights and approached this Tribunal in time, the Applicant had been lethargic and had not taken any steps to challenge the order of dismissal in time. In this context, the following observation of the Honourable Supreme Court in S.M. Kotrayya (supra) is relevant for not condoning the delay in approaching the Tribunal in time:
8. Thus considered, we hold that it is not necessary that the respondents should give an explanation for the delay which occasioned for the period mentioned in sub-sections (1) or (2) of Section 21, but they should give explanation for the delay which occasioned after the expiry of the aforesaid respective period applicable to the appropriate case and the Tribunal should be required to satisfy itself whether the explanation offered was proper explanation. In this case, the explanation offered was that they came to know of the relief granted by the Tribunal in August 1989 and that they filed the petition immediately thereafter. That is not a proper explanation at all. What was required of them to explain under sub-sections (1) and (2) was as to why they could not avail of the remedy of redressal of their grievances before the expiry of the period prescribed under sub-section (1) or (2). That was not the explanation given. Therefore, the Tribunal is wholly unjustified in condoning the delay.
8. On the basis of above considerations, the OA is dismissed on the ground of being barred by limitation. No costs.
( Dr. Dharam Paul Sharma ) ( L.K. Joshi ) Member (J) Vice Chairman (A) /dkm/