Karnataka High Court
H V Gopal vs The Bangalore Souhardha Central on 8 July, 2024
Author: S.R.Krishna Kumar
Bench: S.R.Krishna Kumar
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WP No. 21349 of 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 8TH DAY OF JULY, 2024
BEFORE
R
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
WRIT PETITION NO. 21349 OF 2022 (GM-DRT)
BETWEEN:
1. H.V. GOPAL,
S/O LATE N VENKATA JETTY,
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS,
R/AT NO.232/28, 14TH MAIN ROAD,
GOKULA 1ST STAGE, 1ST PHASE,
BANGALORE - 560 054.
2. H.V. SURESH,
S/O LATE N VENKATA JETTY,
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS,
R/AT NO.232/28, 14TH MAIN ROAD,
GOKULA 1ST STAGE, 1ST PHASE,
BANGALORE - 560 054.
3. H.V. NAGARATHNA,
D/O LATE N VENKATA JETTY,
Digitally signed
by AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS,
LEELAVATHI S R/AT NO.232/28, 14TH MAIN ROAD,
R GOKULA 1ST STAGE, 1ST PHASE,
Location: HIGH BANGALORE - 560 054.
COURT OF
KARNATAKA 4. H.V. NIRMALA,
D/O LATE N VENKATA JETTY,
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS,
R/AT NO.232/28, 14TH MAIN ROAD,
GOKULA 1ST STAGE, 1ST PHASE,
BANGALORE - 560 054.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. D.R. RAVISHANKAR, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. PRASHANT L. KANAL, ADVOCATE)
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WP No. 21349 of 2022
AND:
THE BANGALORE SOUHARDHA CENTRAL
CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD.,
NOW CALLED AS "THE SHAMRAO VITHAL
CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD.,"
NO.1, 2ND FLOOR, CENTRAL BANK ROAD,
CHAMARAJPET, BANGALORE - 560 018,
REPRESENTED BY AUTHORISED OFFICER.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. M.S. SURYANARAYAN RAO, ADVOCATE A/W
SRI. K. NAGARAJ, ADVOCATE FOR R1;
SRI.B.S.SHREYAS, ADV. FOR R2)
THIS W.P IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER DATED
22.9.2022 PASSED BY THE DEBT RECOVERY TRIBUNAL-I AT BANGALORE
IN DAIRY NO.1985/2019 VIDE ANNEXURE-O AND ETC.,
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS
DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER
In this petition, petitioners have sought for the following reliefs:
(i) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ or direction, quashing the order dated 22.09.2022 passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal I at Bangalore in Diary No.1985/2019; (vide Annex-O);
(ii) Consequently, issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ or direction, quashing the order dated 03.06.2019 passed by the 24th Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Bangalore in Crl.Mis.No.04/2019;(Vide Annex-J);-3-
NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022
(iii) Direction against the respondent to strictly adhere to the One Time Settlement dated 25.09.2019.(Vide Annex-G);
(iv) Grant such other relief or reliefs as this Hon'ble Court deems fit in the circumstances of the case.
2. This petition is directed against the impugned order dated 22.09.2022 passed on I.A.No.2655/2019 in D.No.1985/2019 by the Debt Recovery Tribunal-I(for short 'the DRT'), Bangalore, whereby, the application filed by the petitioners under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was dismissed by the Tribunal, which also dismissed the main petition under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002.
3. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that petitioners filed the instant application / appeal in D.No.1985/2019 against respondent-Bank seeking setting aside of the order dated 03.06.2019 passed by the 24th ACMM at Bangalore in Crl.Misc.No.4/2019 under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, as well as the order passed under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act.
Along with the said application / appeal, the petitioners also filed an application I.A.No.2655/2019 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, -4- NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 1963 seeking condonation of delay of 45 days in filing the application / appeal. Both the application for condonation of delay and the main application / appeal having been opposed by respondent-Bank, the DRT, Bangalore proceeded to pass the impugned order by not only rejecting the application for condonation of delay but also dismissed the main application / appeal, aggrieved by which, the petitioners are before this Court by way of the present petition.
4. Heard learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for the respondents and perused the material on record.
5. In addition to reiterating the various contentions urged in the petition and referring to the material on record, the learned Senior counsel for the petitioners invited my attention to the impugned order, in order to point out that having come to the conclusion that the delay in filing the application / appeal cannot be condoned, the DRT clearly committed an error in proceeding to reject the main application / appeal on merits, which is impermissible in law. It was submitted that the DRT committed an error in holding that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable and cannot be invoked by the petitioners, since it was not permissible for Tribunals -5- NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 to extend and condone the delay in filing the instant appeal / application. It was also submitted that the delay in filing the instant application / appeal was due to bonafide reasons, unavoidable circumstance and sufficient cause and the DRT committed an error in refusing to condone the delay of 45 days by passing the impugned order, which deserves to be set aside.
6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-Bank as well as learned counsel for the auction purchaser jointly submits that the DRT was truly justified in refusing to condone the delay in filing the application / appeal by passing the impugned order, which does not warrant interference in the present petition. It is also submitted that the respondent-Bank brought the properties to sale during the pendency of the present petition and since the third party rights have already been created, the question of granting any relief to the present petitioners in the present petition would not arise.
7. By way of reply, learned Senior counsel for the petitioners submits that having regard to the undisputed fact that the sale in favour of the auction purchaser took place during the pendency of the present petition, if the delay in filing the application is condoned and the matter is remitted back to the DRT for reconsideration -6- NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 afresh, the petitioners would take necessary steps to seek amendment of the petition before the DRT and seek appropriate reliefs including challenging the sale proceedings and the auction sale by impleading the auction purchaser also.
8. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions and perused the material on record.
9. The following points arise for consideration in the present petition:-
(i) Whether an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay is maintainable to an application filed under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act?
(ii) Whether the DRT was justified in rejecting the application filed by the petitioner under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and consequently dismissing the application under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act by passing the impugned order?
Re-Point No.1:-
10. The material on record discloses that it is an undisputed fact that there was a delay of 45 days on the part of the petitioner-
applicant in filing the application / appeal under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act before the DRT. Along with the said application / -7- NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 appeal, the petitioner also filed an application seeking condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In this context, a perusal of the impugned order will indicate that the DRT has come to the conclusion that an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not maintainable / applicable to an application / appeal filed under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act and accordingly, rejected I.A.No.2655/2019 filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
10.1 Before considering the rival submissions in this regard, it is necessary to extract Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, which reads as under:-
"17 [Application against measures to recover secured debts].--(1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under this Chapter, [may make an application along with such fee, as may be prescribed,] to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty-five days from the date on which such measure had been taken:
[Provided that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower.] [Explanation.--For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the communication of the reasons to the borrower by the secured creditor for not having accepted his -8- NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 representation or objection or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons to the borrower shall not entitle the person (including borrower) to make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under this sub-section(1) of section 17.] x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x xx x x x x x (7) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Debts Recovery Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the application in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and the rules made thereunder.
10.2 A plain reading of Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act will indicate that a period of 45 days is prescribed for filing an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act; in this context, it is relevant to state that no further / condonable / extendable period of limitation in excess of 45 days is prescribed or mandatory under Section 17(1); so also, the said provision also does not contemplate condonation of delay by the DRT if an application under Section 17 is filed beyond the prescribed period of 45 days.
10.3 Section 17(7) of the SARFAESI Act provides that an application under Section 17 shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, now known as the Recovery of Debts and -9- NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 Bankruptcy Act,1993 (for short 'the RDB Act'). Section 24 of the RDB reads as under:-
Section 24 of the RDB Act, 1993: Limitation.--The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), shall, as far as may be, apply to an application made to a Tribunal.
10.4 As is clear from the aforesaid provision, the Limitation Act would apply to any application made to a Tribunal including an application filed under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. It follows therefrom that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act would also be applicable to an application filed under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. Section 29 of the Limitation Act, reads as under:-
Savings.--(1) Nothing in this Act shall affect section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872).
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.
(3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such law.
(4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition of "easement" in section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in the territories to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), may for the time being extend.
10.5 There is no gainsaying the fact that the SARFAESI Act and RDB Act are both Special Laws / Enactments and not General Laws / Enactments. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act contemplates that if a period of limitation under a Special law / Enactment is different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only to the extent that these provisions are not expressly excluded by such special law; in this context, it is well settled that such exclusion by such special law / enactment can also be inferred by implication having regard to the nature of the statute and the aims and objectives of the same.
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 10.6 A perusal of Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act clearly indicates that there is no expression exclusion of the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act to an application filed under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. As stated supra, by virtue of Section 17(7) r/w Section 24 of the RDB Act, the provisions of the Limitation Act including Section 29(2) would be applicable to an application filed under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act; it follows therefrom that unless there is exclusion of the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, these provisions would be clearly applicable to an application filed under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act; so also, in the absence of any further / condonable / extendable period beyond 45 days to file an application as contemplated under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, it also cannot be said that impliedly or by necessary implication, the applicability of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act stand excluded to an application under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act; in other words, in the absence of any condonable / extendable / further period which permits condonation of delay beyond the prescribed period of 45 days, there can be no inference of exclusion of applicability of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act and consequently, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would clearly be
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 applicable to an application filed under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal.
10.7 In the case of Baleshwar Dayal Jiswal vs. Bank of India & others - (2016) 1 SCC 444, while dealing with the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to an appeal filed before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, the Apex Court came to the conclusion that Section 5 was not excluded by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and that it was open for the DRAT to invoke / apply Section 5 and condone the delay in filing the appeal; it is needless to state that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is applicable to both appeals and applications as is clear from the said provision. In the said judgment, the Apex Court held as under:-
6. At this stage it will be appropriate to reproduce the provisions of Sections 18 and 36 of the SARFAESI Act, Section 20 and Section 24 of the RDDB Act and Section 29 of the Limitation Act:
6.1. Sections 18 and 36 of the SARFAESI Act: "18.Appeal to Appellate Tribunal.--(1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17, may prefer an appeal along with such fee, as may be prescribed to an Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of the Debts Recovery Tribunal:
Provided that different fees may be prescribed for filing an appeal by the borrower or by the person other than the borrower:
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less:
Provided also that the Appellate Tribunal may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not less than twenty-five per cent of debt referred to in the second proviso.
(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and the Rules made thereunder.
***
36. Limitation.-- No secured creditor shall be entitled to take all or any of the measures under sub-section (4) of Section 13, unless his claim in respect of the financial asset is made within the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963)."
6.2. Sections 20 and 24 of the RDDB Act:
"20.Appeal to the Appellate Tribunal.--(1) Save as provided in sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an order made, or deemed to have been made, by a Tribunal under this Act, may prefer an appeal to an Appellate Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter.
(2) No appeal shall lie to the Appellate Tribunal from an order made by a Tribunal with the consent of the parties.
(3) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within a period of forty-five days from the date on which a copy of the order made, or deemed to have been made, by the Tribunal is received by him and it shall be in such form and be accompanied by such fee as may be prescribed:
Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of forty-five days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period.
(4) On receipt of an appeal under sub-section (1), the Appellate Tribunal may, after giving the parties to the appeal, an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit, confirming, modifying or setting aside the order appealed against.
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 (5) The Appellate Tribunal shall send a copy of every order made by it to the parties to the appeal and to the Tribunal concerned.
(6) The appeal filed before the Appellate Tribunal under sub-section (1) shall be dealt with by it as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made by it to dispose of the appeal finally within six months from the date of receipt of the appeal.
***
24.Limitation.--The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), shall, as far as may be, apply to an application made to a Tribunal."
6.3. Section 29 of the Limitation Act:
"29.Savings.--(1) Nothing in this Act shall affect Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872).
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.
(3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such law.
(4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition of 'easement' in Section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in the territories to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), may for the time being extend."
7. The first point for consideration is the applicability of proviso to Section 20(3) of the RDDB Act to the disposal of an appeal by the Appellate Tribunal under Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act. A bare perusal of the said Section 18(2) makes it clear that the Appellate Tribunal under the SARFAESI Act has to dispose of an appeal in accordance with the provisions of the RDDB Act. In this respect, the
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 provisions of the RDDB Act stand incorporated in the SARFAESI Act for disposal of an appeal. Once it is so, we are unable to discern any reason as to why the SARFAESI Appellate Tribunal cannot entertain an appeal beyond the prescribed period even on being satisfied that there is sufficient cause for not filing such appeal within that period. Even if power of condonation of delay by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act were held not to be applicable, the proviso to Section 20(3) of the RDDB Act is applicable by virtue of Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act. This interpretation is clearly borne out from the provisions of the two statutes and also advances the cause of justice. Unless the scheme of the statute expressly excludes the power of condonation, there is no reason to deny such power to an Appellate Tribunal when the statutory scheme so warrants. Principle of legislation by incorporation is well known and has been applied, inter alia, in Ram Kirpal Bhagat v. State of Bihar [(1969) 3 SCC 471 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 154] , Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa [(1974) 2 SCC 777] , Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India [(1979) 2 SCC 529] and Onkarlal Nandlal v. State of Rajasthan [(1985) 4 SCC 404 : 1986 SCC (Tax) 34] relied upon on behalf of the appellants. We have thus no hesitation in holding that the Appellate Tribunal under the SARFAESI Act has the power to condone the delay in filing an appeal before it by virtue of Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act and the proviso to Section 20(3) of the RDDB Act.
8. The fact that RDDB Act and the SARFAESI Act are complementary to each other, as held by this Court
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 in Transcore v. Union of India [(2008) 1 SCC 125 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 116] , also supports this view.
9. We may now deal with the conflicting views of the High Courts on the subject. The Madhya Pradesh High Court has held [AIR 2011 MP 205] that the power of condonation of delay stood excluded by principle of interpretation that if a later statute has provided for shorter period of limitation without express provision for condonation, it could be implied that there was no power of condonation. Reliance has been placed on Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 12th Edn., 2010, p. 310. It was further observed that the Limitation Act was made applicable to a Tribunal under Section 24 of the RDDB Act, but there was no similar provision with respect to the Appellate Tribunal. To justify such an inference, reliance has also been placed on Gopal Sardar case [Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar, (2004) 4 SCC 252] and Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. v. Custodian [(2004) 11 SCC 472] . It was further observed that the object of the SARFAESI Act was to ensure speedy recovery of the dues and quicker resolution of disputes arising out of action taken for recovery of such dues. We find the approach to be erroneous and incorrect understanding of the principle of interpretation which has been relied upon. The principle discussed in the celebrated treatise in question is as follows:
"... '15. ... When an amending Act alters the language of the principal statute, the alteration must be taken to have been made deliberately.' [Ed.: As observed in D.R. Fraser & Co. Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, 1948 SCC OnLine PC 65 :
AIR 1949 PC 120, p. 123, para 15.] "
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10. It is difficult to appreciate how the above principle justifies the view of the High Court. The change intended in the SARFAESI Act has to be seen from the statute and not from beyond it. No doubt the period of limitation for filing an appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act is 30 days as against 45 days under Section 20 of the RDDB Act. To this extent, the legislative intent may be deliberate. The absence of an express provision for condonation, when Section 18(2) expressly adopts and incorporates the provisions of the RDDB Act which contains provision for condonation of delay in filing of an appeal, cannot be read as excluding the power of condonation. As already observed, the proviso to Section 20(3) which provides for condonation of delay (45 days under the RDDB Act) stands extended to disposal of appeal under the SARFAESI Act (to the extent that condonation is of delay beyond 30 days). There is no reason to exclude the proviso to Section 20(3) in dealing with an appeal under the SARFAESI Act. Taking such a view will be nullifying Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act. We are thus, unable to uphold the view taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court.
11. We approve the view taken by the Madras [2009 SCC OnLine Mad 437 : (2009) 2 CTC 302 : (2009) 3 BJ 401] , Andhra Pradesh [2012 SCC OnLine AP 195 : AIR 2013 AP 24] and Bombay [2008 SCC OnLine Bom 170 :
(2008) 4 Mah LJ 424] High Courts, but for different reasons.
The view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sajida Begum v. SBI [2012 SCC OnLine AP 195 : AIR 2013 AP 24] is based on applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. In our view, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act has no absolute application, as the statute in question impliedly
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 excludes applicability of provisions of the Limitation Act to the extent a different scheme is adopted. If no provision of the Limitation Act was expressly adopted, it may have been possible to hold that by virtue of Section 29(2) power of condonation of delay was available. It is well settled that exclusion of power of condonation of delay can be implied as laid down in Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. [(2001) 8 SCC 470] , Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker [(1995) 5 SCC 5] , Chhattisgarh SEB v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission [(2010) 5 SCC 23] , CCE and Customs v. Hongo India (P) Ltd. [(2009) 5 SCC 791] and Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar [Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar, (2004) 4 SCC 252] relied upon on behalf of the Banks.
12. We may now advert to the last question as to whether the Appellate Tribunal under the SARFAESI Act was not a court and therefore, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act was not attracted.
13. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sajida Begum case [2012 SCC OnLine AP 195 : AIR 2013 AP 24] in holding the Tribunal to be court, has relied on Sections 22 and 24 of the RDDB Act. Section 22 vests powers of civil court in the Tribunal only for purposes mentioned therein, such as summoning witnesses, discovery and production of documents, receiving evidence, issuing commission for examining witnesses, etc. and deems the Tribunals to be courts for specified purposes, such as for Sections 193, 196 and 228 of the Penal Code, 1860 and Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. These provisions may not be
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 conclusive of the question of the Tribunal being court for Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act without further examining the scheme of the statutes in question. In Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corpn. [(2009) 8 SCC 646 : (2009) 3 SCC (Civ) 481] , this Court examined the scheme of the two Acts in question and held that the Tribunal was a court but not a civil court for the purposes of Section 24 CPC. We are of the view that for the purposes of decision of these appeals, it is not necessary to decide the question whether the Tribunal under the banking statutes in question is court for purposes of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.
14. We have already held that the power of condonation of delay was expressly applicable by virtue of Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act read with proviso to Section 20(3) of the RDDB Act and to that extent, the provisions of the Limitation Act having been expressly incorporated under the special statutes in question, Section 29(2) stands impliedly excluded. To this extent, we differ with the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court as well as the Madras and Bombay High Courts. We are also in agreement with the principle that even though Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be impliedly inapplicable, principle of Section 14 of the Limitation Act can be held to be applicable even if Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act does not apply, as laid down by this Court in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt. [(2008) 7 SCC 169] and M.P. Steel Corpn. v. CCE [(2015) 7 SCC 58 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 510] .
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15. As a result of the above discussion, the question is answered in the affirmative by holding that delay in filing an appeal under Section 18(1) of the SARFAESI Act can be condoned by the Appellate Tribunal under proviso to Section 20(3) of the RDDB Act read with Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act. The contrary view taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Seth Banshidhar Kedia Rice Mills (P) Ltd. case [AIR 2011 MP 205] is overruled.
16. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the Bank against the judgment [2012 SCC OnLine AP 195 : AIR 2013 AP 24] of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is dismissed and the appeals filed by the borrowers are allowed. The impugned orders [Baleshwar Dayal Jaiswal v. Bank of India, WP No. 8864 of 2011, order dated 5-9-2011 (MP)] , [Kedarnath Rausalya v. SBI, WP No. 5076 of 2011, order dated 5-9- 2011 (MP)] passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh [in appeals arising out of SLP (C) No. 27674 of 2011 and SLP (C) No. 36316 of 2011] are set aside and the matters are remanded to the High Court for being dealt with afresh in accordance with law. The appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 38436 of 2012 has been preferred directly from the order of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Delhi passed by the said Tribunal relying upon the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Seth Banshidhar Kedia Rice Mills (P) Ltd. case [AIR 2011 MP 205] . The said impugned order is also set aside and the matter is remanded to the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Delhi for being dealt with afresh in accordance with law.
17. All the appeals are disposed of accordingly.
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 10.8 While dealing with the question regarding applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Anirudh Singh vs. Authorised officer, ICICI Bank - M.P.No.5324/2023 dated 03.01.2024, placed reliance upon Baleshwar's case supra and held as under:-
" This petition filed under Article 227 of Constitution of India invoking supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, assails final order dated 02.09.2023 (Annexure-P/9) passed in S.A. No.806/2022 by Debt Recovery Tribunal, Jabalpur (for brevity "DRT") dismissing the said SA filed u/S.17 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for brevity "SARFAESI Act") for being barred by limitation, having been filed beyond the period of 45 days stipulated in Section 17(1) of SARFAESI Act.
2. Learned counsel for rival parties are heard extensively on the short question as to whether benefit of provisions of Limitation Act, in particular Section 5, are available in respect of an application preferred u/S.17(1) of the SARFAESI Act or not ?
3. The judgments of Apex Court as well as various High Courts have been cited for and against the said question.
4. Short facts giving rise to the present dispute are that petitioner on 16.09.2022 filed an application (S.A. No.806/2022) u/S.17(1) of SARFAESI Act assailing
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 demand notice, possession notice and auction notice issued in respect of the secured assets in question.
4.1 Along with the aforesaid S.A. No.806/2022, petitioner had moved an application u/S 5 of Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay in preferring the same. Delay sought to be condoned was of 46 days.
4.2 DRT by the impugned order dismissed S.A. No.806/2022 for being time barred. It was held by DRT that an application u/S.17 is in the nature of suit and, therefore, the provisions of Section 5 of Limitation Act are inapplicable. Thus, by relying upon Apex Court's decision in the case of Bank of Baroda & Another Vs. M/s Parasaadilal Tursiram Sheetgrah Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. (C.A. No.5240/2022) judgment dated 11.08.2022, DRT declined to interfere.
5. The Apex Court in Bank of Baroda (supra) did not decide the question which is posed herein. Instead, Apex Court was required to answer the question as to whether High Court of Allahabad was correct in staying the order of DRAT which had set aside the order of DRT passed in review jurisdiction. DRT had allowed the review application on the ground that one of the Directors of the Company had expired on 18.09.2012 which was before the date of auction, without his legal representative being noticed. Relevant paragraphs 8, 9 & 14 of the said judgment in the case of Bank of Baroda (supra) are explicit about the issue therein. Relevant extracts are reproduced hereinbelow:
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 "8.The above referred order was challenged in review. The DRT by its order dated 08.08.2016 allowed the review on the ground that Shri Rakesh Sharma had expired before the auction had taken place and that his legal representatives were not issued notice. It is rather strange that the DRT not only entertained the Review Petition, but has allowed the same on the aforesaid ground.
9. The order in review was challenged before the DRAT, which found no difficulty in allowing the appeal on the ground that there has never been an error apparent on the face of record for exercising the review jurisdiction. It is this order of DRAT that was challenged before the High Court in the Writ Petition filed by the Company, its Directors and also the legal representatives of the deceased Director. This very same ground was raised, that one of the Directors had expired and that his legal representatives were not given notice before the secured asset was brought to sale.
14. For the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in staying the operation of the order of the DRAT which came to the conclusion that there was no error apparent on the face of record for the DRT to invoke the review jurisdiction and recall its order dismissing the application under Section 17 of the Act."
5.1 From the aforesaid, it is evident that the issue of applicability of provisions of Limitation Act to an application u/S.17 of SARFAESI Act were not under consideration of the Apex Court.
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 5.2 Thus, reliance placed by DRT for dismissing S.A. No.806/2022 as barred by limitation by relying upon the said decision in Bank of Baroda (supra) is misplaced.
6. For deciding the controversy in question, it is apt to reproduce Section 17 of SARFAESI Act and Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which are as under:
Section 17 of SARFAESI Act "17. Application against measures to recover secured debts --(1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under this Chapter, (may make an application along with such fee, as may be prescribed) to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty-five days from the date on which such measures had been taken:--
[Provided that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower.] [Explanation.--For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that the communication of the reasons to the borrower by the secured creditor for not having accepted his representation or objection or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons to the borrower shall not entitle the person (including borrower) to make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under sub-section (1) of section [(1A) An application under sub-section (1) shall be filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction -
(a) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises;
(b) whether secured asset is located; or
(c) the branch or any other officer of a bank or financial institution is maintaining an account in which debt claim is outstanding for the time being.] [(2) The Debts Recovery Tribunal shall consider whether any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security are in
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder.
(3) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13, taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, and require restoration of the management or restoration of possession, of the secured assets to the borrower, or other aggrieved person, it may by order, -
[(a) declare the recourse to any one or more measures referred to in-sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor as invalid and
(b) restore the possession of the secured assets or management of the secured assets to the borrower, or such other aggrieved person, who has made an application under sub-section (1) as the case may be;
(c) pass such other direction as it may consider appropriate and necessary in relation to any of the recourse taken by the secured creditor under sub-section (4) of section 13.] (4) If the Debts Recovery Tribunal declares the recourse taken by a secured creditor under sub-section (4) of section 13, is in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the secured creditor shall be entitled to
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 take recourse to one or more of the measures specified under sub-section (4) of section l3 to recover his secured debt.
[(4-A) Where--
(i) any person, in an application under sub-section (1), claims any tenancy or leasehold rights upon the secured asset, the Debt Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts of the case and evidence produced by the parties in relation to such claims shall, for the purposes of enforcement of security interest, have the jurisdiction to examine whether lease or tenancy,--
(a) has expired or stood determined; or
(b) is contrary to Section 65-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882); or
(c) is contrary to terms of mortgage; or
(d) is created after the issuance of notice of default and demand by the Bank under sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act; and
(ii) the Debt Recovery Tribunal is satisfied that tenancy right or leasehold rights claimed in secured asset falls under the sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b) or sub- clause (c) or sub-clause (d) of clause (i), then notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Debt Recovery Tribunal may pass such order as it deems fit in accordance with the provisions of this Act.] (5) Any application made under sub-section (1) shall be dealt with by the Debts Recovery Tribunal as expeditiously as
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 possible and disposed of within sixty days from the date of such application:
Provided that the Debts Recovery Tribunal may, from time to time, extend the said period for reasons to be recorded in writing, so, however, that the total period of pendency of the application with the Debts Recovery Tribunal, shall not exceed four months from the date of making of such application made under sub-section (1).
(6) If the application is not disposed of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the period of four months as specified in sub-section (5), any party to the application may make an application, in such form as may be prescribed, to the Appellate Tribunal for directing the Debts Recovery Tribunal for expeditious disposal of the application pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal may, on such application, make an order for expeditious disposal of the pending application by the Debts Recovery Tribunal.
(7) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Debts Recovery Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the application in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and the rules made thereunder.] Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 "29. Savings.-(1) Nothing in this Act shall affect Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872).
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. (3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such law.
(4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition of "easement" in Section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in the territories to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882, may for the time being extend."
6.1 The Limitation Act of 1963 is a complete Code providing for limitation of suits and other proceedings and for all purposes connected therewith. 6.2 The SARFAESI Act is also a complete Code to regulate securitization and reconstruction of financial assets and enforcement of security interest and to provide for central data base of security interest created on property rights and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 6.3 Section 17 of SARFAESI Act is a remedy available to any person aggrieved by the recourse taken by creditor to any means
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 u/S.13(4). This remedy is available before DRT by filing an application which is ordinarily termed as securitisation application (SA) to be filed within 45 days from the date on which any of the measures u/S.13(4) are taken. 6.4 Section 17 of SARFAESI Act does not confer DRT with discretion to extend the period of limitation of 45 days.
6.5 Noticeably, Section 17 or any other provision of SARFAESI Act does not expressly exclude the operation of beneficial provisions under the Limitation Act.
7. This Court need not go into the prolixity of considering various judicial pronouncements of different Courts to resolve the controversy herein because the answer to the question framed above lies in the bare reading of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. (Reproduced above). 7.1 Section 29 containing saving clause lays down various contingencies in which different nature of causes of action arising under different enactments can be prevented from becoming time barred.
7.2 Section 29(2) inter alia stipulates that if the special law does not expressly exclude the application of Sections 4 to 24 of Limitation Act, then these provisions of Limitation Act shall apply qua all causes raised under the Special Law.
7.3 The special law i.e. SARFAESI Act does not expressly exclude the application of the provisions from Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act (including Section 5) and therefore the benefit u/S.5 of Limitation Act shall be
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 available to the cause of action raised in an application u/S 17 of SARFAESI Act.
8. Now applying the aforesaid principle of law to the fact situation attending the present case, it is obvious from plain reading of SARFAESI Act that while prescribing the period of 45 days for filing an application u/S.17(1) this special Act does not expressly bar the application of Section 5 of Limitation Act.
8.1 Consequent upon the above discussion, it is obvious that provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply with full force and are available for making a prayer for condonation of delay before the DRT in applications u/S.17(1) which are filed after expiry of 45 days.
9. This Court is bolstered in its aforesaid view by the decision of Apex Court in Baleshwar Dayal Jaiswal vs. Bank of India and Others [(2016) 1 SCC 444], relevant extract of which is reproduced below:-
"14. We have already held that the power of condonation of delay was expressly applicable by virtue of Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act read with proviso to Section 20(3) of the RDDB Act and to that extent, the provisions of the Limitation Act having been expressly incorporated under the special statutes in question, Section 29(2) stands impliedly excluded. To this extent, we differ with the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court as well as the Madras and Bombay High Courts. We are also in agreement with the principle that even though Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be impliedly inapplicable, principle of Section 14 of the Limitation Act can be held to be applicable even if Section 29(2) of the
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 Limitation Act does not apply, as laid down by this Court in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt. [(2008) 7 SCC 169] and M.P. Steel Corpn. v. CCE [(2015) 7 SCC 58].
15. As a result of the above discussion, the question is answered in the affirmative by holding that delay in filing an appeal under Section 18(1) of the SARFAESI Act can be condoned by the Appellate Tribunal under proviso to Section 20(3) of the RDDB Act read with Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act. The contrary view taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Seth Banshidhar Kedia Rice Mills (P) Ltd. Case [AIR 2011 MP 205] is overruled."
10. In conspectus of above discussion, it is held that benefit of the provisions from Section 4 to Section 24 (both inclusive) of Limitation Act is available to the causes raised u/S.17(1) before DRT.
11. Accordingly, this petition stands allowed to the following extent:
(i) Impugned order of DRT dated 02.09.2023 passed in S.A. No.806/2022 is set aside.
(ii) DRT is now expected to proceed to consider and decide the application for condonation of delay filed by petitioner along with S.A. No.806/2022.
(iii) Interim order passed by this Court on 14.09.2023 shall continue till the Tribunal decides the application for condonation of delay whereafter decision of the Tribunal shall prevail.
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022
12. This Court hastens to add that no comment herein is made as regards the tenability of claim for condonation of delay in preferring S.A. No.806/2022, which is left for the Tribunal to go into.
13. No cost."
10.9 As can be seen from the aforesaid judgment, the Madhya Pradesh High Court has correctly come to the conclusion that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable to an application filed under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the aforesaid judgment. Under these circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that the DRT fell in error in rejecting the application I.A.No.2655/2019 filed by the petitioner under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and consequently, the impugned order deserves to be set aside and the said application filed for condonation of delay deserves to be allowed.
10.10 Insofar as the judgment of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in the case of K.P.Jayan, Konackal House, Edathala vs. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking & others - 2009 SCC OnLine Ker 1732 is concerned, a perusal of the said judgment will indicate that the interplay between Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 with Sections 17(7), 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 as
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 well as Section 24 of the RDB Act, 1993, have not been considered in the said judgment and consequently, the said judgment of the Kerala High Court cannot be said to be a binding precedent, much less a persuasive precedent and the same has been incorrectly relied upon by the DRT warranting interference by this Court in the present petition.
10.11 In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to an application / appeal filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act and consequently, the applicant in an application / appeal filed beyond the prescribed period of 45 days as contemplated under Section 17(1) would be entitled to seek condonation of delay by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act by filing an appropriate application in this regard.
Point No.1 is accordingly answered by holding that the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to an application / appeal filed under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act and an application seeking condonation of delay is maintainable and can be filed along with the said application / appeal before the DRT for consideration in accordance with law.
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 Re-Point No.2:-
11. At the outset, it is relevant to state that it is well settled that if a court / forum / authority comes to a conclusion that the delay in filing an appeal / application should not be condoned and rejects a request for condonation of delay, it is not open for such a court / forum / authority to venture to adjudicate upon the rival contentions on merits; in the instant case, a perusal of the impugned order at paragraph-5 will clearly indicate that the DRT has come to the categorical conclusion that the delay of 45 days in filing the instant application / appeal in D.No.1985/2019 cannot be condoned and the application in I.A.No.2655/2019 for condonation of delay was liable to be rejected; it follows therefrom that having come to such a conclusion, it was impermissible in law for the DRT to even venture to adjudicate upon the rival contentions on merits as has been done in the impugned order, in which the DRT has proceeded to examine and scrutinise the rival contentions on merits, which cannot be countenanced in law and consequently, the impugned order deserves to be set aside on this ground alone.
11.1 A perusal of the impugned order will indicate that the DRT has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex court in the case of P.K.Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala - (1997) 7 SCC
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 556 for the purpose of holding that merely because the law of limitation is harsh as prescribed by a statute, courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. According to the Maxim, the word "dura lex sed lex", means "the law is hard but it is the law". In this context, the DRT failed to appreciate that in the facts involved in the said case before the Apex Court, there was a delay of 565 days in preferring an appeal before the High Court under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which was condoned by the High Court on an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the Apex Court came to the conclusion that in the facts and circumstances obtaining in the said case, the High Court was not justified in exercising its discretion to condone the delay in favour of the appellant.
11.2 However, in the instant case, apart from the fact that there is only a delay of 45 days in filing the application / appeal by the petitioner, the petitioner had made out valid and sufficient ground to seek condonation of delay and consequently, the said judgment having been rendered in the factual matrix of the said case, cannot be made applicable to the facts of the instant case and as such, the said finding recorded by the DRT deserves to be set aside.
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 11.3 Insofar as the merits of the application filed for condonation of delay is concerned, having regard to the various contentions urged in the application coupled with the specific assertion on the part of the petitioners that their inability and omission to file the application within the prescribed period was due to bonafide reasons, unavoidable circumstances and sufficient cause and having regard to the subsequent events that have transpired during the pendency of this petition, by adopting the justice oriented approach, I deem it just and appropriate to condone the delay of 45 days in filing the application and remit the matter back to the DRT for reconsideration afresh on merits and in accordance with law.
Point No.2 is also accordingly answered in favour of the petitioner by holding that valid and sufficient cause had been made out by the petitioner for condonation of delay of 45 days in filing the application / appeal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, which deserves to be condoned.
12. Insofar as the contention of the respondent that the present petition is not maintainable in view of availability of equally efficacious and alternative remedy of filing of an appeal under
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022 Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act is concerned, having regard to the fact that the impugned order is contrary to the aforesaid statutory provisions which have been incorrectly misconstrued and misinterpreted by the DRT, mere availability of an appeal remedy under Section 18 would not come in the way of this Court exercising its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and as such, this contention of the respondent cannot be accepted.
13. In the result, I pass the following:
ORDER
(i) The petition is hereby allowed.
(ii) The impugned order dated 22.09.2022 passed on I.A.No.2655/2019 in DR.No.1985/2019 by the Debt Recovery Tribunal-I, Bangalore is hereby set aside.
(iii) The application IA.No.2655/2019 in D.No.1985/2019 (IR No.3766/2019) is hereby allowed and delay of 45 days is hereby condoned.
(iv) Matter is remitted back to the DRT for reconsideration afresh on merits without reference to limitation and in accordance with law.
(v) Parties undertakes to appear before the DRT on 02.09.2024.
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NC: 2024:KHC:25805 WP No. 21349 of 2022
(vi) Liberty is reserved in favour of the petitioners to seek amendment of pleadings and impleadment of parties by filing necessary application, which shall be considered by the DRT, which shall proceed further in accordance with law.
(vii) Liberty is reserved in favour of the respondent-Bank as well as the auction purchaser to file their objections and contest the proceedings on all aspects except limitation which stands concluded in favour of the petitioner by virtue of this order.
(viii) All rival contentions on all aspects of the matter except limitation are kept open and no opinion is expressed on the same.
(ix) The DRT is directed to conclude the proceedings within a period of three months from 02.09.2024.
(x) Meanwhile, till disposal of the proceedings before the DRT, all parties are directed to maintain Status-quo on all aspects as on today in relation to the schedule property.
(xi) Registry is directed to communicate this order to the DRT forthwith without any delay.
Sd/-
JUDGE Srl.