Madras High Court
State Of Tamil Nadu And Another vs Vilampatti Nadar Uravinmuraikku ... on 31 August, 1990
Equivalent citations: AIR1991MAD233, AIR 1991 MADRAS 233, (1990) 2 MADLJ395 (1991) 1 MADLW 382, (1991) 1 MADLW 382
JUDGMENT
1. The defendants in O. S. No. 242 of 1981 on the file of the District Munsif of Sathur are the appellants in the second appeal. The plaintiffs in the said suit are the respondents in the second appeal. For the sake of convenience the parties in this second appeal are referred to by their nomenclature given in the suit.
2. The first plaintiff is the managing committee of A. V. M. Marimuthu Nadar Higher Secondary School belonging to Vilampatti Nadar Uravinmurai and it is a registered society registered under the Societies Registration Act represented by its Secretary. The second plaintiff is the president and the third plaintiff is the member of the School managing committee. The fourth plaintiff is the president of Vilampatti Nadar Uravinmurai. The fifth plaintiff is the Secretary of the said committee. The plaintiffs filed the suit (a) for declaration that the Vilampatti Nadar Uravinmurai Higher Secondary School and the primary school named as A.V.M. Marimuthu Nadar Higher Secondary School and Nadar George Primary School managed by the first plaintiff-committee is a denominational institution entitled to protection under Articles 26 and 30 of the Constitution of India; (b) for an injunction restraining the defendants and their officers from in any way interfering with the management and administration of the above two educational institutions and the property belonging to the institutions including the stoppage of the grants in pursuance of the Act 29 of 1974 by enforcing sections 8, 11 to 18, 21 to 26, 31 to 33, 39, 41 to 47 and 56 and rules 5, 7, 9, 10 to 14, 15 to 18 and 21 to 24 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 and the rules framed thereunder; and (c) for further declaration that the Vilampalli Nadar Uravinmurai, the fourth plaintiff in the suit, is a religious denomination entitled to run and manage institutions of its own accord under the rights conferred under Articles 26 and 30 of the Constitution of India. The case of the plaintiffs is as follows :
The Hindu Nadars of Vilampatti are having an Uravinmurai under the name Vilampatti Nadar Uravinmurai established in the yrar 1895. The Uravinmurayars are runn-
ing a 'Higher Secondary School', under the name A.V.M. Marimuthu Nadar Higher Secondary School and elementary school under the name Nadar George Primary School which was established in the year 1918. For running the said educational institutions the Uravinmurayars have formed a separate school committee and registered the same under the Societies Registration Act. The objection of the Uravinmurai which is the educational agency established and administering the school for the benefits of the Hindu Nadar Community, and is assisting financially to run the school, to help the poor and needy students and also to administer Kaliamman and Karuppasamy Koil at Vilampatti village. The Uravinmurai consists of only Hindu Nadars of Vilampatti and the Hindu Nadars of Vilampatti alone are entitled to become members of the School committee and they are alone ligible to hold membership. They are owning two temples namely Kaliamman Temple and Karuppasamy temple. They have important festivals of their own other than those of the majority Hindus, namely Adi Pongal and Panguni Pongal. They only worship Kaliamman and Karuppasami as a form of Devil Gods. The Hindu Nadars of Vilampatti have separate cremation grounds, Nandavanam and wells for drinking water. They have separate barber and dhobi exclusively for them. The 1st plaintiff is administering temples. The 1st plaintiff is the limb of Nadar Uravinmurai and the Uravinmurai is administering the temple, Managing Committee and also other charitable matters. The 1st plaintiff is a religious denominational institution under Article 26 of the Constitution of India and a minority institution under Article 30 of the Indian Constitution and consequently entitled to the protection under Articles 26 and 30. Tn the suit the plaintiffs prayed for a declaration that the provisions of the Tamil-nadu Recognised Private Schools Regulation Act and Rules will not apply to them, and consequently for an injunction restraining the defendants and their officers from in any way interfering with the management and administration of the above two educational institutions and the property belonging to the insti-
tulions including the stoppage of the grants in pursurance of the Act 29/74, by enforcing sections 8, 11 to 18, 21 to 26, 31 to 33, 39 41 to 47 and 56 and Rules 5, 7, 9, 10 to 14, 15 to 18 and 21 to 24 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools Regulation Act, 1973 and the Rules framed thereunder.
3. The defendants resisted the suit contending as follows : The first plaintiff committee is not a denominational institution entitled to protection under Articles 26 and 30 of the Constitution of India. The plaintiffs do not represent the so-called religious denomination and as such the suit cannot be construed as a suit by a religious denomination. At best, the suit is filed by a committee registered under the Societies Registration Act and its office bearers. Hence the suit as framed is not maintainable. The plaintiffs form part of Hindu general public and by no stretch of imagination they can be described as religious denomination. They form a separate caste in the Hindu Society and in religion, customs, manners and in all respects they are only Hindus and belong to the Hindu Society. The suit institution is not a religious or charitable institution. By reserving separate and exclusive temples, burial grounds etc., the Hindu Nadars of Vilampatti cannot be defined as a religious denomination. The suit institution even assuming that the plaintiffs are religious denomination is neither a religious nor a charitable trust. No religious activity is carried on by them and it is not established and maintained to propogate religion. It is an educational institution, pure and simple imparting secular education and cannot be characterised as institution for religious and charitable purposes within the meaning of Article 26 of the Constitution. The schools mentioned in the plaints arc neither religious institutions nor minority institutions and as such the plaintiffs cannot invoke Articles 26 and 30 of the Constitution.
4. The trial Court, after considering the evidence on record, both oral and documentary, held that the Hindu Nadar Community of Vilampatti is not a religious denomination within the meaning of Article 26 of the Constitution of India and that the first plain-
tiff is not a denominational institution belonging to any religious denomination and consequently dismissed the suit. As against the judgment of the trial court the plaintiffs filed an appeal A. S. No. 34 of 1985 on the file of the Sub-Court, Srivilliputhur. The appellate court found that the Hindu Nadar Community of Vilampatti is a religious denomination within the meaning of Article 26 of the Constitution of India and the first plaintiff is a denominational institution established and maintained by the Vilampatti Hindu Nadar community. Consequently the appellate court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. Aggrieved with the judgments of the appellate court the defendants have preferred the present second appeal.
5. The learned Advocate-General appear ing for the defendants submitted that the Hindu Nadar community of Vilampatti is not a religious denomination within the meaning of Article 26 of the Constitution of India and hence the first plaintiff-institution is not a denominational institution. It has to be re membered that the first plaintiff-institution would become a denominational institution only if it is established and maintained by a religious denomination or any section there of. Therefore, the main question which arises for consideration in this second appeal is whether the Hindu Nadar community of Vilampatti to which the first plaintiff-institu tion belongs is a religious denomination within the meaning of Article 26 of the Constitution of India. There is no definition of the term 'religious denomination' either in the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Chari table Endowments Act, 1959 or in the Consti tution of India. However, the term 'religious denomination' has been judicially interpret-
ted in clear terms by the Supreme Court of India in the famous Shirur Mutt case (The Commr. of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Theertha Swamiyar of Shri Shirur, . Dealing with the meaning of the term 'religious denomination, Mukherjee, J., observed as follows : (Para 15) "As regards Art. 26, the first question is, what is the precise meaning or connotation of the expression "religious denomination" and whether a Math could come within this expression. The word "denomination" has been defined in the Oxford Dictionary to mean "a collection of individuals classed together under the same names : a religious sect or body having a common faith and organisation and designated by a distinctive name". It is well known that the practice of setting up Maths as centres of theological teaching was started by Shri Sankaracharya and was followed by various teachers since then. After Sankara, came a galaxy of religious teachers and philosophers who founded the different sects and sub-sects of the Hindus religion that we find in India at the present day.
Each one of such sects or subsects can certainly be called a religious denomination, as it is designated by a distinctive name,-- in many cases it is the name of the founder -- and has a common faith and common spiritual organisation. The followers of Ramanuja, who are known by the name of Shri Vaishnabas, undoubtedly constitute a religious "denomination; and so do the followers of Madhwacharya and other religious teachers. It is a fact well established by tradition that the Udipi Maths were founded by Madhwacharya himself and the trustees and the beneficiaries of these Maths profess to be followers of that teacher. The High Court has found that the Math in question is in charge of the Sivalli Brahmins who constitute a section of the followers of Madhwacharya. As Art. 26 contemplates not merely a religious denomination but also a section thereof, the Math or the spiritual fraternity represented by it can legitimately come within the purview of this Article."
6. In S.P. Mittal v. Union of India, , the majority of the learned Judges of the Supreme Court laid down the following three tests for finding out whether a particular body of persons is a religious denomination;
"The words" "religious denomination" in Art. 26 of the Constitution must take their colour from the word 'religion' and if this be so the expression 'religious denomination' must also satisfy three conditions :
1. It must be a collection of individuals who have a system of beliefs or doctrines which they regard as conducive to the spiritual well-being, i.e., a common faith;
2. Common organisation; and
3. Designation by a distinctive name."
In Jagadishwaranand v. Commr. of Police, Calcutta, , the Supreme Court approved and applied the aforesaid statement of law in S. P. Mittal's case and pointed out (para 9) :
"Ananda Marga appears to satisfy all the three conditions, viz., it is a collection of individuals who have a system of beliefs which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well being; they have a common organisation and the collection of these individuals has a distinctive name. Ananda Marga, therefore, can be appropriately treated as a "religious denomination", In Assistant Commr., H.R. & C.B., Saleh v. Nattamai K. S. Ellappa Mudaliat, , Srinivasan, J., had occasion to consider the question whether Senguntha Ludaliars of Taramangatam in Salem District form a religious denomination within the meaning of Art. 26 of the Constitution. The learned Judge after reviewing all the above decisions of the Supreme Court pointed out (para 30) :
"As seen from the decision of the Supreme Court the word 'religious denomination' must take their colour from the word 'religion'. It is therefore clear that the common faith of the community should be based on religion. It is essential that they should have common religious tenets. The basis chord which connects them should be religion and not anything else. If the aforesaid tests are applied in the present case, it will be seen that Senguntha Ludaliar community of Tara-managalam cannot claim to be a 'religious denomination.'.
7. In the Asst. Commr., H. R. and C. E. (Admn) Dept., Tirumelveli v. Swaminatha Iyer, (1988) 2 Mad LJ 344, S. A. Kader, J., considered the question whether the Brahmin community of Naranammalpuram is a re-
ligious denomination within the meaning of Art. 26 of the Constitution. The learned Judge, after referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above and the decision of Srinivasan, J., reported in, , held that the Brahmin community of Naranammalpuram will not constitute of religious denomination because there is no evidence in that case that the members of the Brahmin community of Naranammalpuram have a common faith i.e., to say a system of beliefs or doctrines peculiar to themselves other than those that are common to the Hindus in general or that they have a common organisation or that they are designated by a distinctive name.
8. In view of the clear pronouncements of the Supreme Court laying down three conditions to be satisfied by the community to fall within the expression of 'religious denomination', it is unnecessary to deal with the various decisions cited by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs in detail. It is enough if I give a reference to the citations. They are :
(1) (D. L. V. College v. State of Punjab).
(2) AIR 1970 Mysore 191 (K. Eranna v. Commr., H. R. & C. E.).
(3) (Digyadharshan Rajendra Ramdassji Varu v. State of A. P.).
(4) (Arya Vyasa Sabha v. Commr., H. R. & C. B. Hyderabad).
(5) AIR 1963 SC 540 (Sidhrajbhai Sabbai v. State of Gujarat).
(6) (K. O. Varkey v. State).
(7) (State of Kerala v. Mother Provincial).
(8) (Chinnamma v. The Regional Deputy DPI).
(9) (State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society).
(10) (A. S. E. Trust v. Director, Education, Delhi ADM).
(11) AIR 1958 SC 956 (In re Kerala Education Bill).
(12) (Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay).
9. Let us now consider the question, in the light of the above decisions, whether the Hindu Nadar community of Vilampatti constitutes a religious denomination within the meaning of Art. 26 of the Constitution of India. As seen from the decisions referred to above, the words 'religious denomination' must take their colour from the word 'religion'. In order to hold that the particular community constitutes a religious denomination within the meaning of Art. 26 of the Constitution, it must be proved that the said community has a system of beliefs or doctrines which the members of the community regard as conducive to their spiritual well being. It is essential that the members of that community must have common religious tenets peculiar to themselves other than those which are common to the entire Hindu community. In this case, there is absolutely no evidence on record either oral or documentary to prove that the members of Vilampatti Hindu Nadar community have a common faith that is to say a system of beliefs or doctrines or religious tenets peculiar to themselves other than those that are common to the Hindus in general. On behalf of the plaintiffs Exs. A. 1 to A.33 were marked and P.Ws. 1 to 5 were examined. P.W. 1 is a member of the Hindu Nadar community of Vilampatti. He deposed that the Hindu Nadaras of Vilampatti established Kaliam-man temple and Karuppasami temple, that they also established the Higher Secondary School and Elementary School viz., A. V. M. Marimuthu Nadar Higher Secondary School and Nadar George Primary School; that the Hindu Nadars of Vilampatti were treated as untouchables by other caste Hindus and, therefore, they established their own temples, educational institutions, their own wells for drinking water, burial grounds and other facilities. P.W. 2 is another member of the Vilampatti Hindu Nadar Community. In his evidence he stated that the Vilampatti Hindu Nadars Uravinmurai was established about 200 years back, that Hindu Nadars of Vilampatti alone are members of the said Uravinmurai and that the said Uravinmurai established educational institutions and financed the same. P.W. 3 is the priest employed in Vilampatti Kaliamman temple and Karuppasami temple. His evidence is that the two temples belong to the Nadar community and the two temples are maintained by the Nadar community. But, P.W. 3 belongs to a different caste, he being a Panararam. P.W. 4 is the barber and his evidence is that he is employed exclusively for the Hindu Nadars of Vilampatli village and if any member of Vilampalti Hindu Nadar Community died, double sangu would be sounded in order to communicate the death of the member of that community. His further evidence is that there is a separate graveyard and Nandavanam for the Hindu Nadar community of Vilampatli P.W. 5 is the dhobi for the Vilampatti Hindu Nadar community. His evidence is that he is the dhobi exclusively for the Hindu Nadar community of Vilampatti. In my opinion, neither the oral evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 5 referred to above nor the documentary evidence produced by the plaintiffs would be sufficient to prove that the three conditions laid down by the Supreme Court in S.P. Mittal's case, , in order to make a particular community a religious denomination are salisfied in the present case. The contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that the common faith peculiar to Vilampatti Hindu Nadar community is evident from the fact that the members of Vilampatti Hindu Nadar community are worshipping the idols Kaliamman and Karuppasami cannot be countenanced, because, I do not find any peculiarity in worshipping the idols Kaliamman and Karuppasami, which are deities for several sections of the Hindu community. The infirmity in the judgment of the lower appellate court is that in coming to the conclusion that Vitampatti Hindu Nadar Community is a religious denomination, it has not considered the issue in the proper perspective in the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Shirur Mutt case, S. P. Mittal v. Union of India etc. The lower appellate Court also failed to see that the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 5 relates only to certain secular practices of the Hindu Nadar Community of Vilampatti and the evidence in this case does not show that the members of the Hindu Nadar community of Vilampatti have a common faith peculiar to themselves. In the absence of., evidence in this case to show that the Hindu Nadar community of Vilampatti have a common faith, that is to say, a system of beliefs or doctrined or religious tenets peculiar to that community, the lower appellate court is not correct in coming to the conclusion that the Hindu Nadars of Vilampatti is a religious denomination. In view of my discussion as above, it has to be held that the Hindu Nadar community of Vifampatti is not a religious denomination in order to get the benefits under Art. 26 of the Constitution. From this it follows that the first plaintiff-institution is not a denominational institution and, therefore, the first plaintiff is not entitled to the benefits of Arts. 26 and 30 of the Constitution. In these circumstances, the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reliefs claimed in the suit. The above discussion of mine obliges me to interfere with the judgment of the lower appellate Court. Accordingly the second appeal is allowed, the Judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside and the Judgment and decree of the trial court arc restored. But, in the circumstances of the case, there is no order as to costs.
10. Appeal allowed.