Punjab-Haryana High Court
Gurmail Singh And Ors. vs Amrit Singh And Anr. on 24 December, 1998
Equivalent citations: (1999)123PLR68
Author: Swatanter Kumar
Bench: Swatanter Kumar
JUDGMENT Swatanter Kumar, J.
1. The basic challenge in this regular second appeal to the judgment and decree dated 2.5.1998 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Ludhiana, is on the ground that the learned Court has not construed the contents of Ex.P-1 in the light of the evidence on record, in a correct perspective. It is further argued that the suit for specific performance ought not to have been decreed. In order to appreciate the merit of this contention, reference to the basic facts may be necessary. The plaintiff had filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 5.10.1987 and the possession of the land in dispute. The agreed rate was Rs. 19,000/- per bigha. A sum of Rs. 11,000/- was paid as earnest money and rest of the amount was payable upon execution of the sale deed before the Registrar. According to the plaintiff, he had served notice and had gone to the office of the Registrar but the defendant did not appear and later on it came to the notice of the plaintiff that the defendant had sold the land by two different sale deeds to defendants No. 2 to 9 in this suit. Consequently, the suit for specific performance was filed and in alternative a decree for Rs. 22,000/- was prayed for. The defendants contested the suit. According to them, the plaintiff had committed beach of terms of the agreement and the sale deeds executed in favour of other defendants were valid and proper. The learned trial Court framed as many as six issues and while answering all the material issues against the defendants decreed the suit for specific performance with possession and declared the other sale deeds as null and void. The judgment and decree dated 12.3.1996 passed by the learned trial Court was assailed unsuccessfully in appeal by the defendants. The learned first appellate Court vide its judgment and decree dated 2.5.1998 upheld the finding recorded by the learned trial Court, giving rise to this regular second appeal.
2. It is true that the language of Ex.P-1 indicated that the plaintiff could claim double the amount i.e. Rs. 22,000/- but this language does not exclude the right of the plaintiff to enforce the agreement through a process of law. No agreement could be entered into which will deprive a party from legitimately pursuing its legal remedy before the competent Court. Even if such an agreement was entered into, the same would not stand the scrutiny of law, as it would be hit by the provisions of the Contract Act, being a contract opposed/violative of public policy.
3. In other words, right of a party to take recourse to judicial process cannot be denied. If a party to a contract wishes to avail of such legal remedy available to him in law, denial of such a protected right is not permissible in law.
4. The learned Courts below have come to a concurrent finding of fact and view that the present appellant was responsible for breaching the terms of the agreement. It further doubted the correctness of Ex.D-1 and Ex.D-2 produced by the said appellant. The findings arrived at by the learned Courts below are based upon the statement of plaintiff and documents Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-5 to Ex.P-8. This conclusion of the Courts below cannot be termed as erroneous or palpably wrong. The plaintiff in fact had got prepared a bank draft of Rs. 30,000/- from the UCO Bank to clear his liability and to show his willingness to perform his part of the agreement. Another factor which must be considered by this Court is that the pleas sought to be raised before this Court now were not raised in the memorandum of appeal filed before the first Appellate Court nor were they pleaded to their perfection before the trial Court.
5. In view of the judgment of this Court in the case titled as Ram Dass v. Ram Lubhaya, (1998-2) 119 P.L.R. 326, I am unable to uphold the contention raised on behalf of the appellants that only alternative relief ought to have been granted by the Courts below. I find no merit in this regular second appeal and the same is dismissed in limine.