Madras High Court
P.Maheswaran vs Green Home Landscape on 6 August, 2021
Author: C.Saravanan
Bench: C.Saravanan
S.A.No.119 of 2012
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
RESERVED ON : 23.07.2021
PRONOUNCED ON : 06.08.2021
CORAM
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE C.SARAVANAN
S.A.No.119 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012
P.Maheswaran .. Appellant
vs.
Green Home Landscape
Pvt. Limited,
Rep.by its
Managing Director
550, Whites Building
D.B.Road
R.S.Puram, Coimbatore. ... Respondent
Prayer: This Second Appeal has been filed under Section 100 of the
Code of the Civil Procedure, against the judgment and decree dated
16.08.2011 in A.S.No.24 of 2011 on the file of the Hon'ble 1st
Additional District Judge, Coimbatore reversing the judgment and
decree passed by the Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore made in
O.S.No.689 of 2008 dated 27.04.2010.
For Appellant : Dr.C.Ravichandran
For Respondent : Mr.A.Selvanambi for
Mr.A.Ramaswamy
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https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
S.A.No.119 of 2012
JUDGMENT
This Second Appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment and decree dated 16.08.2011 in A.S.No.24 of 2011 passed by the1st Additional District Judge, Coimbatore ("Appellate Court" for short).
2. The appellant herein was the respondent before the Appellate Court. By the impugned judgment and decree, the appellate Court reversed judgment and decreed dated 27.04.2010 of the Trial Court in O.S.No.689 of 2008 decreeing the suit as prayed for by the appellant.
3. The appellant had filed O.S.No.689 of 2008 before the Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore ("Trial Court" for short) for specific performance of Ex.A2 agreement dated 2.9.1999 against the respondent.
4. The Trial Court decreed the suit filed by the appellant vide its judgment and decree dated 27.04.2010. Aggrieved by the Page 2 of 27 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis S.A.No.119 of 2012 same, the respondent preferred an appeal in A.S.No.24 of 2011 before the 1st Additional District Judge, Coimbatore ("Appellate Court" for short).
5. The Appellate Court allowed the appeal of the respondent and revered the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court in O.S.No.689 of 2008.
6. This Second Appeal was admitted on 02.02.2012 by this Court. Following substantial questions of law have been framed for being answered in this appeal:-
i) Has the Appellate Court committed error in applying the dictum laid down in Apex Court "SarathamaniKandahsamy Vs. Rajalakshmi"
reported in 2011 (4) CTC 640 to the case of the appellant and respondent totally overlooking the factum of location of suit property in the unapproved layout and also far from the urban area besides absence of evidence of alleged manifold increase of market value of the suit property ?Page 3 of 27
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis S.A.No.119 of 2012
ii) Has the Appellate Court committed error in holding that the plaintiff is never ready and willing to perform his part of obligation under Exhibit A2 contrary to the oral and documentary evidence besides surrounding circumstances ?."
7. The appellant and the respondent had entered into Ex.A2 agreement dated 02.09.1999. The respondent agreed to convey an extent of 6540 square feet of land at Plot No.181, KallikkanaickenPalayam Village, to the appellant/plaintiff for a total consideration of Rs.1,99,000/- in 59 instalments.
8. The appellant opted to pay the aforesaid amount in 59 equated monthly instalments. The final instalment was to be paid during August 2004.
9. As per Clause 12 of the sale agreement (Ex.A2) dated 02.09.1999, if the appellant failed to pay three consecutive instalments, the amount would paid till then stands forfeited and agreement would stand cancelled.
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10. The appellant was irregular in making payments. It was therefore the case of the appellant that though the appellant was irregular, the respondent condoned such defaults and Clause 12 was not acted upon. It was case of the appellant that16 instalments of first 21 instalments were paid belatedly.
11. It was further stated that even the 38th , 39th and the 40th instalments were paid belatedly on 17.03.2006 and the respondent still received payments and never cancelled the agreement in terms of Clause 12 of Ex.A2.
12. However, when the appellant's father attempted to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs.70,500/- during the month of May 2008, the respondent refused to accept the payment stating that the agreement had come to an end as per the Ex.A2sale agreement.
13. Under these circumstances, the appellant issued Ex.A6legal notice dated 02.07.2008 and enclosed a cheque for Rs.70,500/- bearing number 631482 drawn at State Bank of India in favour of the respondent and thereafter the appellant issued a telegram Page 5 of 27 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis S.A.No.119 of 2012 (Ex.A7) on 16.08.2008.
14. The respondent however sent Ex.B1 legal notice dated 21.07.2008 and stated that as per the records and in terms of clause 12 of Ex.A2 sale agreement, the contract stood terminated and therefore called upon the appellant to come and collect the cheque.
15. On receiving the reply notice of the respondent/defendant, the appellant filed O.S.No.689 of 2008 on 24.11.2008 before the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore.
16. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that though the respondent resisted the suit by stating that the appellant was irregular in paying the amount and that the agreement stood terminated in terms of the clause 12 of the Ex.A2 agreement dated 02.09.1999, it was never treated with any seriousness by either of the parties as the respondent continued to receive belated payments from the appellant.
17. It is submitted that only when the appellant offered to pay the last few instalments together during the month of May 2008, the respondent refused to accept the same.
18. The learned counsel for the appellant further submits that Page 6 of 27 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis S.A.No.119 of 2012 the respondent also took a specious defence in their written statement stating that the Government of Tamil Nadu had also put an embargo on the respondent from effecting sale on the un-approved layout and therefore even on count this respondent was not required to execute the sale deed.
19. To counter this point, the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff drew attention to another sale agreement (Ex.A8) which is dated 27.08.2008 executed by the respondent in favour of a neighbouring plot allotted by the respondent.
20. The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff submits that for the same reason, the so called Government Order, which was referred to in paragraph 15 of the written statement as it was not applicable for sale of a farmland but to a residential plot. That apart the respondent/defendant has also not produced any Government Order before the Trial Court.
21. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the well considered Judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court was Page 7 of 27 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis S.A.No.119 of 2012 erroneously reversed by the Appellate Court vide impugned Judgment and degree by placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Saradamani Kandasamy Vs. Rajalakshmi[AIR 2011 SCW 4062 : (2011) 6 CTC 460: CDJ 2011 SC 641].
22. He submits that the aforesaid decision is not applicable to the facts of this case as property in question was not located in an urban centre or in an urban city but far away from the City and was merely a "farmland".
23. In support of his contention he relied upon the following decisions,
(i) Narinderjit Singh Vs. North Star Estate Promoters Limited [(2012) 5 SCC 712].
(ii) LizammaUrmese Vs. S.Sankar and Another [(2010) 6 MLJ 67].
(iii) Zarina Siddiqui Vs. A.Ramalingam[(2015) 1 SCC 705],
(iv) R.GnanaArulmoni Vs. R.S.Maharajan[2019 (3) CTC 564] and
(v) R.Lakshmikantham Vs. Devaraji[(2019) 8 SCC 62]
24. The learned counsel for the appellantfurther submitted that Page 8 of 27 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis S.A.No.119 of 2012 the in above cited decisions, the Courts have applied the ratio in Saradamani Kandasamy Vs. Rajalakshmi[AIR 2011 SCW 4062 :
(2011) 6 CTC 460: CDJ 2011 SC 641].
25. He specifically drew attention to the decision of the Court in Narinderjit Singh Vs. North Star Estate Promoters Limited[(2012) 5 SCC 712] where in the views of the lower appellate Court was accepted following the view in K.Narendra Vs. Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd1993 (25) DRJ 72::(1999) 5 SCC 77 by holding that escalation in the price of the land cannot, by itself could not be a ground for denying relief of specific performance. In K.Narendra Vs. Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd.,the Court interpreted Section 20 of the Act and laid down the following propositions:
"29. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary and the Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; the discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a Court of appeal. Performance of the contract involving some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee by non-performance involving Page 9 of 27 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis S.A.No.119 of 2012 no such hardship on the plaintiff is one of the circumstances in which the Court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. The doctrine of comparative hardship has been thus statutorily recognised in India. However, mere inadequacy of consideration or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not constitute an unfair advantage to the plaintiff over the defendant of unforeseeable hardship on the defendant. (emphasis supplied)"
26. The learned counsel for the appellant further submits that there is variance between the averments and the evidence before the trial Court and thereforeit is not only the conduct of the plaintiff, which is relevant but also the conduct of the defendant in the case of specific performance which is relevant.
27. Alternatively, thelearned counsel for the appellant refund should have been ordered in terms of the decision of the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the case of R.GnanaArulmoni Vs. R.S.Maharajan (supra).
28. It is submitted that the Trial Court after considering the evidence on record had correctly decreed the suit as prayed for Page 10 of 27 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis S.A.No.119 of 2012 which was wrongly reversed by the appellate Court. The learned Counsel therefore prayed for allowing the appeal.
29. Defending the impugned Judgment and Decree of the Appellate Court, the learned counsel for the respondent(defendant)submits that the respondent was always ready and willing to perform their part of the obligation under Ex.A2. However, it was the appellant who breached the agreement and therefore was not entitled to the relief of specific performance.
30. It is submitted the appellate court has rightly upheld the contention of the respondent while allowing the appeal. In this connection he drew attention to section 3 of The Indian Contract Act,1872,wherein it has been specified that the communication of proposals, the acceptance of proposals, and the revocation of proposals and acceptances, respectively, are deemed to be made by any act or omission of the party proposing, accepting or revoking by which he intends to communicate such proposal, acceptance or revocation, or which has the effect of communicating it.
31. That apart a reference was also placed on section 55 of Page 11 of 27 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis S.A.No.119 of 2012 The Indian Contract Act, wherein it is stated that when a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing at or before a specified time come, or certain things at or before specified time, and fails to do any such thing at or before the specified time, the contract, or so much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee, if the intention of the parties was that time should be of the essence of the contract. He submits time was the essence of the contract in Ex.A2 sale agreement dated 02.09.1999 and therefore the contract was voidable at the option of the respondent.
32. He further submits that even in the case of immovable property, time was the essence of contract and submits that the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to in the impugned Judgment and decree of the appellate court in the case of Saradamani Kandasamy Vs. Rajalakshmi (supra) was correctly applied to the facts of the case.
33. It is submitted that the agreement stood terminated as per clause 12 of the Ex.A2. Even as per the Government Order, if there is an embargo on executing the sale deed as pointed out in the paragraph 15 of the written statement, the respondent was not required to execute sale Page 12 of 27 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis S.A.No.119 of 2012 deed in terms of clause 13 of Ex.A2.
34. Further, the payments made by the appellant/plaintiff were of no consequence as the Ex.A2 Sale Agreement dated 02.09.1999 had already been terminated. It is further stated that the suit filed by the appellant was predicated on the assumption that the entire sale consideration had been paid by the appellant and that only a sale deed has to be executed and registered whereas the balance sale consideration of Rs.70,500/- had not been encashed by the respondent/defendant.
35. It is further submitted that even before the Trial Court no attempt was made by the appellant to deposit the balance sale consideration, though the appellant had issued a cheque for Rs.70,500/-, which was admittedly not encashed by the respondent (defendant).
36. It is therefore submitted that it is clear that the respondent was not agreeable to execute the sale deed as there was no obligation to the respondent. Further, it is submitted that the appellant(plaintiff)ought to have taken steps to deposit the balance sale consideration before the trial Court. Instead, it was deposited after the suit was decreed.
37. It was further submitted by the learned counsel for the Page 13 of 27 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis S.A.No.119 of 2012 respondent that no pre-suit notice was issued by the appellant and even on this count and the Trial Court committed an error in decreeing the suit. Therefore, it is submitted that the Appellate Court has rightly reversed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court.
38. That apart, the decision relied upon in the case of SarathamaniKandahsamy Vs. Rajalakshmi (supra) was applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case and in as much as there was an increase in the value of real estate between 2000 and 2008 and time was the essence of the contract and since the appellant failed to pay the amount, the respondent cannot be saddled with the liability under Ex.A2 Sale Agreement dated 02.09.1999, which stood terminated.
39. Further, an amount of Rs.10,000/-, which was paid on 17.03.2006 was only towards development charge and not an instalment. The learned counsel for the respondent/defendant further submits that the appellant/plaintiff paid the balance sale consideration only on 09.06.2010, after the suit was decreed, and the respondent/defendant filed an appeal before the Appellate Court on 20.11.2010.
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40. Further, it is submitted by the respondent that only after the suit was decreed on 27.04.2010, the balance sale consideration was paid only on 09.06.2010 which clearly showed the conduct of the appellant that he is not ready and willing to perform his part of the obligation even before the Trial Court.
41. Finally, it was submitted that the no substantial question of law arises for consideration in the is appeal. He therefore prays for dismissal of the Second Appeal.
42. By way of rejoinder the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff drew my attention to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of R.Lakshmikantham Vs. Devaraji[(2019) 8 SCC 62] to state that a mere delay in filing of suit after accrual of cause of action cannot be to he prejudice of the appellantas the appellant was always not ready and willing to perform his part of the obligation as long as the suit was filed within period of limitation.
43. He further submits that the respondent has not come with clean hands. He drew my attention to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Zarina Siddiqui Vs. Page 15 of 27 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis S.A.No.119 of 2012 A.Ramalingam(supra)wherein it was held that an equitable discretion to grant or not to grant a relief for specific performance also depends upon the conduct of the parties.
44. The necessary ingredient has to be proved and established by the plaintiff so that discretion will be exercised judiciously in favour of the plaintiff. At the same time, if the defendant does not come with clean hands and suppresses material facts and evidence and misleads the Court then such discretion should not be exercised by refusing to grant specific performance.
45. I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent.
46. The question that requires to be answered is whether in law in the given factual background of the case, the respondent was obliged to execute the sale deed in favour of the appellant under Ex.A2 dated 2.9.1999.
47. Normally, time is not the essence of the contract in the sale of immovable property under Section 55 of the Contract Act, 1872. At the same time, where a the party to a contract promises to do a certain Page 16 of 27 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis S.A.No.119 of 2012 thing at or before a specified time, or certain things at or before specified time and fails to do any such thing at or before the specified time, the contract , or so much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee, if the intention of the parties was that time should be of the essence of the contract. A promisor cannot enforce the terms of the contract after the contractual relation ceases to exist between them.
48. Even where the time was essence of the contract and there was delayed payment, the contract is voidable at the option of the promisee.
49. Where however time is not the essence of contract, the contract does not become voidable by the failure to do such time of a specified time. The promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor for any loss occasioned to him by such failure.
50. The equitable discretion to grant or not to grant a relief for specific performance depends upon the conduct of the parties and necessary ingredient has to be proved and established by the plaintiff so that discretion would be exercised judiciously in favour of the plaintiff. Page 17 of 27 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis S.A.No.119 of 2012
51. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 envisages that the plaintiff must plead and prove that he had performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than those terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant.
52. The fact whether a plaintiff was ready and willing s to perform his part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the plaintiff and the attending circumstances.
53. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material and relevant at all time and is required to be considered by the court while granting or refusing to grant the relief.
54. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the court has to take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration Page 18 of 27 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis S.A.No.119 of 2012 which he has to pay to the defendant must of necessity be proved to be available.
55. Therefore, right from the date of the execution of the agreement till date of the decree, the plaintiff has to be prove that he was ready and has always been willing to perform his part of the contract. The Court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.
56. Under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 the jurisdiction to grant a decree of specific performance is discretionary and the Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so.
57. The discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but to be exercised in a sound and reasonable, guided manner. Its stands established plethora of judicial principles.
58. Performance of the contract involving some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee by non-performance involving no such hardship on the plaintiff is one of the circumstances in which Page 19 of 27 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis S.A.No.119 of 2012 the Court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance.
59. The doctrine of comparative hardship has been thus statutorily recognized in India. However, mere inadequacy of consideration or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature has been held to not to constitute an unfair advantage to the plaintiff over the defendant of unforeseeable hardship on the defendant.
60. In Zarina Siddiqui Vs. A.Ramalingam the Court held that if a party to a lis does not disclose any material facts truly and fairly but states them in a distorted manner and misleads the Court, the Court has inherent power to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in order to prevent abuse of process of law.
61. The views inNarinderjit Singh vs. North Star Estate Promoters Limited, (2012) 5 SCC 712 was slightly altered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Zarina Siddiqui vs. A.Ramalingam alias R.Amarnathan, (2015) 1 SCC 705. While upholding the well settled Page 20 of 27 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis S.A.No.119 of 2012 principle of law, the remedy for specific performance is an equitable remedy, the Court held that while granting a decree for specific performance exercises its discretionary jurisdiction and if the defendant does not come with clean hands and suppresses material facts and evidence and misleads the Court then such discretion should not be exercised by refusing to grant specific performance.
62. The Court can exercise its power and grant relief only if a party to a lis does not disclose also material facts truly and fairly but states them in distorted manner to mislead the Court. The Court has inherent power to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in order to prevent abuse of process of law.
63. In K.Narendra v. Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd., (1999) 5 SCC 77. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
25.We are also inclined to agree with the lower appellate court that escalation in the price of the land cannot, by itself, be a ground for denying relief of specific performance. In K.Narendra v.Riviera apartments pvt ltd.,
64. Though Ex.A2 – Sale Agreement dated 02.09.1999 has Page 21 of 27 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis S.A.No.119 of 2012 stipulated payment of installments, by conduct of the parties it is evident that clause 12 of the said Agreement was waived by the respondent. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the time was essence of the contract in Ex.A2 – Sale Agreement dated 02.09.1999.
65. It is noticed that three installmentswere paid on 17.03.2006 after the contract period come to an end in Ex.A.2 Sale Agreement dated 02.09.1999 on 1.9.2004.
66. However, Court cannot loose sight of the fact that that during the period in dispute between 1999 and 2008, the real-estate market boomed and value of real-estate increased exponentally.
67. While the appellant paid the installments in a staggard manner on the other hand the respondent also accepted the payment upto 40th installments on 17.03.2006.
68. Thereafter, the appellant did not come forward to pay the amount, though the amount of installment was no more than a mere Rs.2,500/- p.m.
69. The appellant attempted to pay the balance only in the Page 22 of 27 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis S.A.No.119 of 2012 May, 2008 i.e. almost four years after the original period under the contract came to an end by offering Rs.70,500/- in one month which is not acceptable to the respondent as the value of the real-estate boomed and realistic during the aforesaid period.
70. On one hand, the appellant has been causal in making payment, but when the appellant offered to make payment in May 2008. In Ex.A.2 – Sale Agreement as per which, if there is a failure to pay three conciliating installments, the agreement would automatically stand terminated and the amount paid would stand forfeited.In view of the increasing in the land value, the respondent was entitled to increase in the price of the property in question.
71. In this case, though the appellant had sent a cheque for the last installment of Rs.70,500/- on 02.07.2008, the appellant ought to have known that this amount was also not encashed by the respondent. The appellant also did not pay the deposit amount before the Trial Court and took chances for the final out come of the suit filed for specific performance in O.S.No.689 of 2008.
72. On the other hand, the respondent by it conduct Page 23 of 27 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis S.A.No.119 of 2012 continued to receive installments belatedly thought the appellant delayed contract.
73. The appellant was also not prompt in paying the installment. Though clause 12 of the agreement of Ex A.2 Agreement dated02.09.1999 contemplates termination of contract, the respondent ought to have issued a legal notice terminating the contract in Ex. A2 Sale Agreement dated 02.09.1999.
74. Considering the above, while reversing decision of the Trial Court upholding the case for specific performance and reversing judgment of the Appellate Court, this Court directs the respondent to execute a sale deed subject to the appellant paying the differential market value of the land as on 2008 in view of the escalation in the price of land in Ex.A.2 Sale Agreement dated02.09.1999 .
75. Considering the above, the case is referred back to the Trial Court for determining the market value of the land in Ex.A2 as on the date of the suit in 2008.
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76. Therefore, the impugned Judgment and Decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Coimbatore in A.S.No.24 of 2011 dated 16.08.2011 is set aside and the impugned Judgment and the decree passed by the Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore in O.S.No.689 of 2008 dated 27.04.2010 is modified.
77. Therefore, O.S.No.689 of 2008 is restored to the file of the Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore for the limited purpose of determining the correct market value of the land in Ex.A.2 – Sale Agreement dated 02.09.1999 on the date of the attempt of the appellant to pay the 59th instalments during the month of May 2008. The appellant and the respondent are therefore directed to appear before the Trial Court and let in evidence on this aspect.
78. Based on the same, Trial Court shall determine the amount to be paid by the appellant for a specific performance of the sale agreement in Ex.A.2 dated 02.09.1999 together with interest at 12.5% pa for the period of delay.
79. In case, the appellant deposits the amount, that as may be Page 25 of 27 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis S.A.No.119 of 2012 determined by the Trial Court, the respondent shall execute the sale deed in terms of Ex.A.2 within a period of two months thereof, failing which this appeal shall stand dismissed.
80. On the other hand, in case, the appellant fails to pay the balance amount as may be determined by the Trial Court, the Trial Court shall refund the balance amount of Rs.70,500/- deposited by the appellant before the Trial Court .
81. The second appeal stands disposed with the above observation. No costs. Consequently connected miscellaneous petition is closed.
06.08.2021 Jer Index : Yes / No Internet : Yes / No To:
1.The 1st Additional District Judge, Coimbatore.
2.The Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore.
3.The Section Officer, VR Section High Court of Madras.
C.SARAVANAN,J.
Page 26 of 27 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis S.A.No.119 of 2012 Jer S.A.No.119 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012 06.08.2021 Page 27 of 27 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis