Patna High Court
Bandhoo Singh And Ors. vs Govind Lall on 4 November, 1953
Equivalent citations: 1954CRILJ1023
ORDER Misra, J.
1. This petition arises out of an order under Section 145, Criminal P. C., passed by a First Class Magistrate at Nawadah, declaring the opposite party to be in possession of the lands of khata Nos. 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 26 and 34. (except plot nos. 92 and 93). The petitioners were the second party in the proceeding.
2. The case of the first party briefly stated-was that he purchased these lands at an auction sale held on various dates in the year 1936 at the Instance of 'Srikant Lal and Shyamaliant Lal, landlords of the mouza, who obtained rent decree against the members of the opposite party who were the raiyats in respect of the lands in dispute, He came into peaceful possession of the property, put trouble started in 1939 when some of the original raiyats laid claim to the land. This gave rise to a proceeding under Section 144, Criminal P. C., which, however, ended in favour of the first party. The first party, Govind Lall, continued in peaceful possession thereafter when fresh trouble started ,in the year 1946 and there was a police report on 2-12-1947 for action under Section 144, Criminal P. C. This was converted into a proceeding under Section 145, Criminal P. C., on 24-2-1948, which has now end-ed in favour of the opposite party.
The case of the petitioners who were second party in the proceeding was that although there was auction sale of the land in dispute in the year 1936, the members of the second party remained in possession, and they took settlement of the auction-sold lands from the landlady Ambika Bhawani Devi and remained in possession thereafter. The first party, Govind Lall, is a servant of the landlord and he has been set up by the landlord to deprive the petitioners of the land in dispute in a fraudulent manner. The matter was enquired into by a First Class Magistrate who passed an order in favour of the first party, Govind Lall, declaring him to be in possession of the land. The petitioners, however, filed an application in revision against that order and this Court set aside the order holding that there should be two different proceedings, one, in respect of the land which is the subject-matter of the present proceeding, and another in respect of other lands which form the subject-matter of Criminal Revision No. 391 of 1953, which has also been heard along with this petition. The evidence was, again, recorded separately in the two cases and the learned Magistrate in the present case has again declared the first party to be in possession of the land.
3. Sir Sultan Ahmad in support of the application has contended that the judgment of the learned Magistrate is vitiated as he has allowed his mind to be influenced by the so-called delivery of possession by the first party after his alleged auction purchase in 1936. The present proceeding started in 1946 and, therefore, the learned Magistrate was clearly in error in allowing his mind to be influenced by the so-called auction purchase and the delivery of possession which took place some time in 1936 and 1939. In the second place, he has urged that the learned Magistrate has also erred in so far as he has not considered the evidence of actual possession which is really material for the decision of a dispute under Section 145, Criminal P. C. According to the learned Counsel, what the learned Magistrate has done is to make up his mind with reference to the sale certificate and the delivery of possession in favour of the first party and then to enumerate in general terms the witnesses on behalf of the parties coming to a conclusion without assessing their evidence that the first party was in possession.
Considering the argument with regard to the sale certificate and the alleged delivery of possession, I agree with the learned Counsel that the learned Magistrate was really in error In attaching undue importance to that fact. It appears that he has referred to a number of decisions of this Court as well as Calcutta High Court laying down the proposition that where delivery of possession is admitted there is a presumption of continuance of possession in favour of the person obtaining delivery of possession. As a matter of fact, the learned Magistrate has obviously lost sight of the fundamental principle underlying these decisions that what the Criminal Court enquiring into a dispute under Section 145, Criminal P. C. has to do is to respect the recent delivery of possession by the Civil Court, and not a delivery of possession, as in the present case, which was made more than eight years prior to the dispute which has given rise to the present proceeding. It is not that he was wrong in referring to that fact, but he was only wrong in allowing his mind to be unduly influenced by that fact. This part of the argument, therefore, must be accepted as correct. In connection with this argument, it is further urged that the learned Magistrate was wrong in Attaching too much importance to the fact that the petitioners did not produce any 'hukumnama' or rent receipts in support of their claim. It was unnecessary to have a 'hukumnama', because it was not a case of a fresh settlement, taut the petitioners' making payment to the landlord of the decretal dues and being allowed to remain in possession. The absence of rent receipts also is due to the fact that the lands in dispute were held at 'nakdi' basis prior to the auction sale in 1936, and the petitioners remained in possession on a bhowli' basis thereafter for which no rent receipts were issued by the landlord. I do not want to comment upon this part of the argument as it may once more be taken up by the learned Magistrate in view of the order which I propose to pass in this case.
4. It is next urged, as I have said, that being influenced by these two considerations, the learned Magistrate did not properly weigh the oral evidence of the parties to determine their actual possession. Learned Counsel has drawn my attention to certain statements made in the cross-examination of the first party's witnesses which, prima facie, seem to have some value. He has urged that if the learned Magistrate had directed his attention to a proper examination of the oral evidence, it might be that, he might have come to a different conclusion with regard to the actual possession of the land. I think, there is substance in this contention. I have considered the oral evidence on behalf of the parties and I am satisfied that this criticism of the learned Counsel is not without substance. The judgment does not indicate proper consideration of the evidence and the statements brought to my notice make it clear that oral evidence in the case does require a careful consideration. I do not want to refer to those statements lest it might prejudice the proper consideration of the evidence by the learned Magistrate on remand. The statements referred to are of a piecemeal character and I have not consider-ed them in their proper context where they actually occur in the deposition of witnesses. I, therefore, avoid making any observation with regard to what has been brought to my notice.
5. For the reasons given above, I am satisfied that the judgment in the form in which it has been delivered cannot be upheld. It must be set aside. It is unfortunate that this proceeding under Section 145, Criminal P. C., has been dragging on for such a long time as It came to this Court once when, after its decision, It had to be remanded. In view, however, of the criticism levelled against the judgment, I am afraid, I have no other course open to me than to send down the case for a proper judgment. The application, therefore, must be allowed. The case is remanded to the learned Magistrate for a proper consideration of the oral evidence in the case and to arrive at a decision on this as well as the other evidence on record, and the circumstances and probabilities of the case.
6. I am told that the learned Magistrate who heard the case and passed judgment has been transferred. The case will accordingly go to the learned Sub-divisional Officer Nawadah who will hear it himself or entrust it to some other Magistrate competent to hear it.