Gujarat High Court
Navinchandra Laxmidas Mandavia vs State Of Gujarat And Ors. on 25 January, 1999
Equivalent citations: (2000)ILLJ509GUJ
Author: A.L. Dave
Bench: A.L. Dave
JUDGMENT B.C. Patel, J.
1. This appeal is preferred against the order passed by the learned single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 3007 of 1998 on April 24, 1998.
2. This appeal is required to be rejected on the ground of misleading the Court inasmuch as the learned advocate at the initial stage submitted that the workman was already reinstated in service and therefore the respondent State was required to pay the salary in accordance with the provisions contained in the Minimum Wages Act.
3. We find that annexure-B to the present proceedings at page 15 is the order dated July 11, 1997 passed by the Competent Authority, wherein it is specifically mentioned that the State Government presented Special Civil Application No. 5709 of 1996 in the High Court. The High Court has passed appropriate orders, and the workman is to be paid salaries as per the provisions contained in Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. If that order is read in detail it becomes very clear that it was known to the workmen that he was entitled to get benefit of Section 17-B and nothing more.
4. It is interesting to note in this matter that after the order was passed in Special Civil Application No. 5709/1996 the present appellant preferred Civil Application No. 3587 of 1997 which was beard by the learned single Judge of this Court (Coram : M. R. CALLA, J.). The order makes it very clear that on August 2, 1996, while issuing rule, interim order was passed staying the operation of the order subject to the provisions of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Despite these facts on record it was suggested that the workman was reinstated and he is entitled to get minimum wages under the Minimum Wages Act. It is interesting to note that the appellant, by filing the aforesaid Civil Application, sought direction that the wages be paid to the applicant on the basis of the prescribed minimum wages of Rs. 47/- from March 1996 and onwards. The learned Judge pointed out that if the appellant still wants to raise dispute with regard to the increase in the rate of wages, it is always open to him to approach the concerned authority under the Minimum Wages Act or the Payment of Wages Act, but in the special civil application filed by the State of Gujarat no such direction can be issued in favour of the present appellant.
5. It appears that instead of moving the appropriate authority the appellant has filed Special Civil Application No. 3007 of 1998 inter alia praying that the respondents Nos. 1 to 4 be directed to pay the prescribed minimum daily wages of driver from July, 1997. Thus for the same relief civil application was preferred. The learned Judge, in our view, has rightly rejected the same.
6. It is required to be noted that in the case of Dena Bank v. Kiritkumar T. Patel, (1998-I-LLJ-1) the Apex Court interpreted the expression "full wages last drawn" appearing in Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and pointed out that the words cannot be read as "full wages which would have been drawn". Such extended meaning to the words "full wages last drawn" does not find support in the language of Section 17-B. Nor can this extended meaning be based on the object underlying the enactment of Section 17-B. Section 17-B has been enacted by Parliament with a view to give relief to a workman who has been ordered to be reinstated under the award of Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal during the pendency of proceedings in which the said award is under challenge before the High Court or the Apex Court. The object underlying the provision is to relieve to a certain extent the hardship that is caused to the workman due to delay in the implementation of the award. The payment which is required to be made by the employer to the workman is in the nature of subsistence allowance which would not be refundable or recoverable from the workman even if the award is set aside by the High Court or the Supreme Court. Since the payment is of such a character, Parliament thought it proper to limit it to the extent of the wages which were drawn by the workman when he was in service and when his services were terminated and therefore used the words "full wages last drawn". To read these words to mean wages which would have been drawn by the workman if he had continued in service, if the order terminating his services had not been passed, since it has been set aside by the award of the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal, would result in so enlarging the benefit as to comprehend the relief that has been granted under the award that is under challenge. Since the amount is not refundable or recoverable in the event of the award being set aside it would result in the employer being required to give effect to the award during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the award before the High Court or the Supreme Court without his being able to recover the said amount in the event of the award being set aside. The provision contained in Section 17-B cannot be construed as casting such a burden on the employer. The words "full wages last drawn" must be given their plain and material meaning and cannot be given the extended meaning.
7. It is further pointed out by the Apex Court in para 21 of the judgment that the word "full" in the expression "full wages last drawn" only emphasizes that all the emoluments which are included in "wages" as defined in clause (rr) or Section 2 of the Act so as to include the amounts referred to in sub-clauses (i) to (iv) are required to be paid. It does not imply that the wages last drawn must be the wages which the workman would have drawn under the award. The position is clear from the fact that in Section 17-B Parliament has used the words "inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any rule". These words indicate that maintenance allowance that is admissible under any rule is required to be paid irrespective of the amount which was actually being paid as maintenance allowance to the workman. But with regard to wages Parliament has used the words "full wages last drawn" indicating that the wages that were actually paid and not the amount that would be payable are required to be paid.
8. Learned advocate for the appellant submits that since the appellant is reinstated in service there is no question of invoking the provisions of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. According to her, once the workman is reinstated, he is entitled to wages atleast as provided under the Minimum Wages Act. We find fallacy in the submission, because reinstatement is not merely because of the order passed by the Labour Court or Tribunal, but the reinstatement is subject to the provisions contained in Section 17-B as it is made clear by the Court while admitting the petition and the said order, not having been challenged, still holds the field.
9. Thus, in view of the law which is made clear, we find no substance in the appeal. It is also required to be noted that earlier civil application was preferred, which we have referred to hereinabove. Thereafter there was long interval before the special civil application was preferred. Considering the orders passed by the learned judges in different applications also the appeal has no merits. The appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.